C. R. PAL, J. ( 1 ) THE appellants assail the order of conviction and sentence dated 2-4-1993 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Parlakhemundi in Sessions Trial Case No. 11 of 1992 i. e. Sessions Trial No. 5/92 G. D. C. wherein each of the appellants has been convicted under Sees. 366 and 506, I. P. C. and has been sentenced under Sec. 366 to undergo R. I. for ten years. No separate sentence has been passed under Sec. 506 I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE case against the appellants is that on 15-3-199 1 while Manjula Pani, the victim girl (P. W. 3) along with Nandana Bebarta (P. W. 4) were returning from jungle carrying fire-wood those appellants appeared before them and caught hold of P. W. 3, she requested them to leave her stating that her marriage has already been settled at Berhampur. The appellants did not listen to her request and dragged her. In the process of dragging appellant No. 1 torn her blouse. When her companions tried to rescue her the appellants threatened them to kill showing a knife. They also threatened P. W. 3 to kill her if she would shout. At the time Israel Singh, (P. W. 1) who was plucking tamarind from a nearby tree and Rebika Jena, (P. W. 5) came there and asked the appellants to leave the P. W. 3. But they did not listen to their request and forcibly made P. W. 3 to sit on a motor cycle and took her to Bhalletota gagging her mouth. Sometime thereafter the father and brother of P. W. 3 along with some villagers reached at Bhaliatota and seeing them the appellants left that place. From Bhaliatota the victim was sent to Gandahati. On. 16-3-1991 coming to know that the O. I. C. , Ramgiri Police Station was camping at Parlakhemundi she came to Parlakhemundi and orally reported about the occurrence to him. The O. I. C. reduced the oral report into writing and took up investigation and ultimately filed charge-sheet against both the appellants under Secs. 342, 354, 366, 506/34, I. P. C. and after commitment the case came to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge on transfer for trial where the accused persons were charged for the offences under Secs. 363, 366 and 506,-I. P. C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 342, 354, 366, 506/34, I. P. C. and after commitment the case came to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge on transfer for trial where the accused persons were charged for the offences under Secs. 363, 366 and 506,-I. P. C. to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. ( 3 ) THE case of the appellant NO. 1 was that P. W. 3 was in love with him and when her marriage was settled at another place she wrote a letter to the appellant No. 1. intimating him that her marriage was going to be solemnised with another person and requesting him to somehow prevent the same, and accordingly she volunteered to go with the appellant No. 1, who took her to Jaharbandh. Subsequent to that the relations of P. W. 3 arid some of her villagers came there and there was an occurrence in which members of both the groups sustained injuries and they took away the P. W. 3 in them. Subsequently, after deliberation this case has been started with false allegations. The case of the appellant No. 2 is a complete denial of the allegations levelled against him. ( 4 ) THE prosecution examined seven witnesses out of whom P. W. 3 is the victim girl, P. Ws. 1, 4 and 5 are witnesses to the occurrence of taking away the girl forcibly by the appellants and P. W. 2 is a witness to the seizure of the torn blouse of the victim girl and P. W. 6 is the brother of victim girl who rescued the girl from Bhaliatota and accompanied her to Parlakhemundi where P. W. 3 lodged the information, Ext. 1 and P. W. 7 is the Investigating Officer. The appellant No. 1 examined Solanti Jena as D. W. 1. He also produced the letter said to have been written by P. W. 3 marked TX for identification and other documents (Exts. A. B and C ). The trial Court after hearing both the sides found that P. W. 3 by the date of occurrence was more than 18 years of age and accordingly acquitted the appellants from the charge under Sec. 363. I. P. C. , but convicted them for the offences under Sec. 366, and under Sec. 506. I. P. C. and sentenced each of them thereunder as mentioned earlier. I. P. C. , but convicted them for the offences under Sec. 366, and under Sec. 506. I. P. C. and sentenced each of them thereunder as mentioned earlier. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the appellants assails the order of conviction and sentence on the ground that the charge under Section 363 having not been established the charge under Sec. 366 for kidnapping the said minor girl with intent that she may be compelled and will be forced to have illicit intercourse with the appellants is not sustainable. It is also contended that the charge under Sec. 506. I. P. C. is not sustainable as the evidence to that effect are highly discrepant in nature. ( 6 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel of the appellants that the appellants having been acquitted of the charge under Sec. 363. I. P. C. on the grounds that the victim was not a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence the charge under Sec. 366 for kidnapping the said minor girl with intent that she may be compelled and forced to have illicit intercourse with the appellants must also fail. The learned Additional Government. Advocate on the other hand argued in support of the order of conviction and sentence contending that for an offence under Sec. 366 the age of the victim is immaterial. In the above context, before coming to the correctness of the order of conviction and the sentence it will be beneficial to look at the relevant portion of the charge framed by the trial Court which runs as follows: (1) That you on 15-3-1991 at about 8 p. m. at Mahisa Khata Pahada of village Narayanpur kidnapped Manjula Pani a female minor under 18 years from lawful guardianship of Samal Pani her father and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 363. I. P. C. and within my cognizance. (2) That you on or about the same date, time and place kidnapped a woman Susila Pani with intent that she may be compelled and will be forced to have illicit intercourse with you and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. I. P. C. and within my cognizance. (2) That you on or about the same date, time and place kidnapped a woman Susila Pani with intent that she may be compelled and will be forced to have illicit intercourse with you and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 366 of the Indian Penal Code and within my cognizance. (3) That you on or about the same date, time and place committed criminal intimidation by threatening Susila Pani with injury to his person and reputation with intent to cause alarm to the said Susila Pani and thereby committed an offence punishable under Sec. 506, I. P. C. and within my cognizance. From the charge framed under Sec. 366 it is clear that the appellants kidnapped one Susila Pani with intent that she may be compelled and will be forced to have illicit intercourse with the appellants. The charge under Sec. 366, I. P. C. is silent as to whether the victim was minor or not though it reveals that a woman named Susila was kidnapped with the aforesaid intent. The prosecution case as it appears from the evidence on record was that the appellants kidnapped Manjula Pani, the P. W. 3, who according to the prosecution was a minor at the time of the alleged occurrence, None of the witnesses in their evidence before the Court has deposed that any Susila Pani was kidnapped on the date of occurrence. It is argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate that the name of Susila Pani has crept into the charge inadvertently and as such the same should be read as Manjula Pani. The learned counsel of the appellants also did not dispute the same. It also appears that the appellants so far have also proceeded with the case that the charge relates to the alleged occurrence relating to Manjula. In fact out Of the charges in three heads the first head of charge is for offence under Sec. 363. I. P. C. That charge clearly reads that the alleged offence was committed relating to the minor girl Manjula. This the circumstances show that the appellants have neither been misled nor any failure of justice occasioned due to the alleged error. I. P. C. That charge clearly reads that the alleged offence was committed relating to the minor girl Manjula. This the circumstances show that the appellants have neither been misled nor any failure of justice occasioned due to the alleged error. Accepting the contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate that the name of Susila Pani has crept in due to inadvertence the correctness of the conviction under Sec. 366, I. P. C. is now to be examined. From a reading of the charge it is clear that the charge was for kidnapping the victim lady and not for abduction. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge analysing the evidence on record has come to a conclusion that P. W. 3, the victim lady was not a minor on the date of occurrence. In absence of any acceptable evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish the age of the victim girl the trial Court has rightly arrived at the above conclusion on the basis of the electoral role. Ext. A. So it is difficult to understand how the learned Assistant Sessions Judge convicted the appellants for kidnapping the said victim lady for the purpose contemplated under Section 366 I. P. C. It is well known that kidnapping and abduction are to distinct offences. The ingredients of the, two offences are entirely different. Kidnapping except kidnapping from India is an offence against guardianship. As defined in Sec. 361, I. P. C. it consists of enticing or removing a minor from the keeping of the lawful guardian without his consent. Abduction is an offence as defined in Sec. 362. I. P. C. when a person is by force compelled or by any deceitful means induced to go from any place. In abduction the person abducted may be a minor or a major. Kidnapping is punishable per se under Sec. 363, I. P. C. Abduction is not punishable per se and is punishable only when accompanied by a particular purpose as contemplated under Sees. 304 to 366, I. P. C. As kidnapping may also be for the purpose mentioned in Sees. 364 to 366, I. P. C. those sections deal with both kidnapping and abduction for the purpose stated therein and prescribe the punishment. 304 to 366, I. P. C. As kidnapping may also be for the purpose mentioned in Sees. 364 to 366, I. P. C. those sections deal with both kidnapping and abduction for the purpose stated therein and prescribe the punishment. But when a person is specifically charged for the offence of kidnapping a minor girl for being compelled to have illicit intercourse with a person he cannot be convicted for abducting a woman for the said purpose when it is found on evidence that the victim is not a minor as defined in the Code. It is noticed that the trial Court has failed to draw the distinction between kidnapping and abduction which are two distinct offences and has fell into error by convicting the appellants under Sec. 366, I. P. C. for kidnapping the victim while acquitting the appellants from the charge under Sec. 363. In this context, it may be mentioned here that in the charge under Sec. 366, I. P. C. there is no mention whether the victim was a minor or a major. Sec. 366. I. P. C. prescribes punishment for kidnapping as well as abduction committed with the purpose mentioned in that section. Therefore, it may be said that the conviction is for abduction and not for kidnapping. But the charge clearly indicates that the appellants were charged for an offence of kidnapping with the intent to compel the victim to have sexual intercourse with them. Therefore, now it cannot be said that the charge was for abducting the said victim for the aforesaid purpose. Therefore, the conviction and sentence passed under Section 366 I. P. C. cannot be sustained. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel of the appellants further contended that the evidence about the alleged threats given to the victim as well as some of the witnesses is highly discrepant and as such the trial Court should not have placed any reliance thereon to hold the appellants guilty under Sec. 506 IPC. The learned Additional Standing Counsel on the other hand, submitted in support of the finding. The charge is for criminal intimidation alleged to have been committed against Susila Pani. The prosecution case is that the appellants kidnapped Manjula (P. W. 3) and when Manjula and her companions P. Ws. 1 and 5 protested the appellants threatened them all. But as it appears, there was none named Susila among the persons threatened. The charge is for criminal intimidation alleged to have been committed against Susila Pani. The prosecution case is that the appellants kidnapped Manjula (P. W. 3) and when Manjula and her companions P. Ws. 1 and 5 protested the appellants threatened them all. But as it appears, there was none named Susila among the persons threatened. The learned Addi. Government Advocate submitted that the mistake in the charge cannot be of any consequence and the same cannot affect the trial adversely as the appellants were well aware from the beginning that the case was for committed the offence against the victim girl Manjula. The appellants also do not challenge the order of conviction for the above defects in the charge. On the other hand, it is contended on behalf of the appellants that there is no reliable evidence to support the order of conviction under Sec. 506, I. P. C. In the above context, it is noticed that all the eye-witnesses including the victim girl have stated that the persons threatened them showing a knife. All of them have also deposed that appellants Abhaya Jena was holding the knife. The witnesses have also identified the knife which has been marked on M. O. 1. But on a close scrutiny of the evidence of the witnesses, it appears that M. O. 1 cannot be the knife said to have been used by the appellant Abhaya in threatening the witnesses. About the use of knife and the identification thereof the P. W. 1 has deposed while we were following the accused persons (both the accused persons) told as to why we were chasing and saying so they threw one kati (again the witness says that they threw one knife, but not kati ). M. O. 1 is that knife. That M. O. 1 was brought by Rebika. Further he has deposed T1rebika brought M. O. 1 to the village Narayanpurt1. Rebika has been examined as P. W. 5. Though this witness has deposed that appellant Abhaya Jena showed a knife to her, her testimony does not show: that the knife was thrown at them or that she picked up the same and took it to her village. Further he has deposed T1rebika brought M. O. 1 to the village Narayanpurt1. Rebika has been examined as P. W. 5. Though this witness has deposed that appellant Abhaya Jena showed a knife to her, her testimony does not show: that the knife was thrown at them or that she picked up the same and took it to her village. The victim girl, P. W. 3, and her companion, P. W. 4, have not also stated that the knife was thrown by any of the appellants while they were going away from the Mahishikotha hill taking with them the victim girl. Contrary to the above evidence of P. W. 1, the brother (P. W. 6) of the victim girl has deposed that he saw the knife in the hands of appellant. Abhaya from a distance of 250 cubits while he was at Bhaliatota. He has also identified the M. O. 1 to be the knife which he saw in the hands of appellants Abhaya Jena. The evidence of all these witnesses becomes highly suspicious when the evidence of P. W. 7 the 1. 0. is looked into. P. W. 7 in his evidence has, stated that the M. O. 1 was seized in connection with another case i. e. , S. C. No. 13 of 1990 and the same had no role to play in this case. From the above evidence, it is difficult to accept that the witnesses P. Ws. 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 saw the M. O. 1 in the hands of Abhaya. Therefore, the alleged threats given by the appellants Abhaya Jena by showing a knife to the witnesses cannot also be accepted base a conviction for an offence under section 506, I. P. C. ( 8 ) IN the result, the appeal is allowed. The order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellants by the trial Court in Sessions Trial No. 11/92-5/92 G. D. C. is set aside and the appellants are acquitted from the charges under Sees. 366 and 506, I. P. C. They be set at liberty forthwith if their detention is not required in any other case. Appeal allowed.