JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 1.8.95 passed by the learned Single Judge, by which the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the petitioner-appellant. 2. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that while deciding the renewal application filed by the petitioner-appellant for the grant of stage carriage permit, the later development which took place after the arguments were heard and before the judgment was pronounced, could not have been taken into consideration in pronouncing the judgment and the order passed by the Regional Transport Authority on the basis of the later developments, is wholly without jurisdiction and deserves to be quashed and set-aside and the learned Single Judge was not justified in dismissing the writ petition filed by the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned Single Judge, while dismissing the writ petition, has erred in holding that after the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 came into force, no renewal of the permit under the repealed Act of 1939 can be made and a fresh application for the grant of permit has to be made. 3. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 4. In Secretary, Quilon District Motor Transport Workers Cooperative Society Limited v. Regional Transport Authority & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 82 , it has been held that:- "In view of the provisions of Section 217 (2)(b) of the new Act of 1988 notwithstanding the repeal of the Act, IV of 1939, the permit issued under the repealed Act will continue to be operative for the period for which it was issued as if new Act had not been passed and the repealed Act continues to be in operation. With the expiry of the period of grant given in the permit under the repealed Act, by necessary implication, the operator has to make fresh application in the prescribed manner to the concerned Regional Transport Authority or State Transport Authority and seek a grant under Section 72. The grant of renewal is no more than a fresh permit to operate the transport service for a fresh period mentioned in the renewed permit. The grant of renewal is no more than a fresh permit to operate the transport service for a fresh period mentioned in the renewed permit. Therefore, the operation of the permit issued under Section 58 of the repealed Act, IV of 1939 is a terminus with the expiry of the period of the grant and the operation of the Act IV of 1939 ceases to have effect from the date. Any right to run the permit, therefore, must be under the permit granted under the Act as per its provisions. Harmonious construction of the relevant provisions would lead to the above conclusion lest any other construction would fly in the face of the express provisions of the Act. By necessary implication of Section 217 (2)(b) the right to renewal under the Act IV of 1939 stands repealed with the expiry of the period of grant of the permit made under the repealed Act. Where the application was not made for fresh grant under the Act, the rejection of the renewal application under Act IV of 1939 or under the Act is perfectly legal." 5. It is true that after the arguments are heard and the matter is closed, it is not permissible under the law to take into consideration the later events, but in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court reported above, no relief can be granted to the appellant because the right to renewal of the permit under the Old Act stands repealed with the expiry of its period and the operator has to apply for the grant of fresh permit under the new Act of 1988. 6. In view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in : Secretary, Quilon District Motor Transport Workers Co-operative Society Limited v. Regional Transport Authority & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 82 , we do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and it does not require any interference. 7. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.Appeal dismissed. *******