JUDGMENT : P.K. Misra, J. - The petitioner is a small-scale industrial unit engaged in "processing" (or re-cycling) of "waste cotton". In OJC No. 1166 of 1992, it has challenged the order of re-assessment u/s 12 (8) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act") for the assessment year 1989-90 and the notices issued u/s 12 (8) of the Act have been challenged in OJC Nos. 6, 162, 181 and 182 of 1993. Earlier, all these cases were heard together and by judgment dated 29-7-1994, the writ applications were disposed of. The order of re-assessment impugned in O. J. C. No. 1166 of 1992 and the notices impugned in other writ petitions were set aside on a finding that the order of re-assessment was illegal. The earlier judgment is reported in (1995) 96 STC 291 (Jagannath Cotton Company v. State of Orissa and Ors). Against the aforesaid judgment, the Commissioner of Sales-Tax and the Sales Tax Officer, Sambalpur (opp. parties 2 and 3) filed appeals in the Supreme Court which were numbered as Civil Appeal Nos. 6627 to 6631 of 1995. Ultimately, the appeals were allowed and the cases were remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made in the judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and Another Vs. Jagannath Cotton Company and Another. The relevant portions of the judgment of the Supreme Court are extracted hereunder: "A reading of the above provisions in the context of the IPR shows that the incentives are meant only for those units which are engaged in the manufacture or production of goods, Indeed, Clause (2) (a) in the above extract speaks of "concerned manufacturing units". Manufacture, in its ordinary connotation, signifies emergence of new and different goods as understood in relevant commercial circles. Furthermore, the use of the expression 'purchase of raw material' itself shows that what is ultimately produced is different goods than the raw material used. Manufacture, in its ordinary connotation, signifies emergence of new and different goods as understood in relevant commercial circles. Furthermore, the use of the expression 'purchase of raw material' itself shows that what is ultimately produced is different goods than the raw material used. Similarly, the repeated use of the expression 'finished products' and the grant of exemption in the case of small-scale industries both in respect of raw materials as well as finished products indicates that these concessions at substantial cost to public exchequer were being provided with a view to encourage units engaged in the manufacture or production of goods and not to help those units which merely engaged themselves in some sort of processing whereunder the goods remain essentially the same goods even after the said process. Even if a process is adopted, the test is the same, viz., whether different goods emerge as a result of application of such process. Apart from the above consideration, we must also see what are the provisions, if any, in the Orissa Sales Tax Act providing exemption from sales tax in the case of new industries and whether they are consistent with the provisions of IPR or are they different-The High Court seems to have proceeded on the assumption that the IPR by itself is enough to provide the exemption from the sales-tax. But where the provisions of the Sales fax Act are also amended providing for exemption- then the Court has to see whether they are the same as the IPR or are they different and if different, what is the effect of such difference. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain the relevant provisions in the Sales Tax Act, Rules and notifications, if any, issued thereunder before expressing a final opinion in the matter. There is yet another important aspect upon which there is a woeful lack of material. While the respondent asserts that he obtains cotton from the waste cotton by employing machinery, the exact process employed by him is not set out or clarified in the counter-affidavit filed in these matters. The process adopted by the respondent has also not been noted in the judgment. We do not know whether this aspect was gone into at all. Even the order of the Sales Tax Officer does not clearly set out the process. The process adopted by the respondent has also not been noted in the judgment. We do not know whether this aspect was gone into at all. Even the order of the Sales Tax Officer does not clearly set out the process. Befor the Court can express itself on the question whether a particular process amounts to manufacture/production or not, it must know what is the precise process that is gone through. It is necessary to have this material. As a matter of fact, there are a number of decisions both under the Central Excise Act as well as under the several State sales tax enactments where similar questions have arisen. The principles emerging therefrom may have to be kept in mind. The dealers and assessees normally contend that the process undertaken by them does not involve manufacture, that no new goods have come into existence and that, therefore, no tax or duty is leviable. But here the respondent is adopting a converse position because it is beneficial to him under the IPR." 2. After the matter came back on remand, the petitioner has filed further affidavit on 17-11-1995 in support of its contention describing the manufacturing process employed in the unit. No further counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of opp. party No. 1 or opp. parties 2 and 3. 3. In view of the observations made in the judgment of the Supreme Court and the contentions raised by either of the parties, the following questions are to be determined : (i) whether there is any manufacturing process involved in producing "cotton" from "waste cotton" ? and (ii) whether the provision of the Industrial Policy Resolution are consistent with the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act? 4. Since the provisions of the IPR have been quoted in the previous judgment of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court it is not necessary to reproduce the same. So far as the latter question is concerned, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of opp. parties 2 and 3 has fairly submitted that practically there is no difference or inconsistency between the provisions of the Industrial Policy Resolution and the Orissa Sales Tax Act. So, the latter question need not detain us. 5. So far as the latter question is concerned, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of opp. parties 2 and 3 has fairly submitted that practically there is no difference or inconsistency between the provisions of the Industrial Policy Resolution and the Orissa Sales Tax Act. So, the latter question need not detain us. 5. The core question which remains to be answered is whether "waste cotton" which is used as raw-material by the petitioner is same as "cotton" which is said to be the ultimate "finished product" produced by the petitioner. In other words, it has to be decided whether any manufacturing activity is involved in producing cotton from "waste cotton". Originally, the expression "manufacture" had not been defined in the Orissa Sales Tax Act. But by amendment, the word has been defined in the Orissa Sales Tax Act u/s 2 (ddddd) by Act 21 of 1992 which came into effect on 1-8-1991 in the following manner: " 'Manufacture', with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing or adopting any goods, but shall not include such manufacture or manufacturing process as the State Government may, by notification, specify from time to time." As has been observed in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in (1995) 97 STC (Ori.) (Sri Jagannath Industries and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Ors.) the definition clause introduced by way of amendment was essentially declaratory in nature and can be read as intended to have retrospective effect. 6. The word "manufacture" has been construed in several decisions of the Supreme Court reported in South Bihar Sugar Mills Ltd., etc. Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others Ganesh Trading Co., Karnal Vs. State of Haryana and Another, and A. Hajee Abdul Shakoor and Company Vs. State of Madras, ). The ratio of all these decisions is that every change in the raw material is not "manufacture", but there must be such a transformation that a new and different article must emerge having a distinctive name, character or use, As has been observed in the decision of the Supreme Court in this very case Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and Another Vs. Jagannath Cotton Company and Another, the word "manufacture" 5n its ordinary connotation signifies emergence of new and different goods as understood in relevant commercial circles. Jagannath Cotton Company and Another, the word "manufacture" 5n its ordinary connotation signifies emergence of new and different goods as understood in relevant commercial circles. If the goods or raw materials used remain essentially the same goods even after undergoing some processing, it cannot be said that there is any manufacturing process. The crucial test is, as observed by the Supreme Court, whether different goods emerge as a result of application of such process. 7. In the case of Ujagar Prints v. Union of India :, the Supreme Court held that subjecting the "grey fabric" to the various processes like bleaching, dyeing, sizing, printing, finishing et cetera, was a "manufacturing process" as what emerges thereafter is a different commercial commodity with its own price structure and commercial incidents. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, U.P. Vs. Macneill and Barry Ltd., Kanpur the Supreme Court held that ammonia paper or ferro paper, which is made of paper of a rough and special texture by applying a chemical process and giving a chemical coating thereon and which is used for preparing Prints and sketches of site plans, is different from "paper" as understood in the popular sense of that term. Following the aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, it was held in the Full Bench decision of this Court reported in (1995) 97 STC (Ori.) that the process undertaken in preparing exercise and bound books out of paper is "manufacturing process". 8. There is no dispute that the raw material used is "waste cotton". Ordinarily, "waste cotton" has no use and it is an industrial waste product. By re-cycling such industrial waste product the petitioner-unit is producing "cotton" which has got several uses. The process of changing "waste cotton" to "cotton" has been described by the petitioner in its additional affidavit filed on 17-11-1995 in paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5. The said assertions made in paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 are supported by the reply dated 6-11-1995 sent by the South India Textile Research Association, Coimbatore, to the specific query made by the petitioner. The said letter has been annexed as Annexare-A/1. From the said letter as well as the assertions made in the additional affidavit of the petitioner, it becomes clear that "waste cotton" and "cotton" cannot be taken to be the same. The said letter has been annexed as Annexare-A/1. From the said letter as well as the assertions made in the additional affidavit of the petitioner, it becomes clear that "waste cotton" and "cotton" cannot be taken to be the same. Even in ordinary parlance, if one has to ask for "cotton" he will not be given "waste cotton''. In fact, "waste cotton" which is an industrial waste is not ordinarily available in the market and is usually supplied to industrial units for the purpose of producing "cotton" after undergoing some mechanical process and the ultimate product i. e, "cotton" is sold in the market. This process of re-cycling from some industrial waste product is a modern industrial innovation which has become popular in many industrially advanced countries and is being adopted in India. It is thus clear that from a useless waste product a useful product is produced having several uses for the ultimate consumer. Thus by adopting the test laid down in the various Supreme Court decisions including the one reported in Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and Another Vs. Jagannath Cotton Company and Another and applying our mind to the facts and materials on record including the additional affidavit which has not been controverted by opp. parties 2 and 3, we come to the conclusion that "manufacturing process" is involved in producing "cotton" from "waste cotton" and as such the industrial unit is entitled to the exemption claimed by it. 9. Mr. Ray the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, had also placed reliance upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kumar Fuels Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, to contend that it is not open to the sales-tax authorities to go beyond the Certificates issued in favour of the petitioner entitling it to claim exemption. However, in view of our decision upholding the main contention, it is not necessary to go into this aspect of the matter. 10. Accordingly, the writ applications are allowed and the orders of assessment passed u/s 12 (8) of the Act as per Annexures-1 and 1/A in OJC No. 1166 of 1992 and the notices u/s 12 (8) impugned in other writ applications are quashed. There will be no order as to costs. D.P. Mohapatra, A.C.J. 11. I agree. Final Result : Allowed