JUDGMENT 1. The appellant Smt. Indira, has filed this appeal, being aggrieved against the judgment and order dated 16.7.1994, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Beawar in Case No. 29/93 whereby she was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In default of payment of fine she was further awarded two months imprisonment. 2. The facts of the case have been set out in the judgment of the trial court. Though detailed facts are not needed to be given for deciding the present appeal, but the facts indicate that at about 6.30 p.m. on May 1, 1993 when deceased Trilok Singh, after solemnisation of his marriage with the daughter of Prem Singh was going with his bride to his house, the appellant snatched the sword from his hand and inflicted on injury on his left ear Trilok Singh was shifted to the Hospital at Bheem but before he could received medical treatment he died in the same night. The report of the incident was made by PW 1 Dau Singh to the SHO Tatgarh, who happened to be in the Hospital at tnat time. On this report, Crime under section 302 IPC was registered. During investigation, the post-mortem of the dead-body was conducted by Dr. Ashok Kumar Gupta (PW 12) on 1993. He found following injury on the dead-body. 3. "Incised wound bleeding 4 x 4"x muscle deep with external carotid vessels obliquely cut and the internal carotid cut down obliquely, left cheek and left side neck." 4. The injury was opined to be grievous. Cause of death was due to excessive and severe bleeding due to injury to external carotid muscle. The post-mortem report is Ex.P 17 on the record. After usual investigation, the charge sheet was field against the appellant before the concerned Magistrate and on commitment, she was tried under Section 302 IPC in the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Beawar. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant made two submissions. The first submission is that trial of the appellant under the Code of Criminal Procedure is illegal inasmuch as the appellant was a juvenile within the definition of section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant made two submissions. The first submission is that trial of the appellant under the Code of Criminal Procedure is illegal inasmuch as the appellant was a juvenile within the definition of section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986. His second submission is that taking the prosecution case on its face value, the offence does not travel beyond 304 Part II IPC and the appellant has already remained in Jail for a considerable period, as such, she be released on the sentence of imprisonment already under gone by her in the facts and circumstances of the case. 6. After giving our deep consideration we find that both submissions made by the learned counsel have merit. Under Section 2(h) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Juvenile Justice Act) 'juvenile' has been defined as under; "Juvenile means a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years.'' 7. The appellant has given her age in her statement under Section 313 Cr.PC. as 16 years on 4.6.94 i.e. after 14 months of the incident. As per her statement she was less than 15 years on the day of incident. The learned trial judge has estimated her age as on 4.6.94 as 18 years. Even the estimation made by the trial judge is taken, then too she was below 18 years of age at the time of incident and thus she was a `juvenile' on that day. 8. Section 23 of the Juvenile Justice Act clearly provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, no proceeding shall be instituted and no order shall be passed against a juvenile under Chapter VIII of the said Code. The Juvenile Justice Act contains special provision for trial of 'juveniles'. Hence, on face of the record the trial and conviction of the appellant by the Additional Sessions Judge is illegal and void. 9. In the normal course we would have sent the case to the Juvenile Court for proceeding in accordance with law. However, we find that only one injury has been caused by the appellant. The motive of the incident has not come on the record. The appellant has already remained in custody for more than 3 years. 9. In the normal course we would have sent the case to the Juvenile Court for proceeding in accordance with law. However, we find that only one injury has been caused by the appellant. The motive of the incident has not come on the record. The appellant has already remained in custody for more than 3 years. Hence, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances, specially young age of the appellant and the fact that she has remained in Jail for a considerable period, we do not find any ground to send the case back to the Juvenile Court. 10. Consequently, the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court are liable to be set aside and they are hereby set aside. The appellant is in Jail and she shall be released forthwith if not wanted in any other case. The appeal is allowed as indicated above.Appeal allowed. *******