Judgment : 1. This appeal is preferred by the State against the acquittal judgment in C.C.No.36 of 1986, on the file of Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sengottah, acquiting the respondent in respect of the offence under Section 7(i) and 16(1) (a)(i) read with Section 2(ia) (a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. On the side of the prosecution two witnesses were examined and 10 exhibits were marked. The facts of the case are as under: 3. P.W.1, the Food Inspector at Shencottai went to the grocery shop at No.106, Pump House Road, belonging to the respondent, on 30.12.1985 at 12.45 P.M. The gingelly oil was kept in an aluminium vessel for sale. P.W.1 introduced himself to the respondent and expressed his intention to take sample of the gingelly oil. Then he served Form No.VI, EX.P.1 on the accused. The he paid a sum of Rs. 14.40 for the sale of 750 grams of gingelly oil and obtained Ex.P.2 sale receipt and he took sample of gingellyoil, in 3 bottles, after complying all the formalities as prescribed in the provision of the Prevention ofFood Adulteration Act, for the purpose of analysis. Out of three sample bottles, one was sent to the public Analyst and two samples to the local authorities within the time limit. Then the Public analyst found the sample, adulterated and sent a certificate to the local Health authority. On the basis of this report, a complaint was filed by P.W.1 before the Court. Thereafter, Section 13(2) notice was also served on the respondent. The complaint of P.W.1 was taken on file in C.C.No.36 of 1986 for the alleged offences under Section 7(i) and 16(1)(a)(i) read with Sec.(ia) (a) and (m) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. 4. Learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Sengottai, on consideration of the materials placed before him, found the respondent not guilty of the charges and acquitted him, which gives rise to the present appeal. 5. The verdict of acquittal is based upon the ground that P.W.1, the Food Inspector was not able to prove before the Court that he was appointed prior to the issuance of Notification by the Government in 1956, or even prior to 1990. 5. The verdict of acquittal is based upon the ground that P.W.1, the Food Inspector was not able to prove before the Court that he was appointed prior to the issuance of Notification by the Government in 1956, or even prior to 1990. As per the relevant rules, the learned Magistrate observed that ofcouse there is evidence of P.W.1 that he was competent to take sample as a Food Inspector working in the jurisdiction, but, however, he has not adduced any independent evidence to show that on that date he was competent to take sample. It is also observed that he has not produced any order from any one of the authorities mentioned in Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, or the provisions empowering him to lodge a complaint in respect of the offences under the Act, and as such the complaint which was lodged by P.W.1 who was not proved to be a competent officer to file a complaint, cannot be said to be valid in law. On this simple and sole reasoning, the complaint was thrown out by the learned Magistrate. .6. Mr.S. Manimaran, learned Government Advocate, while making his submissions countering the said ground on which the judgment of acquittal was rendered, represented that Section 20 of the Act would point out that there are various authorities empowering to launch the prosecution appointed by Central or State Government by general or special order and the prosecution shall be instituted with the written consent of Central or State Government. 7. A careful perusal of this section would make it clear that the prosecution can only be instituted by Central or State Government. The proviso to the said section as well makes it clear that even a purchaser is entitled to launch the prosecution without any authorisation as referred in the Section. 8. In the instant case, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued a notification in G.O.No.1861, Health Dept, dated 6. 6.1956, published in Government Gazette, dated 20.6.1956, authorising the Food Inspector to initiate prosecution for the offences under the Act, as required under Section 20(1) of the Act. 9. Admittedly, the prosecution has been launched by the person who is authorised by the State Government to launch such prosecution for offences under this Act. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove as to when P.W.1 was appointed as Food Inspector. 9. Admittedly, the prosecution has been launched by the person who is authorised by the State Government to launch such prosecution for offences under this Act. It is not necessary for the prosecution to prove as to when P.W.1 was appointed as Food Inspector. In the complaint itself the general order as contained in the above referred to G.O., authorising the Food Inspectors to initiate prosecution has been appended. 10. The Government Order does not say that the Food Inspectors who are appointed prior to the date of issue of the said G.O., alone would be competent to launch prosecution. As already referred Section 20 of the Act is very clear that general authorisation given by the State Government itself is a sufficient proof to show that power has been conferred upon the Food Inspector to launch prosecution for the offences under the Act. In the instant case, the general authorisation has been appended to with the complaint. .11. In support of his submission, learned Government Advocate has brought to my notice, the Judgment rendered in C.A.No.346 of 1987, dated 30. 6. 1994, by Justice Rengasamy. In that Judgment the position has been clearly spelt out, following the earlier decision in the case of Madurai Co-operative Union vs. Madurai Municipality, 1962 (I) Crl.L.J.166. 12. Yet another decision of this Court in the case of State, Food Inspector v. Arunachalan, 1992 Crl.L.J. 3930 has been relied upon by learned Government Advocate, wherein Justice Janarthanam, after elaborate consideration of the scope and the meaning of the words contained in Section 20 of the Act, has held no separate consent from Central or State Government is necessary and the general order by virtue of the notification in G.O.No.1861, Health Department, dated 6. 6.1956, published in the Gazette dated 20.6.1956, is sufficient, since the said G.O., authorities all the Food Inspectors, irrespective of their date of appointment, in Tamil Nadu, to institute prosecution for offences under the said Act. 13. When similar question was raised, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, has also held in the case of Pyarilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1995 FAJ 215, that on the basis of the similar G.O., issued by the Madhya Pradesh State Government in 1956, all the Food Inspectors of the State have been authorised to ledge the complaint against the vendors under the said Act. 14. 14. The Apex Court, in the case of Suresh H. Rajput v. Bharthipen, 1995 FAJ 589, wherein the qualification of the Food Inspector was challenged has held that Magistrate cannot throw out the prosecution, on the ground that the Food Inspector is not qualified and that what is material is whether the Food Inspector has taken sample in accordance with the provisions of the Act, of the Rules made thereunder, and in that case, if the Court finds that he has acted in contravention, then, the court has to decide as to what would be the effect on the prosecution, and that his qualification cannot be looked into when he launched the prosecution for adulteration of food under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. This decision is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, to hold that the view taken by the learned judicial Magistrate in dismissing the complaint questioning the competency of the Food Inspector to launch the complaint was wrong. 15. Learned Counsel for the respondent cited several judgments of this Court, which are not applicable to the present case. So, I am of the definite view, that the judgment, acquitting the respondent based upon the above reasonings is quite illegal and the same is liable to be set aside. 16. However, I do not propose to impose conviction on the respondent, since the sample was taken on 30.12.1985, i.e. more than 11 years from now and the verdict of acquittal was rendered on 211. 1987, nearly 9 years before. Hence, I feel that the agony suffered by the respondent for all these years would be sufficient. 17. Further, learned counsel also brought to my notice that already this Court sent a letter through the Sub-Assistant Registrar, Appellate Side, in R.Dis.No.207/69 and ROC No.1525/89.F1, dated 6. 1969, directing all the Magistrates not to insist upon a fresh notification in view of the legal position explained in the above decision. 18. So, except in pointing out the position of law and the above illegality, I do not propose to impose any conviction on the respondent, in view of the long elapse of time. Subject to the above observations, the appeal is disposed of.