S. M. SONI, J. ( 1 ) ). [his Lordships after stating the facts of the case, further observed : ] xxx xxx xxx ( 2 ) ). Trial Court in the instant case appears to have overlooked the facts relevant for considering bail in non-bailable case. Question is, if such relevant facts are overlooked, would this Court not interfere with the order of bail and cancel it ? is it that, simply because the accused released on bail has not tried to interfere with in any manner with the administration of justice, this Court should permit to remain illegality? Despite rejection of relevant factors by the trial Court to grant bail, such bail order should not be interfered with ? Will this not amount to permit or condone arbitrary exercise of discretion conferred on the trial Court ? Is it that this Court cannot interfere with the order passed in total disregard of statutory provisions concerning bail ? Answer to all these questions, in my opinion, is that this Court can and should interfere with such bad orders. (Only a part of the Judgment approved for reporting is published.) ( 3 ) ). It will be relevant to state that the Forensic Science Laboratory has opined that the substance found is opium and is a narcotic substance. It is also relevant to state that respondent is alleged to be the tenant of the premises and his son was found present at the time of raid. In view of this fact, there are all the probabilities that he may be held guilty. Thus, there is a strong prima facie case. Keeping in view the minimum punishment of imprisonment as well as fine provided for the offence it can be said that in all probabilities the accused may abscond to avoid evil day and imprisonment or may indulge into such activity again to make good the fine that may be imposed if he is continued on bail. ( 4 ) ). In Dolatrams case, 1995 (1) SCC 349 , the Court has said that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. In Dolatrams case, 1995 (1) SCC 349 , the Court has said that bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial. However, when the question of cancellation of bail arose before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman dighe, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1603 , the Court has held in paragraphs 8 and 9 as under :"8. The learned Judge further discussed the statements of witnesses recorded by the Investigating Officer. The Judge scrutinized the statements of Arun Jagtap, Smt. Sangita Khopkar and Miss Sujata Khopkar and treating those statements to be evidence before the Court, came to the conclusion that the statements could not be relied upon. The learned Judge virtually pre-empted the trial by delivering the judgment on the culpability of respondent Dighe. We are of the view that the learned Judge grossly erred in foreclosing the trial by prejuding the evidence which was yet to come on record. ""9. It is no doubt correct that this Court in its order dated January 16, 1990 observed that the cancellation of bail was without prejudice to the rights of Dighe to move the Designated Court for bail at any subsequent stage, but that was only in the event of any further evidence being recorded by the Court or any fresh material being made available during the investigation or before the Court. This court also directed that it was necessary for the Designated Court to consider further material collected by the investigating agency, by recording statements of witnesses. The Designated Court did not record any evidence and there was no fresh material available before the Court. The learned Judge, Designated Court, by putting his own gloss over the same material has again granted bail to the respondent. We do not appreciate the manner in which the learned Judge has dealt with the matter. The police investigation prima facie show that mafia-type terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold blooded murder of Shridhar Khopkar. The learned Judge acted illegally in appreciating the statements of witnesses and material collected by the investigating officer at the investigation stage. The police investigation prima facie show that mafia-type terror and fear psychosis was created which led to the cold blooded murder of Shridhar Khopkar. The learned Judge acted illegally in appreciating the statements of witnesses and material collected by the investigating officer at the investigation stage. He should have permitted the evidence to be recorded and thereafter dealt with the same in accordance with law". ( 5 ) ). Mr. Raval contended that the facts of the present case are identical to that of Anand Chintamans case (supra), and therefore, this Court should interfere and cancel the bail order. Here, in the case on hand, the learned Additional Sessions judge has appreciated the evidence of the complainant-landlady, and one receipt produced by the prosecution, to show that present respondent is the tenant of the premises. Landlady-Sakinaben has come out with the case that police has not recorded her statement at all. The said landlady has filed one affidavit to the effect that when she declined to police to issue a rent receipt in the name of respondent no. 2, police had approached her rent collector and obtained a receipt under threat and coercion. Question is how police knew that there is rent collector. When and how landlady knew that police claims that her statement is recorded and denies to have given her statement. The case of the police is that her statement has been recorded wherein she has stated that present respondent is her tenant. Despite the same, she has filed an affidavit to the effect that her statement is not recorded and the police has forcibly taken receipt from the rent collector. Affidavit of the said rent collector ought to have been filed to show that a receipt was collected from him in the name of respondent by threat and coercion. However, the learned Judge appears to have misdirected himself casting burden on the prosecution that they have not recorded the statement of said rent collector Suleman Pirmohmed. While considering application for bail the Court is required to consider the police statements whatever recorded. When the case of the police is that the landlady has given her statement and when the accused files an affidavit of the landlady to the effect that her police statement is not recorded at all, it is a matter to be considered at the time of trial. When the case of the police is that the landlady has given her statement and when the accused files an affidavit of the landlady to the effect that her police statement is not recorded at all, it is a matter to be considered at the time of trial. The Court cannot come to the conclusion at the time of considering application for bail and hold that no such statement of the landlady was recorded and the receipts obtained by the prosecution from the rent collector is by threat and coercion. Based on these facts, the learned Judge has come to the conclusion that there is no prima facie case or in other words there are no reasonable grounds to hold that the respondent is guilty of the offence alleged. On the contrary, filing of affidavit of a prosecution witness by accused should have been looked upon as tampering with witness. When the learned Judge has misdirected himself in appreciating the evidence in this manner while deciding the application for bail, in my opinion, the learned Judge has exceeded in his jurisdiction by looking into the evidence to which he is not entitled to. Thus, the learned Judge has erred and exceeded in his jurisdiction by pre-judging the evidence at the stage of bail application. This is in contravention of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Anand chintamans case (supra ). ( 6 ) ). What is required to be established by the prosecution in N. D. P. S. case is that the substance found is a narcotic substance; it is found from possesion of the accused. Possession contemplated is always a conscious possession. As per the prosecution case as it stands, when the premises named Lucky Agro Centre was raided, one Ganibhai co-accused was found occupying the same. On further enquiry by the police, the said premises is in the name of present respondent - father of said Ganibhai. From the statement of other witnesses, it appears that respondent was in the premises just few minutes before the raid. Whether both or one of them was in conscious possession is a matter of evidence. Whether to believe the say of landlady or not is again a matter of appreciation of evidence after cross-examination of landlady. From the statement of other witnesses, it appears that respondent was in the premises just few minutes before the raid. Whether both or one of them was in conscious possession is a matter of evidence. Whether to believe the say of landlady or not is again a matter of appreciation of evidence after cross-examination of landlady. However, appreciating evidence at this juncture and accepting the evidence of landlady which is by way of an affidavit which ordinarily amounts to tampering with, is pre-judging the evidence and is without jurisdiction as held in anand Chintamans case (supra ). Thus, when the order is passed in contravention of certain principles of law which amounts to arbitrary exercise of discretion the same should be interfered with. This apart, when the police says that the statement of landlady was recorded and the landlady files an affidavit in favour of the accused stating that her statement was not at all recorded, this in my opinion, would amount to tampering with the witnesses also. This also calls for a serious view in such matter. In view of this fact also, in my opinion, the bail is liable to be cancelled. ( 7 ) ). In view of above discussion, there is prima facie case against the respondentaccused. Sec. 37 of the N. D. P. S. Act reads as under :"37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable :- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974), - (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless - (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail". ( 8 ) ). (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II of 1974), or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail". ( 8 ) ). Here the learned Public Prosecutor is heard and has opposed the bail application. The above discussion on merits suggests clearly that there are reasonable grounds to hold accused guilty of offence. In absence of any material it cannot be said that accused may not repeat the offence. This was a fit case to refuse the bail, yet the same is granted. Thus, the grant of bail is in contravention of provisions of law and is, therefore, liable to be cancelled. (Rest of the judgment is not material for the Reports.) .