JUDGMENT C.S. Rajan, J. 1. The legal battle between the exporters of marine products and the operators of trawlers on the one side and the Government and Fishermens' Welfare Fund Board on the other side started almost a decade back. It is necessary to trace the history of these litigations in order to understand the issues to be decided by us in this batch of original petitions. In 1985 Kerala Legislature passed the Kerala Fishermens' Welfare Fund Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). When the scheme under the Act was sought to be enforced, the first Original Petition to be filed was O.P. No. 3374/87 which was withdrawn with liberty to move afresh. This was followed by the filing of O.P No. 6388/88. In the above Original Petition the constitutional validity of the Act was under challenge. This was also dismissed as withdrawn. Then followed O.P. No. 3655/90 which was dismissed as not pressed. Almost after two years, O.P. No. 4065/92 was filed in which also the constitutional validity of the various provisions of the Act was under challenge. According to the respondents, even though the constitutional validity was challenged in the Original Petition, no arguments were addressed on the above point at the time of the final hearing. The above Original Petition was also disposed of without deciding the constitutional validity of the Act. According to the respondents it was made clear in the judgment that the other points were not argued before the Court. 2. Another batch of Original Petitions filed by the marine products exporters (O.P. Nos. 4611/92 and 5399/92 etc.) came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. The Division Bench after considering the 'factual matrix' of the cases came to the conclusion that the marine products exporters who purchased processed fish and retained there with requisite arrangement for preservation could not be considered as dealers within the definition of the Act. The Division Bench after setting aside the assessment orders passed by the Kerala Fishermens' Welfare Fund Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') remitted the proceedings to the authorities to hear the petitioners in the light of the observations made in the judgment and to pass fresh orders. The above judgment was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Division Bench after setting aside the assessment orders passed by the Kerala Fishermens' Welfare Fund Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board') remitted the proceedings to the authorities to hear the petitioners in the light of the observations made in the judgment and to pass fresh orders. The above judgment was taken up in appeal before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court considered the question whether the exporters in marine products are dealers so as to come within the definition of 'dealer' under the Act and held that the exporters are dealers within the meaning of S.4(2) read with S.2(d) of the Act. According to the petitioners, the Supreme Court came to the above finding without deciding whether the above section is manifestly illegal or constitutionally invalid. 3. The next round of litigation started when the Board again passed assessment orders holding that the exporters are dealers. The main prayers in these Original Petitions are: (1) To issue a declaration that the dealer definition in S.2 (d) of the Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Act, 1985 roping in the exporter of fish and directing him to pay contribution as per S.4 (2) of the said Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional. (2) To issue a declaration that the expression 'one per cent of the sale proceeds in the year' mentioned in S.4 (2) of the Act means only one per cent of net sale proceeds in the year and under such circumstances the contribution, if at all payable by an exporter can only be one per cent of the net profits of business of the exporter, and not one per cent of the sales turnover of the business of the exporter. (3) To issue a writ of certiorari calling for the records relating to the notices issued to the petitioners relating to the period 1st April 1989 to 31st March 1995 and to quash the same. 4. In order to decide these Original Petitions it is necessary to read the definition clause and the charging clause in the Act which are as follows: "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. 4. In order to decide these Original Petitions it is necessary to read the definition clause and the charging clause in the Act which are as follows: "2. Definitions. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires. * * * * (d) 'dealer' means any person who carries on within the State of Kerala the business of buying and selling fish or processing fish for export or domestic marketing and includes: (i) a commission agent, a broker, or any other mercantile agent by whatever name called; and (ii) a non resident dealer or an agent of a non resident dealer or a local branch of a firm or company or association situated outside the State of Kerala." "4. Contribution to the Fund. A fisherman shall contribute to the fund three per cent of the value of fish caught by him during a year or three per cent of the wages earned by him in a year: Provided that the contribution by a fisherman for a period of three years from the commencement of the Act shall be at the rate of Rs. 30 per year. (2) A dealer shall contribute every year to the fund one per cent of his sale proceeds in the year: Provided that the Board shall fix, upon such principles as may be specified in the scheme, the amount which a dealer shall contribute every year to the fund, for a period of three years from the commencement of this Act: Provided further that the amount fixed under the preceding proviso shall not exceed one per cent of the sale proceeds of the dealer." The validity of the Act was unsuccessfully challenged by the petitioners herein and the owners of the trawlers engaged in fishing in a number of Original Petitions. It is necessary to advert to those decisions in extenso in order to understand and to decide the contentions raised in these Original Petitions. 5. Indian Trawlers' Association challenged the constitutional validity of the Act in O. P. No. 7787 of 1988. Justice K. A. Nayar, who heard the Original Petition in a well considered judgment reported in Indian Trawlers Association, Ernakulam v. State AIR 1992 Kerala 360 dismissed the Original Petition. 5. Indian Trawlers' Association challenged the constitutional validity of the Act in O. P. No. 7787 of 1988. Justice K. A. Nayar, who heard the Original Petition in a well considered judgment reported in Indian Trawlers Association, Ernakulam v. State AIR 1992 Kerala 360 dismissed the Original Petition. The argument of the petitioners therein that even though the act has not specifically referred to levy a tax, the effect of the impugned Act if considered, it will be seen that the levy is masquerading as a tax, was dealt with by the learned Judge in Para.10 of the above ruling. After considering the cases of Maneka, Gandhi AIR 1978 SC 597 and Bennet Gateman and Co. Ltd. AIR 1973 SC 106 the learned Judge concluded as follows: "Whether the pith and substance of the Act is taken, or the direct impact of the law is examined, it cannot be considered that it imposes a tax or a fee. It cannot be a tax as there is no levy under the impugned Act for a general purpose. No characteristic of a tax is present. The benefit conferred under the Act is only to subserve the common good of the fishing industry. Since the petitioners are also benefited by the hard labour of the fishermen, they also have a liability to pay contribution." The learned Judge also considered the argument of the petitioners that the levy is not supported by any entry in any of the Lists of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. After analysing the decisions of Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works' case AIR 1974 SC 1832 , M/s Gasket Radiators' case AIR 1985 SC 790 and Chellappan' case 1990 (1) KLT 254 , the learned Judge held that the Act neatly comes under entries 23 and 24 of List III of the VII Schedule. It was also held that the legislation comes as a welfare measure and it is not a tax or a fee. 6. The above judgment was taken in appeal and the judgment of the Division Bench is reported in Indian Trawlers Association v. State of Kerala 1993 (1) KLT 256 . In a scholarly judgment Justice Kalliath speaking on behalf of the Bench, not only fully endorsed the views expressed by Justice Nayar but also went one step forward and described the legislation as a piece of "affirmative action justice". In a scholarly judgment Justice Kalliath speaking on behalf of the Bench, not only fully endorsed the views expressed by Justice Nayar but also went one step forward and described the legislation as a piece of "affirmative action justice". The next judgment to be referred in this connection is the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Regional Executive, Kerala, Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food 1995 (2) KLT 77 (SC). In the above case the Supreme Court considered the question whether exporters who process fish after purchasing it from the agents in the form of deshelled fish or cut fish or head and tail removed are dealers within the meaning of S.4(2) read with S.2(d) of the Act. After elaborately considering the background of the legislation and the purpose for which it was enacted, the Supreme Court held that exporters like the petitioners in these cases are dealers within the definition contained in the Act. 7. The sheet anchor of the attack of the petitioners against the Act is the lack of legislative competence on the part of the State Legislature to enact such a law like the present Act. According to the petitioners the present legislation is not covered by any of the entries either in List II or List III of the VII schedule of the Constitution. According to the learned Senior Counsel Sri P. C. Chacko appearing for some of the petitioners, the Act squarely comes under entries 36 and 41 of List I of the VII schedule. The above argument is based on the fact that the power of Parliament to make laws in relation to foreign exchange is manifest in entry 36 of List I of the VII schedule. The reasoning is that the petitioners are engaged only in export of the marine products and there is no local sale as far as they are concerned. By such exports they earned valuable foreign exchange and therefore any legislation touching the earning of foreign exchange has to be under entry No. 36 of the Union List. Since the contribution is payable on the basis of the sale proceeds of the exporters, it has a direct bearing on the earning of foreign exchange by the petitioners. By such exports they earned valuable foreign exchange and therefore any legislation touching the earning of foreign exchange has to be under entry No. 36 of the Union List. Since the contribution is payable on the basis of the sale proceeds of the exporters, it has a direct bearing on the earning of foreign exchange by the petitioners. In order to drive home the above point, the counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in L.K. Sugar Mills v. Union of India AIR 1959 SC 1124 . In the above case the Supreme Court was considering the constitutional validity of the Sugar Export Promotion Act by which certain restrictions were placed by the Central Government on the quantity of sugar to be exported, including a levy of additional excise duty on sugar despatch from the factory for consumption in India. In dealing with the above aspect, the Supreme Court in the above case held that on a wide interpretation of entry No. 36 of the Union List, it would embrace within itself not only laws relating to the control of foreign exchange but also to its acquisition to better the economic stability of the country. The need for foreign exchange to finance the various development schemes was very proper and it cannot be disputed that the above object is in the public interest. 8. The State has pitched the tent on entries 23 and 24 of List III of the VII Schedule in order to sustain the constitutionality of the Act. According to the counsel for the petitioners unless the beneficiaries of the fund are directly employed by the petitioners, there cannot be any welfare of the labour as far as the petitioners are concerned. The fund has been established for the welfare of fishermen. A fisherman has been defined in S.2(g) of the Act as a fisherman as defined in clause(e) of S.2 of the Kerala Fishermens' Welfare Societies Act, 1980. According to the above definition, a fisherman means any person engaged mainly in fishing operations for his livelihood. Therefore the counsel contends that the petitioners are not employing any fisherman in their business or industry. His own employees who are engaged in the export of marine products are not covered by the Act and the fund is not intended for them. Therefore the counsel contends that the petitioners are not employing any fisherman in their business or industry. His own employees who are engaged in the export of marine products are not covered by the Act and the fund is not intended for them. According to the petitioners there is absolutely no connection between the fisherman as defined in the Act and the petitioners or their industry. The petitioners also have no control or supervision over these fishermen. Therefore, according to the petitioners, the Act cannot relate to either entry 23 or entry 24 of List III of the VII schedule. Sri P. C. Chacko relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in M. G. Beedi Works v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC 1832 in order to support the above line of reasoning. In the above case the provisions of the Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 were impeached as unconstitutional. The first and foremost ground of attack was lack of legislative competence on the part of the parliament to enact such an enactment. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, entries 22, 23 and 24 of List III were pressed into service to support the above enactment on the ground that the Act was intended to benefit the workers of the beedi industry and it was found by the Supreme Court that the workers employed by independent Contractors are also indirectly employed by the manufacturers and therefore the Supreme Court found a nexus between the manufacturer and the employees of independent contractors. 9. Art.246 of the Constitution imposes limitations on the legislative powers of the Union and State Legislatures. Under Art.246(1), the Parliament has exclusive power to legislate with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I of the VII schedule. The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the VII schedule. List III of VII schedule, otherwise known as concurrent list, contains matters for which both the Parliament and the State Legislature can make laws. According to Art.254 of the Constitution, if any provision of law made by the State Legislature is repugnant to any provision of law made by Parliament, then the law made by Parliament shall prevail and to that extent the law made by the Legislature of the State shall be void. According to Art.254 of the Constitution, if any provision of law made by the State Legislature is repugnant to any provision of law made by Parliament, then the law made by Parliament shall prevail and to that extent the law made by the Legislature of the State shall be void. The above Article also provides for obtaining assent of the President in a case where the State Legislature makes the law on a matter included in the concurrent list which is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament. It is also pertinent to note that the present Act got assent from the President. 10. The argument of the counsel for the petitioners is that the impugned Act is void because it transgresses the field occupied by the subjects covered by List I of the VII schedule, which are exclusively for the Parliament to legislate. Sri P.C. Chacko learned senior counsel relied on the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar (1983) 4 S.C.C, 45, wherein the controversy was whether there is repugnancy between the provisions contained in the Bihar Finance Act providing for the levy of a surcharge and the provisions contained in the Essential Commodities Act. In the above ruling the Supreme Court enunciated the principles to be applied in a matter, where there is an apparent conflict between the powers of the Union and the State Legislatures. One of the principles to be applied is the doctrine of pith and substance and incidental encroachments. Once it is found that a law made by the State Legislature is with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the State list, the degree or extent of invasion into the field is immaterial. Moreover, there must be a real conflict between the two enactments made by the Parliament and by the State Legislature which must come into collusion. It is also a well settled principle that the validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches upon matters outside the authorised field and therefore it is necessary to enquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the Act impugned. Therefore in every case the true nature and character of the enactment in question has to be enquired. 11. Therefore in every case the true nature and character of the enactment in question has to be enquired. 11. According to the senior counsel for the petitioners, since the State Legislature is incompetent to make the impugned enactment, it is a colourable piece of Legislation. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider in a number of rulings whether a particular enactment is a colourable piece of legislation or not. One of the earliest rulings of the Supreme Court on this point is the decision reported in State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh AIR 1952 SC 252 , wherein the constitutional validity of the Bihar Land Reforms Act was questioned. According to the Supreme Court if the power has not been exercised under any legislative head authorising the State Legislature to pass a law, then the exercise of that power is a colourable exercise and therefore such a legislation is unconstitutional. Again in the ruling reported in K.C. Gajapathi Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 S.C. 375 the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of colourable legislation does not involve any question of bona fides or mala fides on the part of the Legislature and the whole doctrine revolves itself into the question of competence of a particular legislature to enact a particular law. The transgression of legislative power in respect of the subject matter of the statute may be patent, manifest or direct. It may also be disguised, covert or indirect. The later class of cases has been painted as colourable legislation in certain judicial pronouncements. The above two rulings were followed in G. Nageswara Rao v. A.P.S.R.T. Corpn. AIR 1959 SC 308 , wherein the Supreme Court stated as follows: "The legislature can only make laws within its legislative competence. Its legislative field may be circumscribed by specific legislative entries or limited by fundamental rights created by the Constitution. The legislature cannot overstep the field of its competency, directly or indirectly. The court will scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the legislature by device purports to make a law which though in form appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it. If, in fact, it has power to make the law, its motives in making the law are irrelevant." 12. The court will scrutinize the law to ascertain whether the legislature by device purports to make a law which though in form appears to be within its sphere, in effect and substance, reaches beyond it. If, in fact, it has power to make the law, its motives in making the law are irrelevant." 12. Applying the above principles to the facts of the present cases, the petitioners vehemently argued that the present contribution partakes the colour of a tax which is not supported by any entry either in List II or in list III of the VII schedule. Learned senior counsel cited two decisions, one of this Court and the other of the Madras High Court. In the above two cases the question related to the character of special contribution to be paid by the employers under the Employees State Insurance Act. In the ruling reported in Chandrasekharan Nair v. The Regional Director, E.S.I. Corpn. 1972 KLJ 243 , Justice Govindan Nair (as he then was) speaking for the Bench staled as follows: "4. It is clear that if the impost under the Act is other wise a tax, it will not cease to be one such by the mere fact that the monies collected pursuant to the provision in the Act do not find their way , to the consolidated fund of the Union of India. The impost satisfied all the requirements of tax as denned by Latham, Chief Justice, in Mathews v. The Chicory Marketing Board (Victoria) reported in 60 C.L.R. 263, this: 'A tax is a compulsory extraction of money by a public authority for public purposes, enforceable by law and is not a payment for services rendered. ' This definition has been accepted by the Supreme Court as early as 1954 and reliance has been placed on the definition in the decision in The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt reported in AIR 1954 S.C. 282 . We therefore negative this contention." The same view was echoed by Chief Justice Govindan Nair while he was in the Madras High Court in the ruling reported in Sakti Pipes v. E.S.I. Corpn., Madras 1978 Lab. We therefore negative this contention." The same view was echoed by Chief Justice Govindan Nair while he was in the Madras High Court in the ruling reported in Sakti Pipes v. E.S.I. Corpn., Madras 1978 Lab. I.C. 410 as follows: "As the special contributions under S.73A were claimed from the employers by reason of their not having to comply with the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act and their not having to provide medical facilities to their employees there was no reasonable discernible nexus between the impost and the benefits which the employers might derive from whom the special contributions had been collected. The direct link between the levy and the indirect benefits resulting from the provisions of the Act was not established so as to conclude that the impost was compensated by quid pro quo of the services rendered. So the impost was a tax and not a fee." 13. Sri Pathrose Mathai, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners stressed the point that the contribution under the Act has got all the ingredients of a tax and if the ingredients are analysed, it can be seen that it is really a tax on the sale by the petitioners. In order to substantiate his arguments, learned counsel relied on the classical judgment of the Supreme Court in Comemr. H.R.E. v. L. T. Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 S.C. 282 . In the above judgment the Supreme Court was considering the constitutional validity of certain provisions of Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. Justice B.K. Mukherjea has analysed the incidence of tax and fee. According to the above judgment the essential characteristics of a tax as distinguished from other form of imposition, which, in a general sense, are included within it. The essence of taxation is compulsion and it is imposed under statutory power without the tax payers' consent and the payment is enforced by law. Another characteristic of tax is that it is for the purpose of general revenue and no special benefit is conferred on the payer of the tax. At the same time a fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals and there must be some co-relation between the amount of fees collected and the services rendered. At the same time a fee is generally defined to be a charge for a special service rendered to individuals and there must be some co-relation between the amount of fees collected and the services rendered. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the contribution collected under the Act squarely comes within the mischief of the above ruling and that there is no escape from calling it as a tax. On the above reasoning it was further submitted that none of the petitioner's employees is benefitted by the utilisation of the fund. 14. Sri A. K. Jain, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners elaborately argued that under our Constitution, there can be only a fee, tax or impost and there can be no other kind of payment or contribution. For the above purpose the learned counsel invited our attention to the definition of 'taxation' contained in Art.366 (28) I of the constitution which is as follows: "'Taxation' includes the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special and 'tax' shall be construed accordingly;" Therefore it was forcefully contended that if the contribution is a tax, it has no entry to support in any of the lists of the VII schedule. If it is to be considered as a fee, there is no quid pro quo as far as the petitioners are concerned. Then it must be an impost for which also there is no root in any of the lists of the VII schedule. The learned counsel strongly relied on Corporation of Calcutta v. Liberty Cinema AIR 1965 SC 1107 in order to emphasise the distinction recognised by the Constitution in the scheme of tax and fee with reference to the legislative entries. According to the Supreme Court, each of the Union and the State lists starts by enumerating first the entries conferring general legislative powers as distinct from taxation powers. The taxation entries are separately enumerated after the entries conferring general legislative power. Item No. 96 of list I empowers the Parliament to legislate in respect of any of the matters in the list but not including fees taken in any court. The same pattern of classification and conferment of general legislative powers as distinct from taxation power are adopted in the State list also. Item No. 96 of list I empowers the Parliament to legislate in respect of any of the matters in the list but not including fees taken in any court. The same pattern of classification and conferment of general legislative powers as distinct from taxation power are adopted in the State list also. So far as the concurrent list is concerned, it contains no entry conferring the taxation power but the last entry No. 47, enables the legislature to impose fees which is identical with entry 96 of Lists I and 66 of List II. The Supreme Court also said that a fee may be levied even under an enactment relating to the imposition of tax. Another ruling relied on by the learned counsel is D.G. Gose and Co. v. State of Kerala (1980) 2 SCC 410 wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows: "5. The word 'tax' in its widest sense includes all money raised by taxation. It therefore includes taxes levied by the Central and the State legislatures and also those known as 'rates' or other charges, levied by local authorities under statutory powers. 'Taxation' has therefore been defined in clause (28) of Art.366 of the Constitution to include 'the imposition of any tax or impost, whether general or local or special' and it has been directed that 'tax' shall be 'construed accordingly." Learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in P.M. Ashwathanarayan Setty v. State of Karnataka AIR 1989 SC 100 , wherein the Supreme Court held that the essential character of the impost is that some special service is included or envisaged as a quid pro quo to the class of citizens, which is intended to be benefited by the service and there is a broad and general co-relation between the amount so raised and the expenses involved in providing the services. In such cases the impost would partake the character of a fee notwithstanding the circumstance that the identity of the amount so raised is not always distinct but is merged in the general revenues of the State. Lastly it was argued by the learned counsel that since the gross sate proceeds, which is the basis of assessment of contribution, is the very nucleus of the export made by the petitioners, there is a total ban for the State legislature to enact a law under Art.286 of the Constitution. 15. Lastly it was argued by the learned counsel that since the gross sate proceeds, which is the basis of assessment of contribution, is the very nucleus of the export made by the petitioners, there is a total ban for the State legislature to enact a law under Art.286 of the Constitution. 15. The learned Advocate General Sri M. K. Damodaran as well as the learned counsel appearing for the Welfare Fund strenuously supported the legislation. According to the learned Advocate General, in the Indian Trawler's Association case AIR 1992 Kerala 360 (8) this Court upheld the constitutional validity of the enactment holding that the power to levy the contribution is traceable to entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List of the Constitution. The above decision was affirmed in. a well considered and detailed judgment by the Division Bench reported in 1993 (1.) KLT 256. Further the Supreme Court also considered the above matter in the Fancy Food case 1995 (2) KLT 77 (S.C.). Moreover, the petitioners ia these Original Petitions had filed a number of Original Petitions earlier challenging the constitutional validity of the Act on the very same grounds which have been now raised in these Original Petitions. All the above Original Petitions were dismissed either as not pressed or withdrawn. The petitioner in O.P. No. 4744/96 filed O.P. Nos. 1566/87, 5583/88 and 5383/88. The grounds of attack which consisted of legislative incompetence etc. were raised in grounds B, C and D. Similarly the petitioner in O. P. No. 3408/96 filed O.P. Nos. 4611/90, 4972/92 and 3227/86. The petitioner in O.P. No. 18953/95 filed O.P. Nos 4736/87, 5648/90 and 5398/92. The petitioner in O.P. No. 15742/95 filed O.P. Nos. 3374/87, 6388/88 and 3655/90. A tabular statement filed by the State as well as the Welfare Fund shows that almost all the petitioners herein approached this Court by filing two or more Original Petitions, raising the very same grounds and all of them were dismissed as withdrawn or not pressed. On the above premises the learned Advocate General argued that the petitioners are precluded from raising the very same grounds in these Original Petitions and the same is barred by principles of constructive res judicata. 16. The learned Advocate General relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain AIR 1977 SC 1680 . 16. The learned Advocate General relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Nawab Hussain AIR 1977 SC 1680 . In the above case a disciplinary proceeding was challenged originally on the ground of denial of principles of natural justice. After the dismissal of the above petition the petitioner therein filed a suit in which the order of dismissal was challenged on the ground of violation of Art.311 (1) of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the second suit was barred by the principle of constructive res judicata on the following ground: "3. The principle of estoppel per res judicata is a rule of evidence. As has been stated in Marginson v. Blackburn Borough Council (1939) 2 K.B. 426 at p. 437 it may be said to be 'the broader rule of evidence which prohibits the re-assertion of a cause of action'. This doctrine is based on two theories: (i) The finality and conclusive ness of judicial decisions for the final termination of disputes in the general interest of community as a matter of public policy and (ii) the interest of the individual that he should be protected from multiplication of litigation. It therefore serves not only a public but also a private purpose by obstructing the reopening of matters which have once been adjudicated upon. It is thus not permissible to obtain a second judgment for the same civil relief on the same cause of action for otherwise the spirit of contentiousness may give rise to conflicting judgments of equal authority, lead to multiplicity of action? and bring the administration of justice into disrepute. It is the cause of action which gives rise to an action and that is why it is necessary for the courts to recognise that a cause of action which results In a judgment must lose its identity and vitality and merge In the judgment when pronounced. It cannot therefore survive the judgment or give rise to another cause of action on the same facts. This is what Is known as the general principle of res judicata." 17. The learned Advocate General sustained the legislative competence of the State Legislature on entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List which are as follows: "23. Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment. 24. This is what Is known as the general principle of res judicata." 17. The learned Advocate General sustained the legislative competence of the State Legislature on entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List which are as follows: "23. Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment. 24. Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits." Moreover, Art.39 and 46 also enjoin the State to legislate in order to alleviate the conditions of various weaker sections of the society. 18. Since legislative competence to enact the Act has been put forward as the for most argument in these cases, we shall deal with the above contention first. In view of the categoric statement made by the learned Advocate General that the contribution envisaged in the Act is neither a tax nor a fee but only a contribution, we need not go into the question whether it is a tax for a fee We have already noticed in the case of Indian Trawlers Association's case AIR 1992 Kerala 360 that this Court has come to a definite conclusion that it is neither a tax nor a fee. It was further held that no characteristic of a tax is present in the levy. The Division Bench while affirming the above decision held that there is no reason to brand or stamp the contribution as a tax or fee in order to seek to legitimise it when legitimation is directly derived for the charge from entries 23 and 24 of List III. Still we are dealing with the contention of the petitioners that in order to support a labour welfare legislation, there must be employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and the fishermen The above argument is based on the decision in M.G Beedi Work's case AIR 1974 (S.C.) 1832 . In Para.25 of the above moment it was noticed that the first contention on behalf of the petitioners and the appellants is that the Act of 1966 is invalid on the ground of lack of legislative competence. In dealing with the above contention the Supreme Court found that the true nature and character of the legislation shows that it is for enforcing better conditions of labour amongst those who are engaged in the manufacture of beedies and cigars. In dealing with the above contention the Supreme Court found that the true nature and character of the legislation shows that it is for enforcing better conditions of labour amongst those who are engaged in the manufacture of beedies and cigars. According to the Supreme Court the pith and substance of the Act is regulation of conditions, of employment in the beedi and cigar industry. The Act deals with particular subject matter as regards the establishments and industrial premises. These matters are regulation of conditions of employment in the industry and the industrial relations, between the employer and the employee. Entries 22 to 24 in list III are wide enough to cover this piece of labour welfare measure Thus the Supreme Court held that the Act is valid and falls within the above three entries. Therefore an analysis of the M. G. Beedi Work's case case shows that the constitutionality of the Act was found to be not on the basis of the existence of the employer-empolyee relationship but on the direct connection with the subject matter of the entries referred to above. Really the question of employee-employer relationship was considered while dealing with the next contention of the petitioners therein that the Act imposed unreasonable restrictions on the employers in their right to carry on trade and business in the manufacture of beedi and cigars. Therefore the reliance placed by the petitioners on the decision in M. G. Beedi Work's case is without any substance. 19. S.3 sub-section (4) of the Act enumerates the purposes for which the fund is to be utilised. It reads as follows: "(4) The funds may be utilised for all or any of the following purposes, namely. (a) to provide for distress relief to fishermen in times of natural calamities; (b) for payment of financial assistance to fishermen who suffer permanent or temporary disablement; (c) for payment of loans or grants to fishermen to meet the expenses for the marriage of children, or expenses in connection with disease or death of dependants, or any unexpected expenditure or the day to day expenditure during lean months; (d) to provide for the fishermen and the members of their families. (i) education, vocational training and part time employment; (ii) social education centres including reading room and libraries; (iii) sports, games and medical facilities; (iv) nutritious food for children; and (v) employment opportunities to the handicapped. (i) education, vocational training and part time employment; (ii) social education centres including reading room and libraries; (iii) sports, games and medical facilities; (iv) nutritious food for children; and (v) employment opportunities to the handicapped. (e) for payment of financial assistance to fishermen who offer loss of houses or fishing implements or any other damage due to natural calamities or other unexpected causes; (f) to provide old age assistance to fishermen; (g) for the implementation of any other purpose specified in the scheme." Therefore it is obvious that the Act is intended to benefit the fishermen community in the Kerala State. In this connection it is also advantageous to note the following observation of the Supreme Court in Fancy Food case 1995 (2) KLT 77 (SC) "Before explaining its scope, it is necessary to point out that it is a definition in a welfare legislation directed towards promoting the welfare of fishermen in the State. The objective of the Act being in furtherance of directive principles of Constitution under Art.39 its provisions have to be construed so as to advance the objective of enactment. The Act is responsive to urgent social demand and attempts to ameliorate continuing social vice of exploitation of fishermen living below poverty line. It is designed to have an immediate and visible impacton their economic and social condition. Sub-section (4) of S.3 touches life of a fisherman at every corner and if the objective is faithfully carried out it is an ideal piece of provision which promises a healthy, prosperous and assured future of such-miserable lot. Such a provision has to be construed liberally by applying beneficent rule of construction, 'animated with purpose oriented approach," We do not think that the petitioners have also seriously disputed the above factual position. Under these circumstances we do not find any reason to invalidate the legislation on the ground of legislative incompetence. 20. This is not for the first time that the validity of such labour welfare oriented legislation is being challenged in this Court. Kerala is a fore-runner for such legislations which give lot of benefits to the various toiling masses in the community. The Toddy Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1969 was upheld by this Court in Chellappan v. State of Kerala 1990 (1) KLT 254 . Kerala is a fore-runner for such legislations which give lot of benefits to the various toiling masses in the community. The Toddy Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1969 was upheld by this Court in Chellappan v. State of Kerala 1990 (1) KLT 254 . The Constructions Workers' Welfare Fund Act, 1989 was upheld by this Court in the ruling reported in Kerala Construction W. W. F. Board v. State of Kerala 1995 (2) KLT 724 . In all these cases the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1985 S. C. 790 (M/s Gasket Radiators Pvt. Ltd. v. E. S. I. Corpn.) has been quoted and relied on. It is pertinent to quote the reasoning of the Supreme Court in the above judgment in order to uphold the validity of the special contribution under Chapter V-A of the Employees' State Insurance Act: 6. "We are afraid that the very approach of the appellant to the problem at issue suffers from a basic defect. The appellant's argument proceeds on the fundamental misconception that the payment of contribution directed to be made by the employer under the Employees' State Insurance Act or other similar payment or benefit under various other social welfare legislations must either be labelled as a tax or a fee in order to attain legitimacy or not at all. The idea that such payment, contribution or whatever name is given to it should be so pigeon-holed and fitted in stems from a misunderstanding of the scheme of our Constitution in regard to social welfare legislation. Apart from the preamble which promises to secure to all its citizens 'justice, social, economic and political', the State is enjoined by the Directive Principles of State Policy to secure a social order for the promotion of the welfare of the people. In particular Art.41, 42 and 43 enjoins the State to make effective provision for securing the right to work to education and public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of any undeserved want to make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief and to secure by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise, work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. It is in pursuance of these Directive Principles that we find entries 23 and 24 in List III of the VII Schedule of the Constitution. Both Parliament and the Legislature of any State, subject to conditions with which we are not concerned, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III. It is pursuant to the power entrusted in respect of entries 23 and 24 of List III that Parliament has enacted the Employees' State Insurance Act. In our under standing, entries 23 and 24 of List III, of their own force, empower Parliament or the Legislature of a State to direct the payment by an employer of contributions of the nature of those contemplated by the Employees' State Insurance Act for the benefit of the employees. These contributions or for example contributions to provident funds or payments or other benefits to workers are not required to be and cannot be labelled as taxes or fees for the sole and simple reason that they are neither taxes nor fees. List I and List II contain several entries in respect of which taxes may be levied by the Parliament, by the Legislature of any State and by both. Entry 97 is a residuary clause which enables Parliament to legislate in respect of any other matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists. Entry 96 of List I enables Parliament to levy fee in respect of any of the matters in that list, but not including fee taken in any court. Similarly entry 66 of List II enables the Legislature of a State to levy fee in respect of the matters in that list, but not including fees taken in any court. Again entry 47 of List III enables Parliament and the Legislature of a State to levy fees in respect of any of the matters in that list but not including fees in any court. The payment of contribution by an employer towards the premium (what else is it?) of an employee's compulsory insurance under the Employees' State Insurance Act falls directly within entries 23 and 24 of List III and it is wholly unnecessary to seek justification for it by recourse to entry 97 of List I at entry 47 of List III in any circumlocutions fashion. We see no reason to brand or stamp the contribution as a tax or fee in order to seek to legitimise it. Legitimation need not be sought fictionally from entry 97 of List I or entry 47 of List III when 1 legitimation is directly derived for the charge from entries 23 and 24 of List III." 21. We are also of opinion that the employee-employer relationship is not wanting in these cases. The fishermen are the ultimate beneficiaries of this benevolent legislation. It is they who go to the sea and catch the fishes. They fight against the surging waves in the sea and bring back their catches. These catches will change hands and ultimately reach the petitioners who export them to the foreign countries. Therefore we cannot forget these fishermen who are the backbone of this industry. Without them the industry cannot exist. It is their salt and sweat that are being exploited by various agencies who are engaged in the fish canning industry and the export thereafter, Unless these fishermen are kept in good humour the industry cannot nourish or flourish. Therefore there is a very intimate nexus between these fishermen and the exporters of the marine products who are the petitioners. Thus it is idle to contend that they have absolutely no relationship with the fishermen for whose benefit the Act was enacted. 22. The argument of the learned senior counsel Sri Chacko that the present levy of contribution under the Act has a direct link with entry 36 of the Union List need not detain us further. Entry 36 reads as follows: "36. Currency, coinage and legal tender, foreign exchange.'' The argument is that the sale proceeds /turnover on which the contribution is based represents the foreign exchange earned by the petitioners by exporting the marine products. But we do not think that the State Legislature was enacting on the subject 'foreign exchange' when it enacted the Act. There is no connection between the foreign exchange as mentioned in entry 36 referred to above and the contribution envisaged in the Act. 23. Sri Jain, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners strenuously tried to convince us that there is repugnancy between the Act and the Workmens, Compensation Act, a Central legislation which was made applicable to the fishermen community by a notification in 1995 at the request of the State Government. 23. Sri Jain, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners strenuously tried to convince us that there is repugnancy between the Act and the Workmens, Compensation Act, a Central legislation which was made applicable to the fishermen community by a notification in 1995 at the request of the State Government. The question of repugnancy has to be decided on the basis of the entries in the Union List and the Concurrent List. The law on this point has been made very clear by various decisions of the Supreme Court. No question of repugnancy would arise where Parliamentary Legislation and State Legislation occupy different fields and deal with separate and distinct matters. Art.254 (1) lays down a general rule and Art.254 (2) is an exception to the above rule. If there is any repugnancy between the two laws made by the State and by the Parliament with respect to the same matter enumerated in the Concurrent List, the law made by Parliament shall prevail. It is also made clear by the Supreme Court in various decisions that the pith and substance of argument cannot be imported for the simple reason that when both the Centre as well as the State Legislature were operating in the concurrent field, there was no question of any trespass upon the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre. Thus we have to examine whether there was any repugnancy in the present case. The Workmens' Compensation Act was enacted to provide for the payment of compensation to the workmen of certain classes of employees by their employers for injury by accident. The Act was enacted for the constitution of a welfare fund for promoting the welfare of fishermen in the State of Kerala and for certain other matters incidental thereto. A reading of the various provisions regarding the benefits extended to the workmen will go to show that there is absolutely no repugnancy between the two enactments. In the ruling reported in A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 297 the Supreme Court has spelt out two conditions to be fulfilled to attract the theory of repugnancy: (1) The provisions of the provincial law and those of the Central legislation must both be in respect of a matter which is enumerated in the Concurrent List and (2) they must be repugnant to each other. It is only when both these requirements are satisfied that the provincial law will, to the extent of repugnancy, become void. 24. We will have to bear in mind the well settled principle that the validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches upon matters outside the authorised field and if the Act substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred i upon the State Legislature, then it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to the Parliament. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider the question whether the Public Services (Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 is constitutionally valid as opposed to the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In the above decision reported in Karthiayini v. Block Development Officer ILR 1984 (2) Kerala 446 this Gouri considered and analysed the various decisions of the Supreme Court including the decisions reported in M/s. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1983 (4) SCC 45 and A. S. Krishna v. State of Madras AIR 1957 S.C. 297 (24) and held as follows: "Assuming for the sake of argument that the Ordinance to any extent encroaches upon or even amends the Industrial Disputes Act to the extent it operates in the State of Kerala, that is bound to prevail inasmuch as the promulgation of the Ordinance is only after obtaining the instructions from the President as required in the proviso to Art.213 (i) of the Constitution." 25. One of the tests to ascertain whether there is any inconsistency or repugnancy is to find out whether the State law can be obeyed or respected without flouting or violating the Central law in letter and spirit. If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, the State law cannot be invalidated. In these cases the providing of relief to the poor fishermen will not go against the various provisions contained in the Workmens' Compensation Act. Both the enactments promote the welfare of the workmen. While the Workmens' Compensation Act deals with various classes of employees who are entitled to get compensation from their employers, the Act carves out a section of the above employees, fishermen, and provides various benefits to them. Therefore the State law really promotes the objects of both the laws and in effect is supplementary or complementary to the Central law. While the Workmens' Compensation Act deals with various classes of employees who are entitled to get compensation from their employers, the Act carves out a section of the above employees, fishermen, and provides various benefits to them. Therefore the State law really promotes the objects of both the laws and in effect is supplementary or complementary to the Central law. Thus we can safely come to the conclusion that the Central law is not violated by implementing the Act of the State Legislature. We derive sustenance to the above view from the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Ram Chandra Mawa Lal v. State of. U.P. AIR 1987 SC 1837 26. A Division Bench of this Court considered the question whether the qualifications prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules thereunder are in conflict with the qualifications prescribed by the State special rules with regard to the appointment of various officers in the Motor Vehicles Department. In. the above ruling reported in ILR 1995 (1) Kerala 284 (Basheer v. Kerala Assistant Motor Vehicles Inspectors' Association), this Court upheld the State rules finding that the qualification prescribed for the post of Inspector of Motor Vehicle and Assistant Inspector of Motor Vehicle in the state special rules can be obeyed and followed without violating the qualifications prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules. Therefore we have no hesitation to reject the above arguments of the petitioners. 27. We close the discussion on this topic by referring to the latest ruling of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1996 SC 1627 (State of A. P. v. Mc Dowell and Co.). After recognising the federal supremacy and the paramount power of the Parliament, the Supreme Court held as follows: "If a statute is found in substance to relate to a topic within the competence of the legislature, it should be held to be intra vires, even though it might incidentally trench on topics not within its legislative competence...... The fact of encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment ....any incidental trenching, as already pointed out, does not amount to encroaching upon the field reserved for the Parliament." 28. The fact of encroachment does not affect the vires of the law even as regards the area of encroachment ....any incidental trenching, as already pointed out, does not amount to encroaching upon the field reserved for the Parliament." 28. The learned Advocate General and the learned counsel for the Welfare Fund strongly contended that the principle of res judicata/constructive res judicata squarely applies in these cases and therefore the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in these Original Petitions. As far as the question of res judicata simpliciter is concerned, the argument of the learned Advocate General is that this Court in Indian Trawlers' Association's case AIR 1992 Kerala 360 has upheld the validity of the Act as directly coming under entries 23 and 24 of the Concurrent List. It was further argued on the basis of the Fancy's Food's case 1995 (2) KLT 77 (S.C) that the Supreme Court has also held that the Act is valid. But the difficulty arises to accept the argument of the learned Advocate General when we find that the petitioners are not parties to the Indian Trawlers' Association's case AIR 1992 Kerala 360. In Fancy Food case the present petitioners are only respondents wherein they could not have urged the constitutional validity of the Act. Moreover, it has been stated in Fancy Food case that the discussion hereinafter is confined to the narrow question whether a person like the respondent could be a dealer within the meaning of the Act. Emphasis has also been made by the learned counsel for the petitioners to the following sentence in the Fancy Food's case, 1995 (2) KLT 77 (SC). "Therefore, unless the language used in the section fails to achieve its purpose or it is manifestly illegal or constitutionally invalid the provision has to be so construed as to extend it to a person who is exporting fish." Therefore we are unable to accept the above argument. 28A. The various Original Petitions filed by the petitioners earlier were dismissed either as not pressed or as withdrawn. Specific grounds of attack on the basis of legislative incompetence were raised in the above Original Petitions but they were not argued. Therefore it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that the petitioners are precluded from raising the same questions again in these Original Petitions. Specific grounds of attack on the basis of legislative incompetence were raised in the above Original Petitions but they were not argued. Therefore it was submitted by the learned Advocate General that the petitioners are precluded from raising the same questions again in these Original Petitions. Even though S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not directly applicable to a proceeding under Art.226 of the Constitution, the principles contained therein, being based on public policy can be invoked in the writ proceedings. But the above general rule can be invoked only in cases where a dispute between the parties has been referred to a Court of competent jurisdiction, there has been a contest between the parties at the end the Court has pronounced its judgment of decision. It is obvious that there is no decision on the constitutional validity of the Act in any of the Original Petitions filed earlier. It is also a well established principle that when only a Judgment is rendered on the merits as a contested matter, the principle of res judicata can be invoked. The order dismissing a writ petition as withdrawn or not pressed cannot support the plea of res judicata against the present petitioners. Therefore the present Original Petitions are not barred either by res judicata or constructive res judicata, 29. But another important aspect of the matter, which is incidental to the above contention, has to be considered by us in shaping the reliefs to the petitioners. The Act: came into force in 1985. After agitating the matter in this Court, the Sea Food Exporters' Association of India represented to the Government to reduce the contribution. Thereafter, the Government constituted a committee to study and report to the Government whether any reduction need be made in the contribution due from the dealers. The Committee submitted a report which was considered by the Welfare Fund Board. The Board decided to deduct the expenses incurred in processing the material for export from the F.O.B. value of the exports subject to a maximum of 25 per cent for three years, commencing from the date on which the Act came into force. Thus the Government passed G.O. (P) No. 40/90/Fin, dated 10th August 1990 [Ext. P3 (a)], by which the exporters were directed to pay contribution at the rate of Rs. Thus the Government passed G.O. (P) No. 40/90/Fin, dated 10th August 1990 [Ext. P3 (a)], by which the exporters were directed to pay contribution at the rate of Rs. 9,000 for every crores of rupees of export for the first three years with effect from 26th January 1986. The present petitioners who took advantage of the above order did not grudge against the implementation of the Act from 26th January 1986 to 26th January 1989. The learned counsel for the petitioners also admitted that they had no grievance till 1989 and the present challenge is only against the assessment order's passed thereafter. 30. In order to sustain their challenge against the assessment orders, it was argued by Sri Jain, learned counsel for some of the petitioners, that the assessment orders are liable to be challenged by the petitioners without the inhibition of the rule of res judicata. In order to support the above argument, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in A. T. R.1965 SC 1150 (Devilal Modi v. Sales Tax Officer'). In the above ruling the Supreme Court held that it was open for a party to challenge the assessment orders for different years even after the challenge against an order of assessment in the previous year was rejected. According to the Supreme Court even if a new ground is urged in a subsequent proceeding, the Court may have to consider it on merits, because strictly speaking the principle of res judicata may not apply to such a case. The Supreme Court in the above case followed an earlier decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1964 SC 1013 (Amalgamated Coal Fields Ltd. v. Somapada Sabha Chhividwara]. 31. The facts of the cases now before us are some what similar to that of the case before the Supreme Court. In these cases the petitioners were challenging the validity of the Act on various grounds including the constitutional validity for a decade. By filing these Original Petitions they could postpone the payment of contribution which has to be utilised for the various welfare measures in favour of the fishermen. In none of the cases the petitioners wanted a definite decision on the constitutionality of the enactment. Under S.4 of the Act various agencies have to pay the contribution. The petitioners come under the definition of "dealer". In none of the cases the petitioners wanted a definite decision on the constitutionality of the enactment. Under S.4 of the Act various agencies have to pay the contribution. The petitioners come under the definition of "dealer". The owners of fishing vessels are another class of persons who are liable to pay the contribution. Their challenge against the constitutional validity of the Act was negatived by this Court in the decisions referred to above. Now there are other classes of persons also who are liable to pay the contribution. Can all these persons be permitted to challenge the constitutional validity periodically, thus stultifying the attempt of the State to implement a labour welfare oriented legislation? The answer to this question is available in the very same ruling cited by the counsel for the petitioners in Devilal Modi's case AIR 1965 SC 1150 . In the above ruling the Supreme Court also considered the question as to whether a citizen should be allowed to challenge the validity of the same order by successive petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution. In Para.8 of the above ruling the Supreme Court consider the above question as follows: "It may be conceded in favour of Mr. Trivedi that the rule of constructive res judicata which is pleaded against him in the present appeal is In a sense a somewhat technical or artificial rule prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure. This rule postulates that if a plea could have been taken by a party in a proceeding between him and his opponent, he would not be permitted to take that plea against the same party in a subsequent proceeding which is based on the same cause of action, but basically even this view is founded on the same considerations of public policy, because if the doctrine of constructive res judicata is not applied to writ proceedings, it would be open to the party to take one proceeding after another and urge new grounds every time; and that plainly is inconsistent with considerations of public policy to which we have just referred." The Supreme Court also deprecated the practice of persons who tried to postpone the payment of tax by filing successive original petitions in the following terms: "The present proceedings illustrate how a citizen who has been ordered to pay a tax can postpone the payment of the tax by prolonging legal proceedings interminably. We have already seen that in the present case the appellants sought to raise additional points when he brought his appeal before (his Court by special leave; that is to say, he did not take all the point's in the writ petition and thought of taking new points in appeal. When leave was refused to him by this Court to take those points in appeal, he filed a new petition in the High Court and took those points, and finding that the High Court had decided against him on the merits of those points, he has come to this Court; but that is not all. At the hearing of this appeal, he has filed another petition asking for leave from this Court to take some more additional prints and that show that if constructive res judicata is not applied to such proceedings a party can file as many writ petitions as he likes and take one or two points every time. That clearly is opposed to considerations of public policy on which res judicata is based and would mean harassment and hardship to the opponent. Besides, if such a course is allowed to be adopted, the doctrine of finality of judgments pronounced by this Court would also be materially affected. We are, therefore, satisfied that the second writ petition filed by the appellant in the present case is barred by constructive res judicata." 32. The learned counsel representing the Welfare Board cited the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in 1980 (3) SC G. 719 (Ambika Prasad Mishra v. State of U.P.), in order to bring home the above point. In the above ruling Justice Krishna Iyer in his inimical style dealt with the above question as follows: "Suffice it to say that in the Kesavananda Bharati case Art.31A was challenged as beyond the amendatory power or Parliament and, therefore, invalid. But, after listening to the Marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13-Judge Bench of this Court upheld the vires of Art.31 A in unequivocal terms. That decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the constitutional ground of Art.141. Every new discovery of argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. But, after listening to the Marathon erudition from eminent counsel, a 13-Judge Bench of this Court upheld the vires of Art.31 A in unequivocal terms. That decision binds, on the simple score of stare decisis and the constitutional ground of Art.141. Every new discovery of argumentative novelty cannot undo or compel reconsideration of a binding precedent. In this view, other submissions sparkling with creative ingenuity and presented with high-pressure advocacy, cannot persuade us to reopen what was laid down for the guidance of the nation as a solemn proposition by the epic Fundamental Rights case," Justice Krishna Iyer has quoted with approval an interesting passage from the judgment of Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court (Smith v. All Wright]: "The reason for my concern is that the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago, tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the same class as a restricted railroad ticket good for this day and train only....... .It is regrettable that in an era marked by doubt, and confusion, an era whose greatest need is steadfastness of thought and purpose, this Court which has been looked to as exhibiting consistency in adjudication, and a steadiness which would hold the balance even in the face of temporary ebbs and flows of opinion, should now itself become the breeder of fresh doubt and confusion in the public mind as to the stability of our institutions." We cannot ignore these authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court which aptly fit into the conduct of the present petitioners. We may also visualise the situation where the other persons who are liable to pay contribution may approach this Court again by filing Original Petitions, challenging the constitutional validity of the Act with the contention that they are not parties to these Original Petitions and therefore they are free to raise all these contentions once again. In order to put an end to these contentions and to see that this welfare legislation must be implemented without any further delay, we have to finally hold that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in these Original Petitions because of their past conduct. 33. Before finally closing this case, we have to deal with one more contention pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 33. Before finally closing this case, we have to deal with one more contention pressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners. According to S.4(2) of the Act a dealer shall contribute every year to the fund one per cent of his sale proceeds in the year. According to the learned counsel "sale proceeds" must represent the profits earned by the petitioners. In order to substantiate the above argument, the learned counsel relied on certain meaning given in one of the English Malayalam dictionaries. But we cannot interpret the world "sale proceeds" by relying on the above meaning given in a Malayalam dictionary. The learned Advocate General argued that the sale proceeds used in S.4(2) of the Act and the sale turnover used in S.14 of the Act are interchangeable. It was also argued that in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the Fancy Food case 1995 (2) KLT 77 (S.C.) a most liberal interpretation has to be given to the word "sale proceeds". He also cited the New Standard English Dictionary wherein sale proceeds has been defined as "the amount derived from the disposal of goods." In the legal Thesaurus by William C Burton sale proceeds has been defined as "sum derived from a sale". We are in complete agreement with the submission made by the learned Advocate General that the sale proceeds mean the total amount the exporters got out of the sale of the marine products. It is also rather unsafe to interpret sale proceeds as "profit" because the exporters can very well avoid payment of the contribution showing loss in every year. Thus a restrictive meaning will definitely defeat the very purpose of the legislation. Thus we hold that sale proceeds in S.4 (2) and turnover in S.14 have been used with the same meaning which can only be the total amount received by the petitioners out of the sale of the marine products. 34. In view of the above conclusions which we have reached after an anxious consideration of all the aspects of the matter, we do not find any merit in these Original Petitions. The Original Petitions are dismissed without any order as to costs.