Judgment A. K. Ganguly, J. 1. This writ petition was filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer for quashing the order issued by the Vice-Chancellor of Bheem Rao ambedkar Bihar University (hereinafter referred to as the said university ). The said order was communicated to the petitioner by the registrar of the said University by memo dated 24th January, 1992. From the perusal of the said memo dated 24th January, 1992 it appears that pursuant to the order of the Chancellor contained in Governors Secretariat letter, dated 15th January, 1992, the Vice chancellor stayed the operation of the office order issued under memo No. B/3814, dated 26th December, 1991 until further orders. The said communication dated 24th January, 1992 further directs that the status quo ante prior to 26th December, 1991 was allegedly restored. 2. Pursuant to the direction of this court, learned counsel appearing for respondent Nos.1 and 4 produced the file in which the order, dated 15th january, 1992 is available. The said order dated 15th January, 1992, passed by the Governor as communicated by the officer on special duty (Governors secretariat, Bihar) to the Vice-Chancellor of the said University is set out below: "we may ask for the V. Cs report. Meanwhile stay order is issued and Dr. Matin Ahmad will continue as Professor of persian in Bihar University. " 3. The learned counsel for the chancellor contended that the said order was passed by the Chancellor of the said University in exercise of the power under Sec.9 sub-section (4)of the Bihar State Universities Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act. The said sub-section (4) of Sec.9 of the said Act is set out below : "the Chancellor may, by order in writing, annul any proceeding or order of the university which is not in conforming with this Act, the statutes, the Ordinance or the regulation or for which adequate reason is lacking: provided that before making any such order or direction he shall call upon the university to show cause within the time specified why such order or direction should not be made, and if any cause is shown within the said time limit, he shall consider the same. " 4. " 4. The aforesaid provision as set out above contemplates that the Chancellor may by order in writing annul any proceeding or order of the University which is not in conformity with the said Act, statute, Ordinance or the regulations or Order for which adequate reason is lacking. The said section contains a Proviso which provides that before making any such order or direction the Chancellor shall call upon the University to show-cause within the time specified why such order or direction should not be made, and if any cause is shown within the time limit the chancellor is to consider the same. 5. From the order dated 15th january, 1992 which is set out above it is clear that the said order dated 15th january, 1992 was not passed in accordance with the provisions of section 9 (4)of the said Act. This Court discerns the following errors in the said order dated 15th January, 1992: "i. It does not appear from the said order dated 15th January 1992 that the stay order was passed for annulling any order of university which is not in conformity with the Act, Statute, Ordinance or the Regulations or that the said order was passed in order to annul any order of the University for which adequate reasons are lacking. Therefore, these conditions precedent on the basis of which the Chancellor can assume jurisdiction and pass an order under sub-section (4)of Sec.9 are sadly lacking in the impugned order dated 15th January, 1992. II. The said order dated 15th January, 1992 purports to be a stay order. It does not appear that the Chancellor has any jurisdiction under sub-section (4) of Sec.9 of the said Act to issue a stay order. His jurisdiction is merely to annul a proceeding if a given set of situation prevails. III. The Chancellor here is acting as an authority under the Statute so he has to act within its four corners. Therefore, unless the chancellor is given any power or jurisdiction under the Statute to grant a stay order, such grant of stay order would amount to transgressing the statutory limits and acting without jurisdiction. It is trite to point put that only Courts with plenary powers has inherent jurisdiction to grant stay orders. Therefore, unless the chancellor is given any power or jurisdiction under the Statute to grant a stay order, such grant of stay order would amount to transgressing the statutory limits and acting without jurisdiction. It is trite to point put that only Courts with plenary powers has inherent jurisdiction to grant stay orders. The distinction between an authority or tribunal of limited jurisdiction and a Court with plenary is far too well settled to be stated over again. It is axiomatic ever since the land mark decision of the house of Lords in the case of Anisminic V/s. Foreign Compensation Commission, reported in (1969) 2 AC. page 147, that unless it is specifically stated nothing is included within the power of tribunals of limited jurisdiction and unless it is specifically excluded by clear words there is no bar on the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court of plenary powers. IV. Therefore, by passing the stay order, the Chancellor as a tribunal of limited jurisdiction has definitely wandered outside its designated area and overstepped the confines of its territory. V. The other limes of sub-section (4) of section 9 have also not been satisfied, namely that before annulling any order or proceeding the Chancellor is duty bound to call upon the University to show-cause, within a particular time, why order should not be annulled and if any cause is shown within the time specified in the show cause, the Chancellor is duty bound to consider the same. But in the instant case, both limbs of the Proviso namely a direction to show-cause and an obligation to consider the reply given to the said show-cause have not been honoured in its breach rather than in its due observance. The impugned order dated 15th january, 1992 is therefore ultra vires the provisions of sub-section (4) of Sec.9 of the said Act. 6. The impugned order dated 15th january, 1992 is therefore ultra vires the provisions of sub-section (4) of Sec.9 of the said Act. 6. Apart from the aforesaid statutory infirmity in the matter of passing the said order, this Court finds from the averments made in the writ petition that respondent No.5 was initially appointed a Lecturer in Persian against the sanctioned post in Langer singh College which is a constituent college of the said University, but as the post of Reader in the department of Persian of the said University was lying vacant since 1979, the Vice-Chancellor of the said University issued an order by which respondent No.5 was asked to look after the business of the university in the department of persian. This is a very strange order, but one thing is clear that the said order, dated 11th December, 1979 is not an order of regular appointment of respondent No.5 to the post of Reader in the department of Persian of the said university and it was clearly a stop-gap arrangement. Thereafter, an advertisement was inserted asking for applications to file up such posts of the reader of the University. Pursuant to which the petitioner applied and was selected on being recommended by the university Selection Committee was appointed on the substantive post of reader on the basis of the notification dated 6th July, 1992. It has also been mentioned that there is only one post of Reader in the department of Persian in the said University. The petitioner on the basis of the said appointment joined on 10th July, 1992 and respondent No.5 ceased to function as reader. 7. Even though there is only one post of Reader in the University and the petitioner was selected on that substantive post, but respondent No.5 continued to allegedly function as reader of the said University even though he was not selected substantively on the said post. The aforesaid anomaly in the style of functioning of respondent No.5 was brought to the notice of the Vice-Chancellor of the said University by the petitioner time and again and ultimately the Vice-Chancellor of the said University passed at order dated 26th December, 1991, whereby respondent No.5 was reverted to the original post in the department of Persian of L. S. College, muzaffarpur. 8. 8. After reversion of respondent no.5 to his parent post by the order dated 26th December, 1991 the petitioner assumed charge of the head of the department in Persian of the said university on and from 13th January, 1992. Thereafter, on 24th January, 1992 the impugned communication was made of the aforesaid order dated 15th january, 1992 passed by the Governor in purported exercise of his power under Sec.9 (4) of the said Act. Against the said communication dated 24th january, 1992 the petitioner made several representations but all of them were in vain and as such the petitioner filed a writ petition which was numbered as C. W. J. C. No.6421 of 1992 which was taken-up for admission on 10th December, 1992 by a Division bench of this Court. The Division bench of this Court disposed of the said writ petition being C. W. J. C. No.5421 of 1992 by the following order : "2.10.12.92: The main matter is pending before the Chancellor. In the mean while, stay order has been passed by him. It is our desire that the main matter itself be disposed of as expeditiously as possible subject to the convenience of the Chancellor. This application is disposed of accordingly. Let a copy of this order be sent to the chancellor by the Registrar through the officer-on-special duty in the said office. Sd. B. C. Basak. Sd. Choudhary S. N. Mishra. " 9. The said order dated 10th december, 1992 was communicated by the petitioner and it appears from the averments made in para-27 of the writ petition that the same was received by the office of the Chancellor on 29th december, 1992. Receipt of the same is also annexed. 10. It is clear from the order of the division Bench of this Court that this Hon ble Court did not interfere with the stay order as the matter was pending with the Chancellor and as such this Hon ble Court made it clear that the matter should be expeditiously disposed of by the Chancellor. 11. It took the Chancellor about four years time to dispose of the said matter by passing the order on 10th january, 1996 to the following effect: "this relates to the claim of Dr. Gulam migtaba Ansari in the matter of inter-seseniority between Dr. Gulam Mujtaba Ansari and Dr. 11. It took the Chancellor about four years time to dispose of the said matter by passing the order on 10th january, 1996 to the following effect: "this relates to the claim of Dr. Gulam migtaba Ansari in the matter of inter-seseniority between Dr. Gulam Mujtaba Ansari and Dr. Matin Ahmad for the post of head of the Department of Persian of b. B. A. Bihar University. Dr. Matin Ahmad present Head of the department of Persian is to superannuate in the afternoon of 31.1.1996 on attaining the age of 60 years in accordance with the provision of 1976 Act as amended up-to-date. Dr. Gulam Mujtaba Ansari, University professor of Persian, Bihar University was appointed Reader under Direct recruitment on the recommendation of the University selection Committee and he joined the post of Reader on 10-7- 1982. Dr. Matin Ahmad was promoted as Reader in Bihar University w. e. f.14.11.1980 under the relevant statute, when Urdu and Persian Department was bifurcated, Dr. Matin Ahmad was placed in the department of Persian. Earlier Dr. Matin ahmad was a lecturer in the integrated department of Urdu and Persian. when, however, Department of Urdu and Persian were bifurcated Dr. Matin Ahmad was placed in the department of Persian as being the seniormost teacher in the department of-Persian. He was declared Head of the department of Persian vide Notification No. B/4047 dated the 8th November, 1983 by virtue of his being seniormost teacher in the department. Presently the University has sent a report wherein a reference has been made regarding the principle of determination of seniority with reference to the recent judgment dated 20.4.1995 of the Hon ble supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.6001/94, Dr. Rashmi Srivastava V/s. Bikram university and others, wherein principle has been laid down that directly recruited readers or Professors are senior to promotee ex-cadre Readers/professors. It is apparent that Dr. Gulam Mujtaba Ansari was appointed on 10-7-1982 as Reader on cadre post on the recommendation of the university Selection Committee. Hence, in view of the principle laid down by the Hon ble Supreme Court Dr. Gulam Mur-taba Ansari has an edge over others for the post of Head of the Department of Persian, b. B. A Bihar University. However, Dr. Matin Ahmad was appointed Head of the department of Persian much before the principle aforesaid was laid down by the Hon ble Court. Dr. Gulam Mur-taba Ansari has an edge over others for the post of Head of the Department of Persian, b. B. A Bihar University. However, Dr. Matin Ahmad was appointed Head of the department of Persian much before the principle aforesaid was laid down by the Hon ble Court. Dr. Matin Ahmad is to superannuate recently in the afternoon on 31.1.19%, Dr. Ansari may be given the post of the Head of the Department of Persian of B. B. A. Bihar university immediately thereafter.10th January, 1996. Sd/- A. R. Kidwai, chancellor universities of Bihar. " 12. Even though the Chancellor recognised the fact that respondent No.5 cannot in law continued as head of the department of Persian of the said university ignoring the claim of the petitioner but still then the said order allowed the said respondent No.5 to continue as such till his superannuation. Unfortunately, the impression that the Court forms from the order dated 10th January, 19% is that even after acknowledging the legal position the Chancellor did not hesitate to bestow undue favour on the respondent no.5. 13. As pointed out earlier the initial order of the Chancellor dated 15th january, 1992 is wholly without jurisdiction. Apart from that the length of time which the Chancellor took to dispose of the matter despite direction of this Hon ble Court shows that the chancellor did not exactly cover himself with glory in discharging his duty as a statutory under the said Act. On the top of that when ultimately the Chancellor condescends to act in terms of the direction of this Court he passes an order ignoring the legal position whereby the acknowledges the seniority of the petitioner over respondent No. 14. It may be pointed out here in this case, despite service respondent no.5 did not appear. 15. This Court is aware of the fact that in adjudicating the disputes between parties it is pronouncing on the actions of a very high dignitary of the state. This Court is also aware of the fact that in doing so it must exercise utmost restrain in language and which this Court is trying to observe. But this court cannot help observing that the doctrine power bestowed on his authority will not be abused is an exploded myth and an empty epithet. The records of this case bear ample testimony to that conclusion. But this court cannot help observing that the doctrine power bestowed on his authority will not be abused is an exploded myth and an empty epithet. The records of this case bear ample testimony to that conclusion. In this context the pregnant and poignant observations of the Apex Court in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation V/s. D. T. C. Mazdoor Congress, reported in a. I. R.1991 S. C. Page 101 are very be fitting. "it is inadvisable to depend on the good sense of the individuals, however, high-placed they may be. It is all the more improper and undesirable to expose the precious rights like the rights of life, liberty and property to the vagaries of the individual whims and fancies. It is trite to say that individuals are not and do not become wise because they occupy high seats of power, and good sense, circumspection and fairness does not go with the posts, however, high they may be. There is only a complainant: presumption that those who occupy high posts have a high sense of responsibility. The presumption is neither legal nor rational. History does not support it and reality does not warrant it. " (page 173 of the report ). Again at page-174 of the report it has been observed: "the "high authority" theory so-called has already been adverted to earlier. Beyond the self-deluding and self-asserting righteous presumption, there is nothing to support it. This theory undoubtedly weighed with some authorities for some time in the post. But its unrealistic pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried without even so much as an ode to it. . . . . . " 16. The operative portion of the judgment has already been dictated in the Court and the same will form part of this detailed order. In the said order it has already been held that the petitioner is senior to respondent No.5 and is entitled to be continued as head of the department in Persian with effect from 22nd January, 1996. 17. This writ-petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Petition Allowed.