The petitioner feels aggrieved by an order dated 6-1-1988, contained in Annexure-4 to the writ petition, whereunder, pursuant to the order dated 27-11-1987 he was to be retired w. e. f. 28-1-1988 on attaining the age of superannuation, i. e. 60 years. The petitioner has prayed for quashing of the aforesaid orders. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The facts, which are not in dispute, are that the petitioner was to attain the age of super annuation on 29-1-1988. However, in view of the proviso to Statute 21. 7 of the Statutes of the University concerned which stipulated that in case the date of superannuation of a teacher does not fall on June 30, the teacher shall continue in service till the end of the academic session, i. e. , June 30, following and he will be treated on re-employment from the date immediately following the date of his superannuation till June 30 follow ing, the petitioner was allowed to continue in service as on re-employment during the period 30-1-1988 to 30-8-1988 but before the end of the aforesaid period, the proviso to Statute 21. 7 was deleted vide the order of Chancellor dated 27-11-1987 with the result the petitioner ceased to hold any right to continue in service till the end of the academic session, i. e. , 30th June, 1988. Consequently, superseding the order dated 2-9-1987, continuing the peti tioner in service till 30-6-1988, the impugned order was issued. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the Chancellor had no jurisdiction to delete the proviso to Statute 21. 7 so as to defeat the right of the petitioner to continue in service till the end of the session. He has urged that the provisions contained in Section 29 (6) of the U. P. Krishi Evam Prodyogik Vishwavidhyala Adiniyam, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act only vests the Kuladhipati with the jurisdiction to either approve or disapprove or remit for further consideration any proposed addition or amendment or repeal of a Statute, but he cannot, himself direct for any amendment or repeal. 4. In the present case, it is pointed out that the Kuladhipati himself has exercised the jurisdiction, which really vests in the Board of Manage ment, which was not permissible. 4. In the present case, it is pointed out that the Kuladhipati himself has exercised the jurisdiction, which really vests in the Board of Manage ment, which was not permissible. It has been urged that the Academic Council itself had passed a resolution number 652 dated 14-3-1988 indicat ing that the deletion of the proviso below Statute 21. 7 by the Kuladhipati was not in accordance with the provisions of Section 29 (6) of the Act and the said order was detrimental to the interest of the teachers. 5. In the aforesaid view of the matter, in the absence of any decision of the Board contemplated under Section 29 (2) of the Act and the proposal of the Academic Council, in regard to the deletion of the proviso to Statute 21. 7, the Kuladhipati could not be deemed to have any jurisdiction to delete the proviso in question. The occasion to exercise the jurisdiction by the Kuladhipati, as contemplated under Section 29 (6) of the Act could arise only after the decision had been taken by the Board. 6. In the instant case, no such decision was ever taken. Therefore, the question of according previous approval contemplated under Section 29 (6) of the Act did not arise. The provision contained in Section 29 (6), it seems to us, provides for previous approval of the Kuladhipati, indicating thereby that the decision of the Board could not come into operation, or become effective so long as the previous approval, as contemplated under Section 29 (6) of the Act was not granted. Power of granting previous approval cannot be equated with the power to amend or alter the Statute. 7. In the present case, the Kuladhipati clearly appears to have exceeded the jurisdiction vested in him, as contemplated under Section 29 (6) of the Act. 8 Sri V B Singh, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 3 has vehemently urged that the Kuladhipati had ample jurisdiction in the exercise whereof, the proviso in question could be Dieted. It has been urged by him that the Kuladhipati, by virtue of his office, envisaged under the First Statute, had inherent jurisdiction to issue a direction, which had the effect of deleting the proviso relied upon by the petitioner. 9 Under the provisions of the Act, the powers with which the Kuladhipati stands vested, have been clearly specified. It has been urged by him that the Kuladhipati, by virtue of his office, envisaged under the First Statute, had inherent jurisdiction to issue a direction, which had the effect of deleting the proviso relied upon by the petitioner. 9 Under the provisions of the Act, the powers with which the Kuladhipati stands vested, have been clearly specified. Section 9 of the aforesaid Act is to the following effect : "9 (1) The Governor of Uttar Pradesh shall be the (Kuladhipati) of the University. He shall, by virtue of his office, be the head of the University, and shall, when present, preside at any con vocation of the University. (2) The (Kuladhipati) shall %have such other powers as may be conferred on him by this Act or the Statutes. " 10. As will be apparent from the above the Kuladhipati, besides the jurisdiction contemplate under Section 9 (1) of the Act, could exercise only such other powers, as stood conferred on him by the Act or the Statutes, framed thereunder. 11. In the present case, the jurisdiction of the Kuladhipati envisaged under Section 29 (6) of the Act is of limited nature. A distinction has been maintained between the jurisdiction of the Board, the academic council and the Kuladhipati. The Scheme, underlying the Act, does not indicate that the Kuladhipati could exercise jurisdiction vesting in the Board, as provided for under Section 29 (2) of the Act. There is nothing on the record to indi cate that the Kuladhipati stood vested with the jurisdiction which vested exclusively in the Board of Management. Further there is nothing under the Act or the statutes which could be deemed to vest the Kuladhipati with any such inherent jurisdiction in exercise whereof, any part of the First Statute framed in accordance with law, could be deleted by the Kuladhipati in the manner, as has been done in the present case. 12. The contention, indicated above, is clearly devoid of merits and is not acceptable. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents further urged that the petitioner has not challenged the order passed by the Kuladhipati deleting the proviso in question and has not prayed for any relief in that regard. 12. The contention, indicated above, is clearly devoid of merits and is not acceptable. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents further urged that the petitioner has not challenged the order passed by the Kuladhipati deleting the proviso in question and has not prayed for any relief in that regard. The contention is that the petitioner has sought for the quashing of only a consequential order and unless the main order, deleting the proviso in question is not challenged, relief in regard to the consequential order cannot be granted. 14. In the pleadings as contained in the writ petition has specifical ly challenged the authority of the Kuladhipati to pass the order deleting the proviso to Statute 21. 7 of the 1st Statutes framed under the Act. It has been asserted that the Kuladhipati had no jurisdiction to amend statute 21. 7 by deleting its proviso. The reliefs claimed in the writ petition clearly indicate that the petitioner has sought for the quashing of orders dated 2-12-1987 and 6-1-1988. 15. Taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties, we are of the considered opinion that the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondents is totally devoid of merits. Once the order passed by Kuladhipati, deleting the proviso in question is found to be without juris diction and non est on that account, there does not appear to be any such impediment which could come into the way of quashing the impugned orders. 16. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the conclusion is inescapable that the impugned order, cutting down the tenure of the petitioners service, on the strength of the impugned deletion, cannot be sustained. The peti tioner was entitled to continue in service upto the end of the session, i. e till 30th June, 1988. However, since the petitioner has been retired and is no longer in service, the only relief which can be granted by this court, is to direct the respondents to treat the petitioner as if in service till 30th June, 1988 and release all service benefits to him, accordingly. 17. However, since the petitioner has been retired and is no longer in service, the only relief which can be granted by this court, is to direct the respondents to treat the petitioner as if in service till 30th June, 1988 and release all service benefits to him, accordingly. 17. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and the respondents are directed to treat the petitioner in service on the post held by him immedi ately preceding the date of the impugned order, till 30-6-1988 and release all consequential service benefits to him within a period not later than two months from the date of production of a certified copy of this judgment and order. 18. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .