B. PANIGRAHI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revisional application is directed against an Order/judgment passed by the Executing Court, Assistant District Judge, 8th court, Alipore in Execution Case No. 14/85 whereby and whereunder the court condoned the delay and issued notice against the Judgment-debtors. ( 2 ) THE case has suffered a chequered history. The opposite party, original Decree holder filed a suit in T. S. No. 1171/62 in the Original Side of this court for specific performance of contract against one Salil Kr. Das, the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties 2 to 4 and the predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties 8 to 10, Malay Kr. Das and Chanchal Kr. Das; which was decreed on contest on 8th January, 1964. The decree-holder opposite party No. 1 filed another suit in T. S. No. 1171/62 for recovery of possession in the 8th court, Sub-ordinate Judge, Alipore and was decreed on 3rd October, 1969. After the decree the opposite party No. 1 levied execution case No. 6/76 against the Judgment-debtors in the 8th court of the Sub-ordinate Judge, Alipore and allegedly had taken delivery of possession with police help on 28th May,1977. Subsequently, the opposite party No. 1 said to have filed another suit in T. S. 583/77 against some of the defendants of the earlier suit, Chanchal Das, Malay Kr. Das and Smt. Anjali Das under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act for recovery of two room of the ground floor of the suit premises, on the allegations that the said 3 persons had dispossessed the opposite party No. 1 from the suit premises namely, the two rooms on 29th May, 1977. It appears that the learned Munsif had dismissed the suit by holding that there was no delivery of possession granted to the opposite party No. 1. Thus, the opposite party No. 1 filed fresh execution case in title execution case No. 14/85 before the same executing court, namely, i. e. 8th court of the Sub-ordinate Judge, Alipore along with an application under sections 14 and 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. The learned executing court was however, satisfied about the grounds for filling execution case at such belated stage and condoned the delay. That is how, the petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order or judgment of the executing court filed this instant revision. ( 3 ) MR. The learned executing court was however, satisfied about the grounds for filling execution case at such belated stage and condoned the delay. That is how, the petitioner being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order or judgment of the executing court filed this instant revision. ( 3 ) MR. Bhaskar Bhattacharjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, has strenuously urged that in this case the executing court appears to have committed serious illegality in condoning the delay and accepting the execution case, particularly, after the first execution case having been fully satisfied. The learned executing court was oblivious to the situation that the previous suit filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was only against 3 of the Judgment-debtors and the same in relation to two rooms which was the subject matter of the suit. Once the decree-holder, namely, the opposite party No. 1 had filed an application before the executing court mentioning that the decree was fully satisfied and after the court having recorded that the decree had been fully satisfied, there was no occasion again for the decree-holder to lodge a second application claiming for delivery of possession. In such situation, the learned executing court should not have condoned the delay owing to stay or injunction being passed by various courts in earlier proceedings. ( 4 ) MR. Roy Chowdhury, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party decree-holder has while repelling the contention of the petitioner advanced his argument by stating that the order passed by the executing court by any stretch of imagination be said to have suffered from any factual or legal infirmity so as to be called in question in this revisional application. He has also highlighted that the delivery of possession could not be affected on account of filling of an application by the petitioner for recall of the writ and the court had also actually recalled the writ of delivery of possession. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has further urged that in the suit filed by the opposite party No. 1 under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the court has specifically determined that there was no delivery of possession. Pursuant to the decree, therefore, the decree-holder is at option to take fresh delivery of possession in accordance with law. Mr. Roy Chowdhury has further urged that in the suit filed by the opposite party No. 1 under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the court has specifically determined that there was no delivery of possession. Pursuant to the decree, therefore, the decree-holder is at option to take fresh delivery of possession in accordance with law. In such back-ground, the decree-holder was obliged to file an application before the executing court claiming fresh delivery, notwithstanding, the previous recording by the executing court that the decree was fully satisfied. Chanchal Kr. Das who is one of the judgment-debtor in his execution case filed a suit in T. S. No. 53/70 in the court of 8th Sub-ordinate Judge, Alipore for declaration that the decrees obtained in earlier two suits were nullity, inter alia, prayed for injunction. In the aforementioned suit he took the specific ground that the aforesaid decrees were no binding on him inasmuch as he was a minor at the time of filing of the suit and he was not properly represented in the aforementioned suit. After the prayer for injunction having been refused the plaintiff in the aforementioned suit had filed an appeal in Misc. Appeal No. 45/72 in the court of the Additional District Judge, Alipore. Against the order of the appellate court, the plaintiff filed a revision in revision case No. 687/73 in this court and this court granted injunction against delivery of possession till the disposal of the suit No. T. S. 53/70. The aforesaid suit was dismissed on 20th December, 1975, inter alia, holding that the judgment and decree passed in suit No. 1171/62 and T. S. No. 63/65 were valid and binding on him. After the disposal of the said suit another judgment-debtor Malay Kr. Das filed a suit in T. S. No. 42/76 before the same court. Thereafter, the opposite party No. 1 filed the execution case No. 6/76 in the court of the Assistant District Judge, Alipore for executing the decree passed in T. S. No. 63/65 against the Judgment-debtors. The plaintiff has allegedly taken possession with police help on 20th May, 1977. He was said to have been dispossessed of on 29th May, 1977. So, he filed a suit in T. S. No. 583/77 in the court of the Munsif at Sealdah under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The plaintiff has allegedly taken possession with police help on 20th May, 1977. He was said to have been dispossessed of on 29th May, 1977. So, he filed a suit in T. S. No. 583/77 in the court of the Munsif at Sealdah under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act. The suit filed by one of the judgment-debtor in T. S. No. 42/76 was dismissed on 27th February, 1981. Subsequently, on 31st August, 1981 the suit filed by the opposite party against Chanchal Kr. Das, Anjali Das and Malay Kr. Das was dismissed holding, inter alia, that the possession was invalid as the learned executing court recalled the writ of delivery of possession on 28th May, 1977. ( 5 ) THE scale controversy centres round in this case is whether the possession delivered to the opposite party No. 1 pursuant to decree passed in T. S. 63/65 by the executing court is valid and binding on him. In case, the delivery of possession as claimed by the petitioner to have been granted to the opposite party No. 1 by the executing court is accepted, obviously the second application for delivery of possession on the basis of the same decree would be held not maintainable. ( 6 ) IN the execution case No. 6/76 the petitioner and other judgment-debtors filed an application on 28. 5. 77 that the writ of delivery of possession for the disputed property with police aid be recalled in as much as they had not been given an opportunity of being heard. The court recalled the order under which the police aid was given to the decree-holder. From the case record, it does not appear that the delivery of possession which has been claimed by the petitioner to have been granted to the opposite party No. 1 was recorded in the execution case. ( 7 ) MR. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has strongly urged that since the decree-holder filed an application for recording full satisfaction of the case, there leaves no ambiguity to hold that the decree-holder has already received possession of the suit property. From the undisputed facts, it appears that the opposite party No. 1 decree-holder filed another suit for recovery of possession under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against some of the judgment debtors and T. S. 583/77. From the undisputed facts, it appears that the opposite party No. 1 decree-holder filed another suit for recovery of possession under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against some of the judgment debtors and T. S. 583/77. The said suit was dismissed, inter alia, holding that no possession could be granted to the decree-holder on account of filing of an application by the judgment-debtors for the recall of the writ. In fact, the learned executing court recalled the writ. In the aforesaid situation, the learned court while deciding the prayer for granting delivery of possession declined to accept the prayer of the opposite party on the sole ground that the latter had not taken possession through the court. It was vehemently urged by Mr. Bhattacharjee that the suit filed by the opposite party under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act was only in relation for a portion of the suit house. True it is that the said suit was only for a portion but the question whether the plaintiff of that suit had taken possession of the suit house or not was the subject matter of controversy and the trial court found that there was no delivery of possession on account of writ having been recalled at the instance of the judgment-debtors. Notwithstanding, the filing of the application for full satisfaction, if the court found that there was no actual delivery of possession, there would be no legal impediment entertain the subsequent application for granting delivery of possession of suit house. Such application for recording full satisfaction was prior to the passing of the judgment in T. S. 583/77. It could be open to the judgment-debtor to bring to the notice of the court in course of hearing of T. S. 583/77 that the decree-holder had accepted the delivery of possession and wanted to close the execution case after recording full satisfaction. I am at a loss to understand as to why both parties kept court in dark without bringing to its notice of such fact at the time of disposal of the suit. Therefore, the court was of the view that the delivery of possession assuming to have been granted to the decree-holder was illegal inasmuch as it was given after the recall of the writ. In the above context, it cannot be argued by the petitioner that there was full and complete satisfaction of the decree. Therefore, the court was of the view that the delivery of possession assuming to have been granted to the decree-holder was illegal inasmuch as it was given after the recall of the writ. In the above context, it cannot be argued by the petitioner that there was full and complete satisfaction of the decree. In this connection, the learned advocate appearing for the opposite party No. l decree-holder has relied on a decision reported in AIR 1974 SC page 325 in the case of K. Ramalingam and Ors. v. K. N. Krishna Reddi and Ors. It has been held as follows: -"thiru Nainar Sundaram first cited the decision in Gopaldas v. Thansingh (1882) ILR 4 All 184. That was a case in which the plaintiff appellant got possession of the property as per law, subsequent to that possession, the defendant entered into possession and cultivated the lands, and the subsequent execution petition by die plaintiff, who originally filed the suit for possession was rejected on the ground that the order of execution was complete as early as 7. 3. 1877. Thus, it was a clear case wherein possession had been handed over legally and actually and subsequent to that possession the defendants have taken possession of the property. In such circumstances there is no difficulty in upholding the principle that no second execution will lie after the satisfaction of the decree entered completely in the prior execution petition. In such cases, a suit alone will lie. Correctly the Bench of the Allahabad High Court has decided so, and I do not think that the said facts are present in the present case. Here, the contention of the appellants is that the decree has not been executed and that the alleged delivery of possession by way of execution is only a paper delivery, and not actual physical delivery. In such a case, it cannot be said that the decree has been executed in full until the court satisfies itself that there has been a real actual physical delivery in execution of the decree as claimed by the decree holder. In such a case, it cannot be said that the decree has been executed in full until the court satisfies itself that there has been a real actual physical delivery in execution of the decree as claimed by the decree holder. The decisions cited by Thiru Nainar Sundaram, such as Thandavaraya Mudali v. Subramania Gurukkai, AIR 1961 Mad 930 and Chokkalinga v. Gopalathathachariar, AIR 1917 Mad 202 clearly hold that a decree-holder is not entitled to file a second execution petitioner for possession under Order XXI, Rule 35, CPC after he has been put in possession in accordance with an order passed in an application under the same Order and Rule. These decisions also follow (1882) ILR 4 All 184. It is clear from the above decisions that once it is found that there is no actual possession given in accordance with an order passed on an application under Order XXI, Rule 35, CPC, there cannot be any finality in the execution proceedings and as such a subsequent application is maintainable for execution of the decree. " ( 8 ) MR. Bhattacharjee, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has also invited my attention that the judgment filed under section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is not binding on the petitioner since in that suit all the judgment debtors were not parties. The aforesaid contention does not cut any ice. Since in the above suit the sole question was about the validity and the propriety of the delivery of possession and the learned court was led to believe that there was no legal and valid possession granted to the decree-holder pursuant to the decree and on that account the prayer for delivery of possession was refused. In that view of the case even all the judgment-debtors might not have been added as parties but since the question of delivery of possession was the prime consideration, the findings of the court thereto shall bind on all the parties. Mr. Bhattacharjee has laid great stress on a judgment reported in AIR 1961 SC, page 137 in the case of Shew Bux Mohata and Ors. v. Bengal Breweries Ltd. and Ors. On a close of reading of the decision I do not find that it would be of any help to him since the facts of the above case are quite distinguishable from the instant case. v. Bengal Breweries Ltd. and Ors. On a close of reading of the decision I do not find that it would be of any help to him since the facts of the above case are quite distinguishable from the instant case. The apex court was inclined to believe that the returns submitted by the Nazir showed that there was delivery of possession of this premises to the decree-holder. In the instant case, it is not spelt-out that the decree-holder was granted possession through the Nazir by court. It transpires that the writ of delivery was subsequently recalled at the instance of the judgment-debtors. So, therefore, it cannot be argued that there was full and complete delivery of possession pursuant to the decree. Reliance was placed by the opposite party decree-holder on the decision reported in AIR 1934 Cal page 793 in the case of Abdul Hamid v. Prokash Chandra Nandi and Ors. It has been as follows:"where after delivery of possession made in execution of a final decree for partition, a party cannot get actual possession of his share, court should order for fresh delivery of possession. In execution of a final decree for partition A's share was delivered, but it was found that A could not get actual possession of his share as some huts belonging to other co shares were standing on it. Held: that court's order for a fresh delivery of possession by removing the huts was within jurisdiction. " ( 9 ) TAKING broad and expansive view of the matter and after going through the executing court records, I found that there was no legal and valid delivery of possession to the decree-holder opposite party No. 1, therefore, he has obviously a remedy to take possession through court. Thus, the learned executing court was fully within its jurisdiction to condone the delay by excluding the time occupied in the previous litigation on account of injunction and was, further justified to direct the execution to proceed against the judgment-debtors ( 10 ) IN the result, there is no merit in this revisional application is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. Application dismissed