JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - These two appeals are inter-linked being directed against the same judgment of learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack though the grounds of challenge are different. Although the pivotal question posed appears to be simple, it presents some complexities. In essence the dispute is whether there is scope for substitution in place of deceased husband after an ex parte decision is taken in a proceeding for judicial separation or divorce. Certaion other disputes have been raised, with which we shall deal infra. 2. The dispute has arisen in the following background : Sabita Behera alias Das (appellant in Civil Appeal No. 19 of 1994 and respondent in Civil Appeal Nos. 23 of 1994) was married to Kishore Kumar Das (hereinafter referred to as 'Kishore') on 30-1-1990 according to Hindu rites and customs. An application seeking divorce was filed by Kishore, the husband u/s 14 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956 (in short, 'the Act') which was duly accepted on 15-11-1991 by allowing prayer for divorce and directing dissolution of marital tie between Sabita and Kishore. The petition for divorce filed by Kishore was registered as Civil Proceeding No. 184 of 1991 before learned Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. An application was filed on 7-1-1992 purported to be one under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, 'CPC') seeking to set aside the ex parte Judgment which was numbered as Misc. Cass No. 3 of 1992. The said Misc. Case was dismissed on 24-6-1993 as the parties were absent on repeated calls. On 2 -1-1994 Kishore had ultimately died. On 19-1-1994 Misc. Case No. 9 of 1994 was filed with prayer to implead the heirs of deceased Kishore and for restoration of Misc. Case No. 3 of 1992, which as indicated above, was dismissed on 24-6-1993. By the impugned order, learned Judge, Family Court held that no case for restoration was made out, but directed parents-in-law (appellants in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1994) to be impleaded and to pay Sabita a lump sum of Rs. 40 000/- in two installments. Case No. 3 of 1992, which as indicated above, was dismissed on 24-6-1993. By the impugned order, learned Judge, Family Court held that no case for restoration was made out, but directed parents-in-law (appellants in Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1994) to be impleaded and to pay Sabita a lump sum of Rs. 40 000/- in two installments. It has directed that the copies of the judgment shall be sent to the Director General of Police, Orissa, Cuttack, D. I. G. of Police, P. M.T., Orissa, Buxi Bazar, Cuttack and to the Accountant General, Orissa, Bhubaneswar, for speedy disposal of monetary and service benefits payable to the opposite parties, i.e., parents of Kishore, by the State Government. Parents of Kishore assail direction for their impletion and further direction for payment of lump sum amount of Rs. 40,000/- so far as they are concerned, while Sabita assails the rejection of prayer made under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC. 3. According to learned counsel for Prafulla Kumar Das and his wife, the parents of Kishore, an application for substitution in place of Kishore in a proceeding initiated on the basis of application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC, is misconceived and there is no scope for any substitution. Additionally it is submitted that while dealing with an application under Order 9, Rule 13, CPC, there is no scope for giving any direction for payment of Rs. 40,000/- by two installments to Sabita as life maintenance. The learned counsel appearing for Sabita fairly accepted that the direction for payment of Rs. 40,000/- as given is not sustainable. It is, however, submitted that the findings given in the ex parte decision are likely to affect the social status, property rights of Sabita by way of survivorship because of her marriage with Kishore, and therefore, the prayer for substitution has been rightly accepted. 4. We shall deal with the question of scope of substituting the relative in place of the husband who dies after the decree for judicial separation or divorce is passed, Before delving into that question, it is to be seen what marriage really means. The exact definition of the word 'marriage' is not available in any sastric texts, though the meaning remains cleat. It essentially means union of man and woman in body soul. The exact definition of the word 'marriage' is not available in any sastric texts, though the meaning remains cleat. It essentially means union of man and woman in body soul. As described in Dharma-Sastras marriage is a sacrament or samskara never to be broken and which can never perish. Legally speaking, marriage entails much more than the mere union of the soul and the body. Lord Stowell in Lindo v. Belisario : (1975) 1 BC. 216 has defined marriage as : "It is held by some persons that marriage is a contract merely civil, by others that it is a sacred, religious and spiritual contract and only so to be considered... I conceive that neither of those opinions are perfectly accurate. According to juster notion of the nature of the marriage contract, it is not merely either civil or religious contract. It is contract according to law of nature, antecedent to civil institutions which may take place to all intents and purposes where two persons of different sexes engage, by mutual contract to live together. A mere casual commerce without the intention of cohabitation and bringing up of children would not constitute marriage under any supposition. But when two persons have that commerce for the procreation and bringing up of children and for such fasting cohabitation that in a state of nature would be marriage. In most countries it is also clothed with religious rites, even in crude societies as welt as in those which are more distinguished for their religious and civil institutions-" In Edgar Bdenheimer, Jurisprudence-The Philosophy and Method of law, 1974 Edn it was stated : "It is contract starting as from terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of person are summed up in relation to family. We seemed to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order of relations, arising from the free agreements of individuals. The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract." J. Guncan N. Derrett, in "A Critique of Modern Hindu Law" 1970 Ed. We seemed to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order of relations, arising from the free agreements of individuals. The movement of progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract." J. Guncan N. Derrett, in "A Critique of Modern Hindu Law" 1970 Ed. 291, states that there are three strands in the notion of marriage, one strong one, the ancient, atavistic, secular family alliance type of union in which the woman is a pawn in negotiation between families; another strong one, the shastric modification or amelioration, ritualisation and spiritualisation of this, with its resulting prestige worthy vivaha, towards which all traditional; castes tend : and lastly there is a weak strand, the "westernised" or if you prefer, cosmopolitan life, an education with many advantages for the bride but many anxietiea and pitfalls for the couple. Marriage is legally and socially sanctioned union between man and woman that accords status to their offspring and is regulated by laws, rules, customs, beliefs and attitude that prescribe the fights and duties of the partners. The object of the Hindu Marriage Act is to amend and codify the law relating to marriage among Hindus. Marriage is oldest social institution of the world. It is this institution which influences the moral and social values of the people. Divorce, that Donortium a vinculo matrimoni was generally recognised in the shastric precepts. However, some skritikaras have spoken of women marrying for the second time. Manu emphatically denies the right to divorce. An indirect reference of divorce is found in Atharva Ved3 where it is stated that whenever a woman having married one person marries another if they two offer a got with five dishes or rice they could not be separated from each other. The second husband secures the same world with his remarried wife when he offers a goat accompanied with the five dishes of rice with the light of fees. (See Atharva Veda, IX, 5. 21-23). Divorce is absolute dissolution of marriage. It is a decree by which the bond of matrimony is dissolved. 5. In the present day society marital discords have become the order of the day. Many attribute the increase in number of divorces to permissiveness in the present day society of our country. (See Atharva Veda, IX, 5. 21-23). Divorce is absolute dissolution of marriage. It is a decree by which the bond of matrimony is dissolved. 5. In the present day society marital discords have become the order of the day. Many attribute the increase in number of divorces to permissiveness in the present day society of our country. Public policy, good morals and interests of society require that marriage relationship should be surrounded with such safeguard, and its severance is to be allowed only in the manner and for the causes specified by law. In olden times the marital differences between the spouses were taken to be very little. That is why it was said that DAMPATYA KALAHA SHAIBA. Compatibility, adjustment and tolerance are key words to a good marriage. In the modern social context marriage is increasingly become a voluntary union of two persons. As a result, a Hindu marriage is rapidly losing its strictly sacramental status, thus giving effect to Mayne's classical statement that the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from status to contract. 6. Marriage creates certain rights and imposes certain obligations on the spouse. The status of being a wife is a status in law. "I he Court has been given the responsibility of attempting reconciliation before it goes to the conclusion of irretrievability of marriage. Only where the marriage is do facto defunct and is de jure alive, the Court should grant it. Where irreparable damage has been caused to the marriage and further continuance would he neither conducive nor beneficial for the parties to the marriage, divorce can be granted. That is why it is the statutory requirement u/s 23 even in an undefended case the Court has role to play. Here again the law has imposed certain conditions before a divorce is to be granted. Merely because a marriage has broken down irretrievably, dissolution cannot be granted unless the conditions prescribed u/s 3 are satisfied. Marriage is an alliance. Daily trivial differences get dissolved in the course of time and may be treated as teething trouble of early matrimonial adjustments. While the stream of life lived in married mutuality, may wash away similar problems. Merely because a marriage has broken down irretrievably, dissolution cannot be granted unless the conditions prescribed u/s 3 are satisfied. Marriage is an alliance. Daily trivial differences get dissolved in the course of time and may be treated as teething trouble of early matrimonial adjustments. While the stream of life lived in married mutuality, may wash away similar problems. What is to happen if intransigent compatibility of mind breaks up the flow of the stream in such a situation, a breakdown of marriage itself results and it is left open for law to recognise whether in fact there is complete breakdown of marriage and divorce is to be granted. 7. The case at hand presents some shocking pictures of marital discord. Even before the break of marital tie, it is alleged that the wite left the husband's house. Divorce was payed for on the ground of mental cruelty of such nature that it was not conducive for the husband to continue the marital knot. Since requisite period which has to elapse before a petition for divorce can be presented was not over, prayer for relief in terms of Section 14 of the Act was sought for. It was indicated that as Exception 1 hardship and exceptional depravity existed, it warranted immediate action. Admittedly the matter was taken up ex parte and on considering the evidence of the husband, prayer for divorce was accepted. 8. In the application for setting aside ex parte decree, it was stated that on account of unavoidable difficulties, and having not been permitted to engage a lawyer effective steps could not be taken. Since the application was belatedly filed, an application for condonation of delay was filed. The motion for setting aside the ex parte decree and condonation of delay was opposed by the husband. The application for restoration was dismissed for default. As indicated above, it led to filing of a second application during pendency of which Kishore died. That is how the direction to implead Kishore's parents came to be made. 9. So far as various High Courts of the country are concerned, the views are divergent as to whether the application of wife for substitution of Segal heir is maintainable where the husband dies. While Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Bombay High Courts have taken the view that it is maintainable, the Madras High Court has taken the contrary view. 9. So far as various High Courts of the country are concerned, the views are divergent as to whether the application of wife for substitution of Segal heir is maintainable where the husband dies. While Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Bombay High Courts have taken the view that it is maintainable, the Madras High Court has taken the contrary view. While the Madras and Calcutta High Courts have taken the view in Saraswathi Ammal Vs. Lakshmi and in Butterfield Vs. Butterfield, respective!/ that an application filed for setting aside the ex parte decree for divorce is not maintainable under Order 22, Rule 4, CPC, contrary view has been taken by Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Bombay High Courts in Vadalasetti Samrajyamma v. Vadalasetti Nagmma : AIR 1994 AP 18 : Iravva Vs. Shivappa Shiddalingappa Angadi, ; and Kamalabai Vs. Ramdas Manga Ingale, that the provisions of Order 22, Rule 4, CPC can be applied to faring on record the legal representatives of the deceased party. 10. A valid marriage causes the relationship of husband and wife to exist, not only as between the parties to it, but also as respects all the world; a valid dissolution of a marriage, whether it be by the act of the husband, as in the case of repudiation by Mohammedan husband, or by the act of a Court competent to dissolve it, causes that relationship to cease as regards the whole world. (See Kanhya v. Radha : (1867) 7 WR 338 (FB). In divorce proceedings a finding [against the petitioner or respondent in a previous suit may be given in evidence, though between different parties. (See Ruck v. Ruck: (1996) P 152. A judgment of a Court given in the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction under the Act falls u/s 41 of the Evidence Act, and would be conclusive against the whole world. (See Survepalli Siddaiah Vs. Survepalli Penchalamma, : Suhas Manohar Pande Vs. Manohar Shamrao Pande, ). A decree for dissolution or for nullity of marriage by a competent Court being a judgment affecting status is a judgment in "rem. [See Salvasan v. Administrator and C. : (1927) AC 641 : Hals Simond's Edition, Vol. 7, page 117], A judgment granting divorce would affect the status of the parties and would result in the annulment of the relationship which existed between the wife and the husband. [See Salvasan v. Administrator and C. : (1927) AC 641 : Hals Simond's Edition, Vol. 7, page 117], A judgment granting divorce would affect the status of the parties and would result in the annulment of the relationship which existed between the wife and the husband. Such resolution which affected the status of parties will be relevant u/s 41 of the Evidence Act even in the proceedings when such questions arose for consideration. Therefore, when such serious questions are involved and when such matters affected the status of the parties, the Court will have to be very cautious in adjudicating upon the matters because serious consequences are likely to follow. The Court should be extremely vigilant when the suit involves the question of marital status because property rights are likely to be seriously affected and also because the ligitimacy or otherwise of the parties involved would be seriously affected. (See Razia Begum Vs. Sahebzadi Anwar Begum and Others, ). 11. Though the question involved is very complex, equitable considerations must prevail and bearing in mind the nature of the conclusions, the far-reaching effect of the findings of the Court, both on personal status and property rights, it is desirable that the party aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court must have the opportunity to have the findings reversed and this opportunity must be assured irrespective of the death of the respondent. Even though the husband dies, it is open to the wife to challenge the decree of dissolution of marriage by persons known to law. If this right is to be denied to wife, her status would be in serious jeopardy and her property rights would be seriously affected. 12. A decree dissolving a marriage involves termination of status of the wife. If the husband dies subsequent to the passing of the decree and the wife seeks to set aside the decree, the question would be whether the wife would be the widow of the deceased or a divorcee. If the wife succeeds in having the decree set aside, she will be a widow of the deceased entitled to the benefit of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and will be entitled to inherit the properties of the husband as a Class I heir. Such a right cannot be claimed and will be lost unless the legal representatives of the deceased-husband are impleaded. Such a right cannot be claimed and will be lost unless the legal representatives of the deceased-husband are impleaded. The judgment dissolving the marriage is a judgment in rem. and will not merely involve the personal status of the wife, but would involve her property rights. The principle of 'Actio personalis cum moritor persona', will not be applicable and the proceedings to set aside an ex parte decree will not abate. Section 21 of the Act makes the provisions of CPC applicable to the proceeding under the Act. The provisions of Order 22, Rule 4, CPC can be applied to bring on record the legal representatives of the deceased party to the proceedings. The wife should be and is competent to maintain application under Order 9, Rule 13 of CPC. Even though the husband is dead, the decree obtained by him is effective in law and determines the status of the wife. If the appellant says that it is an ex parte decree and ought to be set aside, her application has to be heard on merits. The decree of divorce determines her status as wife apart from determining her rights in the properties of her deceased husband. This gives sufficient locus standi and right to contest the divorce proceeding even after the death of her husband. 13. So far as the contention of maintainability of the application of the wife is concerned, it must be kept in view that petition of divorce was moved by the husband for getting his marriage with the respondent dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the respondent deserted him for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. It is also to be kept in view that such petition for divorce can be moved either by the husband or the wife, as the case may be. To that extent it is certainly a personal cause of action based on one or more matrimonial misconducts alleged in the petition against the erring spouse. Consequently, in such proceedings before any decree comes to be passed if either of the spouse expires pending the trial then the personal cause of action would die with the person. To that extent it is certainly a personal cause of action based on one or more matrimonial misconducts alleged in the petition against the erring spouse. Consequently, in such proceedings before any decree comes to be passed if either of the spouse expires pending the trial then the personal cause of action would die with the person. Such civil proceedings would not abate only if right to sue survives after the death of one or more of the parties to the proceedings, as laid down by Order -XXII, Rule 1, CPC. However, if daring the pendency of the petition for divorce either of the spouses expires, the cause of action being personal to both of them, the right to sue would not survive. The next question is whether after the decree of divorce is passed ex parte or bipartite against the other spouse whether the right to sue would survive for the spouse against whom such decree has been passed by the Court and whether such a decree can be got set aside by the surviving spouse either by filing an appeal or by moving an application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC for getting 1t set aside if it is an ex parte decree. The answer to the question will depend upon the legal effects of such a decree of divorce passed by the trial Court u/s 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act. It is obvious that so long as the decree is not passed and proceedings are at any stage prior to the decree, no rights or obligations of either spouse get crystallised. The marital status of both the spouses remains in fact as it was prior to the filing of the suit. But once a decree gets passed in such proceedings the rights and obligations of the respective spouses who are parties to such proceedings get crystallised tinder the orders of the Court, The marriage gets dissolved; the status of the spouses gets changed and they become ex-husband and ex-wife. As a result of such a decree of divorce the marriage tie is snapped. Both -of them become free to marry again as laid down by Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Not only that after such a decree when the spouses have ceased to be husband and wife and become ex-husband and ex-wife, proprietary rights of both the spouses also get affected. Both -of them become free to marry again as laid down by Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Not only that after such a decree when the spouses have ceased to be husband and wife and become ex-husband and ex-wife, proprietary rights of both the spouses also get affected. As per Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, if a male Hindu dies in testate, his widow would be entitled to inherit his property being a relative specified in Class I of the Schedule. Similarly, if the wife dies leaving behind her any property, as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, the property of the female Hindu shall devolve according to the rules set out in Section 16-firstly, upon the sons and. daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband. Thus if a female Hindu dies leaving behind her children and husband, the husband also becomes entitled to inherit property as first class heir. Consequently, because of a divorce decree of inheritance in each others property on the death of when the spouses do not remain husband and wife, the mutual rights either of them get extinguished. Therefore, apart from the divorce decree destroying the erst while status of husband and wife, it has a direct impact on the property rights of the concerned spouses. Even that apart, as per Section 9 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1958, a Hindu widow is entitled to be maintained out of her deceased husband's estate and failing which by her father-in-law under circumstances laid down by the said section. Even this right will vanish after the decree of divorce, when her husband dies after obtaining the said decree against her. It has also to be kept in view that when a decree of divorce gets passed against a spouse on the grounds of matrimonial misconduct mentioned in Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriages Act, it attaches a social stigma on the concerned spouse. Such a spouse cannot be said to be left without any remedy to get such finding vacated by filing an appeal or if it is an ex parte decree to get it set aside by filing an application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. Such a spouse cannot be said to be left without any remedy to get such finding vacated by filing an appeal or if it is an ex parte decree to get it set aside by filing an application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. Cause of action for getting such an adverse finding stigmatising the concerned spouse, cannot be said to be purely a personal cause of action against the departed spouse who was armed with a decree in his or her favour based on such a finding, When such legal effects flow from divorce decree, it cannot be said with any emphasis that proceedings for setting aside such a decree either by way of appeal or if it is an ex parte decree by way of application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC would also abate and such a right to sue for getting the divorce decree set aside by the aggrieved party whose status and proprietary rights get adversely affected by such decree would not survive to such an aggrieved spouse. It is also pertinent to note that as per Section 305 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 an executor or administrator has the same power to sue in respect of ail causes of action that survive the deceased and may exercise the same power for recovery of debts as the deceased had when living. Save . and except the personal cause of action which dies with the deceased on the principle of "action personal is moritur cum persona" i.e., a personal cause of action dies with the person, all the rest of causes of action which have impact on proprietary and socio-legal status of the parties cannot be said to have died with such a person. 14. Once a divorce decree is passed, the stage of launching any petition u/s 13(1) does not survive. It is true that Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act lays down that marriage whether solemnised before or after the commencement of the Act may be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the grounds mentioned therein on a petition presented, the person who presents such petition must be either wife or husband and the other party would be the spouse. But once these proceedings are initiated by the concerned aggrieved spouse, the trial then proceeds further. But once these proceedings are initiated by the concerned aggrieved spouse, the trial then proceeds further. It is of course true that pending such trial if either of the spouses expires then, as seen earlier, the personal cause of action against the husband or the wife, as the case may be, dies with the departing spouse. As no rights are still crystallised by then against or in favour of either spouse no proprietary effect or any adverse effect on the status of the parties would get generated by mere filing of such petition and the status quo ante would continue to operate during the trial of such petition. However, the site situation gets changed once a decree of divorce follows in favour of either of the spouses whether such decree is bipartite or ex parte. Thereafter, as noted earlier, direct legal consequences affecting the status of parties as well as proprietary rights of either of them, as noted earlier, would flow from such a decree. Under these circumstances, if the aggrieved spouse who suffers from such legal effects of the adverse decree against him or her is told off the gates of She appellate proceedings or proceedings for setting aside such ex parte decree, the concerned spouse would suffer serious legal damage and injury without getting any opportunity to get such a decree set aside on legally permissible grounds. Consequently, it may be held that once the petition u/s 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act results into any decree of divorce either ex parte or bipartite then the concerned aggrieved spouse who suffers from such pernicious legal effects can legitimately try to get them reversed through the assistance of the Court, In such an exercise, all other legal heirs of deceased spouse who are interested in getting such a decree maintained can be joined as necessary parties. Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act can obviously come in the way of such proceedings being maintained against the legal heirs of the decree-holder spouse. Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act can obviously come in the way of such proceedings being maintained against the legal heirs of the decree-holder spouse. A mere look at the ground of Section 13(1) will show that a Hindu marriage can be dissolved on the proof of matrimonial misconduct of very serious nature as mentioned in the concerned grounds, namely, that the offending spouse, after the solemnization of the marriager, has voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouser or has treated the petitioner with cruelty, or has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately preceding the presentation of the pertition or has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religions or has been incurably, of unsound mind or has been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder; or has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy, or has been suffering from veneral disease in a communicable form; or has renounced the world by entering any religious order or has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more. These grounds, to say the least, if found established, against the offending spouse would be serious matrimonial misconducts or incapabilities and such a spouse will go with a stigma for the rest of his or her life which will have serious pernicious consequences not only social but also legal, as we have noted earlier. If a decree of divorce on these grounds whether ex parte or bipartite is not permitted to be challenged by the aggrieved spouse, it would deprive the aggrieved spouse of an opportunity of getting such grounds re-examined by the competent Court. It cannot, therefore, be said that after a decree of divorce is passed against a spouse whether ex parte or bipartite such aggrieved spouse cannot prefer an appeal against such a decree or cannot move for cutting ex parts divorce decree set aside under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. Such proceedings would not abate only because the petitioner who has obtained such decree dies after obtaining such a decree. The cause of action in such a case would survive qua the state of the deceased spouse in the hands of his or her heirs or legal representatives. Such proceedings would not abate only because the petitioner who has obtained such decree dies after obtaining such a decree. The cause of action in such a case would survive qua the state of the deceased spouse in the hands of his or her heirs or legal representatives. Consequently in such appellate proceedings or proceedings under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC, other heirs of the deceased spouse could be joined as opposite parties as they would be interested in urging that the surviving spouse against whom such decree is passed remains a divorce and is not treated to be a widow or widower of the deceased original petitioner so that she or he may not share with other heirs the property of deceased spouse. So far as the other heirs of the deceased spouse are concerned, they would certainly be interested in getting the decree of divorce confirmed by the appellate Court or by the trial Court by opposing application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. if it is an ex parte decree against the concerned spouse. It must, therefore, be held that when a divorce decree is challenged by the aggrieved spouse in proceedings whether by way of appeal or by way of application under Order IX, Rule 13, GPC for setting aside the ax parte decree of divorce, right to sue survives to the aggrieved surviving spouse if the other spouse having obtained such decree dies after the decree and before appeal is filed against the same by the aggrieved spouse or application is made under Order IX, Rule 13 by the aggrieved spouse for getting such an ex parte decree of divorce set aside. Similarly, the right to sue would also survive even if the other spouse dies pending. such appeal or application under Order IX, Rule 13, CPC. in either case proceeding can be continued against the legal hairs of the deceased spouse who may be interested in supporting the decree of divorce passed against the aggrieved spouse. The position has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Cour in Smt. Yallawwa Vs. Smt. Shantavva and the cleavage of view has lost its significance. 15. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the applications for substitution, and under Order 9, Rule 13. CPC are maintainable. The learned Judge, Family Court was justified in accepting the prayer. The position has been elaborately dealt with by the Apex Cour in Smt. Yallawwa Vs. Smt. Shantavva and the cleavage of view has lost its significance. 15. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that the applications for substitution, and under Order 9, Rule 13. CPC are maintainable. The learned Judge, Family Court was justified in accepting the prayer. While accepting the prayer for substitution, the learned Judge, Family Court directed payment of money by the in-laws. They were not heard on the question of liability to pay. The order is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice. The direction for payment of lump sum amount of Rs. 40,000/- by Prafulla Kumar Das and his wife which is subject-matter of Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1994 stands vacated. So far as Civil Appeal No. .19 of 1994 is concerned, we find sufficient cause was shown for non-appearance. A too rigidistic approach has been adopted, which is not appropriate in a dispute of the present nature. The order rejecting the prayer for restoration is indefensible. The' entire matter shall now be heard by the learned Judge, Family Court. We make it clear that no opinion as regards merits of the main dispute has been expressed by us. The Civil Appeals are allowed to the extent indicated above. A. Ded, J. 16. I agree. Final Result : Allowed