JUDGMENT 1. Petitioner is a company incorporated for carrying on tourism and hotel business. The first respondent is a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. According to the petitioner, first respondent is an instrumentality of the State and therefore, amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. First respondent took over from the 3rd respondent certain land in Bangaram Island for the purpose of developing into a tourist resort. For the purpose of opening a tourist resort in the above Island, the first respondent invited offers from various persons who are interested in participating in the process of development of tourism in the Lakshadweep. In the above bid, 2nd respondent was successful and accordingly, Ext. P2 agreement for lease was executed between the first respondent and the 2nd respondent. The above lease was for 5 years from 1st September 1988. to 31st August 1993. Just before the expiry of the above lease, petitioner wrote Ext. P3 letter to the 3rd respondent requesting him to lease the Bangaram Resort to the petitioner. He also wrote Ext. P4 letter to the Minister for Tourism. The Minister of State for Home who is also local M.P. from Lakshadweep forwarded the above letter as per Ext. P5. The Minister received Ext. P5 letter from the Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism informing the petitioner that he might give his offer in prescribed pro forma as and when offers for the Resort at Bangaram and / or other islands in Lakshadweep were invited by the Government. Petitioner also received Ext. P7 communication from the Additional Director General of Tourism advising the petitioner to apply in the prescribed pro forma as and when offers were invited. The Original Petition was filed on 29th August 1995 apprehending that the lease in favour of the 2nd respondent would be renewed by the first respondent. 2. The first prayer in the Original Petition is for a writ of mandamus to the respondents to call for competitive tenders or to auction the right to carry out business on lease basis in Bangaram Resort owned by the first respondent. The second prayer is for a direction to the first respondent not to renew the lease agreement evidenced by Ext. P2 and extended till 31st August 1995. The second prayer is for a direction to the first respondent not to renew the lease agreement evidenced by Ext. P2 and extended till 31st August 1995. The petitioner has also prayed for a suitable direction to allow the petitioner to take part in the bid or auction and direct the respondents to issue competitive tender or other invitation to public. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of respondents 1, 3 and 4. In the counter affidavit, it has been stated as follows: Second respondent applied for extension of lease proposal for fresh financial terras which were more favourable than the existing terms of the agreement. The same was forwarded to the Ministry of Tourism and it was placed before the high level committee constituted by the Government to finalise global tenders on developing two islands into international tourist resorts. Even though the committee met on different occasions for taking a decision, the committee could not take a final decision in view of various imponderable difficulties. Therefore, ad hoc extension of the lease from 1st September 1993 to 31st August 1.994 was given by the Ministry to the 2nd respondent. There was problem regarding the land occupied by the first respondent. After settling the above problem, the committee decided to extent the lease period for another 5 years with effect from 1st September 1995. The terms of the fresh lease were more favourable in terms of financial returns to the first respondent. The annual royalty was increased from Rs. 1.5 lakhs to Rs. 2.5 lakhs and percentage on gross income was increased from 16 percent to 20 percent subject to a minimum amount of Rs. 20 lakhs annually. 4. The 2nd respondent has also filed a detailed counter affidavit. The above counter affidavit reveals that consequent to the notification of the Ministry of Tourism inviting tenders, several parties submitted their offers. Initially, the offers of the 2nd respondent and of one Mercury Travels were considered by the first respondent. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner was nowhere in the picture at that stage. After considering the entire matter and as a result of series of discussions and negotiations, the 2nd respondent was awarded the right to develop the island as a tourism centre. Accordingly, Ext. R-2 (e] agreement was executed between the first and 2nd respondents. It may be mentioned here that the petitioner was nowhere in the picture at that stage. After considering the entire matter and as a result of series of discussions and negotiations, the 2nd respondent was awarded the right to develop the island as a tourism centre. Accordingly, Ext. R-2 (e] agreement was executed between the first and 2nd respondents. According to the 2nd respondent, it is the 2nd respondent who completely developed the island into one of the prettiest tourist attractions in the Lakshadweep. He has given vivid picture by quoting facts and figures how the foreign exchange and the royalty showed a stead fast increase from 1988-89 to 1994-95. The foreign exchange increase was from Rs. 6.44 lakhs to 113.12 lakhs. The royalty and lease rent increased from 2.45 lakhs to 24.21 lakhs. 5. According to the 2nd respondent, what the petitioner now demands is that he must be given the tourist resort at Bangaram Island after it was developed by the 2nd respondent. He was not prepared to enter into the competition at a time when there was no facilities for tourist development in Bangaram Island. 6. Shri Vijayan Nair, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the first respondent should have gone for open tender giving wide publicity when the initial lease was for 5 years in 1995. He has also a further case that there was a renewal from 1993 to 1995 which was surreptitiously made without anybody knowing about it. In order to drive home his point, he relied on the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. m/s M. and N. Publications Ltd. AIR 1996 SC 51 . The above case related to the tenders regarding the publication of what is called "yellow pages" in the telephone directories for Delhi and Bombay. In the above case, even though a contract was entered into between the Department and the contractor for printing directories for five years, the contractor failed to perform his part. Still fresh contracts for additional years were granted in the garb of extension of original agreement and without inviting tenders. In the above case, even though a contract was entered into between the Department and the contractor for printing directories for five years, the contractor failed to perform his part. Still fresh contracts for additional years were granted in the garb of extension of original agreement and without inviting tenders. Considering the challenge against the above action of the Department, the Supreme Court dealt with the extended scope of judicial review in the matter of Government contracts as follows: "While exercising the power of judicial review, in respect of contracts entered into on behalf of the State, the Court is concerned primarily as to whether there has been any infirmity in the 'decision making process'. By way of judicial review the Court cannot examine the details of the terms of the contract which have been entered into by the public bodies or the State. Courts have inherent limitations on the scope of any such enquiry. But at the same time the Courts can certainly examine whether 'decision making process' was reasonable rational, not arbitrary and violative of Art.14 of the Constitution. If the contract has been entered into without ignoring the procedure which can be said to be basic in nature and after an objective consideration of different options available taking into account the interest of the State and public, then Court cannot act as appellate authority by substituting its opinion in respect of selection made for entering into such contract. But, once the procedure adopted by an authority for purpose of entering into a contract is held to be against the mandate of Art.14 of the Constitution, the Court cannot ignore such action saying that the authorities concerned must have some latitude or liberty in contractual matters and any interference by Court amounts to encroachment on the exclusive right of the executive to take such decision." 7. Holding that the supplemental agreement was really a fresh agreement without fresh terms and conditions without inviting any fresh tender, the Supreme Court was of the view that the authorities applied irrelevant considerations while granting a fresh contract and therefore, "decision making process" before the supplementary agreement was entered into cannot be said to be consistent with the requirement of Art.14 of the Constitution. The facts of the present case are entirely different from the facts of the case of Sterling Computers Ltd. In the present case, there was no difficulty on the part of the 2nd respondent while carrying out the terms of the existing agreement. On the other hand, the facts disclosed in the pleadings go to show that the 2nd respondent was able to increase both the foreign exchange earning and the royalty by performing excellently his part of the contract. According Clause.9 of Ext. R-2 (e), in case the licensee opts to continue the lease arrangement after the expiry of the period of this deed, he may apply for the renewal of the lease suggesting his terms and conditions at least 6 months from the expiry of the period of this lease. The renewal of the lease was granted only pursuance to the above clause contained in the lease deed. It is also pertinent to point out that a similar clause exists in Ext. R-2 (j) agreement executed between respondents 1 and 2 on 29th August 1995 allowing the 2nd respondent to continue the existing lease arrangement till 2000. Therefore, I am of the definite view that there was absolutely nothing illegal or unconstitutional in the decision making process which led to the renewal of the lease in favour of the 2nd respondent. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited 3 other rulings of the Supreme Court reported in M/s Rajshila v. State of U.P. and others. AIR 1992 SC 1600 , Food Corporation of India v. Kamadhenu Cattle Feed Industries AIR 1993 SC 1601 and K.K. Singhania v. M/s Lala Shyamlal Jain Ship Breaking Co. Ltd. AIR 1994 SC 660 . In the first ruling, the Supreme Court was considering the case of the bidder who failed to give security deposits due to strike and circumstances beyond his control. In the above case, the Supreme Court gave certain directions to reauction in order to meet the ends of justice. In the 2nd case, the Supreme Court was considering the power of the Food Corporation of India to reject the highest tender and to re-negotiate with the tenderers. The Supreme Court has held that the acceptance of an offer of higher amount than that quoted in the tender during negotiations is not arbitrary. In the 2nd case, the Supreme Court was considering the power of the Food Corporation of India to reject the highest tender and to re-negotiate with the tenderers. The Supreme Court has held that the acceptance of an offer of higher amount than that quoted in the tender during negotiations is not arbitrary. In the third case, the Supreme Court was considering the auction by negotiation in which the successful bidder prayed for reliefs like with drawl of sum already paid, compensation for expenses on renewal and transportation of some articles, etc. 9. Thus, a reading of these 3 decisions will go to show that none of them can be fit in the facts of the present case. 10. Shri Joseph appearing on behalf of the 2nd respondent relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar AIR 1977 SC 1436. According to him, the question of discrimination in the matter of award of contracts by the State arises only at the beginning and not at a later stage. Para 1,0 of the above ruling is quoted herein below which is as follows: "10. It is thus clear that the Erusian Equipment and Chemicals Ltd's. case ( AIR 1975 SC 266 ) (supra) involved discrimination at the very threshold or at the time of entry into the field of consideration of persons with whom the Government could contract at all. At this stage, no doubt, the State Act purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the Individual citizens import into every transaction entered into in exercise of its constitutional powers. But. after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Art.14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confer some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract." 11. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confer some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract." 11. Considering the above rulings of the Supreme Court and applying the principles followed therein to the facts of this case, I don't find any illegality either in the renewal of the lease granted in 1993 or in 1995. First respondent was well within its powers in granting the above 2 renewals. As far as the petitioner is concerned no facts were placed before this Court by way of pleadings to show that the petitioner is capable of undertaking the development of a tourist spot in the international standards in Bangaram Island. Though the counsel for the petitioner submitted that he is having a hotel business in Maly Island, the pleadings do not support the above claim. Moreover, as stated earlier, the petitioner never competed at the initial stage when number of parties in and around India competed for the project in Bangaram Island. It is also worth while to remember that only when the question of renewal came, the petitioner put forward his claim for the first time. By the time, the island has become a fullfledged tourist centre attracting tourists from all over the world. Thereafter, it was easy for the petitioner to claim that he is also interested to run the tourist centre at Bangaram Island. As rightly pointed out by the counsel for the 2nd respondent he has invested large amounts and developed the island into a famous world tourist centre and now everybody will desire to run that tourist centre without investing any more amount, because the whole infrastructure of a tourist centre is now available in Bangaram Island. Therefore, I don't think that this Court will be justified in exercising its discretionary jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution in favour of the petitioner and to invalidate the renewal granted in favour of the 2nd respondent. 12. Under these circumstances, I don't find any reason to allow any of the prayers in the Original Petition. Original Petition is dismissed, but, without any order as to costs.