Judgment : Having failed in both the courts below, the defendant has preferred this civil revision petition against the concurrent order of the lower appellate court confirming the dismissal of his I.A. No.5116 of 1995 praying for setting aside the ex parte money decree dated 19. 1992 in O.S. No.9875 of 1990 passed in favour of the respondent-plaintiff who is none other than the brother of the defendant. 2. From the impugned order of the lower appellate court in C.M.A. No.157 of 1995, it is found as follows: “For the hearing on 3. 1991, the suit summons taken by the plaintiff to the defendant was refused by the defendant and hence the bailiff effected service by affixture.” The bailiff’s endorsement in this regard as follows; “Refused-affixed. 2. 1991 I went to the address and I tender the copy of the summons, the defendant had come to know about the matter, refused to receive the summons. Hence I affix the copy on the outer door of the address.” [Italics supplied] However, subsequently the court ordered fresh summons privately by registered post with acknowledgment due. Then the counsel for the plaintiff filed a memo together with the affidavit of service and the returned postal cover. The postal acknowledgement once again shows that summons was refused. Yet the trial court ordered fresh summons by substituted service, and public action in one issue of “Makkal Rural” was made on 20.8.1992 as directed; the, since the defendant did not appear, the trial court set him ex parte after holding the service sufficient. Then, after taking ex parte evidence, the abovesaid decree was passed on 19. 1992. Therefore, the appellate court concludes that the plaintiff has taken all steps to effect service, but that the defendant refused to receive summons twice and even for the substituted service effected, the defendant did not appear. 3. Now the learned counsel for the petitioner submits before me that the abovesaid substituted service is not due service. He points out that the supporting affidavit to the LA. avers that the petitioner came to know of the passing of the abovesaid decree only on 3. 1995 when E.P. notice was served. He also relies on Bashyam v. Parthasarathy, (1953)2 M.LJ. 371 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 195:1953 M.W.N. 606. 4. But in my considered view, there is no case at all for interference by this. avers that the petitioner came to know of the passing of the abovesaid decree only on 3. 1995 when E.P. notice was served. He also relies on Bashyam v. Parthasarathy, (1953)2 M.LJ. 371 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 195:1953 M.W.N. 606. 4. But in my considered view, there is no case at all for interference by this. Court under Sec. 115, C.P.C. for the following reasons: The abovesaid substituted service cannot be consid ered as not a due service. O.5. Rule 20(2) specifically states; “service substituted by order of the court shall be as effectual as if it had been made on the defendant personally;” So, substituted service is certainly a due service. No doubt, Explanation to Art.123 of the Limitation Act which provides 30 days time as the period of limitation for filing a petition to set aside the ex parte decree, says: “For the purpose of this Article substituted service under O.5, Rule 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not be deemed to be due service.” But that Explanation is only for the purpose of the said Art.123. In the present case, there is no such limitation question. Therefore, what is contained in O.5, Rule 20(2), C.P.C. alone would apply. 5. The abovesaid decision Bashyam v. Parthasarathy, (1953)2 M.LJ. 371 : A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 195: 1953 M. W.N. 606 is not applicable to the present case. The abovesaid decision turned on its own facts and the facts here are different. First of all, in the said decision, the question that was considered appears to be the application of Art. 164 of the Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to the present Art.123 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Further, in the said decision there was no refusal to receive the summons by the defendant therein, as in the present case. The return of the bailiff there, was that when the notice was taken to the defendant therein, to his office address, he was not found in the said office and on enquiry, it was found that he was transferred to another place. Therefore, summons was returned. Yet a further notice was taken to the said defendant to the same office address, rather strangely, as observed in the said decision. On the second time, there was no endorsement on the summons. Then only, substituted service was effected by publication in the newspaper. Therefore, summons was returned. Yet a further notice was taken to the said defendant to the same office address, rather strangely, as observed in the said decision. On the second time, there was no endorsement on the summons. Then only, substituted service was effected by publication in the newspaper. Only in that context, the Division Bench of this Court held that there was no due service by the abovesaid substituted service in the context of the abovesaid Art.164. 6. The facts of the present case are different as already mentioned. No doubt, pursuant to the original refusal to receive summons followed by affixture, the trial court could have declared that the summons has been duly served. On the other hand, it chose the other alternative indicated in the said Rule and ordered fresh summons privately by registered post with acknowledgment due. But thereafter also, it has been already seen that the defendant refused to receive the summons. Then also, the trial court could have inferred that there was due service on the defendant, but it chose to order fresh summons by substituted service as already mentioned. 7. For all these reasons, there is absolutely no scope at all for my interference under Sec. 115, C.P.C. That apart, I may also point out the scope of my jurisdiction under Sec.115, C.P.C. as mentioned in certain significant decisions of this Court and other courts. In Chennichi alias Parikkalv. Srinivasa Chetti, (1970)1 M.L.J. 234 , Ismail, J. as he then was observed as follows: “The exercise of the revision powers of the High Court under Sec. 115, C.P.C. is purely discretionary. The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper. If, such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction of the court is intended to secure and subserve ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. The High Court will not take a technical view and necessarily interfere in every case, where an order is wrong and even improper. If, such interference will produce hardship or injustice. The revisional jurisdiction of the court is intended to secure and subserve ends of justice and not to deny or defeat it. If interference in a particular case will result in hardship or injustice to party, the High Court will be justified in refusing to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, even if the order is found to be one without jurisdiction.” Further, a Division Bench of this Court agreed with the abovesaid observation of Ismail, J. and held as follows: “We are also inclined to accept the contention of the respondent that the discretionary jurisdiction under Sec.115, C.P.C. should not be exercised when the order of the court subordinate renders justice to the parties on the facts of the case. A single Judge of this Court had occasion to consider this question in Chennichi v. Srinivasa, (1970)1 M.L.J. 234 .” This view has also been held even earlier, (vide: Kuppusamy Pillai v. Alwar Chettiar, A.I.R 1935 Mad. 89). Further, in Dominion of India v. Bobhardhandas Shroff, A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 384, it was held that before interfering in revision, the High Court will take into consideration the conduct of the petitioner. 8. In the present case also, the lower appellate court has come to the following conclusions: “On the other hand, there are sufficient records available in this case to show that the appellant/ defendant having come to know that one such suit is filed by his brother, respondent, for the recovery of the amount due from him, he refused to receive the summons and simply kept quiet left the suit decreed ex parte by court and only subsequent to that, when the steps has been taken for executing the decree by the respondent/ plaintiff, he came forward with this petition to set aside the ex parte decree as though he came to know about the suit only on receipt of the notice in the execution petition.” In other words, the effect of this observation is that the lower appellate court has not believed the version of the defendant that he came to know of the said decree only on 3. 1995 as alleged by him in the supporting affidavit which has been categorically denied in the counter-affidavit. In view of this conduct of the petitioner also, I am not at all inclined to interfere. Therefore, the civil revision petition is not admitted but dismissed. Consequently, C.M.P. No.3354 of 1996 is also dismissed.