JUDGMENT S. N. Phukan C, J —This revision petition is directed against the judgment of the Rent Controller, Mandi dated 6-3-1995. The revision petition has been filed by the landlord against the impugned order, 2. The landlord-petitioner was an employee of the State Government and he retired as Chief Medical Officer on 28th February, 1994. He filed an application before the Rent Controller under section 15 (2) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (for short the Act). The application was filed on 18th May, 1994 i e. within one year from the date of his retirement. The application for evection was filed against the respondent, who was his tenant in respect of the suit premises on the ground that the landlord-petitioner wants to settle down in Mandi with his family and that the petitioner wants the suit premises for the purpose of running his E. N. T. Clinic being a specialist in the profession. After issuance of notice on the tenant, application was filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) of section 16 of the Act alongwith an affidavit seeking permission to contest the application for eviction, which was allowed by the impugned order. 3. After issuance of notice on the tenant, application was filed by the tenant under sub-section (4) of section 16 of the Act alongwith an affidavit seeking permission to contest the application for eviction, which was allowed by the impugned order. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and 1 quote below sub-section (2) of section 15 and also sub-section (4) of section 16 of the Act : "15 (2) Where a specified landlord, at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement or after his retirement but within one year of the appointed day whichever is later, applies to the Controller alongwith a certificate from the authority competent to remove him from service indicating the date of his retirement and his affidavit to the effect that he or his spouse does not own and possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or to start his own business, to recover possession of one residential building for his own occupation, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such application to such specified landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether expressed or implied), custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediate possession of such residential building or any part or parts of such building if it is let out in part or parts : Provided that in case of death of the specified landlord, the widow or widower of such specified landlord and in the case of death of such widow or widower^ mother or father or a child or a grand child or a widowed daughter-in-law who was dependent upon such specified landlord at the time of his death shall be entitled to make an application under this section to the Controller,— (a) in the case of death of such specified landlord before the appointed day, within one year of the said day ; (b) in the case of death of such specified landlord after the appointed day, but before the date of his retirement, within one year of the date of his death ; (c) in the case of death of such specified landlord after the appointed day and the date of his retirement, within one year of the date of such retirement; and on the date of such application the right to recover the possession of the residential building which belongs to such specified landlord or his spouse at the time of his death shall accrue to the applicant: Provided further that nothing in this section shall be so construed as conferring a right, on any person to recover possession of more than one residential building inclusive of any part or parts thereof if it is let out in part or parts : Provided further that the Controller may give the tenant a reasonable time for putting the specified landlord or, as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grand-child or widowed daughter-in-law in possession of the residential building and may extend such time not exceeding three months in the aggregate." “16 (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served (whether in the ordinary way or by registered post) in the form specified in Schedule II shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the premises unless he files an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Controller as hereinafter provided ; and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons or his obtaining such leave, the statement made by the landlord or by the specified landlord, or as the case may be, the widow, widower, child, grand-child or widowed daughter-in-law of such specified landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant and the applicant shall be entitled to an order for eviction on the ground aforesaid." 4. Sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, inter alia, provides that a specified land at any time within one year prior to or within one year after the date of his retirement may apply to the Controller to the effect that he or his spouse does not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area in which he intends to reside or to start his own business, for recovery of possession of one residential building for his own occupation and there shall accrue from the date of such application to such specified landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act or in any other law in force or in any contract, custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediate possession of such residential building or parts thereof. Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that a specified landlord within one year before his retirement or within one year thereafter can recover immediate possession of one premises rented out to reside or to start his own business. The legislature also intended that recovery of premises for the above purpose should be immediate and normal procedure of trial need not be followed in such cases. The word specified landlord has been defined in Clause (i) of section 2 of the Act, which, inter alia, means a person who is entitled to receive rent in respect of the building on his own account and who is an employee under the Union of India or a State Government. Admittedly, the petitioner-landlord being a retired Government servant is a specified landlord and he has the right to file an application for eviction under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act. 5. From sub-section (4) of section 16, this Court finds that there is a prohibition imposed on the tenant not to contest the prayer for eviction from the premises filed under sub-section (2) of section 15 unless he seeks leave to contest the application by filing an affidavit stating the grounds and such permission to contest the application is allowed. 5. From sub-section (4) of section 16, this Court finds that there is a prohibition imposed on the tenant not to contest the prayer for eviction from the premises filed under sub-section (2) of section 15 unless he seeks leave to contest the application by filing an affidavit stating the grounds and such permission to contest the application is allowed. Sub-section (5) of section 16 of the Act empowers the Rent Controller to grant leave to the tenant to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the specified landlord for obtaining an order for recovery of possession from the premises on the ground in sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of sub-section (3; of sections 14 and 15 of the Act. 6. In the affidavit filed before the Rent Controller by the tenant-respondent under sub-section (4) of section 16 of the Act, the tenant took a plea that the present landlord-applicant has in his occupation a huge residential building adjoining to the premises in dispute at Mandi Town and the said accommodation is much more than the requirement of the applicant and further the landlord-applicant can run a full-fledged hospital in the ground floor of the building in which he is residing. 7. By the impugned order, the Rent Controller took note of the fact of the present accommodation of the landlord-applicant and was of the view that whether the Clinic proposed to be started by the landlord-petitioner can be run in either of the floors of the premises in occupation of the landlord-applicant is a matter which requires evidence and held that it would not be fair to decide the matter merely on the basis of the allegations and counter allegations of the parties. 8. From sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act, I have no hesitation in holding that an application under the above sub-section can be filed by the specified landlord if he or his spouse does not own or possess any other suitable accommodation in the local area, in which he intends to reside or to start his own business Therefore, the legislature gave the privilege to the specified landlord for eviction of the tenant even for starting his own business if he has no other suitable accommodation for such business. Though the landlord-petitioner has got his own residential building, being a Doctor he wants to start his own E. N. T. Clinic, he is entitled to get the privilege conferred on a specified landlord by sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act. 9. The attention of this Court has been drawn to a decision of the apex Court in Zenobia Bhant v. P. K Vasudeva and another, JT 1995 (8) SC 97, in support of the contention that the premises, which is in occupation of the tenant-respondent is within the same compound and it is an out house. The apex Court while considering section 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 applicable to the City of Chandigarh and which is also similar to the present sub-section (2) of section 15 held that right is given to the landlord in case where he does not own or possess any other suitable accommodation to recover possession of his residential building and if the building is let out in parts, any of such parts can also be recover, ed Therefore, it has been urged that as the out house was rented out, possession can be recovered under sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act. 10. The attention of this Court has also been drawn to a decision of the apex Court in Anand Swaroop Vohra v. Bhim Sen Bahri and another (1994) 5 SCC 372. The facts of the case are that the appellant and his brother, respondent No. 2 therein, were owners of the house in New Delhi and they let out the entire ground floor in 1959. The appellant was the employee of the Central Government, after retirement, shifted from the Government quarters to the first floor of the house. His brother, who was also an employee of the Central Government had earlier shifted to the first floor on his retirement. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under section 25-B (I) read with section 14-C (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. His brother, who was also an employee of the Central Government had earlier shifted to the first floor on his retirement. Thereafter, the appellant filed an application under section 25-B (I) read with section 14-C (1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The tenant after appearance before the Rent Controller obtained leave to contest the same on the grounds that the accommodation available to the appellant was more than sufficient and that in any case sufficiency or insufficiency of accommodation could not be gone into in an application under section 14-C. His application was rejected by the Rent Controller and his revision petition was also rejected by the Delhi High Court summarily in view of the decision of the apex Court in Madan Lal Lamba v. Tarlok Singh Sehgal, 43 (1991) DLT 624. The apex Court set aside both the orders and directed the Rent Controller to dispose of the application filed by the appellant in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in the above judgment. While allowing the appeal, the apex Court held that both the Rent Controller and the High Court failed to appreciate that Madan Lals case was not applicable to the facts of that case The apex Court relied on earlier decisions of the apex Court in Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India, (1991) 2 SCC 87; Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain, (1985) 1 SCC 1 and S. P. Jain v. Krishna Mohan Gupta, (1987) 1 SCC 191. The apex Court quoted extensively from the decision in Surjit Singhs case (supra). It may be stated that sections 14-B to 14-D introduced by the Amending Act 57 of 1988 to the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 to carve oat some more classes of the landlords to enable them to recover immediate possession of premises let out by them. These classes of persons include also retired employees of the Central Government and Delhi Administration. The portions of the judgment of the apex Court in Surjit Singhs case (supra) which were quoted in this decision are reproduced below : "Before the introduction of sections 14-B to 14-D section 14 (1) (e) was the only remedy available to all landlords except those covered under section 14-A to recover possession of their premises. The portions of the judgment of the apex Court in Surjit Singhs case (supra) which were quoted in this decision are reproduced below : "Before the introduction of sections 14-B to 14-D section 14 (1) (e) was the only remedy available to all landlords except those covered under section 14-A to recover possession of their premises. The Controller shall give the tenant leave to contest the applications, if the tenant in his affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlords from obtaining an order for recovery of possession of the premises on the grounds specified under section 14 (1) (e). It is but natural when the landlord brings an action for recovery of possession of the premises covered under section 14 (1) (e), the tenant has the legitimate right to show that the landlord does not qualify under or satisfy the requirements of section 14 (1) (e). But today the remedy under section 14 (I) (e) is available only to landlords in general or the landlords who are not classified landlords under sections 14-B to 14-D. The classified landlords have been conferred with certain rights which are different from and independent of the rights under section (sic) 14 (1) (e)." “When an application is filed under section 14-B, a copy of the application should be sent to the tenant by making necessary amendment to the prescribed form and omitting the other references which are not relevant, If the application is filed under section 14-B, the summons should state that the application is filed under section 14-B, and not under sections 14 (1) (e) or 14-A Likewise if the applications are under sections 14-C to 14-D, the summons should state accordingly. That would indicate the scope of the defence of the tenant for obtaining leave referred to in sub-section (5) of section 25-B. Under sub-section (5), the tenant could contest the application by obtaining leave with reference to the particular claim in the application of the landlord depending upon whether it is under sections 14-A, 14 B, 14-C or 14-D or under section 14 (1) (e). The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under section 14 (1) (e) as against an application under section 14-B. There cannot be any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence. The tenant cannot be allowed to take up defence under section 14 (1) (e) as against an application under section 14-B. There cannot be any defence unconnected with or unrelated to the claim or right of the plaintiff or applicant. That would be against our jurisprudence. It is unlikely that the legislature intended the result for which the counsel for the tenant contended. It will be a mechantcal interpretation of the enactment defeating its purpose. Such an interpretation has never found favour with the courts which have always adopted a purposive approach to the interpretation of statutes. Section 14-B and other allied provisions ought to receive a purposeful construction and subsection (5) of section 25-B should be so construed as to implement the object and purpose of sections 14-B to 14-D. It is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed in sections 14-B to 14-D." "The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the classified landlords. The fact that there is no reference to the word bona fide requirement in sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve the landlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or the tenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claim for eviction against a tenant must be a bona fide one. There is also enough indication in support of this construction from the title of section 25 B which states special procedure for the disposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement." 11. Following the above decisions of the apex Court, 1 hold that the impugned order is bad in law as it is not within the scope of the Rent Controller to find out regarding the suitability of accommodation for running a Clinic by the landlord petitioner. However, the tenant-respondent shall be entitled to raise all relevant contentions as against the claim of the specified landlord. The landlord has also to prove that the accommodation in possession of the tenant is bona fide required for starting E N. T- Clinic by him. The scope of enquiry of the Rent Controller in the present application for eviction filed under section 13(2) of the Act shall be confined to the above two points With the above directions and observations, the revision petition is disposed of. No costs. The scope of enquiry of the Rent Controller in the present application for eviction filed under section 13(2) of the Act shall be confined to the above two points With the above directions and observations, the revision petition is disposed of. No costs. Order accordingly. -