KRISHNA MOORTHY, J. ( 1 ) THE Karnataka State Electricity Board is the Appellant. They have challenged the Judgement of the Single Judge in W. P. 1531/1991 whereby the demand for interest for the period 16-12-1981 to 31-3-1987 on belated payment of electricity charges was set aside. ( 2 ) THE first respondent-writ petitioner is a Public Limited Company engaged in the production of Ferro Alloys and is one of the largest consumers of High Tension Electricity in the State. Special long-term agreements were entered into in the year 1977 under Section 49 (3) of the Electricity Supply Act 1948 between the petitioner and the Karnataka Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the 'board'.) The petitioner was being charged at a concessional rate of 12. 7 paise per Unit of power consumed in its plant. By the Electricity Supply Karnataka Amendment Act 1981 Section 49 (5) was inserted in the parent Act by which petitioner and other similar establishments became liable to pay at the Uniform Tariff rate for the time being in force notwithstanding the special agreements under Section 49 (3 ). The petitioner challenged the validity of the above legislation. In that writ petition this Court granted stay of operation of the impugned legislation or notification and directed the petitioner to pay at the rate of 25 paise per unit with effect from 16-12-1981 and at 45 paise per unit from 17-3-1986 by a modified interim order and to furnish security for the balance amount. As a result of the above interim orders, the Board used to send bills at the rate directed in the interim order as against the higher uniform tariff up to 31-3-1987. But from 1-4-1987 even during the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner started paying at the full uniform tariff rate for the time being in force. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was however ultimately dismissed by the Court on 19-4-1988. The S. L. P. against the above was admitted on 26-5-1988 and it is pending. But no interim order was granted by the Supreme Court. But the appeal filed by another Company was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 13-5-1992 and the judgement is reported in Indian Aluminimum Company v. Karnataka Electricity Board, AIR 1992 SC 2169 . ( 3 ) IN the meanwhile by letter Annexure-A dated 16-6-1988 the Board demanded from the petitioner payment of Rs. 6. But the appeal filed by another Company was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 13-5-1992 and the judgement is reported in Indian Aluminimum Company v. Karnataka Electricity Board, AIR 1992 SC 2169 . ( 3 ) IN the meanwhile by letter Annexure-A dated 16-6-1988 the Board demanded from the petitioner payment of Rs. 6. 14 crores as arrears of energy charges as well as Rs. 4. 74 crores as an interest on belated payments of energy charges. The petitioner paid the arrears of energy charges of Rs. 6 crores for the period 16-12-1981 to 31-3-1987 subject to the result of the appeal before the Supreme Court. By letter dated 28-6-1990 (Anexure-B) the petitioner sent 4 cheques for an aggregate amount of Rs. 3,95,50,250/- towards the arrears of energy charges with an intimation that the petitioner is not liable to pay penal interest as they were paying the dues in accordance with the interim orders. To this the petitioner was informed by Annexure-C communication of the Board that the amount paid by the petitioner is adjusted towards interest on Revenue arrears under Regulation 30. 07 of the Electricity Supply Regulation 1988. The petitioner replied that the provision for appropriation contained in Regulation 30. 07 was inapplicable when the petitioner has opted for appropriation under the general law. ( 4 ) THE petitioner is challenging the levy of interest for the aforesaid period on the ground that the Board has no authority to recover arrears as Regulation 30. 05 is beyond the power given under Section 79 of the Act and that it is penal, unjust and usurious and cannot be enforced. It was also contended that when the petitioner has indicated the mode or appropriation of the payment in a particular manner regulation 30. 09 which provides for mode of appropriation cannot have any application. ( 5 ) IT is also the case of the petitioner that, during the operation of the interim order by this Court in W. P. 34410/ 1991 the petitioner was not liable to pay the uniform tariff rate and the liabilities arose only from 19-4-1988 when the writ petition was dismissed by this Court. During that period the Board also served bills only at the rate fixed by the interim order which was being punctually paid by the petitioner. During that period the Board also served bills only at the rate fixed by the interim order which was being punctually paid by the petitioner. It is also the case of the petitioner that under the Regulation Bill amount will have to be paid within 15 days of the presentation of the Bill. The regulation further provides that in case of belated payments of bill amount interest will levied from the due date, the due date being the date mentioned in the bill. In this case the demand for the energy charges were made only on 16-6-1988 and accordingly the petitioner is not liable to pay interest from 16-12-1981 to 31-31987. ( 6 ) ON behalf of the Board it was contended that the interim order passed by this Court in the earlier writ petition will not absolve the petitioner from paying the energy charges at the uniform tariff rate. When the writ petition is ultimately dismissed the petitioner became liable to pay the energy charges which were due with interest as provided for in the Regulation. The Board was prevented from issuing the bills during the pendency of the writ petition because of the interim order. When the interim order stood vacated by the dismissal of the writ petition all consequences follow and the non-service of a bill when they were prevented from doing so cannot be availed of by the petitioner in denying the legitimate interest which is due. The petitioner is responsible for the interim order and they cannot take advantage of the same after the dismissal of the writ petition. Even otherwise under the agreement the petitioner is liable to pay the energy charges consumed in the previous months every month. For the charges to become due it is not necessary that the bill should be presented, for, the petitioner is liable to pay on the basis of the meter reading. In the light of Regulation 30. 07 providing for appropriation the petitioner is not entitled to rely on the general law of appropriation. ( 7 ) THE learned Single Judge held that no action has been initiated under the Karnataka Electricity Board (Recovery of Dues) Act 1976. So far as the liability under the Regulation is concerned it was held that the bill amount will have to be paid within 15 days from the date of presentation which should provide for a date of payment. So far as the liability under the Regulation is concerned it was held that the bill amount will have to be paid within 15 days from the date of presentation which should provide for a date of payment. The interest will become due only if the bill amount is not paid within the stipulated time. In this case during the pendency of the writ petition, the Board served bills only on the basis of the interim orders. The claim that the uniform tariff rate was made only on 16-6-1988 after the dismissal of the writ petition and accordingly the petitioner is liable to pay interest only from that date and claim for interest prior to that date is not legal. The learned Judge also held that in spite of the interim order by this Court, the Board could have served a Bill for the full amount but postponed payment till the disposal of the writ petition. That having not been done, the Board is not liable to claim interest till 16-6-1988. Accordingly the writ petition was allowed and the demand for interest made by the Board was set aside. As the learned Judge held that the claim for interest is not sustainable the question regarding appropriation was not considered. The Board has come up in appeal against the above Judgment. ( 8 ) SRI Sundaraswamy, learned Senior counsel for the appellant-Board contended that by the dismissal of the earlier writ petition, the interim order also merged in the final order and the petitioner became liable to pay the charges at the Tariff rate with consequential liabilities to pay the interest on the belated payment of charges. The Board was prevented by the interim order from serving the Bills at the Tariff rate and an order of Court cannot prejudice a party. They were serving the bill showing the amount of energy consumed and the petitioner could have paid the amount under the Tariff to avoid payment of interest in the eventuality of the writ petition being dismissed as was done by him from 1-4-1987. At any rate under the agreement, petitioner was bound to pay the charges in the succeeding month and the non-service of a bill will not make the charges not due. The amount will become due in the succeeding month of consumption even without serving bill. At any rate under the agreement, petitioner was bound to pay the charges in the succeeding month and the non-service of a bill will not make the charges not due. The amount will become due in the succeeding month of consumption even without serving bill. Though the petitioner obtained an interim order the writ petition was ultimately dismissed and the Board cannot be made to suffer due to an order of Court. ( 9 ) ON the other hand, Sri. G. Ramaswamy learned Senior Counsel contended that by virtue of the interim order, the notification was stayed and during that period the energy charges were not payable or due and hence there is no liability to pay interest. It was also contended by him that at any rate the liability to pay interest will arise only on presentation of a bill and the non-payment of the same within the due date. In this case the bill for the full amount was presented only on 16-6-1988 and hence liability for interest arises only from that date. Under Regulation 35 an option is given to the consumer to pay within 15 days of the presentation of the Bill or as provided in the agreement. The Board having chosen to serve a bill, the liability to pay interest will arise only if default is made in not paying the amount on the due date. ( 10 ) SRI Jayaram, Senior Counsel who continued the arguments of Sri. G. Ramaswamy contended that the provision in Regulation 30. 07 will not apply when the petitioner has indicated his mode of appropriation and that the general law of appropriation alone will apply. ( 11 ) IN the light of the above contentions, the following points arise for consideration in this appeal, namely (1) Whether in view of the interim order in W. P. 34410/ 1981, the demand in Annexure- A for payment of interest on belated payment is lawful ? (2) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the non-presentation of a bill for energy charges at the Tariff rate from 16-12-1981 to 31-3-1987 would disentitle the Board from claiming interest after the dismissal of W. P. 34410/ 1981 ? (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to indicate the mode of appropriation of payment made by them in view of Regulation 30. 07. ( 12 ) POINT NO. (3) Whether the petitioner is entitled to indicate the mode of appropriation of payment made by them in view of Regulation 30. 07. ( 12 ) POINT NO. 1 :-On 5-2-1982 an interim order was passed by this Court to the following effect :-"we direct the operation of the impugned notification to be stayed subject to the condition that the petitioner pay 25 paise per KWH for the supply of electricity to Ferro-Silicon Plant and Pig Iron Plant from 16-12-1981 upto the date of disposal of this writ petition and for the balance of the amount that may become due from the company to the Board under the impugned notification, it should furnish security to the satisfaction of the Board within 2 weeks from this date". ( 13 ) THE order was modified on 17-3-1986 and the petitioner was directed to pay at the rate of 45 paise per unit. The Board was presenting bills at the rates fixed by the interim order and the petitioner was paying at the above rates till 31-3-1987. But from 1-4-1987 the petitioner was paying the full Tariff rate. It is the case of the writ petitioner that by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court the notification was stayed and the charges at the Tariff rate was not due and accordingly they are not liable to pay interest on the belated payment under the Regulation. ( 14 ) THERE is a distinction between the quashing of a notification and stay of operation of the same. If the notification is quashed, it ceases to have any effect at any time and it results in restoration of the position as it existed on that day. But in so far as an order of stay is concerned, inspite of the order the notification continues to be in force, but its enforcement is kept in abeyance during its operation, as against the petitioner. The interim orders passed by the Court will merge in the final order with the result that when the writ petitions were ultimately dismissed, the interim order becomes non-est from the inception. In other words, when the writ petition is ultimately dismissed the parties will be relegated to the original position as on the date of notification with all consequential liabilities and obligations arising therefrom. In other words, when the writ petition is ultimately dismissed the parties will be relegated to the original position as on the date of notification with all consequential liabilities and obligations arising therefrom. The liability of the petitioner to pay the uniform Tariffrate with effect from 16-12-1981 is restored and he has to face the consequences of non-payment of the same. ( 15 ) IT is appropriate at this stage to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust reported in AIR 1992 SC 1439 at page 1444. "while considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of a operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an order does not, however, lead to such a result. It only means that the order which has been stayed would not be operative from the date of the passing of the stay order and it does not mean that the said order has been wiped out from existence. This means that if an order passed by the Appellate Authority is quashed and the matter is remanded the result would be that the appeal which had been disposed of by the said order of the Appellate Authority would be restored and it can be said to be pending before the Appellate Authority after the quashing of the order of the Appellate Authority. The same cannot be said with regard to an order staying the operation of the order of the Appellate Authority because inspite of the said order the order of the Appellate Authority continues to exist in law and so long as it exists, it cannot be said that the appeal which has been disposed of by the said order has not been disposed and is still pending. " ( 16 ) THE Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Adoni Ginning Factory v. Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board reported in AIR 1979 SC 1511 for the position that by virtue of the interim order staying the notification there was no liability for the petitioner to pay the Uniform Tariff rate and no question of belated payment arises. In the above case the Government of Andhra Pradesh enhanced the rate of electrical energy from 30-1-1955. This was challenged in a writ petition and an interim order was granted. Though the writ petition was allowed in an appeal by the Government, the writ petition was dismissed. There was a further appeal and the Supreme Court restrained the Government from realising the enhanced rates. The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appeals. Andhra Pradesh Electricity Board, successor of Government, directed the consumers to pay surcharge on the bills payment of which was not made within time against which writ petitions were filed. The petitions were dismissed and in the appeal before Supreme Court the question arose as to whether there is liability to pay surcharge while the interim order of the Supreme Court was in force. The Electricity Board did not claim surcharge when the notification was stayed by the High Court. In that context the Supreme Court observed as follows:- "5. The primary submission of the learned Counsel was that there was no default on the part of the appellants in view of the injunction granted by the Supreme Court. We are unable to agree. The injunction granted by this Court restrained the Government from realising the arrears of enhanced charges. For the purposes of the appeals we may proceed on the assumption that the order of injunction bound the Electricity Board also. All that the injunction did was to restrain the Board from realising the arrears which meant that the Board was restrained from taking any coercive of electricity etc. , for the realisation of the arrears. The operation of G. O. No. 187 dated 30th January, 1995, as such was not stayed. Thus the obligation of the consumers to pay charges at the enhanced rates was not suspended though the Electricity Board was prevented from realising the arrears. It was up to the consumers to pay or not to pay the arrears. The operation of G. O. No. 187 dated 30th January, 1995, as such was not stayed. Thus the obligation of the consumers to pay charges at the enhanced rates was not suspended though the Electricity Board was prevented from realising the arrears. It was up to the consumers to pay or not to pay the arrears. If they paid the arrears they relieved themselves against the liability to pay surcharge. If they did not pay the arrears they were bound to pay the surcharge if they failed in the appeals before the Supreme Court. This was precisely what was pointed out by the Electricity Board in the Bills issued to the consumers after the Supreme Court granted the injunction. We may mention here that the Electricity Board is not demanding any surcharge on the arrears for the period during which the Andhra Pradesh High Court had granted stay. It was explained by the learned counsel for the Electricity Board that no surcharge was claimed for that period as the operation of G. O. No. 187 dated 30th January, 1955 had itself been stayed at that time. Surcharge was claimed for the period during which the appeals were pending in the Supreme Court since the Supreme Court did not stay the operation of G. O. No. 187 but only restrained the Board from collecting the arrears. That no stay of G. O. No. 187 was ever intended to be granted by the Supreme Court is also clear from the circumstances that there was no injunction restraining the Electricity Board from collecting future charges at the enhanced rates. The Electricity Board was, therefore, right in claiming surcharge for the period during which the appeals were pending in the Supreme Court and not claiming surcharge for the period during which the writ petitions and writ appeals were pending in the High Court. "it is evident from the Judgment of the Supreme Court, that the Electricity Board demanded late payment surcharge only during the period when the interim order of the Supreme Court was in force by which they were restrained from realising the arrears of surcharge. "it is evident from the Judgment of the Supreme Court, that the Electricity Board demanded late payment surcharge only during the period when the interim order of the Supreme Court was in force by which they were restrained from realising the arrears of surcharge. The Board did not claim surcharge during the period of operation of the interim order of the High Court by which the notification itself was stayed and as such the effect of dismissal of the writ petition on the result brought about by the interim order did not come up for consideration and the above decision is no authority as to the effect of an interim order when ultimately the writ petition is dismissed. It is well settled that the decision of a Court will become a binding precedent on propositions which are raised and decided by it. A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. The observations made in a Judgement has to be weighed in the light of the facts and questions of law arising for consideration in the case and cannot be made use of in isolation and out of context. Thus we are clearly of the opinion that the above decision cannot be pressed into service for the position taken up by the writ petitioner that he has no liability to pay interest during the operation of the interim order. ( 17 ) THE decision in Modi Industries Ltd. (Steels) v. Executive Engineer, E. D. Division Modinagar, reported in AIR 1991 All 351 is also a case where there was no stay of operation of the notification and is not parallel to this case. ( 18 ) BUT an identical question came up for consideration before the Allahabad High Court in M/s. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. , v. Uttar Pradesh Electricity Board reported in AIR 1994 All 273 . After analysing the entire case law and the judgment of the Supreme Court, the Court held in similar circumstances as follows:-"7. After dismissal of the writ petitions wherein notification dated 21-4-1990 was stayed, the result brought about by the interim orders staying the notification, became non-est in the eye of law and lost all its efficacy and the notification became effective from the beginning. After dismissal of the writ petitions wherein notification dated 21-4-1990 was stayed, the result brought about by the interim orders staying the notification, became non-est in the eye of law and lost all its efficacy and the notification became effective from the beginning. The result is that liability of the petitioners to pay the additional charges (late payment surcharge) on the electricity dues, payment of which was not made within time, stands revived with retrospective effect and they are liable to pay the same and no exception can be taken to the impugned bill issued by the Board. "we are in respectful agreement with the dictum laid down by the Allahabad High Court in the above case. ( 19 ) IT is to be remembered that but for the interim order passed by this Court, staying the notification, the Electricity Board could have served the bills for the full amount. It is an admitted fact that they were presenting bills at the rates fixed by the order. The writ petitioners were instrumental in getting the interim orders preventing the Board from claiming the full Tariff rates. When the writ petitions are ultimately dismissed their liability to pay the full Tariff rate revived and they have to face the consequences of non-payment of the dues in time and they cannot use the interim order as a shield when it became non-est by the dismissal of the writ petition and they cannot take advantage of their own wrong. ( 20 ) IT is a well known rule that the date of Court shall not prejudice any person. It cannot be disputed that the party affected by the interim order is the Board and not the petitioner. The delay in payment of the bills will certainly affect the working of the Board and they cannot be made to suffer by the interim order of Court when it was ultimately found that they are entitled to demand full Tariff rate. The Board was kept out of the money which was legally due to them by the act of the petitioner which has to be compensated by the petitioner by paying interest if it is otherwise due. The Board was kept out of the money which was legally due to them by the act of the petitioner which has to be compensated by the petitioner by paying interest if it is otherwise due. We accordingly hold that by the dismissal of W. P. No. 34410/1981 the interim order becomes non-est from its inception and it cannot stand in the way of the Board demanding interest on delayed payments if they are otherwise entitled to claim the same under the provision of the Regulation. Point found accordingly. ( 21 ) POINT No. 2. Regulation 35 of the Karnataka Electricity Supply Regulations framed under the Electricity Supply Act so far as it is relevant reads as follows:-"35 (a) Bills shall be paid by the consumer at the concerned Board's office within 15 days from the date of presentation or as provided in the agreement for supply. 35 (b) Any complaints with regard to the accuracy of the bills shall be made in writing to the Local Office of the Board and the amounts of such bills shall be paid under protest within the said period of 15 days. The amounts of bills paid under protest will be regarded as advances to the credit of the consumers account until such time, as the bills in dispute have been fully settled. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 (c) If the consumer fails to pay any bill presented to him within the said period of 15 days, the Board shall be at liberty to take action under sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, and to cut off the supply after giving such consumer not less that seven days clear notice in writing without prejudice to the Board's right to recover the amount of the bill by suit. Where however, any difference or dispute has been referred under the Act to an Electrical Inspector before notice was aforesaid has been given by the Board, the Board shall not be at liberty to cut off the supply for failure to pay the bill except where the Board has made the requests in writing to the consumer that the amount in dispute should be deposited with the Electrical Inspector and the Consumer has failed to comply such request. In case the last date for payment of energy charges happened to be a Sunday or a declared General Holiday the date to be noted on the Bill Cards shall be the next working day. 35 (d ).- The Board will levy interest at one and a quarter per cent per month (fifteen per cent per annum) or part thereof, from the due date on all belated payments of bills (including meter hire) subject to a minimum interest of Re. 1 /- in the case of L. T. Consumers and Rs. 5/- in the case of H. T. Consumers. ( 22 ) THE Counsel for the writ petitioner contended that the liability to pay interest will arise only from the due date on all belated payments of bill. The electricity charges will become due only within 15 days of the presentation of the bill or as provided in the agreement. It was contended that in this case the bill at the full tariff rate was served on the petitioner only on 16-6-1988 and so they are not liable to pay interest for any period before that date. On the other hand the counsel for the Board contended that they were prevented by the interim order from making a demand by the interim order. Alternatively it was contended that the presentation of the bill is not necessary if the agreement provides otherwise. In this case Clause 15 of the agreement which still binds the parties provides that "the consumer shall pay to the supplier every month, charges for the electrical energy supplied to the consumer during the preceding month. " It is his case that the energy charges automatically becomes due even without presenting a bill and the non-service of a bill does not absolve the petitioner from the liability to pay interest if the payment is belated. " It is his case that the energy charges automatically becomes due even without presenting a bill and the non-service of a bill does not absolve the petitioner from the liability to pay interest if the payment is belated. ( 23 ) THE learned Single Judge accepted the case of the writ petitioner that the liability, to pay interest would arise only after presentation of a bill and if it is not paid in time then only the payment becomes belated. The bill having been presented in this case only on 16-6-1988, there is no liability to pay interest before that date. The learned Judge further held that even during the operation of the interim order, the Board could have claimed the full Tariff rate with interest also added but could have postponed the collection of the same. In that view of the matter the learned Judge declared that the petitioner is not liable to pay interest until a demand is made on 16-6-1988. ( 24 ) AFTER hearing counsel on both sides, we find it difficult to agree with the conclusion reached by the learned Judge. It is no doubt true that under Regulation 35 (d) the Board can levy interest from the due date on all belated payments of bills. It is also true that payment becomes due only within 15 days of the presentation of the Bill or as provided for in the agreement (Regulation 35 (a) ). ( 25 ) BUT the question to be considered is as to whether the above position would change in a case where by an interim order the Board was prevented from making a demand or presenting a bill for the full Tariff amount. According to us the position is different in a case where the Board was restrained from presenting such a bill when the notification making the petitioner liable to pay full Tariff rate was stayed by this Court. In the Adoni Ginning Factory case AIR 1979 SC 1511 and also in Kanoria Chemicals and Industries case, AIR 1994 All 273 inspite of the interim order bills for the entire claim were being presented but the payment was postponed till the disposal of the writ petition. May be the Board could have presented the bills for Full Tariff rates and postponed payment till the disposal of the writ petition. May be the Board could have presented the bills for Full Tariff rates and postponed payment till the disposal of the writ petition. But the point is whether they were obliged, to do so? According to us the answer is 'no'. When the interim order is in force we are doubtful whether they could claim the entire Tariff rate. At any rate we have no doubt that they were not obliged to do so especially when the notification itself was stayed by this Court. ( 26 ) IT is not as if the Board was not presenting the bills to the petitioner. They were serving the bills at the rates fixed by the interim order of this Court and no doubt the petitioners were paying the same. The Board cannot be penalised for acting in accordance with the interim order of this Court. In fact that bills having been served on the petitioners, there was no difficulty for the petitioners making the payment at the full Tariff rate taking into account the eventuality of the writ petition being dismissed which actually happened in this case. The amounts consumed could be ascertained from the bills. It is also pertinent to note that inspite of the interim order being in force for reasons best known to them they were paying at the full Tariff rate from 1-4-1987. They should have anticipated the eventuality of the writ petition being dismissed and could have paid the full amount as was done from 1-4-1987. On the dismissal of the writ petition, the interim order became non-est from its inception and the bills presented by the Board to the petitioner in accordance with the interim order have to be deemed to be bills at the full Tariff rate. As stated earlier the interim order in a case should not prejudicially affect the Board who is the successful party when ultimately the writ petition was dismissed. In view of the above we disagree with the learned Judge and hold that the petitioner is liable to pay interest on belated payments of energy charges at full Tariff rate. ( 27 ) IN view of our above finding it is not necessary for us to consider the question as to whether by the provision contained in the agreement the energy charges will become due every succeeding month even without presenting a bill. ( 28 ) POINT No. 3regulation 30. ( 27 ) IN view of our above finding it is not necessary for us to consider the question as to whether by the provision contained in the agreement the energy charges will become due every succeeding month even without presenting a bill. ( 28 ) POINT No. 3regulation 30. 07 provides as follows :priority for adjustment of payment1 All payments made by the consumer will be adjusted in the following order of priority : (a) Interest on tax arrears. (b) Tax arrears. (c) Interest on revenue arrears. (d) Revenue arrears. (e) Current power supply charges. ( 29 ) IT is contended by the Counsel for the writ petitioner that above provision cannot have any overriding effect on the general provisions regarding appropriation contained in the Indian Contract Act. It is further contended that the petitioner having indicated the manner of appropriation by his letter the above Regulation cannot have any application. But we are not inclined to accept the contention. It is well settled that the provisions contained in Sections 59 to 61 of the Contract Act deals with cases where there are several distinct debts and does not apply to cases in which principal and interest is due on a single debt. (See AIR I941 Lahore 386 (FB), Jia Ram v. Sulakhan Mal and AIR 1965 Pandh 375, Bansilal Bullaki Ram v. Sant Ram Chopra ). ( 30 ) THAT apart the liability to pay interest is imposed by the provisions in the regulations and when a specific mode of appropriation is provided in the regulation itself that alone is applicable and not the general law of appropriation. Accordingly, we hold Point No. 3 against the writ petitioner and in favour of the Board. ( 31 ) NO other point was argued before us. In the result we allow this appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismiss W. P. No. 153/ 1991. No costs. Appeal allowed. --- *** --- .