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1996 DIGILAW 354 (ORI)

DAYANIDHI BHUKTA v. STATE OF ORISSA

1996-11-29

P.C.NAIK, R.K.DASH

body1996
JUDGMENT : R.K. Dash, J. - The appellant assails the judgment and order of conviction u/s 32.IPC and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded to him by the learned Sessions Judge, Bolangir, in Sessions Case No. 44 of 1992. The charge levelled, against the appellant was that on 15-1-1992 he assaulted Sumitra Bhukta (hereinafter referred to as 'the deceased'), his daughter-in-law with an axe and committed her murder. 2. Briefly stated, the prosecution case is that the appellant an old man aged 75 used to have frequent quarrels with the deceased and this is the reason why he, although was residing under the same roof with his son, was cooking his food separately. On the date of incident, i. e. on 15-1-1992, at about noon, the appellant hit the deceased with an axe and caused her instantaneous death. He had been seen by Dhanmat Saraf, PW 1 while coming out of the place of incident with an axe smeared with blood. PW 1 then reported the matter to the Sub-Inspector of Police, PW 7 who registered a case and proceeded with the investigation in course of which he held inquest over the body of the deceased, sent the dead body for post-mortem examination, seized blood-stained earth, wearing apparels of the deceased as well as the appellant, blood stained axe and nail scrapping of the appellant, examined the witnesses and after closure of investigation, placed charge-sheet against the appellant u/s 302, IPC to face the trial. 3. The plea of the appellant was one of denial and false accusation. 4. The prosecution, in oder to bring home the charge to the appellant, examined as many as seven witnesses of whom Daitari Bhukta (PW 3) is the sole eye-witness to the incident, Dhanmat Saraf the informant (PW 1) and Govinda Chandra Tandi (PW 2) are the post occurrence witnesses and Juglal Bhukta (PW 4) is the son of the appellant. Dr. Sarat Kumar Routrai (PW 5) is the doctor who conducted autopsy and Ganesh Chandra Pradhan (PW 7) is the Investigating Officer The learned trial Judge upon consideration of the evidence and mainly relying on the evidence of the sole eye-witness (PW 3) held the appellant guilty of the charge and consequently, convicted and sentenced him as hereinbefore stated. 5. Dr. Sarat Kumar Routrai (PW 5) is the doctor who conducted autopsy and Ganesh Chandra Pradhan (PW 7) is the Investigating Officer The learned trial Judge upon consideration of the evidence and mainly relying on the evidence of the sole eye-witness (PW 3) held the appellant guilty of the charge and consequently, convicted and sentenced him as hereinbefore stated. 5. Shri P. K. Misra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, has assailed the legality and correctness of the findings arrived at by the trial Court on the following grounds : (1) That PW 3, the solitary eye-witness to the incident being a child witness and there being no other evidence to corroborate his testimony, learned trial Judge would have been slow to put implicit reliance on his evidence and to act upon it, particularly when he was not questioned about his competency to understand the questions and give rational answers; (2) That the find of blood of group 'B' in the wearing apparel of the appellant which was the blood group of the deceased, cannot be a circumstance against the appellant since his blood Was of the same group as found by the Scientific Officer; (3) That the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, even if taken as a whole does not establish beyond doubt about the appellant's involvement in the alleged crime. 6. Learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State, while supporting the impugned judgment, contends that as the findings of the learned trial Judge is based on appreciation-of evidence and there being no infirmity in the ultimate conclusion, the same should not be interfered with. 7. The motive for the crime, as sought to be projected by the prosecution, was that there were frequent skirmishes between the appellant and the deceased for which the appellant intended to do away with the deceased. In order to prove the motive, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of PW 1 as also PW 4, the son of the appellant. It would appear from the evidence of PW 1, the informant that the deceased bad earlier lodged report to the police against the appellant but police did not file any case as dispute and difference between them was amicably settled. It would appear from the evidence of PW 1, the informant that the deceased bad earlier lodged report to the police against the appellant but police did not file any case as dispute and difference between them was amicably settled. So far PW 4 in concerned, he has candidly admitted that his father, though was staying with him but was not taken food as it was being prepared by deceased from the above evidence, it is well-proved that the appellant was quits unhappy with the deceased for which he had frequent quarrels with her. 8. Turning to the factual aspect of the case, we may note that the only evidence on which the prosecution has sought to prove its case is the evidence of PW 3, As the record reveals, the learned trial Judge did not put specific questions for his satisfaction that he was capable to understand the questions and give rational answers. It is no doubt true that the learned trial Judge has indicated that he tested the witness and was satisfied that he was giving rational replies, but how he tested and what questions he put are not clearly borne out from the record. 9. Section 118, Evidence Act provides that all persons are competent to testify unless the Court considers that they are unable to understand the questions put to them or to give rational answers due to tender years, extreme old age, disease whether of body or mind or any other cause of same kind. A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto. However, before the evidence of a child witness is recorded, the Court must by preliminary examination test his testimonial competency by putting appropriate questions, Therefore, it is desirable for the trial Court who has a child witness before him to preserve on record, apart from the child witness's evidence, the questions that were put and the answers elicited, so that the appellate Court can come to the conclusion whether trial Court's decision in regard to competency of the witness was correct or erroneous. But then omission to make such note in the deposition of the witness does not affect the admissibility of his evidence or render his evidence unworthy of credit, since it is merely an irregularity and not illegality. But then omission to make such note in the deposition of the witness does not affect the admissibility of his evidence or render his evidence unworthy of credit, since it is merely an irregularity and not illegality. In the case in hand learned Sessions Judge although kept a note that he tested the child witness, PW 3 and was satisfied about his competency to give intelligible and rational answers, but he failed to mention in details the questions that he put to the witness in that regard. This omission as I have already observed being an irregularity, does not militate against the witness's testimonial competency. It need be stated, the trial Court having tested his evidence with rigorous circumspection has accepted the same as true and trustworthy. For our satisfaction we have scrutinised the evidence of PW 3 for our independent assessment of his creditworthiness. He has unhesitatingly stated that while he was near the culvert saw the appellant killing the deceased with an axe. True it is when cross-examined he could not say whether the incident occurred during day-time or night-time, but that alone in our opinion is not sufficient to impeach his credibility particularly when he was examined about six months after the incident. To our mind, he is a witness of truth and has given a true account of the incident that happened in his presence. 10. Though we have accepted and relied upon the version of PW 3, as disussed above, yet for abundant caution. we have searched for corroboration from the evidence of PWs 1 and 2, According to PW 1, he while returning home saw the appellant corning out with a blood-stained axe from the roadside low land, that is the spot where dead body of the deceased was lying and while coming he was uttering that she had been paid her dues (meaning thereby the deceased). The next witness is PW 2 whose evidence runs almost In the same line as that of PW 1; inasmuch as he stated the he was sitting in his shop when he saw the appellant going with a blood-stained axe and was giving out that since the woman (meaning thereby the deceased) was always harassing him, she had been finished. 11. The Investigating Officer (PW 7) in course of investigation seized blood-stained earth, nail scrappings and wearing apparels of both appellant and the deceased. 11. The Investigating Officer (PW 7) in course of investigation seized blood-stained earth, nail scrappings and wearing apparels of both appellant and the deceased. He also took blood sample of the appellant and sent all the seized articles including the blood sample . of the appellant., to the State Forensic Science Laboratory, for examination. The report of the Chemical Examiner which is marked Ext. 11 reveals that the wearing apparel and nail scrappings of the appellant and the saree of the deceased contained human blood of group 'B'. It further appears that the sample of blood drawn from the appellant was also of the same group. In that view of the matter, we would have rejected the Chemical Examiner's report outright but as no explanation was offered by the appellant as to how human blood group 'B' could be found on the axe when it being not his case that at the relevant time he had sustained some injuries with that axe; we are of the opinion that find of blood on the axe as well as on the wearing apparel and nail scrappings is a strong piece of corroborative evidence to prove the appellant's involvement in the incident 12. Having given our anxious consideration to the materials on record, as discussed above, 'we are of the firm view that it was the appellant who hit the deceased with axe and committed her murder. Consequently, we uphold the conviction and sentence recorded against him by the trial Court and dismiss the appeal P.C. Naik, J. 13. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed