JUDGMENT The judgment of the Court was as follows :–– Sinha, J.: This appeal is directed against a judgment and order of a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 9th March, 1994 passed in Matter No. 2204 of 1987 whereby and whereunder the said learned Court dismissed the writ application filed by the petitioner/appellant. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 2. On 8.6.1985 the petitioner/appellant submitted his resignation which was accepted by the Administrator on 25.7.1985 with effect from 2.2.1985. The contention of the petitioner was that the aforementioned letter of resignation was obtained by coercion. As against the aforementioned decision the petitioner preferred an appeal purported to be in terms of Regulation 3 of Appeal Regulations framed under and/or in terms of West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act known as West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (Manner of Hearing and Deciding Appeals by Appeal Committee) Regulations, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Regulation'). By reason of the order as contained in Annexure 'L' to the writ application, the Appeal Committee dismissed the said appeal holding that the aforementioned letter of resignation submitted by the petitioner was not under duress. Before the learned Trial Judge the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents inter alia, submitted that the petitioner would be entitled to all retiral benefits. The learned Trial Judge having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case refused to exercise his discretion in the matter. 3. Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant/petitioner has raised a short question in support of this application. The learned counsel has taken us through the order passed by the Appeal Committee and submitted that keeping in view the fact that District Inspector of Schools, inter alia, held that the appellant became a victim of circumstance, he should not have at the same breath come to the conclusion that it was not unnatural for him to tender his resignation on his own accord. 4. Before the Appellate Court the petitioner raised two contentions as regards purporting to obtain the said letter of resignation under duress viz. (a) he had some disagreement with the Principal of the School over the affairs of the Co-operative Society of which he was the Vice-President and (b) that the remuneration of examination which was due to him was not paid by the Headmaster. (a) he had some disagreement with the Principal of the School over the affairs of the Co-operative Society of which he was the Vice-President and (b) that the remuneration of examination which was due to him was not paid by the Headmaster. On the other hand, the case of the respondents appeared to be that the petitioner had illicit connection with a girl student viz. Smt. Aparna Pradhan over which there was a commotion in the locality and the appellant had no other alternative but to sign the said letter of resignation. Mr. Bhattacharjee submitted that a bare perusal of the impugned order would show that the letter of resignation was dated 19th January and which having been found to be correct, the Appeal Committee could not have ignored the said relevant fact stating that the same was not relevant. 5. In the instant case it is not disputed that the petitioner submitted the letter of resignation. The said letter of resignation whether issued in June 1985 or January 1985 may although be of some consequence cannot be said to have the effectual bearing inasmuch as the possibility of committing a mistake on the part of the petitioner in writing the month cannot be ruled out particularly in view of the fact that from the records of the school it appeared that the said letter of resignation was submitted on 8th June, 1985. 6. It was also not disputed by the petitioner that the Administrator took office on 8th June, 1985 and he accepted the same on 25.7.1985. Before the Appeal Committee the petitioner took two defences which have been noticed hereinbefore. Mr. Bhattacharjee has failed to show that the petitioner has been able to prove the aforementioned defences before the Appeal Committee. As the petitioner raised specific defence before the Appeal Committee and could not submit any proof in support thereof, in our view that itself might have been a sufficient ground for disposal of his appeal. However, the Appeal Committee also took into consideration the other side of the story meaning thereby as to why and under what circumstance such letter of resignation was submitted. 7. In terms of the said regulations, a copy of the Memo. of Appeal is to be sent to the Managing Committee. The Secretary shall forward a copy of the Memo. However, the Appeal Committee also took into consideration the other side of the story meaning thereby as to why and under what circumstance such letter of resignation was submitted. 7. In terms of the said regulations, a copy of the Memo. of Appeal is to be sent to the Managing Committee. The Secretary shall forward a copy of the Memo. of Appeal by registered post with acknowledgement due to the Managing Committee concerned inviting a statement, if any, whereupon the Managing Committee shall forward the same in triplicate. The Secretary of the Board shall thereafter forward a copy thereof by registered post with acknowledgement due to the appellant who may within a fortnight from the date of receipt of such copy forward the same to the Secretary of the Board by registered post with acknowledgement due as counter statement. The Secretary of the Board thereafter shall place all the records before the Appeal Committee for a decision as to whether further enquiry into the case is necessary or not and the decision of the Appeal Committee in this respect shall be final. In the instant case, no such decision had been taken by the Appeal Committee. Under Regulation 8 the Appeal Committee may at its discretion hear the appellant or the Secretary of the Managing Committee or his representative. 8. It is not the case of the writ petitioner/appellant that there has been any violation of any of the mandatory provisions of the regulations aforementioned. The only criticism put forth by the learned counsel appears to be on the merit of the matter as also on the ground that in relation to the self-same case a criminal case has also been instituted against the petitioner but he was not found guilty therein. 9. In the instant case the Appeal Committee has arrived at a finding of fact keeping in view the heavy onus that was on him that the petitioner has not been able to prove the allegations made by him against the Headmaster relating to the facts and circumstances resulting in submission of his resignation. The only thing he had shown was a complaint to the local police wherein allegedly some teachers and non-teaching staff asked him to write and submit the letter of resignation and also alleged that beyond the walls of the school some people assembled and they intended to teach the appellant a lesson. The only thing he had shown was a complaint to the local police wherein allegedly some teachers and non-teaching staff asked him to write and submit the letter of resignation and also alleged that beyond the walls of the school some people assembled and they intended to teach the appellant a lesson. The Appeal Committee is, therefore, correct in coming to the conclusion "it is not clear that the reason for forcing the appellant to write and sign the letter of resignation is only because he had some difference with the Headmaster over the affairs of Co-operative society and over the alleged non-payment of examination remuneration. There was an enquiry by the D. I. From the Memo. of the D. I. No. 24145-S dated 27.6.1985 it appears that the D. I. took the statement of the Headmaster and other teachers of the School and also some people of the locality. It appeared to the D. I. that the alleged affair with the girl student v. Aparna Pradhan created a commotion in the village, the appellant became a victim of circumstances and that it was not unnatural for him to tender the resignation on his own accord. The D. I., therefore, on an enquiry was of the opinion that it was not unnatural for the appellant to tender his resignation voluntarily. The appellant is, therefore, unable to show that it was a letter of resignation that was obtained under duress. The matter was enquired into by the District Inspector of Schools. As noticed hereinbefore, Mr. Bhattacharjee made a comment about the said report. The said Authority held that as the affair of the petitioner with the girl student created a commotion it was not unnatural for him to tender the resignation on his own accord. The words, "the appellant became a victim of circumstances" referred to the commotion in the village and not as submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee referred to the situation under which the petitioner submitted his resignation. The Appeal Committee has also taken into consideration the other documents including a letter written by the father of the girl. The words, "the appellant became a victim of circumstances" referred to the commotion in the village and not as submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee referred to the situation under which the petitioner submitted his resignation. The Appeal Committee has also taken into consideration the other documents including a letter written by the father of the girl. The Appeal Committee has further come to the conclusion that certain expressions which are used in chemistry which had been used in the letter of the petitioner is of significance as both the petitioner and the concerned girl student are acquainted with the same inasmuch as the petitioner was a teacher of chemistry and the concerned girl student was also a student of chemistry. 10. The definite finding of the Appeal Committee is, therefore, that the petitioner has failed to show that the letter of resignation tendered by him was under duress. The said finding is a finding of fact. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not concerned with the merit of the decision but is concerned only with the decision making process. It is now well known by reason of various decisions of the Supreme Court of India that while exercising the power of judicial review this Court is concerned with the illegality, irrationality and procedural irregularity in the decision making process. Reference in this connection may be made to (1) Toto Celular v. Union of Indio, 1994 (6) SCC 561. No such illegality, irrationality of procedural irregularity has been pointed out before us. In any event, it is now well known that issuance of a Writ of Certiorari is discretionary. A Court does not exercise its jurisdiction to issue a Writ of Certiorari only because it is lawful to do so. It may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case including the conduct of the appellant, refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. As indicated hereinbefore, the petitioner took a positive stand as regards the reason for obtaining the letter of resignation under duress by the Headmaster. He failed to prove his case. 11. It may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case including the conduct of the appellant, refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. As indicated hereinbefore, the petitioner took a positive stand as regards the reason for obtaining the letter of resignation under duress by the Headmaster. He failed to prove his case. 11. Moreover, the services of the petitioner has come to an end as the petitioner submitted his resignation as far back as in 1985, in our view, it will not be wise on our part to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellant-petitioner after more than 10 years particularly when the petitioner in view of the judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge was to receive all retiral benefits. However, we may notice that the Administrator had no jurisdiction to accept the petitioner's resignation with retrospective effect from 2.2.1985. The resignation of the petitioner, therefore, must be held to have been accepted on and from 25.7.1985 and in that view of the matter he will be entitled to all retiral benefits upto the said date. It is expected that the petitioner must have received all the retiral benefits in terms of the judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge in the meanwhile. If, however, he has not been paid the said retiral benefits pursuant to the judgment of the learned Trial Judge, it is directed that the petitioner shall also be entitled to interest on such retiral benefits at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of judgment passed by the learned Trial Judge till actual payment. 12. For the reasons aforementioned this appeal stands dismissed with the aforementioned modification but in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Chakraborty, J.: I agree.