JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J. :---This appeal arises from the Award dated 8th March 1988 passed in Land Acquisition Case No. 468 of 1981 by Additional District Judge, South Goa, Margao, in respect of land admeasuring 1025 sq. mts. situated in the village of Shirvoi, Taluka of Quepem bearing Survey No. 8/3 which was acquired for Seloulim Irrigation Project, Distributories D1 by issuing Notification under section 4 dated 3rd February 1979. The compensation which was awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer was Re. 1/- per sq. mt. The appellants being aggrieved by the said Award of the Land Acquisition Officer sought reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act claiming Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. in respect of the acquired land as well as severance compensation in respect of an area of 1182 sq. mts.. 2.The appellants examined three witnesses, namely, Epifanio Fernandes, the Attorney of the appellant No. 2, as A.W.1, Shri Pramod Dessai, Architect Engineer and Government Approved Valuer as A.W. 2 and Shri J.D.'Silva, Civil Engineer as A.W. 3. Shri Balkrishna Nipanikar, Director of P.W.D., who was the Land Acquisition Officer, examined himself as R.W. 1. The appellants relied upon two Awards, namely, one passed by the Land Acquisition Officer in Case No. SLAO/33/381/74 dated 21st March 1974 and the other in Land Acquisition Case No. 158/81 by District Judge, South Goa, Margao, passed on 1st September 1984 and five other Sale Deeds. 3.The Reference Court enhanced the compensation from Re. 1/- to Rs. 3/- per sq. mt. and awarded severance compensation in respect of severed portion of 16 sq. mts. at the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. mt. and in relation to severed portion of 1166 sq. mts. at the rate of Re. 1/-per sq. mt. Being dissatisfied with the Award of the Reference Court, the appellants have preferred the present appeal. 4.Shri Diniz, learned advocate for the appellants, submitted before me that though the appellants have relied upon five Sale Deeds apart from two Awards, he was not insisting upon reliance of the said Sale Deeds in view of the Supreme Court decision as regards the procedure of proving the Sale Deeds for the purpose of establishing the market value of the acquired land and he would only rely upon the two Awards referred to above. He further submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of (The State of Madras v. A.M. Nanjan and another)1, reported in 1976(1) S.C.C. 973 , the learned District Judge ought to have placed full reliance on the said Awards and based thereon ought to have accepted the claim of the appellants as regards the market rate of Rs. 20/- in respect of land acquired. He further submitted that the Land Acquisition Officer had fixed the rate at Rs. 10/- which was many year prior to the acquisition of the land in question and in relation to a land situated hardly at a distance of 370 metres away from the acquired land and which was acquired in November 1973 whereas the learned District Court had awarded the compensation at the rate of Rs. 20/- in respect of the land acquired in November 1974 and which is situated at a distance of about 25 mts. away from Tilamol Junction. Considering the rate awarded under the said Award, according to Shri Diniz, the claim of the appellants at the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. was just and appropriate and was the real market value in the locatity and ought to have been awarded to the appellants. 5.Opposing the claim of the appellants, Shri Bharne, Additional Government Advocate for the respondents, submitted that it has come on record that the land in question is an agricultural land and is subjected to tenancy rights and there is a clear finding to that effect by the Reference Court. Drawing my attention to section 18k of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 he submitted that there was no challenge by the appellants to the apportionment of the compensation between the appellants and the tenants as well as to the statements of Land Acquisition Officer before the Reference Court that the land in question was a paddy field. Therefore, according to the Addl1. Government Advocate, the rate awarded to the appellants is the real market value and cannot be considered to be unjust or in anyway less than the market value at the relevant time. Therefore, according to the Addl1. Government Advocate, the rate awarded to the appellants is the real market value and cannot be considered to be unjust or in anyway less than the market value at the relevant time. Shri Bharne further submitted that it was incumbent upon the appellants to adduce evidence regarding the nature of land in respect of those lands which were acquired by Award dated 21st March 1974 of the Land Acquisition Officer and Award dated 1st September 1984 of the District Judge and in the absence of any details regarding the nature of land and its exact location, there could not be any comparison of those lands with the land in question and, therefore, those Awards are of no assistance to arrive at the findings that the market value of those lands could be the market value of the land in question. In this respect he drew my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in (Chimanlal Hargovinddas v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Poona and another)2, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1652. As regards the manner in which the market value is to be ascertained, Shri Bharne drew my attention to the general guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in (Periyar and Pareekanni Rubbers Ltd. v. State of Kerala)3, reported in 1991(4) S.C.C. 195 and submitted that the appellants have not adduced any cogent and material evidence to establish the exact market value of the land otherwise than which has been decided by the Reference Court. He further submitted that the land being subject to tenancy, it cannot be held to have building or industrial potentiality. Admittedly no conversion of land has been obtained by the appellants. He drew my attention to the deposition of A.W. 3 J. D'Silva in this respect. 6.In reply to the arguments of Shri Bharne, Shri Diniz submitted that there has been no evidence brought on record to show that the land is tenanted or agricultural. He further submitted that the statements of the witnesses and the appellants that the land in question is suitable for industrial purposes has not been challenged. 7.According to Shri Diniz proper reliance on the two Awards would sufficiently prove the case of the appellants and had the Reference Court given due weight to the said Awards, there would have been no difficulty for the Reference Court to fix the rate at Rs. 7.According to Shri Diniz proper reliance on the two Awards would sufficiently prove the case of the appellants and had the Reference Court given due weight to the said Awards, there would have been no difficulty for the Reference Court to fix the rate at Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. as claimed by the appellants. According to Shri Diniz the lands which were acquired in both the Awards were much prior to the date of acquisition of land in the instant case and in both cases the lands were in the vicinity of the land in question and in both the cases the rate awarded was much higher than which was awarded in the instant case. With the passage of time it is but natural that the price increased and this being common knowledge, the Reference Court ought to have awarded the rate of Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. as the market value in respect of the land of the appellants acquired in the instant case. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Madras, 1976(1) S.C.C. 973 there was absolutely no difficulty for the Reference Court to rely upon the said Awards for fixing the market value of the land in question. 8.The points for determination in this appeal are as under:- (a) Whether the compensation of Rs. 3/- per sq. mt. fixed by the Reference Court is less than the market value of the land in question at the relevant time and whether it ought to have been fixed at Rs. 20/- per sq. mt. as claimed by the appellants. (b) Whether the Awards given in other acquisition proceedings ought to have been relied upon without any evidence in respect of the nature and other details of the lands which are the subject matter of such Awards being brought on record. 9.No doubt the Supreme Court in the case of State of Madras has held that if the land involved in the Awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in fact observed in the said decision that as a matter of fact the Awards given by the Collector are at least relevant material and may be in the nature of admission with regard to the value of land on behalf of the State and if the land involved in the Awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of all lands, the rate found in such documents would be reliable material to afford a basis to depend upon for determination of the compensation on a later date and in that view of the matter the Award cannot be dismissed as inadmissible for the purpose of determination of compensation. I do not find any assistance to the appellants from the said Judgment of the Supreme Court in the instant case. The Reference Court has in fact discussed both the Awards in detail and has arrived at a clear finding that the rates awarded in both the said Awards cannot be applied to the acquired land in question for the various reasons mentioned in the impugned Award. The Reference Court has found that the nature of the land in question is different from the lands referred to in both the Awards. It has also found that the location and surroundings in case of land in question are different from those in case of lands in both the Awards. The various differences pointed out in case of the land in question and the land in both the Awards are sufficient to reject the plea of the appellants that the rate awarded in those Awards should have been accepted for fixation of market value of the land in question. The decision relied upon by the appellants is no authority to say that the rates in the earlier Awards in respect of lands in the vicinity of the land of subject matter is to be accepted blindly without even comparing the land acquired subsequently with that of the one acquired earlier. The decision relied upon by the appellants is no authority to say that the rates in the earlier Awards in respect of lands in the vicinity of the land of subject matter is to be accepted blindly without even comparing the land acquired subsequently with that of the one acquired earlier. In fact such argument runs counter to the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Madras wherein it is clearly stated that the land involved in the awards is comparable land in the reasonable proximity of the acquired land, the rates found in the said documents would be a reliable material to afford a basis to work upon for determination of the compensation on a later date (underlining supplied). 10.The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Chimanlal Hargovinddas, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1652 had laid down broad guidelines for the determination of market value of the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. On perusal of the impugned Award it is evident that the Reference Court had followed the said guidelines while fixing the market value to be awarded to the land in question.The Reference Court has not only analysed both the Awards but has also considered the oral evidence led by the parties. Based on the materials on record the Reference Court has found that the acquired land is in the interior and on account of the fact that the appellants did not obtain any conversion in respect of the acquired land as there has been no scheme prepared for the acquired land, which is being subjected to tenancy, there was no feasibility for development of the land for industrial or construction activity. Indeed the evidence on record clearly shows that the land in question is low lying paddy field. Clear statement to that effect by the Land Acquisition Officer was not challenged by the appellants. In fact appellants themselves have not brought on record any cogent and material evidence to establish that the land in question was of a suitable and potential nature for construction and industrial activity therein. The absence of evidence from the appellants in this regard coupled with the clear statement of the Land Acquisition Officer as regards the nature of the land, there was no occasion for the Reference Court to arrive at finding other than the one arrived at. The absence of evidence from the appellants in this regard coupled with the clear statement of the Land Acquisition Officer as regards the nature of the land, there was no occasion for the Reference Court to arrive at finding other than the one arrived at. 11.There being no material placed on record other than two Awards to establish the claim of the appellants as regard the rate payable to them, the Reference Court had no alternative then to fix the rate at Rs. 3/- per sq. mt. I do not find any infirmity in the Award of the Reference Court in this respect. No doubt the appellants had produced some sale deeds in the course of evidence but as rightly submitted by Shri Diniz in the course of hearing of the appeal, appellants could not prove the said sale deeds and, therefore, no reliance could be placed on the said sale deeds. Moreover the Reference Court has considered the said sale deeds and has rightly come to the conclusion that the same relate to land in different villages. 12.I have, therefore, no hesitation in answering both the points in the negative and thereby hold that though the Awards passed in earlier acquisitions can be relevant for the purpose of comparing the rates awarded while fixing the rate for subsequent acquisition, this is possible only in cases of comparable lands in reasonable proximity of the acquired land and not otherwise. Secondly the Reference Court has rightly come to the conclusion as regards the rate of Rs. 3/- per sq. mt. awarded for the land acquired. Hence, I pass the following order: The appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.