V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) FOR the commision of certain alleged misconduct, the 2nd respondent-worker herein was dismissed from service by the petitioner-Management after holding a domestic enquiry. The worker thereupon filed O. S. No. 368 of 1977 on the file of the munsiff Court, Bangalore challenging the proceedings. The main relief sought for therein were as follows: " (i) declaring that the charge-sheet dated 2-3-1976 under ex. A and the enquiry proceedings held in pursuance thereof are all illegal ab initio and not binding on the plaintiff and especially in view of the communication marked Ex. "g", final orders may come off any; (ii) for a consequential permanent injunction restraining the defendants from making any action in pursuance of the said illegal enquiry and proceedings there; and" the averments in the plaint showed that his grievances were that:"17. This plaintiff in all humility submits that the entire proceedings commencing from the issue of the charges memo dated 2-3-1976 are ab initio void, illegal and not binding on the plaintiff for the following reasons: (a) The Enquiry Officer should have given up the proceedings since the issues involved should have been handled by a Criminal Court based on the complaint given by defendant 5-Vise Varalakshmi who in her statements (Exhibits "e" and "f") has charged this plaintiff for suitable action being taken for abusing/annoying her or for insulting her modesty, if at all there was an iota or truth in such allegations; (b) The charges made against this plaintiff are extremely vague and in fact they are hurled at him just to insult him and bring about a deadlock to his promotional opportunities forever, with ulterior motives thereat". The Enquiry Officer was impleaded as 8th defendant. Barring the above there were no pointed allegation against him throughout the plaint which would have disentitled him from continuing as an Enquiry Officer. ( 2 ) THE suit was contested. Issues 1 and 2 framed were as hereunder:"1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the enquiry proceedings stated by him are illegal and void ab initio and not binding on him? 2. Whether it is proved that the plaintiff was dismissed from service on 24-2-1977?"these issues were tried jointly. The Trial Court answered both the issues in the negative against the worker. The Civil Court stated as hereunder:"12. Whether the plaintiff proves that the enquiry proceedings stated by him are illegal and void ab initio and not binding on him? 2. Whether it is proved that the plaintiff was dismissed from service on 24-2-1977?"these issues were tried jointly. The Trial Court answered both the issues in the negative against the worker. The Civil Court stated as hereunder:"12. From the above discussion, it is clear that the two grounds put forward on behalf of the plaintiff to declare that the enquiry proceedings are illegal and not binding on him are required to be answered against the plaintiff and consequently Issue 1 is answered against the plaintiff. 13. From the above discussion it is also clear that the 1st defendant has shown that the plaintiff was dismissed from service on 24-2-1977 as per the order at Ex. D-1. Consequently, issue 2 is answered in favour of the first defendent". Thereafter, the Civil Court considered the question of the relief to be granted. In this behalf it stated as follows: ". . . . . . In view of the findings on Issues 1 and 2 holding that the plaintiff has been dismissed from the service with effect from 24-2-1977, the remedy open to the plaintiff is by way of a suit for damages and he cannot enforce the right to reinstate or a direction to the Employer to take him on duty". Ultimately the suit was dismissed. ( 3 ) THE worker took up the matter in appeal. Pending the appeal, the worker filed LA. 3 under Order 23, Rule 1 read with section 151, CPC for permission to withdraw the suit and reserving permission to proceed under the Industrial Disputes act. This application was opposed by the employer. After considering the respective contentions, the Appellate Court held as follows:". . . It appears to me that having regard to the facts of the case, the right of the plaintiff arises under general law and not solely under the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is alternative and not barred and plaintiff has a right to elect the forum". This means the worker was entitled to elect the appropriate forum to claim the relief that he is entitled to and he having elected the jurisdiction of Civil Court which jurisdiction it held was not barred, he was entitled to prosecute the civil suit. This means the worker was entitled to elect the appropriate forum to claim the relief that he is entitled to and he having elected the jurisdiction of Civil Court which jurisdiction it held was not barred, he was entitled to prosecute the civil suit. Necessarily any adverse finding he has suffered therein will bind him as well. The Civil Court considered the question of granting permission to withdraw the suit. It stated as below: "8. Then as regards the ground for permitting the plaintiff to withdraw, it is to be noted that the plaintiff is not seeking liberty to institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action. He has already instituted the proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act and the matter is pending before the Labour Court. Therefore, it is only by way of election ] plaintiff seeks permission to withdraw the suit. No permission need be granted and it is sufficient if plaintiff is permitted to withdraw the suit, reserving liberty for him to proceed with the reference in Labour Court". Thus, the suit was permitted to be withdrawn reserving his right to proceed under the Industrial Disputes Act. It expressly held that as the plaintiff was not intending to bring a fresh suit, order 23, Rule 1 of CPC had no application. ( 4 ) AN industrial dispute was raised by the worker which was referred to the 1st respondent for adjudication. Before the 1st respondent, the worker raised the validity of the domestic enquiry as a preliminary issue. By the impugned order herein it has been held that the same is invalid and the domestic enquiry therefore stands set aside. The Management challenges the said order. ( 5 ) FROM the facts set out therein it can be seen that the worker had earlier elected a forum for agitating his right; the jurisdiction of that forum is not excluded. It is therefore held by a Competent Court with the worker on party array that the right of the worker did not arise solely under the Industrial law, but also under the general law. This finding may be right or may not be so, but nevertheless the worker is bound by the said finding and he cannot contend that the said finding is not binding on him. If so, whatever finding is entered in the civil suit, is equally binding on the worker. This finding may be right or may not be so, but nevertheless the worker is bound by the said finding and he cannot contend that the said finding is not binding on him. If so, whatever finding is entered in the civil suit, is equally binding on the worker. ( 6 ) WE may here also notice the further fact that expressely the permission sought by the worker under Order 23, Rule 1 was declined by the Court. When the said relief was declined to him it expressely means that whatever findings entered in the said suit has to bind the parties to the suit. The declining of permission to withdraw the suit was on the ground that the plaintiff is always entitled to withdraw the suit as long as he does not intend to bring a fresh suit and he does not require the permission of the Court to do so. Normally, the plaintiff seeks permission to obviate the consequence of sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of order 23. That rule reads thus:" (4) Where the plaintiff. (a) abandons any suit or part of claim under sub-rule (1); or (b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the permission referred to in sub-rule (3), he shall be liable for such costs as the Court may award and shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject-matter or such part of the claim". In this case the consequence of the rule has befallen on the plaintiff. Normally, a plaintiff to whom the permission has been declined will suffer the bar under Order 23, Rule 1 (4 ). It cannot be said that merely because the plaintiff has elected another alternative forum, he would be in a better position even if the court has declined to grant the permission under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC. The corollary inference would be that the worker who was the plaintiff in the earlier suit cannot reagitate any of the issues tried and decided in the earlier suit. ( 7 ) AS stated earlier Issue 1 in the civil suit covers the validity of the domestic enquiry. The impugned order catalogues of reasons as to why the domestic enquiry held by the employer has to be set aside. ( 7 ) AS stated earlier Issue 1 in the civil suit covers the validity of the domestic enquiry. The impugned order catalogues of reasons as to why the domestic enquiry held by the employer has to be set aside. Without entering on an examination of the case on merits of the contention it has to be straightaway held that the worker ought to have highlighted every one of the grounds now urged as reason while agitating Issue 1 in the civil suit. Even though Section 11 of the CPC as such is not directly attracted to an industrial adjudication, nevertheless the general principles of res judicata will apply to the industrial adjudication as well. Explanation IV to Section 11 clearly states that by application of the principles of constructive res judicata the reasons set out by the 1st respondent would have been directly and substantially in issue while trying Issue 1 in the suit. In the light of the finding by the Civil Court on Issue 1, these objections should be deemed to have been overruled by the civil Court. If so, the 1st respondent is barred from retrying the question of validity of the domestic enquiry in the light of the finding on Issue, 1 in the suit O. S. No. 368 of 1977. The finding in the civil suit on Issue 1 will operate as res judicata and the 1st respondent-Labour Court cannot retry the issue regarding the validity of the domestic enquiry. If that be so, the impugned order passed by the 1st respondent cannot be sustained and has to be quashed. ( 8 ) APART from the above premises, I am constrained to state that none of the grounds held out by the 1st respondent to set aside the domestic enquiry are legally sustainable. Though this court is not exercising the appellate jurisdiction and this Court cannot reappreciate the evidence, I feel that the Court is bound to glance through the reasons assigned by the Labour Court to set aside the domestic enquiry in the teeth of the legal objection raised by the Management. The 1st respondent assigns inter alia the following reasons to set aside the domestic enquiry: (i) the charges framed are vague; (ii) the enquiry is completed in undue haste; (iii) the Enquiry Officer was not examined before the Labour Court; (iv) the worker was called upon to cross-examine. . . . The 1st respondent assigns inter alia the following reasons to set aside the domestic enquiry: (i) the charges framed are vague; (ii) the enquiry is completed in undue haste; (iii) the Enquiry Officer was not examined before the Labour Court; (iv) the worker was called upon to cross-examine. . . . the witness the very same day after the witness was examined in chief; (v) A co-worker was foisted on the worker against the wishes to represent him at the domestic enquiry; (vi) the Enquiry Officer was biased; (vii) day-to-day proceedings were not made known to the worker; (viii) documents were not furnished to the worker; (ix) on the charges framed no action can be taken as it is unconnected with the discharge of the duties of the worker. I am of the view that none of these objections are sustainable and these grounds are puerile to set aside the domestic enquiry, as can be seen from the following: 8 (a ). The following circumstances will furnish an answer for the above. The memorandum of charges are produced in this case. One cannot say that it is vague so that the worker could not have understood the contents of the allegation he has to face. The enquiry commenced on 12-3-1976 and was completed in a period of seven months. This cannot be termed as a too short period to complete an enquiry. The Enquiry Officer could not be examined before the Labour Court as by then he was dead. As regards the complaint regarding the cross-examining of the witness, the worker had not objected to this course adopted by the Enquiry Officer. Besides, it is a sound practice of examination of witness in that it is a tactical move to commence the cross-examination of a witness as soon as the chief examination is over lest the chief examination would be continued further, the next day as well, so that his evidence can be improved. As -regards the allegation of foisting of an authorised representative is concerned no such grievence is pleaded by the worker in the claim statement filed before the labour Court. No allegation of bias was imputed against the enquiry Officer in the suit. If there was bias, this would have been made mention there. The worker cannot be permitted to improve the case as and when he initiates further proceedings. No allegation of bias was imputed against the enquiry Officer in the suit. If there was bias, this would have been made mention there. The worker cannot be permitted to improve the case as and when he initiates further proceedings. There is no substance in the other allegations that day-to-day proceedings before the Domestic Tribunal were not made known to the worker. It is seen that the worker had been furnished with copies of the documents. As regards the allegation that the charges related to an incident unconnected with the discharge of duties of the delinquent employee the same cannot be entertained at all. The allegation made against the worker is that the worker misbehaved with a lady visitor who had come to the factory premises to meet her uncle who is working in the factory. The worker is in charge of security. He had stopped the visitor from entering the factory. To contend that he can freely misbehave with such visitors whom he has detained using colour of his office and that such conduct will be outside the scope of his duties as a security officer is preposterous. He is able to stop the visitor and thereafter misbehave only because he holds the post of security staff. This is certainly an act in the course of the discharge of his duties. ( 9 ) THEREAFTER, there does not exist any ground to set aside the domestic enquiry held by the Management before imposing the punishment on the worker. Annexure-H is therefore quashed. The Labour Court is directed to take up the reference, it being an old dispute and dispose of the same as expeditiously as possible in any event within six months from the date of receipt of this order. The writ petition is disposed of as above. --- *** --- .