Judgment :- G. Raj asekharan, J. The Original Petitions are under Art.226 read with Art.227 of the Constitution of India. Both are connected and the question to be decided is one and the same, and so both the original petitions were head together and they are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The landlord of three shop buildings possessed by three different tenants, sought eviction of all the buildings (shop rooms) on the grounds falling under Ss.11(2) (b),11(3) and 11(4) (iv) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, 'the act). The petitions before the Rent Control Court, Varkala were R.C.O.Ps. 32,33 and 34 of 1975. The Rent Control Court allowed those petitions. There were appeals before the appellate Authority (Sub Judge), Attingal as B.R.C. appeals 5,6 & 7 of 1977. They were disposed of by a common judgment, allowing eviction under S.11(2)(b) alone. There was revision before the District Court, Thiruvananthapuram and further revision before this court and an original petition under Art.227 of the Constitution. The final order was one granting eviction under S.11(2)(b) of the Act. That order when put into execution before the Munsiff s Court, was objected to on the ground that there is no executable order since the order of eviction stood vacated by the order working out itself, since it was only a conditional order. The operative portion of the order as extracted in the objections before the execution court, reads as follows: "The appellants are given one month's time from today to put the respondent in possession of their respective shop buildings, of the appellants deposit the arrears of rent with interest within one month from this day, the order of eviction in O.P. (BRC) No. 33 and 34 will stand vacated", 3. In the execution court, the judgment debtors (Petitioners) by Ext. P2 sought permission to adduce evidence in support of their contention that the entire arrears of rent, interest etc. have been discharged, and the order under S.11(2)(b) stood vacated. The execution court allowed that application and Ext. P3 is a copy of that order. That order was challenged in revision in R.C.R.P.No. 8/92 and 9/92 before the Revisional Authority and the Revisional Authority passed Ext. P4 order. have been discharged, and the order under S.11(2)(b) stood vacated. The execution court allowed that application and Ext. P3 is a copy of that order. That order was challenged in revision in R.C.R.P.No. 8/92 and 9/92 before the Revisional Authority and the Revisional Authority passed Ext. P4 order. As per that order, the order of the Munsiff s Court was set aside and it was held that the tenant was not entitled to adduce evidence before the execution court to prove that the rent has been discharged. It was further directed that the execution court will consider whether the order of eviction under S.11(2)(b) was substituted or whether it stood vacated under S.11(2)(c) of the Act. Itis that order now under challenge in these Original Petitions, and the prayers are: "(a) issue a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writs, directions or orders calling for the records leading to Ext. P4 order of the 1st respondent; and (b) quashing Ext. P4 order of the Ist respondent in the jurisdiction of superintendence under Art.227 of the Constitution of India and restoring Ext. P3 order of the court of Munsiff, Varkala". 4. It was argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the order of eviction was a conditional order making it clear that the order shall stand vacated in the event of payment of arrears of rent, interest etc., on the payment of these amounts, there was discharge of the liability, and the order of eviction stood vacated and to prove that it is necessary that evidence is allowed to be adduced before the execution Court. In other words, the argument is that there is no eviction order subsisting and whether there is such an order or not is a matter the execution court can go into and for deciding that question, evidence is to be adduced and the order refusing to adduce evidence before the execution court is illegal, arbitrary and erroneous. 5. This argument is met by the counsel appearing of the landlord relying on two decisions of this Court - one reported in 1967 KLT 933 (Gopalan v. Michle Thresia alias achamma) and the other reported in 1994 (2) KLT 396 (Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Philipose Abraham). 5. This argument is met by the counsel appearing of the landlord relying on two decisions of this Court - one reported in 1967 KLT 933 (Gopalan v. Michle Thresia alias achamma) and the other reported in 1994 (2) KLT 396 (Gopalakrishna Pillai v. Philipose Abraham). In the earlier of the two decisions, it was held that 'it is clear from S.11 that the Munsiff has power to execute as if the order for eviction is a decree passed by the Munsiff. The power under clause (c) of sub-s.(2) of S.11 to vacate the order for eviction can be if at all exercised only by the Rent Controller'. In the later decision, it was held: "Provision has been made in S.11(2)(c) of the Act to enable the tenant to get the order of eviction vacated by making deposit of the arrears of rent with interest and costs of the proceedings within a period of one month from the date of the order or such further period as the Rent Control Court may in its discretion allow. The question of the actual arrears of rent due to the landlord and adjustment of the amounts paid since the commencement of the proceeding are to be done in a petition presented under that sub-clause. The scheme of the Act appears to be that once the tenant is found to be a defaulter and has failed to pay the rent due within the period prescribed an order of eviction has to be passed against him giving him an opportunity to get it vacated by making the requisite deposit within the period of one month or such further tune allowed by the Court. The contention that the Rent Control Court and the appellate Authority should not have granted an order of eviction on the ground of rent arrears when once the tenant has discharged the arrears is therefore, unsustainable. The question of discharge and the liability to pay the arrears of rent if any are matters to be considered at the time of enquiry in a petition under clause (c) of S.11(2) of the Act. An order of eviction on the ground of rent arrears is not usually passed by the Rent Control Court and the appellate Authority in case it is satisfied that the arrears of rent had been discharged. That is only for the sake of expediency. An order of eviction on the ground of rent arrears is not usually passed by the Rent Control Court and the appellate Authority in case it is satisfied that the arrears of rent had been discharged. That is only for the sake of expediency. No purpose will be served by directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building and driving the tenant to a petition to get that order vacated by moving the court under clause (c) of S.11(2) of the Act. But that does not mean that the Rent Control Court or the appellate Authority has a duty to determine the arrears of rent and ascertain whether mere was anything due. If the Rent Control Court or the appellate Authority has failed to determine such arrears and has passed an order under S.11(2)(b) finding the tenant to be a defaulter, such an order cannot be said to be illegal or unreasonable". 6. I am in respectful agreement with the interpretation placed by the learned Judge. Even though the appellate order for eviction is in a language by which it may appear that it is a conditional order and on the condition being satisfied, the order of eviction will vanish, it can only be read as a repetition of the requirements of S.11(2) (c) and without an order on a properly instituted application under S.11(2) (c), the order passed under S.11(2)(b) shall remain operative. The Rent Control Court when exercising the powers under S.11(2)(b) is concerned only with the requirements of S.11(2)(b) and if those requirements are satisfied, then the order to he passed is one directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. Such an order becomes capable of being executed only on the expiry of one month from the date of the order or such further period as the Rent Controller may in its discretion allow. That is provided in S.11(2)(c). If during such period the arrears of rent, interest and costs of proceedings are deposited, under S.11(2)(c) the Court shall vacate the order of eviction. Unless and until an order under S.11(2)(c) vacating the eviction order is passed, the order under S.11(2)(b) will remain operative and executable. That is provided in S.11(2)(c). If during such period the arrears of rent, interest and costs of proceedings are deposited, under S.11(2)(c) the Court shall vacate the order of eviction. Unless and until an order under S.11(2)(c) vacating the eviction order is passed, the order under S.11(2)(b) will remain operative and executable. When an order under S.11(2)(b) is put in execution, the execution court is not competent to receive evidence and embark upon an enquiry as to whether the arrears of rent, interest and costs have been paid or not. It is the domain of the Rent Control Court itself when an application is moved under S.11(2)(c) to get the order of eviction vacated. Accepting for argument's sake that the order passed by the appellate Authority was a conditional order, even then for satisfying that condition there shall be an application under S.11(2) (c) before the Rent Control Court and an order passed by that court under S.11(2)(c) vacating the order of eviction passed under S.11(2)(b). From what has been stated above, it is clear that the original petitions are without merit. In the result, both the original petitions are dismissed. No costs.