R. BALIA, J. ( 1 ) RULE. Mr. Anjaria waives service of rule for the respondents. ( 2 ) THE petitioner had appeared for M. Sc. examinations conducted by respondent sardar Patel University in the month of April/may 1994 for the academic year 1993-94. The petitioner having been found guilty of copying at the examination, on the recommendation of the unfair means committee by its resolution No. 18 dated 31. 8. 1994 was visited with the following punishment. 512 ( 3 ) THEREAFTER the petitioner approached respondent University in December, 1994 making a specific enquiry as to whether admission would be granted to the petitioner in the discipline of education in respect of academic term which was to commence in the month of June, 1995 and the examinations for which were to be held in the month of april/may 1996. In response to that enquiry, petitioner was informed by the Registrar of the University that as per resolution No. 18 he can appear at the M. Sc. Examinations to be conducted in April, 1996 and he can also take admission in B. Ed. Thereafter, the petitioner applied for admission to B. Ed. in the month of May, 1995 for pursuing the course, examinations of which were to be held in April/may 1996. ( 4 ) AFTER the petitioner had completed the course of his studies for B. Ed. , at N. V. Patel College of Education and was due to take examinations which were to commence from 8th April, 1996. The petitioner was informed by letter dated 22. 3. 1996 which reads as under: ( 5 ) ACCORDINGLY, the petitioners admission to B. Ed. course was cancelled and he was restrained from taking examinations of B. Ed. to be held in April, 1996. ( 6 ) UNDER the circumstances, petitioner approached this court. By way of interim order dated 26. 3. 1996, the operation of the communication dated 22. 3. 1996 was stayed, as a result thereof, the petitioner was permitted to take examinations. The result was declared and it is stated that the petitioner has secured first class marks. ( 6 ) UNDER the circumstances, petitioner approached this court. By way of interim order dated 26. 3. 1996, the operation of the communication dated 22. 3. 1996 was stayed, as a result thereof, the petitioner was permitted to take examinations. The result was declared and it is stated that the petitioner has secured first class marks. ( 7 ) THE short issue raised before me is whether in view of the punishment order passed against the petitioner, he can be admitted to any course of studies prior to october/november, 1996 so as to enable the petitioner to take the examinations held for obtaining a degree/diploma in the month of April, 1996. ( 8 ) MR. Dave contends that the petitioner fulfils all the conditions of the punishment order reproduced above and there was no impediment in the pursuit of such courses by the petitioner, examinations of which were to be held in the month of April, 1996 or thereafter. He also relied on the letter dated 16. 12. 1994 from the Registrar of the university and contends that even the respondents also treated the order to be so. Having permitted the petitioner to take admission in B. Ed. and allowed him to complete the full course of study of B. Ed. , it is now not open for the University to nullify the admission of that course vide the impugned communication dated 22. 3. 1996. Breach of principles of natural justice was also complained of for invalidating the order dated 22. 3. 1996. ( 9 ) ON the other hand it was urged by Mr. Anjaria, learned counsel for the respondent university that the impugned order imposed a ban on the petitioner not only from taking any examination prior to October/november 1995 but also imposed a ban of taking admission to any course of studies prior to October/november, 1995. Therefore, during the operation of the punishment order, no admission could have been granted to the petitioner in B. Ed. course or any other course and the petitioner can take admission to any course or any examinations only after October 1995. He also urged that this is a consistent practice of the University for considering such orders of punishment in the aforesaid manner and the court should be slow to take a different view so as to not disturb the established practice of the university. He also urged that this is a consistent practice of the University for considering such orders of punishment in the aforesaid manner and the court should be slow to take a different view so as to not disturb the established practice of the university. ( 10 ) HAVING carefully considered the rival contentions I am of the opinion that the petition merits acceptance. ( 11 ) THE order in terms imposed two fold punishment. Firstly it cancels examination taken in April/may 1994 by the delinquent student, secondly it restricts the delinquent student from taking any examinations in future, for the period specified in the order, which in the present case is, October/november, 1995. The ban is two fold, not to take any examination upto date specified in the order nor to take admission for such examination. The order does not stop there. It further clarifies that petitioner can take examinations which may be held in April, 1996. In my opinion, the language of the order is clear enough to come to any other conclusion than that the petitioner shall not be entitled to take any examinations until October/november, 1995 not he would be entitled to pursue any course of studies for such examinations, namely, examinations upto October/november 1995. There is no impediment to take examinations of any discipline after October/november 1995. This is clarified by stating that the petitioner can take examinations in April, 1996. Obviously, if the petitioner is permitted to take examinations of April 1996, restrictions against admissions to the courses of studies which precede the examinations of April, 1996 cannot be read into the order either from the express language of the order or by necessary intentness. The communication dated 22. 3. 1996 obviously appears to be founded by not taking note of the last para of the punishment order clarifying that the petitioner is entitled to take examination in april, 1996. In quoting the punishment order, it stops short of it. ( 12 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that aforesaid view of the order would render the entire order meaningless exercise in enforcing the discipiline of the university is not well founded. The order itself does not prescribe a calendar period of restraint from taking further examinations, but adopts a language by fixing the outer limit of ban with reference to particular dates. The order itself does not prescribe a calendar period of restraint from taking further examinations, but adopts a language by fixing the outer limit of ban with reference to particular dates. The date up to which petitioner was debarred from taking further examinations is about 18 months from the date of examinations which were cancelled, with further clarification that he is permitted to take examinations in April, 1996. That makes it abundantly clear that until before completion of two years from the cancellation of the examination, petitioner will not be entitled to fruits of any further examinations. Therefore, it cannot be said that the reading of the order in the aforesaid manner would render the imposition of punishment a futile exercise. It is a matter for the university to decide upon the quantum of punishment to be imposed for alleged misconducts. We are not here to examine, nor the issue is before the court, about the adequacy, sufficiency or insufficiency of the punishment imposed. ( 13 ) QUESTION is only what punishment has been imposed and whether taking examination of B. Ed. in April, 1996 is prohibited under the order made by the resolution imposing punishment? In its reply in affidavit, respondent has tried to import a motion of restraining the petitioner from pursuing studies for one year under the punishment order, and that he would be entitled to appear in examinations in April/may next year. If we accept this interpretation, though the one year term does not finds place in the order, even then, on their own showing that period of ban of one year of pursuing course of studies is over, at the close of academic session 1994-95 because period will have to be reckoned from the date of academic session ensuing of examinations which have been cancelled. The propagated ban of one year of pursuing any course of the university is to be related to academic sessions 1994-95 and candidate becomes eligible to pursue academic course for academic year 1995-96 which can enable the candidate to take examination in April/may 1996. It is only by taking this view of the matter, the expression in the punishment order that the candidate shall be eligible to take examinations in April, 1996 becomes meaningful. ( 14 ) THERE is yet another aspect which can be noticed. It is only by taking this view of the matter, the expression in the punishment order that the candidate shall be eligible to take examinations in April, 1996 becomes meaningful. ( 14 ) THERE is yet another aspect which can be noticed. While the whole contention revolves round petitioner pursuing the course of studies for which admission was sought in May, 1995. There is nothing in the order which could come in the way of such candidate seeking entry to the examination as a private candidate, wherever it is permissible in the examinations of 1996. If that be so, prohibition to admission as regular student to such course for examinations of 1996 also cannot be read as a part of the punishment order referred to above. ( 15 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents referred to Principal, Patna College, Patna and Ors. vs. Kalyan Srinivas Raman, reported in AIR 1966 SC 707 wherein the Apex Court has observed. "that the High Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of two constructions, and it would generally not be expedient for the High Court to reverse a decision of the educational authorities is on the ground that the construction placed by the said authorities on the relevant regulation appears to be High Court less reasonable than the alternative construction which it is pleased to accept. " ( 16 ) THIS decision is of little assistance to the respondents. Firstly it is noticed that question by which punishment was imposed, it is not capable of two constructions and the question before me therefore, of not that of choosing the better one. Secondly, here, this case is not concerned with interpretation of a statutory provision adopted by those who are entrusted to execute it for long and they have acted thereon, in accordance with such interpretation. The case is concerned with an order passed by University authorities under the regulations imposing punishment. The question is not of interpreting the language of any statutory provision and giving effect to it. Here we are concerned with an order of penalty imposed. The case is concerned with an order passed by University authorities under the regulations imposing punishment. The question is not of interpreting the language of any statutory provision and giving effect to it. Here we are concerned with an order of penalty imposed. In this connection, rules of interpretation are settled, that an order imposed penalty must be strictly construed and no greater punishment can be read into the order only by intentment, unless it can be brought within the ambit of the penalty order on its own terms. By the rules of interpretation, the scope of penalty imposed cannot be enlarged on later date. ( 17 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, this petition succeeds. The decision of respondents in cancelling the admission of the petitioner and in withdrawing permission to take examinations of B. Ed. in April, 1996 is quashed. The petitioner is allowed to retain the result of B. Ed. examinations which have been taken by him in pursuance of the interim order passed by this Court. The marksheet may be issued to the petitioner without riders. Rule made absolute with no order as to costs. .