Anil Dev Singh, J ( 1 ) THIS petition under Articles 276 and 227 of the Consti- tution is by petitioners who claim to be the owners of 19 Bighas and 8 Biswas of land comprised in Khasra No. 687 situate in village Peer Kamaria, Tehsil Tibi, District Sri Ganganagar. It is claimed that the father of petitioners Shri Peer Ditta, from whom the petitioners claim title to the land, was a co-share r of the Khewat, having jointly purchased the property along with the other co-sharers. S/shri Noora and Pathana were Gair Dakhilkars and tenants at Will on the plots in question. Both Noora and Pathana migrated to Pakistan and the plot in question was incorrectly treated as evacuee property and mutated in favour of the President of India as owner. The petitioners contend that on coming to know of the wrong entry made in favour of the President of India they took steps for getting the property back. It is not disputed that in the year 1967 the third respondent Harkishan Dass made an application for allotment of this land under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, being a displaced person from Pakistan and being owner of agricultural land which he left behind. On August 29, 1967, about 19 Bighas and 4 Biswas were allotted to the third respondent against the aforesaid compensation claim. ( 2 ) THE petitioners preferred a Revision Petition under Section 27 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, against the alleged vesting of the property in the custodian. The Deputy Custodian General by his order dated February 23, 1968, allowed the revision petition and remitted the matter to the Assistant Custodian for redetermining the evacuee nature or otherwise of the property after giving the petitioners an opportunity of being heard. Even after remand the petitioners did not succeed as the Assistant Custodian after hearing the petitioners and considering the evidence on record rejected their claim and confirmed the evacuee nature of the land. This order was passed by the Assistant Custodian on May 31, 1971. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Custodian filed an appeal before the Deputy Custodian General. The Deputy Custodian General by his order dated September 25,1972, also rejected the revision petition. It is this order of the Deputy Custodian General which has been impugned in this petition. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the order of the Assistant Custodian filed an appeal before the Deputy Custodian General. The Deputy Custodian General by his order dated September 25,1972, also rejected the revision petition. It is this order of the Deputy Custodian General which has been impugned in this petition. ( 3 ) LEARNED Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that Noora and Pathana did not acquire any right in the land as they were tenants at Will and, therefore, the land could not be treated as evacuee land. He also submitted that the view of the Deputy Custodian General that Section 18 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, ( for short the Act ) was applicable, is not correct. Learned Counsel has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of the Punjab High Court in Prem Sarup Bansal and Others v The Additional Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab Jullundur, and Others (CWP No. 108/56, decided on March 28,1957 ). ( 4 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 have filed a counter-affidavitin which it is brought out that excepting4 Bighas and 10 Biswas, the entire agricultural land was in possession of Noora and Pathana. Counter-affidavit further avers that as per Jamabandi for the year 2003 Noora and Pathana (evacuees) were Gair Dakhilkars. On their migration to Pakistan the land having become evacuee was allotted to the third respondent against his claim for the aforesaid compensation, it is further stated that the land in question was allotted to the third respondent on August29,1967, and possession of the same was taken by the third respondent on October 6, 1967, from the second respondent. It is also pointed out in the counter-affidavit that the petitioners applied for certified cupy of the impugned order only on April 9, 1973 even though they were aware of the order prior to this date. It is further contended that the petition was not filed promptly. ( 5 ) 1nthecounter-AFFIDAVITOFTHETHIRDRESPONDENT it is pointed out that the land has since been sold to S/shri Partap Singh, Mehander Singh and Bansa Singh by registered sale deed dated January 13,1975. Regarding the possession of Noora and Pathana it is stated that they were in cultivating possession of the land before they left for Pakistan. ( 5 ) 1nthecounter-AFFIDAVITOFTHETHIRDRESPONDENT it is pointed out that the land has since been sold to S/shri Partap Singh, Mehander Singh and Bansa Singh by registered sale deed dated January 13,1975. Regarding the possession of Noora and Pathana it is stated that they were in cultivating possession of the land before they left for Pakistan. ( 6 ) THERE is no appearance on behalf of the third respondent, nor is there any representation from the side of the first and second respondents. It is not disputed by learned Counsel for the petitioners that certified copy of the impugned order was applied for on April 9, 1973. It is also not disputed that the copy was obtained by the petitioners on the same date. This is apparent from the certified copy produced by Mr. Talwar, learned Counsel for the petitioners. It is also not disputed that the writ petition was filed only on January 16, 1975. Then is no explanation as to why the writ petition was not filed earlier, on obtaining the certified copy on April 9, 1973. Even if it be assumed that the petitioners came to know about the order passed by the Deputy Custodian General on April 9, 1973 there is no explanation why the petitioners had to wait for more than a year to file the writ petition. The petitioners cannot be allowed to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court after sleeping over their rights especially when the rights of other parties have intervened. The petitioners filed the writ petition only after the land was sold to S/shri Partap Singh, Mehander Singh and Bansa Singh. On this score alone the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. ( 7 ) IT is significant to note that on July 17, 1975, my predecessor permitted the petitioners to implead the vendees. Mr. Talwar, learned Counsel, submits that probably an application was moved in August 1975 to irnplead the vendees. He is not sure whether such an application was actually moved. However, he has shown me a carbon copy of an impleadment application which was drawn by him. The carbon copy, however, does not bear the day as to when the original, if any, was filed. Assuming that the application was filed, no step- whatsoever were taken to have the application posted for hearing. However, he has shown me a carbon copy of an impleadment application which was drawn by him. The carbon copy, however, does not bear the day as to when the original, if any, was filed. Assuming that the application was filed, no step- whatsoever were taken to have the application posted for hearing. After more than ten years of the passing of the order dated July 17,1975 the request of the learned Counsel for the petitioners, at this stage, to take on record the carbon copy and issue notice to the alleged vendees cannot be granted. When valuable rights accrue to vendees they cannot be disturbed at a belated stage at the instance of a party who has been guilty of inaction. ( 8 ) SO far as the plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the land could not be treated as evacuee land as Noora and Pathana were hot occupancy tenants is concerned, the same cannot be accepted as the authorities below have held that Noora and Pathana were tenants covered by the provisions of Section 18 of the Act. These being findings of fact cannot bereopened in the writ petition. ( 9 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners then submitted that the land could not have been declared as evacuee land after May 7,1954, in view of Section 7-A of the Act. This question cannot be gone into as the petitioners had not laid any foundation in the writ petition. Even before the authorities below no such point was taken. Therefore, the learned Counsel is not justified in taking up this plea. Even otherwise, it is nowhere stated that the land was declared evacuee after May 7, 1954. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioners is merely based on an assumption, ( 10 ) THERE is another aspect of the matter. The petitioners did not agitate their rights even when the colonisation authorities carved out the chak in favour of the President of India. This aspect has also been noticed in the impugned order. For the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged.