Per T.K. CHANDRASHEKHARA DAS, J.:---Rule, by consent heard both sides forthwith. 2.The petitioner was a Bus Conductor under the first respondent. He was charge-sheeted for misconduct of misappropriation of funds. After disciplinary inquiry an order dated 23rd January, 1996, has been passed by the first respondent demoting him to the post of helper. The said order is under challenge in this writ petition. 3.Heard counsel for the petitioner and the respondents. The only point urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that the Order impugned is ex facie illegal as it has been passed demoting him to a lower category which he has never worked in or it is not feeder post for promotion to the post of Bus Conductor. The learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that even though the order is found to be prima facie illegal this Court cannot interfere in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as an effective and alternate remedy by way of appeal before the Managing Director, failing which he can also raise an industrial dispute. Secondly, the counsel for the respondents submits that this is a punishment as laid down certain Standing Order No. 2914 and so long as the petitioner did not challenge the Standing Order, he cannot straightway come to this Court for seeking remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. None of the grounds urged by the counsel for the respondents appeal to us as far as the question posed in this case is concerned. 4.It is an elementary principle of service law, particularly in the sphere of imposition of penalty after inquiry that a person cannot be reverted to a lower post which he had not been working in or from which he has never been promoted from. A person can be reverted to a lower post only if the post to which he is reverted is a feeder category of the post in which he is presently working. This has been repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court as well as several High courts. A person can be reverted to a lower post only if the post to which he is reverted is a feeder category of the post in which he is presently working. This has been repeatedly stated by the Supreme Court as well as several High courts. We need not take all those decisions in this case, but we only point out a decision of this Court also in (Sheshrao Daulatrao Raut v. State of Maharashtra)1, reported in 1989(3) Bom.C.R. 353 : 1989 S.L.R. 122 and the Supreme Court in (Nyadar Singh v. Union of India others)2, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1979, wherein it has been cited thus :--- "Though the idea of reduction may not be fully equivalent with 'reversion', there are certain assumptions basic to service law which bring in the limitations of the latter on the former. The penalty of reduction in rank of a Government servant initially recruited to a higher time-scale, grade, service or post to a lower time-scale, grade, service or post virtually amounts to his removal from the higher post and the substitution of his recruitment to lower post, affecting the policy of recruitment itself. ......................................................... There are, therefore, certain considerations of policy that might militate against such a wide meaning to be given to the power. In conceivable cases, the Government servant may not have the qualifications requisite for the post which may require and involve different, though not necessarily higher skills and attainments. Here enter considerations of the recruitment policy. The rules must be read in consonance with the general principles and so construed the expression 'reduction' in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his promotion. ............................................................... The rules must be read in consonance with the general principles and so construed the expression 'reduction' in it would not admit of a wider connotation. The power should, of course, be available to reduce a civil servant to any lower time-scale, grade, service or post from which he had subsequently earned his promotion. ............................................................... It appears to me that on a fair and proper construction of Rule 11(vi) of the Rules, the condition precedent for the exercise of power under that rule by way of imposing penalty reduction in rank to a lower post is, that the higher post from which the concerned civil servant is sought to be reduced must be a promotional post in relation to the lower post to which he is sought to be reduced." what is held in these decisions in substance is that only a promotee can be reverted to the lower post and a direct appointee to the post cannot be so reverted. In the light of this clear and unambiguous pronouncement of law on the subject we have no hesitation to hold that the order issued by the fourth respondent is illegal and not sustainable. The argument of the counsel for the respondents based on alternate remedy cannot be entertained by us for two reasons. Mr. Dessai cited two decisions in support of his argument, i.e. (The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Another etc. v. Krishna etc., etc.)3, reported in 1995(II) I.L.J. 728, dealing with jurisdiction of the Civil Court under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code vis-a-vis industrial disputes and (Swetambar Stanakwasi Jai Samiti another v. Alleged Committee of Managements Sr. R.J.I. College, Agra others)4, reported in (1996)3 S.C.C. 11 . There also the Supreme Court has held that when a litigant resorted to Civil Court and obtained injunction and then rushed to the High Court for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, it cannot be entertained when there is alternate remedy. We are of the view that these decisions are not applicable in the facts of this case. Secondly, when the action of the respondent is ex facie illegal as pointed out earlier, even if there is alternate remedy, this Court can entertain a writ in the interest of justice and expediency. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the order impugned is not sustainable. 4.In the result, the writ petition is allowed. Secondly, when the action of the respondent is ex facie illegal as pointed out earlier, even if there is alternate remedy, this Court can entertain a writ in the interest of justice and expediency. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the order impugned is not sustainable. 4.In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The order passed by the first respondent dated 23rd January, 1996, is quashed. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. No order as to costs. 5.We make it clear that this judgement will not stand in the way of the first respondent in awarding an appropriate punishment against the petitioner in accordance with law. Petition allowed. *****