M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) A point of some interest has been raised by the petitioners before me who are the Corporation of the City of Mysore in these two Civil Revision Petitions. It may be briefly summarised in the following terms : (a) Whether in a case where a group of citizens have presented a composite challenge to the enhancement of property tax through a writ petition filed before the High Court and the High Court has rejected the petition after hearing the parties through a speaking order which order has thereafter, been confirmed in appeal; it will, at all be open to another group of citizens to file a suit challenging the same notification as also the action? (b) Where the Corporation contends that all matters relating to the levy of tax and challenges thereto are provided for in a self contained statute, and where there are specific provisions for redressal of grievances in such a statute, whether it would be open to a group of citizens to invoke the jurisdiction of the Civil Court if the enhancement is questioned or challenged? ( 2 ) THE brief facts giving rise to these disputes need to be set out. The Corporation published a notification dt. 30th March, 1984 in the Karnataka Gazette dt. 6th September, 1984 setting out a proposal to revise the property taxes in that City. A public interest petition was filed by the Saraswathipuram Rate Payers Association which is a registered body, before this Court challenging the action in question. The petition was numbered as W. P. No. 12515/85 and after notice to the respondents, a learned Single Judge of this Court heard the petition on 21-3-1988. The matter was hotly contested and after hearing the parties, this Court dismissed the petition through a speaking order upholding the defence of the Corporation that there was no variation in the rate of taxation and that it was only a revision which the Corporation was competent to undertake in law. As regards the question of individual notices, the Corporation's learned Counsel had agreed to comply with this requirements and the petition came to be disposed of. The matter was thereafter taken in appeal to the Division Bench and the Division Bench confirmed the learned Single Judge's order. As regards the question of individual notices, the Corporation's learned Counsel had agreed to comply with this requirements and the petition came to be disposed of. The matter was thereafter taken in appeal to the Division Bench and the Division Bench confirmed the learned Single Judge's order. ( 3 ) THE present proceedings have been instituted by a group of eight bodies in Mysore none of which were petitioners before the High Court in the earlier W. P. These petitioners are the plaintiffs in O. S. No. 231 / 89 filed in the Court of the First Munsif at Mysore. They have challenged the enhancement of property tax principally on the ground that the rateable value of the properties which is the basis on which the tax is levied, has been arbitrarily and unjustifiably raised. Their whole challenge proceeds on the footing that the principles on which rateable value is to be fixed cannot be left to the individual whims and fancies of one or more officers, but that the well-settled legally defined principles governing such fixation have to be adopted and it is their case that this has not been done. There are a few subsidiary aspects which have also been taken up such as the fact that the Corporation sought to give retrospective effect to the decision which the plaintiffs maintain, is bad in law. A preliminary objection was raised by the defendant -Corporation in that suit wherein it was pointed out that the bar of res judicata would apply in so far as this very action of the Corporation was the subject matter of the earlier W. P. which had been decided in favour of the Corporation right up to the appellate stage and that therefore, the plaintiffs were precluded in law from re-agitating the issue. The second objection that was canvassed was with regard to the aspect of maintainability whereunder the contention raised was that the Act and the Rules framed thereunder are a self-contained piece of legislation and that they make adequate provisions for redressal of grievances of this type and that therefore, if the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the enhancement, that it was open to them to agitate those remedies departmentally and that in these circumstances, the Court ought not to and should not exercise jurisdiction in a case of this type. This defence basically hinges around the principle that if a clear-cut alternate remedy is provided for by law, that the plaintiffs would be estopped from invoking the jurisdiction of a Civil Court under those circumstances the learned trial Judge heard the parties at length and rejected both the contentions raised on behalf of the Corporation. As regards the first heard, the learned trial Judge has, in the course of a detailed speaking order, recorded the finding that the points raised in the suit filed before him are different to the ones that were raised before the High Court in the W. P. and that therefore, in his opinion, the bar of res judicata would not apply. As far as the second head is concerned, the learned trial Judge has upheld the contention that there is no legal bar to the plaintiffs invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and that therefore, the matter would have to be heard on merits. It is against the common order passed on these two preliminary issues, that the present C. R. Ps. have been preferred by the Corporation. ( 4 ) THE petitioner's learned Counsel Mr. Papanna has argued the matter at considerable length and he has also taken the trouble to produce, for the assistance of the Court, the relevant records on which he has based his submissions, particularly a copy of the earlier W. P. , the orders passed thereon and some of the earlier orders passed in the present proceedings at the stage when the interim relief was obtained by the plaintiffs. The respondents' learned advocate has also made his submissions in some detail, because it is his case that the litigants namely, the petitioners before the High Court on the earlier occasion and the plaintiffs before the Civil Court on this occasion, are not the same and he therefore, submitted that the first ingredient for purposes of invoking the bar of res judicata against his clients is totally absent. It is his submission that the principle requires that an issue between the same parties ought to have been canvassed and decided on an earlier occasion in which case, it only stands to reason that the parties would be totally precluded from seeking to re-agitate the same point irrespective of which forum they thereafter approach. It is his submission that the principle requires that an issue between the same parties ought to have been canvassed and decided on an earlier occasion in which case, it only stands to reason that the parties would be totally precluded from seeking to re-agitate the same point irrespective of which forum they thereafter approach. The learned advocate has also submitted that the trial Court has not only exercised its discretion, but that the Court has very carefully examined the plea regarding res judicata from all angles and has unequivocally held that it would not be possible to press that principle into operation in this case. It is his submission that no interference is called for with regard to that order. As regards the second head, he has submitted that it must be left to the trial Court to decide as to whether or not the plaintiffs have a clear alternate remedy. Prima facie, he points out that even the wording of Rule 15 in Schedule III Part II of the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act excludes "property taxes" and it is his submission therefore, that it would be incorrect to contend that the petitioners can get adequate redressal within the machinery provided for by the department. The learned advocate also advanced the additional submission that the statute does not bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the present circumstances and he hastens to add that situations are not unknown where authorities do take decisions which are extremely oppressive and not in the public interest and that in situations like that, the only remedy open to a tax payer would be to approach the competent Civil Court as the question of obtaining speedy relief through an interim order is not provided for within the framework of the Act and the Rules. He therefore, submitted that there is no warrant to interfere with the findings of the trial Court that the suit is maintainable and that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain it. ( 5 ) I need to record here that this matter was heard on more than one date of hearing when the two learned Counsel advanced their submissions. He therefore, submitted that there is no warrant to interfere with the findings of the trial Court that the suit is maintainable and that the Court has jurisdiction to entertain it. ( 5 ) I need to record here that this matter was heard on more than one date of hearing when the two learned Counsel advanced their submissions. As the order sheet will indicate, the learned Counsel who represented the Corporation was to some extent, slightly handicapped by the fact that certain instructions which had been sought for by him could not be received and it was under these circumstances, that the matter was adjourned more than once. He has made his best efforts to contact the officers and obtain their instructions, but he informs me that there have been some recent changes particularly at the level of the Commissioner and that this is one of the possible reasons why the difficulty has arisen. However, the learned Counsel hasthoroughly argued the matter and made his submissions on merits. ( 6 ) THE main thrust of the argument canvassed by Mr. Papanna is that the Courts will have to adopt a very clear-cut formula while dealing with challenges of the present type which are labelled as public interest litigation. The learned counsel submitted that almost every action of a public authority is questioned through some form of public interest litigation before same Court or the other and that even assuming the challenge is of some consequence, that repeated rounds of challenge should not be permitted. His contention is that the whole purpose of incorporating the principle of res judicata in the CPC is in order to prohibit such multiplicity of ligitation as otherwise, particularly in this field, individual after individual or group after group would approach different Courts virtually getting wiser after the event on each occasion and raising the contention that each one of them had nothing to do with the others and that therefore the principle of res judicata ought not to apply. He submitted that it is for this reason, that the law applies the principles from a deeper and wider angle by ensuring that if the issue involved has been heard and decided, that no further challenge would be permitted irrespective of who the party presenting the fresh challenge is. Mr. He submitted that it is for this reason, that the law applies the principles from a deeper and wider angle by ensuring that if the issue involved has been heard and decided, that no further challenge would be permitted irrespective of who the party presenting the fresh challenge is. Mr. Papanna places heavy reliance in this regard on the decision reported in AIR 1965 SC 1153 in the case of Gulabchand Choutalal Parekh v. State of Gujarat. In that case, the Supreme Court held that once there is a decision in an earlier writ petition on merits, that a subsequent suit involving the same questions, and for the same reliefs would be barred on the general principles of res judicata. The Supreme Court was dealing with a special aspect of Section 11, C. P. C. and had occasion to hold on the facts of that case that the subsequent suit was totally barred. What needs to however, be taken into account is that it was the same party who had presented the subsequent litigation and which is not the case before me. The Supreme Court however, had occasion to uphold the principle that if the issue in question has been heard and decided that a further challenge would be barred and Mr. Papanna submitted that it is this aspect of the law that he is pressing into operation in the present case. He submits that the earlier dismissal of the W. P. challenging the same action as not a summary dismissal in limine, but that it was after a long hotly contested and protracted hearing and in a situation where the Court had passed a detailed speaking order. This situation in his submission, would preclude any further challenge to that issue irrespective of where it came from. There can be little dispute about the fact that the principle canvassed by the learned Counsel is not only correct, but that it have to be applied with some degree of vigour in all cases, but more so in those situations where different groups of persons or different individuals seek to challenge the same action in the same or different Courts. Once the issue has been heard and decided, the rule of finality would apply, and under the principles of constructive res judicata, no further challenge would be permissible. Once the issue has been heard and decided, the rule of finality would apply, and under the principles of constructive res judicata, no further challenge would be permissible. The mere techicallity that the subsequent challenge is presented by different individual or set of individuals will not apply. ( 7 ) IN the present situation however, I do need to take cognizance of the second aspect of the matter which the respondents' learned advocate has pointed out to me. Whereas Mr. Papanna has, in the course of his arguments, demonstrated that all aspects of the challenge were set down in the earlier W. P. , a copy of which he has produced before me and relied on, the respondents' learned advocate has disputed this position, and I must confess that there are certain aspects that have been pleaded in the plaint which were not averred or pleaded in the W. P. Mr. Papanna has taken me through the order passed by this Court and contended that once the Court has issued Rule and disposed of the matter, that it is a disposal on merits and the petition having been dismissed, the position in law is that all points raised in that petition are rejected. He submits that the principle of res judicata would therefore, apply because, the grounds on which the revision of tax has been challenged are similar in the present proceeding. The respondents' learned Advocate has disputed this aspect of the matter and demonstrated to me that there is total variation to the challenge in so far as he submits that the legally defined formula for fixing the rateable value has not been adopted in this case and that this is the entire basis of his challenge and that the various other procedural aspects which were canvassed in the earlier proceeding are not the grounds on which the present plaintiffs are litigating. Secondly, the learned advocate has argued in considerable detail on the basis of the order passed by the Court on the earlier occasion and he submits that the defence that was upheld by the Court which was to the effect that there is no increase in the rate of tax, but that it is only a revision, is the solitary ground on which the petition had failed and on the basis of the order passed by this Court, he submits that the grounds of challenge in the present plaint were neither specifically pleaded in so many words nor is there a specific finding in respect of any of them. He therefore, contends that those issues have not been decided and that therefore, there is no legal bar in his way. ( 8 ) IT is really this last aspect of the matter that is crucial. For this purpose, it became necessary for me to carefuly go through the W. P. that was filed on the earlier occasion. I do find that grounds 19 and 20 in the W. P. as pointed out by Mr. Papanna do take some reference to the aspect of rateable value, but the line of challenge that is presented in the present plaint is entirely different to what was pleaded earlier. More importantly, the respondents' learned advocate is right when he points out that this Court neither addressed itself to those aspects of the matter nor is there any finding or decision with regard to the same. It was for this reason that the learned trial Judge, after a detailed evaluation of the material before him, came to the conclusion that the bar of res judicata would not apply in the present situation. I am conscious of the principles incorporated in Section 11, C. P. C. as also the manner in which these have been interpreted by the Courts and the guidelines which have emerged whereunder, these principles are required to be applied. Bearing all of these in mind, one would have to clearly sift the material placed before the Court and decide as to whether cumulatively taken, the bar of resjudicata would be applicable in the present proceeding. Bearing all of these in mind, one would have to clearly sift the material placed before the Court and decide as to whether cumulatively taken, the bar of resjudicata would be applicable in the present proceeding. I need to point out here that this Court disposed of the earlier W. P. upholding the one preliminary objection raised on behalf of the Corporation, namely that this was not an upward increase in the rate of tax, but that it was a revision and that therefore, the challenge was misconceived. This Court did not have occasion to examine any of the other issues even assuming they were either indirectly pleaded or argued and under these circumstances, it would be wrong to uphold the bar of res judicata as against the present plaintiffs who are the respondents before me. To this extent, therefore, on the basis of the record, since the issue has neither been agitated nor decided earlier, the contention of the Corporation that the bar of res judicata applies will have to fail. ( 9 ) AS regards the question of maintainability, the learned trial Judge has recorded the finding that there would be no bar to the plaintiffs approaching the Court for the reliefs that have been asked for. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned. I would prefer to leave it open since the trial is yet to take place and it shall be open to the respective parties on the basis of the material produced before the Court, to satisfy the trial Court. The reason for this is principally because, there does not appear to lie any distinct specific statutory bar to invoking the Court's jurisdiction other than the reference to Rule 2; whereas Mr. Papanna vehemently submits that his clients will satisfy the trial Court that this is not a case in which the Court should or can exercise its jurisdiction if there are provisions for adequate, complete and satisfactory relief to plaintiffs within the ambit of the Corporation's rules. As far as this aspect of the matter goes, suffice it to say that this is not a case in which the plaintiffs should be shut out at the threshold. If the Corporation is in a position to satisfy the trial Court on the aspect of maintainability they are open to do so in the course of the trial. As far as this aspect of the matter goes, suffice it to say that this is not a case in which the plaintiffs should be shut out at the threshold. If the Corporation is in a position to satisfy the trial Court on the aspect of maintainability they are open to do so in the course of the trial. ( 10 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid situation, I see no reason to interfere with the order passed by the trial Court. Both the revisions fail and stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs. The trial Court shall now take up the hearing of the suit on merits and proceed with the same. Having regard to the fact that this is a public interest litigation and that it is an old matter, the trial Court shall take up the same on an expedited basis and shall endeavour to complete the trial as early as possible. Revisions dismissed. --- *** --- .