M. S. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution is filed by the Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Rajkot challenging the bill dated 17-9-1982 issued by Rajkot Municipal Corporation for levy and demanding property tax, education cess and conservancy tax from the petitioner. The aforesaid bill dated 17-9-1982 (Annexure A to the petition) is in respect of the financial year 1981-82. It is pertinent to note that this very petitioner had earlier filed Special civil Application No. 752 of 1980, against the same respondent for a declaration that the education cess is not leviable on the properties of the petitioner within the limits of the respondent-Corporation and for a writ quashing the action of the respondent-Corporation in levying the education cess on the said properties. ( 2 ) WHEN the present petition came up for hearing, this Court passed the following order on 2-11-1982 :"rule insofar as the petition relates to properties belonging to the Committee and solely used for its purposes and not used or intended to be used for the purpose of profit. Ad-interim relief in respect of the said properties so far as recovery of education cess is concerned. Notice as to interim relief. "after hearing the respondents, on 11/01/1983, this Court confirmed the adinterim relief to the extent and in respect of the properties for which Rule was issued and the petition was ordered to be heard with Special Civil Application No. 752 of 1980. ( 3 ) WHEN the petition came up for hearing to-day, the Court was informed by both the learned Counsels that Special Civil Application No. 752 of 1980 was already decided by judgment and order dated 6-7-1990 whereby this Court has partly allowed the said petition and held that the respondent-Corporation has no right, authority or jurisdiction to levy education cess in respect of the buildings and lands belonging to the petitioner-society and used solely for public purpose and not used or intended to be used for the purposes of profit. The Court came to this conclusion after considering the provisions of the Gujarat Education Cess Act, 1962 (for brevity "education Cess Act") particularly the provisions of sub-sec. The Court came to this conclusion after considering the provisions of the Gujarat Education Cess Act, 1962 (for brevity "education Cess Act") particularly the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 13 of the said Act and after considering the provisions of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce markets Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the A. P. M. C. Act) particularly provisions of Sec. 10 (2) of the said Act. On a conjoint reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions, this Court held that the petitioner-Committee is a "local authority" and is, therefore, exempted from payment of education cess under Sec. 13 of the Education Cess Act but the said exemption is confined to the buildings and lands belonging to the local authority and used solely for its purpose and not used or intended to be used for the purposes of profit. ( 4 ) IN view of the aforesaid clear pronouncement of this Court in a case between the same parties, there can be no doubt that the present petition deserves to be partly allowed insofar as the respondent-Corporation has sought to levy education cess on the petitioner in respect of the lands and buildings belonging to the petitioner and used solely for its purpose and not used or intended to be used for purposes of profit. ( 5 ) HOWEVER, so far as the demand of the respondent-Corporation for property tax and conservancy tax is concerned, the petitioner is on a weaker footing. Property tax and conservancy tax are levied under the provisions of Chapter II of the Bombay provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as the B. P. M. C. Act ). Sec. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act exempts certain properties from the payment of property tax. The relevant provisions thereof read as under :"132 (1 ). The general tax shall be levied in respect of all buildings and lands in the City, the rateable value of which exceeds six hundred rupees except : (c) buildings and lands vesting in the Government used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of trade or profit or vesting in the Corporation, in respect of which the said tax, if levied would under the provisions hereinafter contained be primarily leviable from the Government or the corporation, respectively. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 6 ) THE petitioner does not claim that it falls under sub-clause (a) or (b) but its contention is that the case of the petitioner is covered by sub-clause (c) which exempts buildings and lands vesting in the Government used solely for public purposes and not used for intended to be used for purposes of trade or profit. The petitioners contention that the petitioner should be considered to be a Government or Government authority within the meaning of the aforesaid provision of clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 132 of the B. P. M. C. Act deserves to be rejected, as the petitioner is a body constituted under the A. P. M. C. Act and is an entity separate from the State Government. Similar contention urged on behalf of an Agricultural produce Market Committee, in the context of provisions of Sec. 99 of the Gujarat municipalities Act, 1963, also came to be rejected by this Court in the case of agricultural Produce Market Committee, Gondal v. Gondal Municipality and Anr. , 1995 (1) GLR 542 . In the aforesaid case, this Court interpreted similar provisions of sub-clause (a) of second proviso to Sec. 99 of the aforesaid Act. I respectfully agree with the reasoning of my learned brother D. G. Karia, J. I have no hesitation in holding that the buildings and lands vested in an Agricultural Produce Market committee are not covered by Sec. 132 (1) (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act. ( 7 ) MR. Udwani, learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, sought to distinguish the aforesaid judgment on the ground that under Sec. 99 of the Gujarat municipalities Act exemption is granted only in respect of the lands and buildings belonging to Government; but under Sec. 132 (1) (c) exemption is also granted in favour of the buildings and lands vested in the Corporation. According to the Counsel the word "corporation" in Sec. 132 (1) (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act includes corporate bodies like an Agricultural Produce Market Committee because it has been incorporated or established under an Act of the State Legislature. The aforesaid contention deserves to be rejected for the following reasons. According to the Counsel the word "corporation" in Sec. 132 (1) (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act includes corporate bodies like an Agricultural Produce Market Committee because it has been incorporated or established under an Act of the State Legislature. The aforesaid contention deserves to be rejected for the following reasons. ( 8 ) FIRSTLY, the expression "corporation" is defined by Sec. 2 (10) of the B. P. M. C. Act as under :"2. In this Act, unless there be something repugnant in the subject or context - (10) the Corporation" means the Municipal Corporation of the City; for the purposes of the present petition, therefore, the expression "the Corporation"would mean Rajkot Municipal Corporation and it would not include any other corporate body even if established by an Act of the Legislature. It would not even include Municipal Corporation of any other City if any other Municipal Corporation had its buildings and lands within the local limits of the Rajkot Municipal corporation. ( 9 ) SECONDLY, it is required to be noted that the exemption granted in respect of the Government properties is also not an absolute exemption because the provisions of Sec. 133 of the B. P. M. C. Act provide for a separate machinery for assessment of the rateable valuation of the buildings and lands in the City vesting in the Government. If the properties vested in any other corporate authority, other than the concerned Municipal Corporation, were intended to be exempted under Sec. 132 (1) (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act, a similar machinery would have been provided in respect of such other Corporations. The very fact that the provisions of Sec. 133 and other provisions of the B. P. M. C. Act do not provide for any such machinery also lends support to the submission of Mr. Raval that the expression "corporation" in Sec. 132 (1) (c) of the B. P. M. C. Act only refers to the Municipal Corporation of the City and not to any other Corporation even if established by an Act of the legislature. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Udwani that the petitioner-Committee is exempted from payment of property tax or conservancy tax. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Udwani that the petitioner-Committee is exempted from payment of property tax or conservancy tax. ( 10 ) IN view of the above findings, the petition is partly allowed to the extent that the demand made by the respondent-Corporation for education cess is quashed and set aside in so far as the said demand pertains to the buildings and lands belonging to the petitioner which are used solely for public purposes and not used or intended to be used for purposes of trade or profit. However, the prayer for a declaration for exemption from the payment of property tax and conservancy tax in respect of the properties belonging to or vested in the petitioner is hereby rejected. ( 11 ) IN the result, this petition is partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent only with no order as to costs. .