JASPAL SINGH,j. ( 1 ) ON February 28, 1996 Mr. O. P. Saxena, who happens to be the President of All India Lawyers Forum for Civil Liberties, filed a Criminal Complaint under sections 4 and 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 161 of the Indian Penal Code against Mr. Shailender Mahto a member of Parliament. On March 4, 1996 the learned Special Judge dismissed the said complaint "in limine" holding the same as being not maintainable". Finding the said order of dismissal unpalatable. Mr. Saxena has preferred this revision petition. What was it that was alleged in the Complaint ? ( 2 ) MR. Saxena alleged that he was shocked to read in various newspapers a confessional statement of Mr. Mahto to the effect that he had received Rs. 40 lakhs as bribe from Mr. Suraj Manda 1, Member Parliament. Mr. Saxena claimed that it being an extra-judicial confession clearly indicating commission of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by Mr. Mahto and there being other sufficient material to prove it, Mr. Mahto ought to be summoned and prosecuted under the said Act. He claimed that he would adduce documentary evidence and shall summon witnesses to establish the charges of corruption against Mr. Shailendra Malto" ( 3 ) THE learned Special judge neither proceeded, to examine the complainant nor his witnesses and. as already noticed above, dismissed the complaint in limine as being not maintainable. ( 4 ) ON what basis did the Special Judge hold the complaint as not maintainable ? What were the reasons ? The learned Special Judge after referring to section 190 (1) (c) and observing that under the said provision he was "fully empowered to take cognizance upon information received from any person", he proceeded to reproduce section 39 (1) of the Code. What followed thereafter, were the reasons which prevailed with him. Since it would be much safer to delineat then in the words of the learned Judge himself, here they are, coming from his own pen :-- "according to this provision of law, only that person can give information who is aware of the commission of the offence relating to illegal gratification or of the intention of any oilier person to commit such crime. It is not the case of the present applicant that he is aware of the commission of the offence or of the intention of any other person to commit such offences because admittedly applicant has no personal knowledge of any such offence nor the alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act have been committed in the presence of the applicant. Further it. is not the case of the applicant that he has paid any illegal gratification to any public servant or any illegal gratification was demanded from the applicant by any public-servant. The press reports annexed with the present application does not show that the present applicant had any knowledge of the alleged offence or be is aware of the commission of the alleged offence. Further admittedly as per applicant s own case. the alleged confession made by Shri Shailender Mehto, M. P. has already been retracted by him. " ( 5 ) I discern three things emerging from the order. First. as per the learned Special Judge, sections 39 (1) (iii) and 190 (1) (c) stood attracted. Second, since Mr. Saxena had no personal knowledge of the commission of offence as the same had not been committed in his presence, therefore, he was not a person " aware" of the commission of offence within the A meaning of section 39 of the Code or a person having "personal knowledge" within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 190 of the Code, and thirdly, the confessional statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Mahto admittedly stood retracted. It would be better, I think, if I first reproduce section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code. Here it is :- "39. Public to give information of certain offences.- (1) Every person, aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit, any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely :- (i) (ii) (iii) Sections 161 to 165-A, both inclusive (that is to say, offences relating to illegal gratification)". ( 6 ) TO my mind reference to and reliance upon section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Special Judge was misplaced. ( 6 ) TO my mind reference to and reliance upon section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Special Judge was misplaced. The section imposes an obligation upon every person aware of the commission of, or of the intention of any other person to commit, any of the offences as specified in section 39. The provision corresponds to what is known in English Law as misprison of felony or crime, that is. the concealment from the authorities of one s knowledge of commission of an offence or crime. The provision thus proceeds on the principle that it is the duty of law-abiding citizens to report to the authorities any crime which they know has been committed. Failure to do so is an offence. However, I fail to see how this provision which is totally foreign to the point in issue could be brought in and, I must. say in all fairness to Mr. Anil Sapra who was appearing for Mr. Mahto, that he too found reliance upon the provision by the learned Special Judge as out of place and thus indefensible. ( 7 ) THE learned Special Judge, while pacing reliance on section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code also lost sight of the fact that sections 161 to 165-A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code to which section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code relates, already stand omitted and repealed by section 31 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1986. The said section 31 of the Act runs as under :- "31. Omission of certain sections of Act 45 of 1860.- Section 161 to 165-A (both inclusive) of the Indian Penal Code shall be omitted, and section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply to such omission as if the said sections had been repealed by a Central Act. " ( 8 ) THUS, in any case, section 39 (1) (iii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure could not even be taken note of, As noted above, the learned Special Judge has also made reference to and relied upon section 190 ( 1) (c) of the Code. Since I will be dealing with this provision at some length. I am tempted to reproduce it. This is how it runs : --- "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. Since I will be dealing with this provision at some length. I am tempted to reproduce it. This is how it runs : --- "190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. __ (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence,- (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. " ( 9 ) AS would be borne out from a bare reading of the provision which is one out of a group of sections under the heading "conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings", the Magistrate specified therein may take cognizance of an offence either (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence, or (2) upon a police report of such facts, or (3) upon information received from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has been committed. ( 10 ) SIGNIFICANTLY, the learned Special Judge has reterred to and placed reliance only upon section 190 (1) (c) and has surprisingly completely ignored section 190 (1) (a) of the Code. If we look at the complaint filed by Mr. Saxena, it would be revealed that it first gives the facts, then speaks of commission of offences by Mr. Mahto under the Prevention of Corruption Act and later proceeds to pray :- " (I) Register this complaint and. take cognizance of the offences committed by Mr. Shailendra Mahto M. P under the Prevention of Corruptioit Act. (ii) Summon the accused/issue N. B. W. s against the Respondent No. 2 and try him for offences under section 4 of P. O. C. Act read with section i61 I PC and also direct C. B. I. to recover Rs. Twenty lakhs which are still admittedly in bank Account of R-2. (iii) Pass such further order orders as deemed fit in the interest of justicc. Twenty lakhs which are still admittedly in bank Account of R-2. (iii) Pass such further order orders as deemed fit in the interest of justicc. " ( 11 ) WHAT the learned Special Judge had received was thus a complaint of allegations constituting commission of ofence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. it was a private complaint falling within the ambit and scope of section 190 (1) (a) and as such could not be taken to fall within the parameters of section 190 (1) (c ). ( 12 ) THE object of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 190 of the Code is to enable a Magistrate to see to it that justice. is vindicated when he has information about the commission of an offence but with regard to which he is otherwise unable to proceed in the ordinary way on account of there being neither any complaint nor any police report about it. In other words where there is a complaint, within the meaning of section 190 (1) (a) or a police report within the meaning of section 190 (1) (h) it would not be open to the court: to proceed under clause (e ). It also needs to be noticed that the term "information" finding mention in clause (c) is distinct from a complaint under clause (a), the essential difference being that while a Magistrate acts on a complaint because tlie complainant has asked him to act. in the case of "information" a Magistrate acts of his own accord and initiative upon information from any person named or unnamed or any source or upon his own knowledge. Undoubtedly "information" is a wider term than complaint but the term "information" in the context of section 190 (1) (c) would not include "information from a private complaint instituted validly as any such interpretation would hurt the very relevance of clause (a) of section 190 (1 ). In short thus in the case in hand the learned Special Judge has wrongly placed reliance upon clause (c) not only by treating a complaint falling under clause (a) as one falling under clause (c) but also by interpreting the terms "information" and "knowledge" in the light of the term "aware" appearing in section 39. In short thus in the case in hand the learned Special Judge has wrongly placed reliance upon clause (c) not only by treating a complaint falling under clause (a) as one falling under clause (c) but also by interpreting the terms "information" and "knowledge" in the light of the term "aware" appearing in section 39. ( 13 ) THE third, and may I say the only other reason, which led the learned Special Judge to hold the complaint as not "maintainable" is that the person complained against namely Mr. Mahto had, as per Mr. Saxena himself, retracted the extrajudicial confession. ( 14 ) ONE can understand the Magistrate taking note of alleged retraction of extra-judicial confession at the stage of section 202 or of section 203 or at the stage of section 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but it is difficult to comprehend as to how it affects the very maintainability of the complaint. The requisites of a legal complaint within the meaning of section 190 (1) (a) of the Code are that it must (i) contain such facts as constitute an offence committed by a person known or unknown, (but would not include a police report under section 173 (2) of the Code) (2) made to a Magistrate (the term Magistrate would include Special Judge as in the present case), and (3) with the object that he should take action under the law. It is not necessary that the person making the complaint must have personal knowledge of the facts complained of. Barring a few exceptions like a complaint of an Offence specified in section 195 (1) (a), a complaint under section 196, 198 and 199 or a complaint in respect of offences specific in clauses (B) and (C) of section 195 (1) of the Indian Penal Code or where a special or local law puts a bar. every person can make a complaint. In the words of the Supreme Court in A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak AIR 1984 SC 718 : "it is well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. The scheme of the Criminal Procedure Code envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can beent enterned and proceeded with according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. . . . . . . . . . . . While section 190 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i. e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (Sec Section 2 (n), Criminal Procedure Code.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendatta or vengannce. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it. is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it. is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings; cannot be whittled down, circumscribe, or fettered by putting it into a straight-jacket fomula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception". ( 15 ) NOTHING more need be said except of course, this that the impugned order is set aside and the learned Special Judge is directed to give a fresh look to the complaint and to proceed to deal with it in accordance with law. The complainant is directed to appear before the learned Special Judge on May 1 1996. Lower Court record be sent back forthwith. Disposed of