B. S. CHAUHAN, J. Learned Single Judge vide order dated 21st October, 1994 has referred the matter to the Division Bench for decision whether the court exercising revisional powers under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Act, 1887 (hereinafter called the Act), can admadmit the additional evidence while entertain ing the revision. The reference order reads as under : "the main question involved before this Court is for adjudication is whether the Court sitting in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Courts Act can take additional evidence. There are conflicting decisions of this Court on this point. However it is felt that the matter should be decided by a Division Bench of this Court. " 2. Section 25 of the Act as applicable in the State of Uttar Pradesh reads as under: "revision of decrees and orders of courts of small causes.- The District Judge, for the purpose of satisfying himself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a court of small causes was according to law, may of his own motion, or on the application of the aggrieved party made within 30 days from the date of such decree or order, call for the case and pass such order with respect thereto as he thinks fit. " 3. The power and procedure, of a particular court, tribunal or authority is to be determined primarily from the provisions of applicable statute itself. The procedure to be followed by the revisional court under the said Act is governed by the proce dure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, (hereinafter called the Code ). Section 7 of the Code excludes the application of various sections of the Code. However, it does not exclude the application of Section 151 of the Code which provides for exercise of inherent powers of the Court. 4. Order L of the Code excludes the operation of certain orders and rules provided under the schedule of the said Code to the proceedings before the court under the Act. Order L reads as under: "provincial Small Causes Courts : The provisions hereinafter specified shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Act, 1887 (9 of 1987 ). . . Order L reads as under: "provincial Small Causes Courts : The provisions hereinafter specified shall not extend to courts constituted under the Provincial Small Causes Act, 1887 (9 of 1987 ). . . that is to say, (a) * * * * (b) The following rules and orders : **** Order Li Section 17 of the Act reads as under: "application of the Code of Civil Procedure.- (1) The procedure prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, shall, save insofar as in otherwise provided by that Code or by this Act, by the procedure followed in a court of small causes in all suits cognizable by it and in all proceedings arising out of such suit. " 5. In Malini Ayyappa Naickar v. Seth Manghraj Udhavidas Firm, AIR 1969 SC 1344 , the Supreme Court considered the scope of revisional powers under the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, which is identical to Section 25 of the Act and held as under: "quite clearly the legislature did not confer on the High Court. . . . . an appellate power nor did it confer on it a jurisdiction to reappreciate the evidence on record. While examining that power the High Court is by and large bound by the findings of fact recorded by the District Court. If the legislature intended to confer power on it to re-examine both questions of law and fact it would have conveyed its intention by appropriate words as has been done under various other statutes. A wrong decision on facts by a competent court is also a decision according to law. For these reasons we cannot accept the contention. . . . that the Act enables it to be de novo examine the finding of fact reached by the District court. " 6. The Apex court quoted the passage from the judgment in Bell and Company Limited v. Woman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bom 223, wherein the Bombay High Court had considered the scope of powers under Section 25 of the Act and observed as under: "the object of Section 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no miscarriage of justice, that decision was given according to law. . . . Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But,. . . . . . . . Wherever the court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the court can interfere. But,. . . . . the court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at. " 7. A Division Bench of this Court considered the scope of powers of the revisional court under the Act, in Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Sharma, 1979 Alld. Civil Journal 473, wherein the court has relied upon a judgment of the Apex Court in Arbind Kumar Singh v. Nand Kishore Prasad, AIR 1968 SC 1277, wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "if for the purposes of doing complete justice between parties, the authority who hears the revision petition is satisfied that it is necessary to call for additional evidence, he may call for such evidence. There is no bar in the Act or the rules against an appellate or revising authority taking into consideration of additional evidence brought on the record if the authority requires additional evidence to be brought on the record or allows it to be brought on record to do complete justice between the parties. " 8. In Smt. Kamini Khare v. Ram Naresh Pandey and another, 1979 Allahabad Law Journal 1263, the learned Single Judge of this Court has held that Section 25 of the Act does not empower the revisional court with same powers as have been given to an appellate court, revisional court has not been vested with the power to admit additional evidence and to hold enquiry on facts and if the court cannot adjudicate the dispute properly without admitting additional evidence, the remand is the only remedy. 9. 9. In Smt. Gujja and others v. P. L. Nigam, 1982 ACJ 312, another learned Single Judge made the following observations: "in view of this limited jurisdiction vested in the revisional court, to occasion arises for admitting additional evidence, if after hearing arguments in the case, revisional court finds that for any substantial cause and in the interest of justice some additional evidence was required for enabling the court to decide the case satisfactorily, then it has got inherent powers to remand the case to the trial court and in that event it will be open to the trial court to admit additional evidence. " 10. In Mahant Girja Shanker Das v. State of U. P. and others, 1985 Allahabad Civil Journal, 212, another learned Single Judge took the same view. However, reliance was placed in both the cases on the judgment in Laxmi Kishore (supra ). 11. In Surendra Pal Singh v. IInd Additional District Judge, 1980 (2) RCC 379, this Court has held that the revisional court under the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulations Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 has power to admit the additional evidence. Reference was made to the Division Bench as the court opined that the judgment in Surendra Pal Singh (supra) was in conflict with the judgment in Smt. Kamini Khare (supra ). The controversy was considered by this Court in Babu Ram v. The Additional District Judge, Dehradun and another, 1983 ARC 15. The Division Bench relied upon two earlier judgments of this Court in the cases of Zafaruddin v. Madan Mohan, AIR 1960 All 612 and Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1931 All 727 (F. B.), wherein it had been held that the court of small cause has inherent powers. The court further took the view that in exercise of its inherent powers the court can certainly admit the additional evidence. But further observed that the circumstances under which and the manner in which the inherent power is to be exercised should not be mixed up with the jurisdiction of the court to admit additional evidence. The court reached the conclusion that there was no conflict in the aforesaid two cases. But further observed that the circumstances under which and the manner in which the inherent power is to be exercised should not be mixed up with the jurisdiction of the court to admit additional evidence. The court reached the conclusion that there was no conflict in the aforesaid two cases. The reason for concluding the same is as under: "after a review of the various provisions of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure, we find that there is no prohibition contained in either of the two enactments expressly or impliedly providing for the bar of admitting additional evidence. What Order L, Rule l (b) did by excluding Order XLI was only that this provision will not apply to revisions. But, the fact that Order XLI, Rule 27 has been excluded does not lead to the conclusion that the Court cannot in exercise of its inherent power admit additional evidence when the ends of justice requires the same to be done. " The Court also held that a court under Section 25 of the Act can take into account subsequent or new facts which had emerged since the decision of the case by the Small Causes Court. In taking the new facts into account, the court may be called upon to amend the pleadings or take documentary or oral evidence on record and admit the same and for that purpose also it was appropriate for the revising court to set aside the order of small causes court and remand the case back for deciding the rights of the parties on its basis. The Court further held that even if in such a case, the additional evidence is taken on record by the revisional court, it would not be entitled to set aside the finding of fact. 12. In the case of Ramesh Kumar v. Kesho Ram, AIR 1992 SC 700 , the Supreme Court has observed as under : "subsequent events are pleaded in the course of an appeal or proceeding of revision, the court may, having regard to the nature of the allegation of fact on which the plea is based, permit evidence to be adduced. . . . . . . It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. " 13. . . . . . . It may record the evidence itself or remit the matter for an enquiry and evidence. " 13. The Apex Court observed that court can take "cautious cognizance" of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief. 14. In M/s M. Lakshmi and Co. v. Dr. Anant R. Deshpande and another, 1973 (1) SCC 171, the Supreme Court held that the "court takes notice of subsequent events to shorten litigation, to preserve rights of both the parties and to subserve the ends of justice. " 15. The aforesaid judgment in the case of Babu Ram (supra) was considered and followed by the learned Single Judge in Mahabir Prasad Sehgal v. VI Additional District Judge and another, 1991 JRC 604, Smt. Gayatri Devi and others v. Additional District Judge and another, 1992 JRC 393 and Smt. Savitri Devi and others v. 1st Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur and others, 1994 JRC 437. 16. In Padam Sen v. State of U. P. , AIR 1961 SC 218 , the Apex Court observed as under: "the inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and, therefore, it must be held that the court is free lo exercise them for the purposes mentioned in Section 151 of the Code when the exercise of these powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the legislature. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code. 17. Similar view was taken by the Apex Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Raja Seth Hira Lal, AIR 1962 SC 527 ; Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 and Ram Karan Das Radhavallabh v. Bhagwan Das Dwarkadas, Alr 1965 SC 1144. In M/s Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Barabhanki v. Kanhayalal Bhargava and others, AIR 1966 SC 1899 , the Supreme Court made the following observations: "the inherent power of a court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the. Code. In M/s Ram Chand and Sons Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. Barabhanki v. Kanhayalal Bhargava and others, AIR 1966 SC 1899 , the Supreme Court made the following observations: "the inherent power of a court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the. Code. But that power will not be exercised if its exercise is in consistent with, or conies into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code. 18. The rules of procedure had been framed for the purpose of advancing and facilitating the cause of justice and not to perpetuate injustice.-Vide M/s Ganesh Trading Company v. Moji Ram, AIR 1978 SC 484 . In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and another, AIR 1987 SC 1353 , the Court observed that "when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done. " 19. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, AIR 1969 SC 1267 . 20. In Pasupuleri Venkateshwarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 , the Supreme Court observed as under: "equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the impact on the right to relief or the manner or moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render thept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies binding the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated with a view to promote substantial justice subject, to course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just cir cumstances. " 21. Similar principles have been reiterated and reaffirmed in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 . 22. Equity justifies binding the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated with a view to promote substantial justice subject, to course to the absence of other disentitling factors or just cir cumstances. " 21. Similar principles have been reiterated and reaffirmed in Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1981 SC 1711 . 22. It is also settled law that the additional evidence urged to be allowed to be admitted must be relevant to decide the real controversy and the court must feel that the admission of the same is required in the interest of justice i. e. it must meet the requirements of provisions of Order XLI, Rule 27 of the Code. [billa Jagan Mohan Ready and another v. Billa Sanjeeva Reddy and others, 1994 (4) SCC 659 ]. 23. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that in exercise of its inherent power the court in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act may admit the additional evidence. We are in full agreement with the Division Bench judgment in Babu Ram (supra ). Decision of the learned Single Judges in the cases of Smt. Kamini Khare, Smt. Gujja and Mahant Girja Shanker Das (supra) do not lay down the correct law and are accordingly overruled. However, the decision of the Division Bench in Babu Ram (supra) lays down the correct proposition of law. 24. In view of the above, our answer to question referred to us is that there is no bar of taking additional evidence by the revisional court in exercise of its power under Section 25 of the Act. 25. The reference is replied accordingly. Let the papers be placed before the learned Single Judge with this opinion and answer. Answered affirmatively. .