JUDGMENT - S.B. MHASE, J.:---This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed in Reg. Civil Appeal No. 210/79 decided by District Judge, Buldhana on 30-11-82 confirming judgment and decree of partition passed by Civil Judge, Jr. Dn. Buldhana on 13-8-79 in R.C.S. No. 243/77. Brief facts of the case are that one Ramsing was the main propositor of the family, who was the maternal grand-father of plaintiff/respondent. Said Ramsing was having four sons viz. Rustam (D-1), Fulsing (D-2), Tukaram and Gulabsing-father of plaintiff-respondent. Tukaram one of the sons of Ramsingh was also dead and deft. No. 3 Ramdas is son of Tukaram. The father of the plaintiff/respondent Gulabsing expired on 8-5-57. At the time of death of Gulabsing, there was a joint family and co-parcenery of defendant No. 1 to 3 and his deceased brother Tukaram. The suit property is the joint family property of the said family. The respondent is claiming her ¼ the share in the suit property. 3. Pending the suit, original defendant No. 1 Rustam expired and his undivided share in the suit property has been inherited by original defendants 2 and 3 i.e. by the present appellants. 4. The Civil Judge, Jr. Dn., Buldhana as stated above, has passed a decree in favour of respondent for partition and separate possession of ¼th share of respondent. Further enquiry under O. 20, Rule 12 C.P.C. for fixing means profits from the date of suit till the possession of suit property is obtained by the respondent/plaintiff was also granted by the said decree. Further direction was that copy of the decree be sent to Collector for effecting partition of the suit field and so far as house property and other moveable property is concerned, direction was given that the same will be partitioned by the Commissioner who will be appointed by the Court. Accordingly, preliminary decree was drawn. The said decree was challenged as stated above by the appellants. However, the decree was confirmed by the Appellate Court also. 5. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants Mrs. Sirpurkar submitted that the judgment and decree passed by both lower courts in favour of respondent so far as house property is concerned is contrary to section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, the decree was confirmed by the Appellate Court also. 5. The learned Advocate appearing for the appellants Mrs. Sirpurkar submitted that the judgment and decree passed by both lower courts in favour of respondent so far as house property is concerned is contrary to section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to her house property included in the present suit is a dwelling house, wherein appellants, who are the male co-parceners of the said family and that they have not partitioned amongst themselves and, therefore, the law as per section 23 is bar or prohibition for filing a suit of partition in respect of said property. The second contention, which has been raised by the learned Advocate for appellants is that the suit filed by the respondent is barred by limitation. According to the appellants, father of the respondent expired in May, 1957 and the suit has been filed in the year 1977 i.e. practically after a period of 20 years. It is further submitted that the respondent has admitted in her statement that after the death of her father Gulabsing in 1957, she was married and, thereafter after a period of six years, she claimed partition from the appellants. However, instead of granting her share in partition, appellants said that the respondent shall go to the Court to claim partition of her share. Thereby according to her, right to claim partition has been denied six (six) years after the death of the father of respondent and, therefore, the suit was barred. The respondent was served in this appeal. However, she has not engaged any lawyer and, therefore, the appeal is being heard today exparte. 7. So far as the first contention raised by Mrs. Sirpurkar, learned Advocate for appellants is concerned, I find that the property described in the plaint is of three types. There is a description of agricultural lands. Thereafter, there is a description of house property and thereafter, moveable property is described. All these descriptions of different properties have been stated in the plaint para 1, without giving distinct sub-paras. However, so far as the present case is concerned, I am concerned with the house property i.e. three storeyed house - 25 hands in length and 25 hands in breadth as per the boundaries shown in the suit. All these descriptions of different properties have been stated in the plaint para 1, without giving distinct sub-paras. However, so far as the present case is concerned, I am concerned with the house property i.e. three storeyed house - 25 hands in length and 25 hands in breadth as per the boundaries shown in the suit. No doubt, this property being sole house property must have been used as a dwelling house by the appellants, who are male members. It is admitted position that the plaintiff/respondent is only class I heir entitled to ¼th share of her father. However, section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 makes it clear that - where Hindu intestate has left surviving him or her both male and female heirs specified in Class I of the Schedule and his or her property includes a dwelling house wholly occupied by members of his or her family, then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the right of any such a female heir to claim partition of a dwelling house shall not arise until the male heir choose to divide their respective shares therein, but the female heir shall be entitled to a right of residence therein; provided that where such female heir is a daughter, she shall be entitled to a right of residence in the dwelling house only if she is unmarried or has been deserted by or has separate from her husband or is a widow. 8. Therefore, even though, the plaintiff/respondent is having ¼th share in the house property described in plaint, the said house can not be partitioned unless partition of the said house is effected by male heirs. However, it is interesting to note that I am considering a case of a succession to the property of deceased Gulabsing, who has expired while joint with his brothers and the right of partition of a female heir viz. daughter of deceased Gulabsing. It is clear and also admitted that the deceased Gulabsing, father of the respondent has not left any male class I heir after his death and only class I heir is respondent/plaintiff, who is a daughter. daughter of deceased Gulabsing. It is clear and also admitted that the deceased Gulabsing, father of the respondent has not left any male class I heir after his death and only class I heir is respondent/plaintiff, who is a daughter. It is pertinent to note that section 23 has specifically laid down that where HINDU intestate has left class I heir and the property of the intestate includes a dwelling house, wholly occupied by members of inestate's family, then right of a female heir to claim partition of a dwelling house shall not arise till the male heir of the intestate do not choose to divide their respective shares. It is pertinent to note that the house in question, which has been occupied by the members of intestate's family and the occupants of the said house after the death of intestate shall be a male heir of the intestate so as to stop any female heirs of the intestate from claiming partition of the dwelling house. I am, therefore, of the view that a male heir on whose desire the right of the female heir to claim partition depends must be or shall be a male heir of the deceased intestate. If the dwelling house is possessed by a male persons wherein the deceased was co-parcener but those male persons are not the heirs of the deceased intestate then in that circumstance the female heirs are entitled to claim partition of the dwelling house and the bar or embargo provided in section 23 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 will not apply. In can be demonstrated by the facts in the present case that the plaintiff/respondent is a daughter of Gulabsing, who had left no male heir. Therefore, amongst the group of heirs of Class I, the plaintiff is the only female heir and there is no male heir of deceased Gulabsing. In can be demonstrated by the facts in the present case that the plaintiff/respondent is a daughter of Gulabsing, who had left no male heir. Therefore, amongst the group of heirs of Class I, the plaintiff is the only female heir and there is no male heir of deceased Gulabsing. The appellants, even though were the co-parceners of deceased Gulabsing are not class I male heirs of deceased Gulabsing and, therefore, even though they are residing jointly in the dwelling house described in the plaint the said joint residence or undivided residence of the appellants cannot be said to be joint residence and/or occupation by the members of the family of deceased Gulabsing and more clearly a jointness by male heirs of deceased Gulabsing so as to prohibit the plaintiff/respondent to claim partition till the appellants choose to divide their respective shares. The thrust of law is on the words, "until the male heirs choose to divide their respective shares", and therefore, on analysis it follows that it is the only male heir or heirs of deceased who succeed the dwelling house alongwith female heirs can prohibit partition of dwelling house till such male heirs choose to divide their respective shares in the dwelling house. As I have observed above, there is no male member, who can be said to be the heir of deceased Gulabsing, and who could have exercised the prohibition provided in section 23 and, therefore, the appellants are not entitled to claim the benefit of section 23. I would like to observe that the scheme of the Act is to the effect that as a result of introduction of female heirs the share of deceased intestate stands nationality partitioned from the rest of the male co-parceners. Therefore, the net result of introduction of female, being a heir of deceased intestate who expires in a joint family is destruction of coparcenery and severance of status takes place which in the result is a partition in the eye of law and, therefore, the subsequent provisions deal with the rights of heir of the deceased. In this view of the matter section 23 has been drafted by the Legislature. The other section which can be equally pointed out is section 22 creating a preferential right to acquire interest of Class I heirs inter se is available to class I heir only. In this view of the matter section 23 has been drafted by the Legislature. The other section which can be equally pointed out is section 22 creating a preferential right to acquire interest of Class I heirs inter se is available to class I heir only. In the result, I hold that there is no bar of section 23 for claiming share and partition by the respondent/plaintiff in the facts and circumstances and the law discussed above. Therefore, the first contention raised by Mrs. Sirpurkar stands rejected. 9. The second contention is about limitation. It is submitted that Articles 65 and/or 110 of Limitation Act applies to the present case. Article 65 provides as under :- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Description of suit Period of Time from which limitation period begins to run ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- For possession of immovable Twelve When the possession property or any interest years. of the defendant herein based on title. becomes adverse to the plaintiff. Explanation - for the purposes of this article: (a) where the suit is by a remainderman, a reversioner (other than a landlord) or a devisee, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the estate of the remainder man- reversioner or devisee, as the case may be, falls into possession. (b) Where the suit is by a Hindu or Muslim entitled to the possession of the immovable property on the death of a Hindu or Muslim female, the possession of the defendant shall be deemed to become adverse only when the female dies; (c) where the suit is by a purchaser at a sale in execution of a decree when the judgment debtor was out of possession at the date of the sale, the purchaser shall be deemed to be a representative of the judgment debtor who was out of possession. Article 110 provides as under :--- By a person excluded from a Twelve When the exclusion joint family property to years. becomes known to enforce a right to share the plaintiff. therein. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- As per Article 65 adverse possession is a starting point and as per Article 110, point or date of exclusion known to plaintiff is a starting point. Article 65 considered every suit based on title, while Article 110 considers claim of a person excluded from joint family property. However, by and large starting point is adverse claim by defendant to knowledge of plaintiff. Article 65 considered every suit based on title, while Article 110 considers claim of a person excluded from joint family property. However, by and large starting point is adverse claim by defendant to knowledge of plaintiff. In the present matter, the property was a joint Hindu family property of Gulabsing and his brothers, in which the plaintiff is claiming share, which she acquired as a result of death of her father in 1957. Thus appellants and respondents were co-owners of the suit property. Therefore, one of the co-owner's possession can not be said to be adverse to the other co-owner, unless the person claiming his possession adverse satisfies not only denial of title of other co-owners but has to prove ouster of other co-owners. Unless there is hostility on the part of the defendant- appellants, the bare possession of one of the appellant cannot be said to be adverse to the plaintiff- respondent. Even though one of the co-owner is not in physical possession of the property, law treats that he is in possession of the said property. The possession of one of the co-owners is the possession of all co-owners is a settled principle of law, unless and until there is an ouster of the co-owner. The facts in the present matter shows that the father of the respondent/plaintiff expired in 1957 and the suit came to be filled on 25-7-77. It is submitted that it has been filed 12 years after the death of the deceased Gulabsingh and, therefore, suit is barred by law of limitation. As to when the limitation started to run on the basis of Article 65, it has been pointed out by the learned Advocate Mrs. Sirpurkar from the deposition of respondent/plaintiff that the marriage of respondent/plaintiff was performed by the appellants and that after 5/6 years after the death of her father, plaintiff demanded her share in the suit estate from the defendants and the defendants asked the plaintiff to go to Court to claim share in the suit estate of her father. The result of this statement of the plaintiff/respondent is only to the effect that the plaintiff/respondent has claimed her share and the appellants directed her to go to Court. However, it will not lead to denial of the share of the plaintiff/respondent by the appellants so as to amount ouster and/or exclusion from the property. The result of this statement of the plaintiff/respondent is only to the effect that the plaintiff/respondent has claimed her share and the appellants directed her to go to Court. However, it will not lead to denial of the share of the plaintiff/respondent by the appellants so as to amount ouster and/or exclusion from the property. Therefore, this act of appellant cannot be said to be adverse so as to start running of time for the purpose of counting period of limitation as provided in Article 65 and/or Article 110. It is further pertinent to note that the statement of Fulsing - Appellant No. 1 was recorded on behalf of appellants. In the examination in chief appellant No. 1 has stated that the respondent never objected to their cultivation of the suit field. She never came to the suit field and it is not true that they (appellants) drove the respondent when she came to the suit field. In the cross-examination, Fulsing has stated that plaintiff/respondent never claimed her father's share from the suit estate. Thus on the basis of this evidence of the appellant No. 1, it is established that there was no ouster or exclusion by the appellants of the plaintiff/respondent from the suit property. It is also pertinent to note that the marriage of plaintiff/respondent was performed by the appellants and this is indicative of the fact that the relations between plaintiff/respondent and appellants were cordial and, therefore, she must not have claimed her share in the property. She must be all the time hoping that the appellants will be giving her share in the property, which she had inherited from her deceased father. She probably waited till 1977 and when she found that the appellants are not giving her share on their own, she has filed the suit. However, above discussion will point out that at no point of time the possession and ownership was adversely claimed by the appellants. There is no evidence to show that the plaintiff/respondent was excluded with an intention to exclude her from enjoyment of her property. I find that there is no evidence in the present matter to show that the period of limitation started to run as provided in Articles 65 and/or 110 against the plaintiff/respondent so as to bar plaintiff's suit, if not filed from that specified date viz. I find that there is no evidence in the present matter to show that the period of limitation started to run as provided in Articles 65 and/or 110 against the plaintiff/respondent so as to bar plaintiff's suit, if not filed from that specified date viz. possession becoming adverse to respondent or respondent is excluded from the possession of property. As observed earlier, the uninterrupted possession of one of co-owners how so long ever it may be, it will be treated as possession of all co-owners and the period of limitation for getting respective shares of the said co-owners will not elapse. 10. In the result, second question of law raised by appellants that is suit is barred by Articles 65 and/or 110 fails. I, therefore, reject said contention. 11. In the result, appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. However, as no one was representing the respondent, I am not awarding cost of second appeal in favour of the respondent. Appeal dismissed.