A. N. DIVECHA, J. ( 1 ) THE order passed by the Competent Authority at Ahmedabad (respondent No. 2 herein) on 15th April 1993 (though communicated on 19th April 1993) under Sec. 8 (4) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (the Act for brief) as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal at Ahmedabad (the appellate authority for convenience) on 31st January 1995 in Appeal No. Ahmedabad-96 of 1993 is under challenge in this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india. By his impugned order, respondent No. 2 declared the holding in the hands of the three trustees appointed under one Will and its Codicil executed by one Bai Manek (the deceased for convenience) widow of Sheth Jamnadas Bhagubhai to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 53674 square metres. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition move in a narrow compass. The deceased is stated to have executed her will on 25th August 1951 and a Codicil on 3rd September 1952 with respect to her properties. She appointed some three persons, named, chandrakant Chhotalal Gandhi, Chandrakant Bakubhai and Vimalshah Bababhai, all of ahmedabad, as, the executors of the properties mentioned in the testamentary documents executed by her. The properties left by her included certain properties within the urban agglomeration of Ahmedabad. On coming into force of the Act, they filed their declaration in the prescribed form under Sec. 6 (1) of the Act as the executors of her testamentary documents with respect to her properties within the urban agglomeration of ahmedabad. That form was processed by respondent No. 2. After observing necessary formalities under Sec. 8 of the Act, by his order passed on 15th April 1993 (though communicated on 19th April 1993), respondent No. 2 treated the executors of the testamentary documents of the deceased to be an association of persons and to be holders of the properties mentioned in the testamentary documents and declared their holding to be in excess of the ceiling limit by 53674 square metres. Its copy is at Annexure-E to this petition. They therefore carried the matter in appeal through one executor before the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act. It came to be registered as Appeal No. Ahmedabad-96 of 1993. Its copy is at Annexure-E to this petition. They therefore carried the matter in appeal through one executor before the appellate authority under Sec. 33 of the Act. It came to be registered as Appeal No. Ahmedabad-96 of 1993. By the order passed on 31st January 1995 in the aforesaid appeal, the appellate authority dismissed it. Its copy is at Annexure-F to this petition. The aggrieved petitioners have thereupon approached this court by means of this petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for questioning the correctness of the order at Annexure-E to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the appellate order at annexure-F to this petition. ( 3 ) IT appears that under the testamentary documents the original executors have been empowered to take some person or persons as executors of the properties left behind by the deceased. The constitution of the Body of Executors has thereupon undergone some changes as transpiring from the statement annexed at Annexure-B to this petition. Copies of the testamentary documents executed by the deceased are collectively at Annexure-A to this petition. A copy of the declaration filed in by and on behalf of the executors under sec. 6 (1) of the Act is at Annexure-D to this petition. Learned Assistant Government pleader Shri Sompura had kept one official from the office of respondent No. 2 present in this court with the necessary record of the case. It was fairly shown to me. Its perusal clearly indicated that a copy of the declaration at Annexure-D to this petition tallied with the original declaration found in the record. ( 4 ) THE main grievance voiced by learned Advocate Shri Patel on behalf of the petitioners is to the effect that the authorities below were not justified in treating the 634 properties shown in the declaration at Annexure-D to this petition to be belonging to the executors filing it. According to him, the authorities below ought to have realised that the declaration was filed by the declarants in their capacities as executors of the testamentary documents executed by the deceased and not in their individual capacities. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri Sompura for the respondents has urged that the declarants did not annexe the testamentary documents with the declaration nor did they produce the same before respondent No. 2 in reply to the draft statement. As against this, learned Assistant Government Pleader Shri Sompura for the respondents has urged that the declarants did not annexe the testamentary documents with the declaration nor did they produce the same before respondent No. 2 in reply to the draft statement. ( 5 ) I think the petitioners cannot be heard to make a grievance in that regard. It transpires form the order at Annexure-E to this petition that the declarants did not bring any material, including copies of the testamentary documents, on record despite grant of opportunities to them by respondent No. 2. It is clearly so stated in the order at annexure-E to this petition. ( 6 ) LEARNED Advocate Shri Patel for the petitioners is right in his submission that the constructed properties should have been excluded from the holding in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Meera Gupta vs. State of West bengal reported in AIR 1992 Supreme Court at page 1567. It transpires from the declaration in the prescribed form at Annexure-D to this petition that there existed some constructed properties and they were in occupation of different tenants. The very fact that it was shown in the declaration would raise a presumption about existence thereof prior to coming into force of the Act. It needs no telling that the declaration in the prescribed form would be with respect to the holding at the time of commencement of the Act. If a property is shown as a constructed property therein, a presumption would arise that it was in existence prior to commencement of the Act. ( 7 ) IT transpires from the annexure to the declaration in the prescribed form that different parts thereof were occupied by different tenants as many as about 50 in number. Occupation of each portion in possession of the respective tenant has been identified by a municipal census number. It would mean that it was assessable to municipal taxation. That should raise a presumption about their construction being authorised. Such constructed property consisting of residential units ought to have been excluded from the holding in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court. It would mean that it was assessable to municipal taxation. That should raise a presumption about their construction being authorised. Such constructed property consisting of residential units ought to have been excluded from the holding in view of the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court. ( 8 ) LEARNED Advocate Shri Patel for the petitioners is also right in his submission that the agricultural lands used as such at the time of commencement of the Act should have been excluded from the holding in view of the binding ruling of the Supreme court in case of Atia Mohammadi Begum vs. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1993 Supreme Court at page 2465. However, as rightly submitted by learned Assistant government Pleader Shri Sompura for the respondents, some investigation into some factual position in that regard will have to be made in order to find out whether or not the aforesaid binding ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Atia Mohammadi begum (supra) is applicable to the facts of this case. It would be necessary to find out whether or not any master plan answering its definition contained in Sec. 2 (h) of the act was in existence and what was the situation of the land in question therein if it was found to be in existence. It will have to be ascertained whether or not agricultural operations were, in fact, carried on therein at the time of commencement of the Act. An inquiry into such factual position can better be conducted by respondent No. 2. ( 9 ) IN view of my aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the matter will have to be remanded to respondent No. 2 for restoration of the proceeding to file and for his fresh decision according to law in the light of what if pointed out hereinabove. The impugned 635 orders at Annexures-E and F to this petition will have therefore to be quashed and set aside for the purpose. The impugned 635 orders at Annexures-E and F to this petition will have therefore to be quashed and set aside for the purpose. Since the matter is remanded to respondent No. 2 for his fresh decision according to law after restoration of the proceeding to file, it would be open to the petitioners to bring on record the testamentary documents executed by the deceased in support of their contention that the declarants were not the owners of the properties left behind by the deceased and they were merely the executors of her properties appointed under the testamentary documents. ( 10 ) IN the result, this petition is accepted. The order passed by the Competent authority at Ahmedabad (respondent No. 2 herein) on 15th April 1993 at Annexure-E to this petition as affirmed in appeal by the order passed by the Urban Land Tribunal at ahmedabad on 31st January 1995 in Appeal No. Ahmedabad-96 of 1993 at Annexure-F to this petition is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to respondent No. 2 for restoration of the proceeding to file and for his fresh decision according to law in the light of this judgment of mine. Rule is accordingly made absolute with no order as to costs. .