Judgment :- ABDUL HADI, J. 1. The plaintiff-Bank, whose suit against the three defendants-respondents, for a sum of Rs. 3,90,743.61 with interest, was dismissed by the trial court, has preferred this first appeal. 2. The plaint allegations may be summerised as follows:— The 1st defendant is carrying on business in motor parts under the name and style of “Popular Auto Parts”. The said business is managed by the 1st defendants husband Pritam Singh Anand, to whom the 1st defendant has given necessary power of attorney. At the request of the defendants, the plaintiff has granted cash credit facility to the extent of Rs. 1,25,000/- to the 1st defendant with effect from 21.1.1975. Defendants 2 and 3 are the guarantors for the due repayment of the amount availed of by the 1s t defendant under the above mentioned loan facility. The plaintiff has filed along with the plaint, the promissory note dated 21.1.1975 executed by the 1st defendant through her power agent, the said Pritam Singh Anand in favour of defendants 2 and 3 for Rs. 1,25,000/- and duly endorsed by them in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also filed along with the plaint the agreement dated 21.1.1975 for cash credit facility on security of pledge of goods, executed by the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has also filed along with the plaint, the agreement dated 21.1.1975 executed by the defendants 2 and 3 in favour of the plaintiff guaranteeing repayment of the amount due under the said loan account. The 1st defendant under a general letter of undertaking dated 20.12.1976 has also acknowledge her liability under the loan account and has affirmed all the action taken by her power agent, by virtue of the power of attorney dated 15.11.1974 given by her in his favour. The defendant s have been most irregular in repayment of the amount availed of under the loan account and despite repeated demands including an advocate’ notice dt. 23.9.1980, a sum of Rs. 3,90,743.61 remains due by the defendants to the plaintiff as on 16.1.1981. as per the copy of the account filed along with the plaint. The defendants are liable to pay the said amount with interest thereon at 18.35% per annum from 17.1.1981 till payment, as that is the rate of bank interest applicable to the loan. 3,90,743.61 remains due by the defendants to the plaintiff as on 16.1.1981. as per the copy of the account filed along with the plaint. The defendants are liable to pay the said amount with interest thereon at 18.35% per annum from 17.1.1981 till payment, as that is the rate of bank interest applicable to the loan. In the reply dat ed 2.10.1980, the 1st defendant has only put forward untenable statements with the object of evading payment. The 1st defendant has also acknowledge the liability by the acknowledgments dated 31.12.1977 and 20.1.1978. Defendants 2 and 3 have also acknowledged the liability by acknowledgments dated 20.1.1978. The plaintiff has filed the suit reserving its right to proceed against the pledged goods as they have not commanded any ready market. 3. The written statement of the 1st defendant may be summarised as follows:— This defendant has not authorised her husband “to borrow large sums” as contended in the plaint. The allegation that this defendant executed a promissory note through her power of attorney agent is denied. This defendant has not executed any other agreement or acknowledged the debt. The loan was sanctioned on the strength of the goods kept in the godown. The loan was termed as key loan. One key of the godown was kept with the plaintiff. The local managers of the plaintiff took an unhelpful attitude and prevented this defendant from selling the goods as and when there was demand for it. If the plaintiff had co-operated with the defendants, the bank loan would have been paid off. Therefore, due to the unbecoming and unhelpful attitude of the authorities, the auto spare parts stored in the godown have become absolutes and this defendant is put to enormous loss. The plaintiff-bank is liable to compensate the loss. The plaintiff is not entitled to claim any interest as this defendant was ready and willing to clear the loan all along by sale of goods kept in the godown. The alleged acknowledgment is not true and the suit claimis barred by time. The plaintiff cannot maintain the suit as it has not taken any effort to sell the goods or release them for sell by this defendant. The interest charged is usurious. The suit framed as a mere money suit when there is a pledge, cannot be maintained. 4. The alleged acknowledgment is not true and the suit claimis barred by time. The plaintiff cannot maintain the suit as it has not taken any effort to sell the goods or release them for sell by this defendant. The interest charged is usurious. The suit framed as a mere money suit when there is a pledge, cannot be maintained. 4. The written statement of the defendant 2 and 3 may be summarised as follows:— These defendants deny having guaranteed the alleged loan. The plaintiff ought to sell the pledged movables and realise the amount due, if any. Th plaintiff has no right to sue on the Guarantee without exhausting the other remedies. These defendants have not acknowledged any debt as claimed. 5. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed:— 1. Whether the suit promissory not has been executed by the 1st defendant through her power of attorney agent? 2. Whether the suit claim is barred by limitation? 3. Whether the interest claimed is excessive and usurious? 4. Whether the suit is maintainable for recovery of the loan, while the plaintiff retained the pledged goods? 5. To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? (There was also one other issue, viz., “Whether there was consideration for the promissory note?” But, on this aspect, now there is no dispute). 6. Exs. A.1. to A.29. were marked on the side of the plaintiff and Exs. B.1. and B.2. were marked on the side of the defendants and Ex. C.1. is the Commissioners report. On the side of the plaintiff, the Branch Manager of the plaintiff Bank and P.W. 2, the Field Officer of the Plaintiff-Bank were examined. On the side of the defendants, the husband of the 1st defendant was examined. 7. The Court below has given the following findings:— 1. The suit promissory note was note executed by the 1st defendant through her power agent. 2. The suit (claiming the amount lent on 21.1.1975 and presented on 16.1.1981) is barred by limitation since Exs. A.7 and A.9. the alleged acknowledgments by the 1st defendant and Ex. A.8. executed by defendants 2 and 3 are not in effect genuine documents. 3. The suit is not maintainable, the plaintiff having retained to itself the pledged goods. 8. Defendants 2 and 3, who are respondents 2 and 3 herein are represented by counsel. But, he was not present when the appeal was heard. A.8. executed by defendants 2 and 3 are not in effect genuine documents. 3. The suit is not maintainable, the plaintiff having retained to itself the pledged goods. 8. Defendants 2 and 3, who are respondents 2 and 3 herein are represented by counsel. But, he was not present when the appeal was heard. So, the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the 1st defendant-1st respondent were heard. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant made the following submissions:— 1. The Court below grossly erred in holding that the suit promissory note was not executed by the power agent of the 1st defendant. Though the power deed dated 15.11.1974 was not produced, there are enough materials to show that only as power agent, the husband of the 1st defendant, D.W. 1, has executed the promissory note, Ex. A.1. dated 21.1.1975 and Ex. A.3, the above referred to agreement dated 21.1.1975 with reference to credit facility given to the 1st defendant on security of pledge of goods. 2. The Court below also erred in holding that the suit claim is barred by limitation. The reasoning of the Court below for coming to the conclusion that Exs. A.7 to A.9. cannot be relied on, is absolutely wrong. 3. The Court below also erred in holding that the suit is not maintainable, the plaintiff having retained the pledged goods. The Court below has not correctly appreciated the decision rendered in Lallan Prasad v. Rahmat Ali ( AIR 1967 SC 1322 ). 4. The interest claimed is not at all excessive and usurious. 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the 1st respondent reiterated the reasonings of the Court below and mainly emphasized that the suit is not maintainable since the plaintiff has retained the pledged goods while filing the suit and it is not in a position to redeliver the goods on payment of the suit debt. In this connection he relies on AIR 1967 SC 1322 (Supra). He also relies on P.S. Kothandarama Gupta v. N. Venkatakrishnan (1974 T.L.N.J. 68). 11. No doubt, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, after arguing at length, on 5.2.1996 when we needed a clarification represented that he could not get proper response from his client and he also filed a memo stating that he was withdrawing his appearance. He also relies on P.S. Kothandarama Gupta v. N. Venkatakrishnan (1974 T.L.N.J. 68). 11. No doubt, learned counsel for the 1st respondent, after arguing at length, on 5.2.1996 when we needed a clarification represented that he could not get proper response from his client and he also filed a memo stating that he was withdrawing his appearance. Anyway since the arguments had already been advanced at length by him also, we directed him to send a registered letter to his client making it clear that only a judgment on merits would be delivered by us, we having heard the arguments of both the learned counsel already. Making the said position clear, we adjourned the appeal by two weeks. On 26.2.1996, when the appeal was taken up again, the said counsel only represented again that there was no response from his client. However, in the circumstances we made it clear once again that judgment would be pronounced only on merits. So saying, Judgment was reserved. 12. We have considered the rival submissions. We shall first consider the first of the above said questions argued before us, viz., whether the suit promissory note Ex. A.1. dated 21.1.1975 and Ex. A.3, the above referred to agreement in relation to the suit loan sanctioned, have been executed by the 1st defendant through her power agent Pritam Singh Anand, who is none other than the husband of the 1st defendant. Paragraph 5 of the plaint mentions the relevant power document dated 15.11.1974 as having been given by the 1st defendant in favour of the said Pritam Singh Anand. No doubt, the said power document has not been exhibited; we also find that in Ex. A.1. as well as Ex. A.3. for the abovesaid “Popular Auto Parts” only the said Pritam Singh Anand has signed and it has not been mentioned therein that he has signed those documents as the agent of the admitted sole proprietrix of the said Popular Auto Part’ viz., his wife, the 1st defendant. 13. But, it must be noted that in Ex. A.4, which is the 1st defendants, general letter of undertaking dated 20.12.1976 given to the plaintiff-bank, it is specifically stated, while admitting the abovesaid suit loan of Rs. 13. But, it must be noted that in Ex. A.4, which is the 1st defendants, general letter of undertaking dated 20.12.1976 given to the plaintiff-bank, it is specifically stated, while admitting the abovesaid suit loan of Rs. 1,25,000/- granted by the plaintiff-bank, as follows:— “And whereas my husband and manager of the said business Shri Pritam Singh Anand to whom I had granted a General Power of Attorney dated 15.11.1974 made the relative application for the loan and executed all documents to secure the same on my behalf on the 21st January 1975. .. I, Smt. Kuldipkaur and Anand (1st defendant) hereby declare. that:— (i) The relative application for the cash credit loan was signed by Shri Priitam Singh Anand on my specific and express authority . I further solemnly undertake to ratify these and all such other actions taken by Shri Pritam Singh Anand in the conduct of the business in all dealings with the Bank. ..” Further, this Ex. A.4. has also been referred to in paragraph 5 of the plaint thus:— “The 1st defendant under her general letter of undertaking dated 20th December, 1976 has also acknowledge her liability under the loan account and has affirmed all action taken by her Power of Attorney Agent the said Pritam Singh Anand.” As against this allegation in the plaint, there is also no denial in the written statement regarding the abovesaid Ex. A.4. dated 20.12.1976. 14. It must also be noted that the said document Ex. A.4 was filed along with the plaint and yet there was no denial regarding the said allegation made in the plaint with reference to Ex. A.4. That apart, D.W. 1, the abovesaid husband of the 1st defendant did not assert in his evidence that his wife, the 1st defendant did not execute the said Ex. A.4. He only gave evasive answer stating that he did not know about it. He also deposed that he did not make any endeavour to inspect the document filed in the suit. On the other hand, after going through his wifes signature in the cheques dated 29.1.1975, 6.2.1975 and 15.5.1975, he has admitted that the signature found in Ex. A.4. is that of his wife, the 1st defendant. 15. Further, to Ex. A.15. He also deposed that he did not make any endeavour to inspect the document filed in the suit. On the other hand, after going through his wifes signature in the cheques dated 29.1.1975, 6.2.1975 and 15.5.1975, he has admitted that the signature found in Ex. A.4. is that of his wife, the 1st defendant. 15. Further, to Ex. A.15. suit notice dated 23.9.1980, it is specifically stated that at the request of the 1st defendant “through her power of Attorney Agent, viz., her husband Pritam Singh Anand .” the plaintiff bank had granted cash credit facility to the extent of Rs. 1,25,000/- to the 1st defendant with effect from 21.1.1975. To this specific allegation that the above said Pritam Singh Anand has acted as power agent of the 1st defendant in the suit transaction there was no specific denial at all i n Ex. A.16, the reply dated 2.10.1980 to the said notice, which inter alia admitted the sanctioning of the loan by the plaintiff-Bank thus:— “The loan was sanctioned and granted to our client on the strength of the goods kept in her godown.” In the light of all these features, there is absolutely no difficulty in holding that Exs. A.1. and A.3. were executed by the husband of the 1st defendant only as power agent of the 1st defendant and the Court below clearly erred in holding otherwise. 16. Then, coming to the next submission relating to the limitation question, once again we have to hold that the Court below has erred in coming to the conclusion that the suit claim is barred by limitation. No doubt, the suit was presented on 16.1.1981, while the suit loan was sanctioned on 21.1.1975. But the question is whether Ex. A.7. acknowledgment of liability dated 20.1.1978 is true. If that is so, the suit is within time. In this regard, the relevant allegation in paragraph 7 of the plaint is as fo llows:— “The Plaintiff further states that the 1st Defendant from time to time has acknowledged her liability under the loan account. The plaintiff files herewith the 1st Defendants acknowledgments dated 31.12.1977 and 20th January, 1978 in the matter. The plaintiff also files herewith the acknowledgments of Defendants 2 and 3 dated 20th January, 1978 acknowledging their liability under the loan amount.” Thus, in the plaint, inter alia, there is a specific reference to Ex. A.7. The plaintiff files herewith the 1st Defendants acknowledgments dated 31.12.1977 and 20th January, 1978 in the matter. The plaintiff also files herewith the acknowledgments of Defendants 2 and 3 dated 20th January, 1978 acknowledging their liability under the loan amount.” Thus, in the plaint, inter alia, there is a specific reference to Ex. A.7. dated 20.1.1978 as acknowledgment of the said liability under the abovesaid loan account. The said Ex. A-7. also has been filed along with the plaint. Yet, the only vague allegation in the written statement is as follows:— “..the alleged acknowledgment is not true and the suit claim is barred by time.” While so, the following finding of the Court below is not even supported by any specific plea in the written Statement:— Tamil In the other words, when there is no such PLEA of the plaintiff utilising blank forms of 1974 signed by the 1st defendant to make Exs. A.7. to A.9. the Court below cannot come to such a conclusion even if there is oral evidence to that effect, since the settled law is that no amount of evidence can be looked into when there is no plea. No doubt, D.W. 1, the husband of the 1st defendant deposed thus:— Tamil But, this evidence that those documents were given in 1974 or that, with reference to Ex. A.9, “it was blank when it was executed in 1974”, cannot be entertained at all when there is no plea in the written statement to that effect. Here again, the Court below has ignored the settled principle of law that no amount of evidence can be looked into on a plea, which was never put forward. In the above light, the other alleged reasonings of the Court below that there is difference in the ink used in certain passages found in the abovesaid documents is also not at all sound. It must be noted th at these documents, viz., Exs. A-7. and A-8. were also filed along with the plaint and there was no plea in the written statement that those documents were not genuine either on the footing that there was difference in the ink used in the passages therein or otherwise. That apart, in Ex. A.9, there is no such difference in the ink at all. A-7. and A-8. were also filed along with the plaint and there was no plea in the written statement that those documents were not genuine either on the footing that there was difference in the ink used in the passages therein or otherwise. That apart, in Ex. A.9, there is no such difference in the ink at all. There, the abovesaid Pritam Singh Anand, acting on behalf of the abovesaid Popular Auto Parts, confirms the balance in the abovesaid cash credit accounts as on 31.12.1977. In the above circumstances, the Court below has grossly erred in coming to the conclusion that the suit is barred by limitation. It is clear that in view of Exs. A-7 to A-9. the suit is quite within time. 18. Coming to the third submission that the suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff, while the plaintiff retained the pledged goods, AIR 1967 S.C. 1322 (Supra) is very much relied on by learned counsel for the 1st respondent. But, in our view that decision actually does not help the respondents. There the Supreme Court refers to S. 176 of the Contract Act, which runs as follows:— “If the pwner makes default in payment of the debt .. the pawnee may bring a suit against the pawnor upon the debt .. and retain the goods pledged as a collateral security, or he may sell the thing pledged, on giving the pawner reasonable notice of the sale.” The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in the said decision are as follows:— “It follows, therefore, that where a pawnee files a suit for recovery of debt, though he is entitled to retain the goods he is bound to return them on payment of the debt. The right to sue on the debt assumes that he is in a position to redeliver the goods on payment of the debt and, therefore, if he has put himself in a position where he is not able to redeliver the goods he cannot obtain a decree The pawnee, therefore, can sue on the debt retaining the pledged goods as collateral security. If the debt is paid he has to return the goods with or without the assistance of the Court and appropriate the sale proceeds towards the debt . If the debt is paid he has to return the goods with or without the assistance of the Court and appropriate the sale proceeds towards the debt . If the pawnee is not in a position to redeliver the good he cannot have both the payment of the debt and also the goods.” Thus, from S. 176 of the Contract Act and the above referred to observations, there is actually no bar for the plaintiff pawnee to file the present suit for recovery of the debt due to it while it retained the pledged goods. No doubt, the abovesaid observation shows that if the plaintiff-pawnee is not in a position to redeliver the goods or it has put itself in a position, where it is not able to redeliver the goods, it cannot obtain a decree. But, first of all, in the present case, there is no such plea at all by the defendants in the Written Statement that the plaintiff was not in a position to redeliver the goods on payment of the debt or it had itself in a positions where it was not able to redeliver the goods. While the plaint allegation is that the plaintiff is filing the suit reserving its right to proceed against the pledged goods as they have not commanded any ready market, there is no plea in the written statement that the plaintiff was not in a position to redeliver the goods on payment of the debt. All that is pleaded in the Written Statement of the 1st defendant is that the plaintiff cannot maintain the suit as it has not taken any efforts to sell the pledged goods or release the same for sale by the defendants. But, even with reference to this plea in the written statement, learned Counsel for the respondents could not point out any evidence by D.W. 1, that the plaintiff had not taken any efforts to sell the pledged goods. On the other hand, it could be gathered from D.W. 1s evidence that the plaintiff bank made an attempt to sell the goods through T.V.S. All that D.W. 1, says in his evidence is that when T.V.S. came to buy the pledged goods, the plaintiff did not inform the 1st defendant. On the other hand, it could be gathered from D.W. 1s evidence that the plaintiff bank made an attempt to sell the goods through T.V.S. All that D.W. 1, says in his evidence is that when T.V.S. came to buy the pledged goods, the plaintiff did not inform the 1st defendant. The relevant deposition is as follows:— Tamil In other words, the factum of the said bank having made an attempt to sell the pledged goods through T.V.S. is impliedly admitted and what is stated is only that when such an attempt was made, the 1st defendant was not informed. D.W. 1, also did not depose that there was ready market for the pledged goods, but that the plaintiff-Bank did not sell them. It must also be noted that even in the written statement, the allegation is that “the auto parts stored in the godown have become obsoletes”. 18. No doubt, learned counsel for the 1st respondent sought to rely on Ex. C.1. dated 18.2.1983, the report of the Commissioner. No doubt, the said report also speaks of certain shortages in the pledged goods kept in the godown in relation to what is contained in the stock book maintained by the bank. But, first of all, it must be noted that it also speaks of certain excesses over the abovesaid stock book balance. Further in this regard, we also find that D.W. 1, himself has admitted thus:— Tamil In the light of the above features, particularly in the light of the absence of relevant plea in the written statement, that the plaintiff is not in a position to redeliver the pledged goods, we are unable to hold that the suit is not maintainable. 19. Learned Counsel for the 1st Respondent no doubt relies on 1974 T.L.N.J. 68 (DB) (Supra). But, there, in view of the specific finding that the plaintiff therein was unable to deliver back the pawned goods, the Division Bench of this Court relied on AIR 1967 S.C. 1322 (Supra) and held that the plaintiff therein was not entitled to a decree as prayed for. That decision will have no application to the present facts. 20. Further, in A.I.R. 1989 Madras 279 (DB) (Supra) also it was held that the pawnee may bring the suit against the pawner upon the debt and he may retain the goods pawned as collateral security. 21. That decision will have no application to the present facts. 20. Further, in A.I.R. 1989 Madras 279 (DB) (Supra) also it was held that the pawnee may bring the suit against the pawner upon the debt and he may retain the goods pawned as collateral security. 21. One other submission of learned counsel for the first respondent is that the rate of interest claimed is usurious or excessive. The rate claimed in the plaint is 18.35% per annum and the said rate is said to be within the existing rate of bank interest applicable to the loan in question. As per Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-3, the rate agreed to between the parties is “1% over SBAR minimum 141/2% per annum-2. Therefore, only the said rate as found in Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-3 can be claimed. The plaint does not specific ally plead how despite what is stated in Ex. A-1 and Ex. A-3 rate of interest at 18.35% per annum is claimed. Therefore, the plaintiff can claim interest only at the rate mentioned in Exs. A-1 and A-3. viz., 14 1/2% = 1% that is 15 1/2% per annum. The said rate can be claimed on Rs. 3,90,743.61 from the date of the suit, i.e., 16.1.1981. The said sum of Rs. 3,90,743.61 is the amount arrived at by the plaintiff as due from the defendant as per Ex. A-6 statement of account filed along with the plaint. It must be noted that when P.W. 1, proved Ex. A-6, deposing as follows:— “Ex. A-6 is the certified copy of ledger accounts concerning the suit loan. On the date of suit Rs. 3,90,743.61 was due by the defendants.” There is no cross examination at all by the defendants on the above aspect. Therefore, we are granting the above rate of 15 1/2% as interest on the above said sum of Rs. 3,90,743.61 from the date of suit, viz., 16.1.1981. 22. In the result, the judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the suit is decreed for a sum of Rs. 3,90,743.61. with interest at 15 1/2% per annum from the date of suit, viz., 16.1.1981. till realisation with proportionate costs. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in part with proportionate costs.