Krishna Murari Pandey v. State of U. P. — 1996 DIGILAW 362 (ALL)

Judgment : B.S. Chauhan, J. 1. THE instant case has already made a chequered history as this is the 4th round of litigation before this Court, though the trial has not yet commenced. Petitioners were arrested on 7.6.1992 on the basis of an F.I.R. lodged under Section 409, I.P.C. read with Section 5 (1) of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (hereinafter called the Act). Petitioner No. 1 who had been posted as Secretary of the U.P. Public Service Commission, was working as a co-ordinating Supervisor at the relevant time and the petitioner No. 2 was functioning as relieving invigilator in the Civil Service (Preliminary) Examination, 1992. Allegation against the petitioners are that in contravention of the instructions issued by the Union Public Service Commission, petitioner No. 1 entrusted two test booklets of that examination to petitioner No. 2 for getting it photo-copied from the market. Petitioner No. 2 complied with the direction and the same was returned at 11.30 a.m. when the same could not have been taken outside the examination hall and the said booklets ought to have been sealed by 10.30 a.m. 2. THE C.B.I, investigated the matter and obtained sanction from the Government of Uttar Pradesh as required under Section 13 of the Act, vide impugned order dated 17.2.1993 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition). On the basis of the said sanction, complaint case No. 3 of 1993 was filed before the C.B.I, court, Lucknow (Annexure 2 to the writ petition). On the basis of the said complaint, summons were issued to the petitioners by the learned Magistrate on 18.2.1993, vide Annexure SA-1. Petitioners moved an application before the learned Magistrate to discharge summons as no case under Section 5/9 of the Act could be made out against them, but the learned Magistrate rejected the same, vide order dated 15.4.1994. Being aggrieved, the petitioners filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 3032 of 1994 under Section 482, Cr. P.C. for quashing of the complaint (Annexure 2 to the writ petition), but this Court rejected the said application, vide its order dated 11.5.1994 as it was not found maintainable (Annexure SA-3 to the writ petition). Petitioners filed Criminal Revisions Nos. 717 and 718 of 1994 for quashing of the order of the learned Magistrate dated 15.4.94, but this Court dismissed the said revisions as being against interlocutory order, not maintainable, vide order dated 27.9.1994 (Annexure SA-4 to the writ petition). Petitioners filed Criminal Revisions Nos. 717 and 718 of 1994 for quashing of the order of the learned Magistrate dated 15.4.94, but this Court dismissed the said revisions as being against interlocutory order, not maintainable, vide order dated 27.9.1994 (Annexure SA-4 to the writ petition). However, observing that the Issue of discharge can be raised before the trial court in accordance with the provisions of Section 228, Cr. P.C. at the appropriate stage and the trial court can examine the same meticulously at that stage as in was neither possible nor necessary for the learned Magistrate to arrive at a decision whether the accused persons had committed the offence or not at the time Of taking cognizance. The instant petition has been filed by petitioners for quashing the order dated 17.2.1993 (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) mainly on three grounds : 1. the sanction had been granted by the appropriate Government without any application of mind ; 2 petitioners do not hold the office under the Government and, thus provisions of the Act are not attracted ; and 3. the provisions of the Act being not applicable in the instant case, no case can be made out against the petitioners. 3. SO far as the 1st issue is concerned, each and every relevant fact of the case has been mentioned in the impugned order itself. It appears from the record that after considering all the relevant material on record, the appropriate Government reached the conclusion that the petitioners failed to comply with the directions issued by the lawful authority and, thus, they were liable to be prosecuted for the offences punishable under Sections 5(1) and (9) of the Act. Sanction under Section 13 of the Act was granted as under : "Whereas the State Government of Uttar Pradesh after carefully examining the matter before it in regard to the said allegations, and the facts and circumstances of the case considers that the said Sri Krishna Murari Pandey and Sri Tribhuvan Prakash Bhatnagar should be prosecuted in a Court of law for the said offence." 4. THE object and purpose of restraining the Court to take cognizance without the sanction under Section 13 of the Act is to prevent unnecessary harassment of the accused and to safeguard the larger interest of the State. THE object and purpose of restraining the Court to take cognizance without the sanction under Section 13 of the Act is to prevent unnecessary harassment of the accused and to safeguard the larger interest of the State. In Dharam Swamp v. State, AIR 1953 All 23, this Court held that 'the discretion to sanction prosecution is vested solely in the sanctioning authority and is absolute. Its exercise cannot be questioned in a Court of law...........No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what facts are necessary to be brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority and it cannot be challenged on the ground that necessary facts were not brought to the notice of the sanctioning authority'. Similarly, in Vishwanath Agarwal v. State of U. P., AIR 1956 All 557 , the Division Bench of this Court held that the satisfaction of the sanctioning authority must be the satisfaction of that authority alone and not of the Court or any other reasonable person. It is a subjective satisfaction of the authority and Court cannot enquire into the reasons for the said satisfaction or into sufficiency of the said reasons. In Superintendent of Police (C.B.I.) v. Deepak Chowdhari, JT 1995 (6) SC 532, the Honble Apex Court held that the sanctioning authority is required only to see whether the material collected during investigation would constitute an offence for which the sanction is sought. In State of Bihar and another v. P. S. Sharma and another, AIR 1991 SC 1260 , the Honble Supreme Court has observed that the sanctioning authority must have before it all the reports and material facts which may prima facie establish the commission of offence and the sanctioning authority must apply its mind to those facts. As the order of sanction is administrative and not quasi-judicial nor a lis involved, the order may not contain the detailed reasons. THE Apex Court further observed as under : "When the Government accords sanction. Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act raises presumption that the official acts have been regularly performed. THE burden is heavier on the accused to establish the contra to rebut that statutory presumption". Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid. THE Apex Court further observed as under : "When the Government accords sanction. Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act raises presumption that the official acts have been regularly performed. THE burden is heavier on the accused to establish the contra to rebut that statutory presumption". Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Mohammed Khalid. AIR 1995 SC 789, the Supreme Court observed that in such a case, it would be more appropriate that the issue may be raised at the time of framing charge under Section 228, Cr. P.C. and if the sufficient grounds do not exist for proceeding with the triad, the accused may be discharged. As the purpose of enacting the provisions of Section 228, Cr. P.C. seems to be not to waste public time over cases which do not disclose a prima facie case and to save the accused from formidable harassment and expenditure. If we examine the impugned sanction order in the light of the above, we reach the inescapable conclusion that the sanctioning authority had applied its mind and all the relevant facts and materials had been placed before the said authority as is evident from the impugned order itself. Moreover, the impugned order is speaking and reasoned one. Thus, we find no merit in the first submission. 5. IT has vehemently been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the provisions of the Act are not applicable in this case as the petitioners do not hold office under the Government. The case of petitioners is that they are employees of the U. P. Public Service Commission which is autonomous and independent body and it can neither be considered the office of the Government nor a department of Government, Reliance has been placed on the judgments in Smt. Asha Kaul v. State of JandK, JT 1993 (3) SC 688 and M. A. Jauhari v. State of JandK and others, 1971 (2) JandK LR 211. In both the said cases, the Courts had examined an issue whether the Government can interfere with the selection process of the candidates appearing for being selected for the civil posts under the State, by the Commission or whether Government can arbitrarily pick and choose candidates from the select list prepared by the Commission. These cases do not provide any assistance, whatsoever, to the petitioners as the said judgments had been rendered in entirely different context. 6. These cases do not provide any assistance, whatsoever, to the petitioners as the said judgments had been rendered in entirely different context. 6. IN H. H. Maharaja Dhiraj Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 , the Supreme Court observed as under : "It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that Judgment." Similarly, in M/s. Amar Nath Om Prakash and others v. State of Punjab and others, AIR 1985 SC 218 , the Supreme Court has observed that it is needless to repeat the often quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it. 7. IN Sarva Sharmik Sangh, Bombay v. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd. and another, 1993 (2) SCC 386 , the Apex Court has observed that the observations made in a judgment must be understood in the fact and circumstances of that case. It cannot be treated as having any binding force if a question raised now in a case where the earlier judgment is sought to be relied upon, has neither been in issue nor considered in that judgment. 8. SIMILARLY, in CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd., 1992 (4) SCC 363 , the Apex Court had made the following observations : "It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court, to support their reasonings." Learned Standing Counsel for the C.B.I, has referred to a judgment of this Court in K. M. Pandey v. State, 1993 AWC 312 . The Division Bench of this Court has examined the case of petitioner No.1 itself as to whether the Government of Uttar Pradesh was competent to suspend the petitioner No. 1 in connection with the same offence for which the impugned sanction had been granted. The Court relied upon Regulations 17 and 18 of the Regulation of 1937 which had been framed under Section 265 of the Government of India Act, 1935 and are applicable on petitioner No.1. Under the said Regulations, an officer of the U. P. Civil Service can be posted as the Secretary of the Commission by the Governor of the State. The petitioner No. 1 is admittedly a permanent Government servant belonging to the U. P. Civil Services and he has been on deputation to the Commission. He still holds a lien in the U. P. Civil Services and, thus, continued to be the officer of the Government of U. P. and he continues to be so in spite of the fact that his day-to-day working is controlled by the Rules and Regulations applicable to the staff of the Commission. Once a Division Bench of this Court has held that the petitioner was the officer of the U. P. Government and the said order has become final, it remains no longer permissible for the petitioners to agitate the same issue again. Petitioner No. 1 is a Government servant within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. Petitioner No. 1 is a Government servant within the meaning of Section 2 (a) of the U. P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956. It includes the Government servant working on deputation like petitioner No. 1 elsewhere as it reads as under : "Government servant"-means a persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Explanation.-A Government servant whose services are placed at the disposal of a company, a corporation, an organisation, a local authority, the Central Government or the Government of another State by the U. P. Government, shall, for the purpose of these rules be deemed to be a Government servant notwithstanding that his salary is drawn from sources other than from the Consolidated Fund of Uttar Pradesh." 9. IN Pradyat Kumar Bose v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1956 SC 285 , the Apex Court observed as under : "The phrase 'persons serving under the Government'..........seems to have a reference to such persons in respect of whom the administrative control is vested in the respective Governments functioning in the name of the President or the Governor." 10. IN the instant case, there can be no doubt that petitioners had been under the direct administrative control of the Government of U. P. at the relevant point of time. Moreover, the case of petitioner No. 2 is also covered by the provisions of Section 5 of the Act as he was working under petitioner No. 1. Section 5 (1) is attracted when there is a criminal breach of trust, as it would be explained later, by a person holding office under Government or who holds or who is employed under a person who holds the office under the Government. Moreover, Section 2 (6) defines 'office under the Government' as it includes any office or employment in or under any department of the Government. The definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. In Lewis v. Cattle, 1938 KBC 454, an issue was raised that a police constable, an employee of a county, who had been appointed under the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 and was paid by the said county, cannot be held to be an officer who 'holds office under His Majesty'. The definition is inclusive and not exhaustive. In Lewis v. Cattle, 1938 KBC 454, an issue was raised that a police constable, an employee of a county, who had been appointed under the provisions of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 and was paid by the said county, cannot be held to be an officer who 'holds office under His Majesty'. The aforesaid contention was rejected and he was found guilty of contravening the provisions of the Official Secrets Act, 1911 for disclosure of the information to a private person, as the information was intended only for the police personnels though it had not been mentioned on the document in question that the information was not to be disclosed. 11. 'OFFICE under the Government' is a very wide term and Section 5 of the Act is very comprehensive in its nature and it applies not only to the Government servants, but to all persons who have obtained the information or documents, etc. in contravention of the provisions of the Act as held by the Full Bench of Bombay High Court in R. K. Karanjia v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Bom 322 and subsequently, followed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in State of Kerala v. B. Balakrishna, AIR 1961 Ker 25 . It certainly does not apply in cases of the private offices and other institutions like Corporations, Universities, etc. The Commission cannot be treated at par with the University or the Corporation. The Commission performs the regal and sovereign functions of the State as it prepares select list of the candidates to be appointed as Civil Servants by the State. This function cannot be performed by a private contractor or a Corporation. It is certainly not like running a hospital by a municipality or imparting education by a University or constructing a dam by a corporation. It is only for this very purpose the Commission has been made of autonomous and independent character. 12. A mere perusal of the provisions of Articles 316 to 322 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that the Commission is a constitutional authority. It is only for this very purpose the Commission has been made of autonomous and independent character. 12. A mere perusal of the provisions of Articles 316 to 322 of the Constitution of India makes it clear that the Commission is a constitutional authority. The procedure for appointment and removal of its Chairman or a member, prohibition of getting any work under the Government after ceasing to be the Chairman or a member of the Commission, leaves no doubt that such terms have been provided in the Constitution only to maintain independence of the Commission, just to make the Commission free from all pressures in order to have a fair selection of candidates. Consultation with the Commission is mandatory in several matters, e.g., methods of recruitment to Civil Services, principles to be followed in making promotions and transfers from one service to another, disciplinary matters affecting the services of persons serving under the Government, etc. All expenses of Commission are made from consolidated fund. There is another aspect of the matter. The principle of claiming privilege in respect of documents under Section 123 of the Evidence Act is based on public policy, i.e., in public interest; the confidentiality of documents relating to the authorities of the Government or its instrumentalities must be safeguarded. State of 13. P. v. Rajnarain. AIR 1975 SC 865 . 13. IN State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1961 SC 493 . the Apex Court held as under: "The report received by the council from the Public Service Commission (under Article 320 of the Constitution) carries on its face the character of a document disclosure of which would lead to injury of public interest. It falls in that class of documents which 'on grounds of public interest must as a class be withheld from production'." 14. PRIVILEGE of documents relates only to the documents concerning the affairs of the Government or its instrumentalities. That too not related to its commercial, Industrial or business like activities. Thus, if the report of the Commission falls under the said category of documents, Commission has to be treated as a Government instrumentality. Thus, we are of the considered view that the Commission is not only a department of the Government but an integral part of the Government for the purpose of the Act and we find no merit in this submission also. 15. Thus, we are of the considered view that the Commission is not only a department of the Government but an integral part of the Government for the purpose of the Act and we find no merit in this submission also. 15. MAIN thrust of the argument on the third issue has been that the provisions of the Act are applicable only in cases where sovereignty, integrity or security of India or its relations with friendly States is involved. The Act of 1923 is an Act to consolidate and amend the law in this regard. Thus, to understand the Act better, reference may be made to the pre-existing law as the new Act did not alter the position of law in this particular regard. The 1st Act on the subject was Act No. 15 of 1889 and it provided as under: "An Act to prevent the disclosure of Official documents and information." Section 4 (1) of the said Act reads as under: "Where a person by means of his holdings or having held an office under Her Majesty has lawfully or unlawfully either obtained possession or control over any document.......and at any time corruptly or contrary to his official duty communicates or attempts to communicate that document... to any person to whom the same ought not, in the interest of the state, or otherwise in the public interest, to be communicated at that time, he shall be guilty of a breach of official trust." 16. SIMILAR to the said Act of 1889, there had been Official Secrets Act of 1911 in England. The provisions of Section 2 of the said Act of 1911 had been pari materia with Section 5 of the Act and prohibited the disclosure of any official information which was of a confidential nature. In R.v. Crisp and Home wood, (1919) 83 JP 121, it was held that if a person having in his possession a document, which he had obtained owing to his position as a person who holds or has held office under Her Majesty, communicates it to any person other than a person to whom he is authorised to communicate it, he is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 2 of the Act of 1911. The next point argued in that case was that information was not of a confidential character and, thus, did not fall within the description of Official Secrets. The next point argued in that case was that information was not of a confidential character and, thus, did not fall within the description of Official Secrets. The Court observed as under :- "It is well-known proposition in the construction of a statute that the enacting words of it are not to be cut down or limited by the title of the Act, although where there is any ambiguity, the title of the Act may assist to construe it. But when there is no ambiguity in the enacting part of the statute, the words cannot be altered or limited merely by the title 'Official Secrets'........ Section 2 applies to any document or information of an official character which has been obtained by a person holding office under His Majesty, provided, of course, that he communicates it to some person to whom he was not authorised to communicate it." (Quoted and discussed in Words and Phrases Legally defined, 1989 Edition Vol. 3, page 272, Edited by John B. Saunders). 17. IN England, the issue had been raised from time to time by the public and the officials to make the Act applicable in limited circumstances. Several private bills were introduced in the Parliament by the members of the Parliament of all political parties to the effect that the Act should be made applicable only in cases relating to the security of the State and likewise as the Official Secrets Act covered cases of breaches of official trust. The information that a Government Servant learns in the course of his work is treated 'official' regardless of its nature or importance, e.g., it covered the cases of deliberate leaking of social security information to a magazine in 1976. The Act provided for publication of "D" notice system in respect of the confidential information to the public at large and the notice includes various instructions including the following : "THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACTS AFFECT YOU ........................................................................................... YOU MUST NOT TALK ABOUT or pass on information about your work unless you are authorised to do so. YOU MUST NOT KEEP or copy any drawing or document unless it is your job to do so...................................... The public demanded for the amendment of the Act because Its application had been too wide and it restricted also disclosure of the information which the public should have access to. YOU MUST NOT KEEP or copy any drawing or document unless it is your job to do so...................................... The public demanded for the amendment of the Act because Its application had been too wide and it restricted also disclosure of the information which the public should have access to. It could also be used against the press and journalists, etc., as the provisions were intended to be used in a case of the post-office workers to 'Black' mail to South Africa in 1977. The concept of damaging disclosure was opposed. It meant that where a Government servant or a Government contractor knew or had reason to know that the disclosure was likely to cause damage, the disclosure of the information itself was an offence. The Official Secrets Act applied to all kinds of information, not necessarily connected with security, disclosure of which was a criminal offence. The fact that information was obtained from a Government servant was sufficient, so long it was acquired by him during the course of his employment." (C. Helen Fenwick : Civil Liberties 1995 ; I. N. Stevens and D.C.M. Yardlay: the protection of Liberty (1982) at page 150-153 ; Halsbury's Laws of England IVth Edition, Vol. 11, pp. 527, 533). 18. IN R. v. Fell (1963) Crime Law Report 207, it was held that the essence of the offence under the Official Secrets Act was the disclosure of the confidential information and it was committed whatever the document contained, whatever the motive for disclosure and whether or not the disclosure was prejudicial to the State. IN R. v. Chandler and others, (1962) 2 All ER 314, about one hundred persons campaigning for nuclear disarmament organised a demonstration on an operational air-field. They were prosecuted and punished. Their claim to be acting in the interest of the State was found irrelevant. IN the said case, it was observed that intentional engagement in prohibited conduct contray to the Official Secrets Act could not be condoned and the same could not be a subject- matter of Judicial Scrutiny. IN Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers) Limited, (1969) RPC 41, it was observed that the requirement necessary for an action must be based on breach of confidence. The obligation of confidence need not be express but could be implied also. IN Coco v. A. N. Clark (Engineers) Limited, (1969) RPC 41, it was observed that the requirement necessary for an action must be based on breach of confidence. The obligation of confidence need not be express but could be implied also. IN Attorney-General v. Jonathan Cape Ltd., (1976) 1 QB 752, it was observed that secrets of new taxation proposals may be of the highest importance and must be kept secret though it is to be disclosed on the budget day and public would come to know it thereafter. There is a restricted document issued by the Home Ministry of India which provides for classification and handling of official documents. The said document has defined various types of classifications and explains what is secret, top secret, confidential, restricted, etc. It also provides for the manner in which the official documents are to be handled. It includes documents of all natures. In Sunil Ranjan Das. v. State, 77 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1061, the project report for the preservation of the port of Calcutta which had been marked for 'official use' only and was not marked 'secret', was leaked and the person who had leaked it unauthorisedly was prosecuted and convicted under the Official Secrets Act. His defence that it was not a secret document as the same had been exchanged with the Government of Pakistan was rejected. In K. Bala Krishna (supra), it was held that disclosure of the information regarding the budget in contravention of the Appendix of the memorandum and introduction plan, was within the mischief of the provisions of Official Secrets Act. 19. In K. Bala Krishna (supra), it was held that disclosure of the information regarding the budget in contravention of the Appendix of the memorandum and introduction plan, was within the mischief of the provisions of Official Secrets Act. 19. IN Nand Lal More v. State, 1965 (1) Cr LJ 393, a Division Bench of Delhi High Court has placed reliance on the judgment in the King v. Michael O Kelly Simington,1921 (1) KB 451, wherein it was observed as under :- "It has been contended that on the true construction of that clause, the words which relates to or is used in a prohibited place or anything in such a place' are to be included not only in the first of its provisions, but also in each of its subsequent provisions beginning with the words" or which", so that each of the alternative provisions of the clause applies only to a sketch, plan, etc., which relates to or is used in a prohibited place ; and that as the plans in question do not relate, as is submitted, to any prohibited place within the meaning of the Act, the appellant committed no offence under the clause. That construction is no doubt ingenious, but it is impossible and indeed absurd. According to that construction, it would be unnecessary to say more than is said in the first provision of the clause. If the clause meant that a person having IN his possession or control and retaining any sketch, plan, etc., did not in any case commit an offence unless the sketch, plan, etc., relate to or was used in a prohibited place, the result would be superfluous. On the other hand, if the reference to a prohibited place be included in the first provision of the clause only, then none of the first provision is superfluous or unmeaning. On the other hand, if the reference to a prohibited place be included in the first provision of the clause only, then none of the first provision is superfluous or unmeaning. According to that construction, the clause makes it an offence for a person to have in his possession and to retain any sketch, plan, etc., (i) which relates to a prohibited plan, (ii) which has been made or obtained in contravention of the Act, (iii) which has been entrusted in confidence to him by any person holding office under His Majesty, or (iv) which he has obtained as a person who holds or has held office under His Majesty, or a contract on behalf of His Majesty, or as a person who is or has been employed under a person so holding office or a contract ; and there can be no doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the clause and every part of it. That is the view of the clause which was taken by the learned Judge at the trial, and this Court agrees with him." Placing reliance on it, the Court observed that the plain reading of Section 5 (1) goes to show that the secret official document contemplated by the said subsection must fall under one of the following categories :- (1) it should relate to or be used in a prohibited place or relate to anything in such a place, (2) or should be such as has been or obtained in contravention of the Act, (3) or should be such as has been entrusted in confidence to a person by anyone holding office under the Government, (4) or should be such as has been obtained by a person who holds or has held office under the Government or a contract on behalf of the Government or as a person who is or has been employed under a person so holding office or contract. Undoubtedly, case of the petitioners squarely falls within Para (4) of the aforesaid observations. 20. IT has vehemently been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the statement of the objects and reasons provided for in the Amendment Act 24 of 1967 specifically provides for the application of the Act in the case of anti- national activities and security of the State. 20. IT has vehemently been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the statement of the objects and reasons provided for in the Amendment Act 24 of 1967 specifically provides for the application of the Act in the case of anti- national activities and security of the State. IT applies only to the cases which affect the sovereignty and integrity of India and friendly relations with foreign States. The submission is totally misconceived as the Amendment Act of 1967 added" or which is likely to assist, directly or indirectly, an enemy or which relates to a matter, the disclosure of which is likely to affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the States or friendly relations with foreign States or which has been made or obtained in contravention of this Act." The objects and reasons itself read as under :- "............in view of the changed circumstances.............and the wide variety of unscrupulous methods which anti-national elements have of late been adopting to secure their ends... IT is proposed to widen the scope of Sections 3 and 5 of the Act by bringing within their ambit cases of secret official codes, etc..............................." Thus, by the amendment Act of 1967 the activities affecting the sovereignty or security of the States, etc. have been included in Section 5 of the Act and it is in addition to disclosure of other types of informations, etc., which were covered by the pre amended Act. In England, the Act of 1911 has been repealed by an Act of 1989 which Includes both type of cases, i.e., relating to the defence and security of the State and disclosure of the other official informations. However, the Act of 1989 has been restricted to the disclosure of particular types of official informations. 21. IN the instant case: the test-booklets were sent to the Commission with certain instructions. The instructions were divided into two parts ; confidential and non-confidential. It was mentioned that the instructions must be read carefully and followed meticulously. One of the terms provided as under: "The unused test booklets should be sealed by the Supervisor immediately after thirty minutes of the commencement of the examination in each session." 22. IT is admitted case of the parties that the test booklets were taken outside the examination hall at the behest of petitioner No. 1 by the petitioner No. 2. One of the terms provided as under: "The unused test booklets should be sealed by the Supervisor immediately after thirty minutes of the commencement of the examination in each session." 22. IT is admitted case of the parties that the test booklets were taken outside the examination hall at the behest of petitioner No. 1 by the petitioner No. 2. The same were taken to a private photo-copying machine and were photocopied. The original test booklets were brought back and sealed at 11.30 a.m. This was undoubtedly in contravention of the instructions. IT has vehemently been argued by the learned counsel for the C.B.I. That the only purpose to photocopy the said test, booklets was to use it for unfair means. Without going into the factual controversy and the intention for which the photo-copies were prepared, we are of the view that each step was taken by petitioners was in flagrant violation of the instructions issued by the Union Public Service Commission. From the Statement of Sri A. Rajagopalan, Joint Secretaty, Union Public Service Commission which was recorded by the C.B.I. (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) the following part is worth quoting. ......the test booklets are accorded a high degree of confidentiality ... before the examination. 23. IT has been argued on behalf of petitioners that once the test booklets had been distributed among the candidates appearing in examination, the same did not remain confidential any more. The submission, in our view, is preposterous and has no legs to stand. The test booklets might have not remained confidential qua the candidates appearing for the examination, the same remained confidential for all other persons till the examination was over. As there remained a possibility to use the same for unfair means and, thus we are not impressed by this argument at all. 24. THE submission on behalf of petitioners that the saction/complaint does not disclose commission of any offence by petitioners and hence is liable to be quashed is, in our considered opinion, untenable. As there remained a possibility to use the same for unfair means and, thus we are not impressed by this argument at all. 24. THE submission on behalf of petitioners that the saction/complaint does not disclose commission of any offence by petitioners and hence is liable to be quashed is, in our considered opinion, untenable. It has to be examined in view of the law laid down in Emperor v. Khawaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18; State of West Bengal v. Swapana Kumar Guha, AIR 1982 SC 949 ; State of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 SC 604 ; THE Junta Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary and others, AIR 1993 SC 892 ; Union of India v. W. N. Chadha, AIR 1993 SC 1082. THE power of quashing the criminal proceedings is to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. It is permissible only in a case where, the documents, etc. do not disclose commission of any offence at all. In Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra), the Apex Court made the following note of caution: "We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases, that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinay or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary Jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." The same was approved and followed by the Supreme Court in Mushtaq Ahmad v. Md. Habibur Rahman Faizi and others, JT 1996 (1) SC 656. 25. IN State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawal JT 1996 (1) SC 601, the Supreme Court observed that the power should be used under exceptional circumstances and very sparingly and cautiously only when the court comes to the conclusion that there would be manifest injustice or there would be abuse of the process of the Court, if such power is not exercised while examining the case it is not permissible for the court at that stage either to sift the evidence or appreciate evidence and come to the conclusion that no prima facie case is made out. 26. 26. SIMILARLY, in Rupan Deol Bajaj and another v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill and another, JT 1995 (7) SC 299, the Supreme Court observed as under :- "Great care should be taken by the High Court before embarking to scrutinise the F.I.R., charge-sheet/complaint. In deciding whether the case is rarest of rare cases to scuttle the prosecution in its inception, it first has to get into the grip of the matter whether the allegations constitute the offence................At that stage, it is not the function of the Court to weigh the pros and cons of the prosecution case or to consider necessity of strict compliance of the provisions which are considered mandatory and its effect of non compliance........When investigation officer spends considerable time to collect the evidence and places the charge-sheet before the Court, further action should not be short circuited by resorting to exercise inherent power to quash the charge-sheet. The social stability and order requires to be regulated by proceeding against the offender as it is an offence against the society as a whole. This cardinal principle should always be kept in mind before embarking upon exercising inherent power." In the instant case allegations, as disclosed before us during the course of arguments and from sanction order, etc., are sufficient to disclose the commission of an offence, whatever it might be. Hence quashing of the sanction order, (Annexure 1 to the writ petition) does not arise. 27. MOREOVER, we fail to understand as to how the instant petition, wherein the only relief sought is quashing of impugned sanction dated 17.2.1993 (Annexure 1) can be helpful to the petitioners. As even if the impugned sanctions is quashed, petitioners are liable to face criminal proceedings because the F.I.R. still remains in existence. The F.I.R. may disclose the offence punishable under Section 409, I.P.C. as the act of petitioners fall outside the scope of their official duty, provisions of Section 197, Cr. P.C. may not be attracted at all. However, it is premature for us to say anything on it because neither the F.I.R. nor any other material/evidence has been placed on record before us. The trial court is free to examine all these legal aspects, whenever need be arisen. Contents of the instant petition are not only frivolous, preposterous and misconceived but also ill- advised. Filing this type of petition amounts to abuse of due process of court. 28. The trial court is free to examine all these legal aspects, whenever need be arisen. Contents of the instant petition are not only frivolous, preposterous and misconceived but also ill- advised. Filing this type of petition amounts to abuse of due process of court. 28. THE petition is devoid of any merit and hence dismissed accordingly with costs. We are further constrained to direct the learned Magistrate to proceed with further proceedings expeditiously, strictly in accordance with law. However, before parting with the case, we would like to clarify that no observation made hereinabove shall, by any means, adversely or otherwise affect the merits of further criminal proceedings or trial, if any. Petition dismissed.