SUBEDEEN v. SATYAWATI DEVI — 1996 DIGILAW 375 (ALL)

A. P. SINGH, J. Both these second appeals have been filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure for questioning legality of the concurrent decree passed by IV Addl. Civil Judge, Lucknow dated 21-2-1990 in Suit No. 206 of 1982 and Suit No. 280 of 1983 which was confirmed by XV Addl. District Judge, Lucknow in Appeal Nos. 88 of 1991 and 95 of 1991 by judgment and decree dated 7-12-1991 decreeing the suits against appellants for eviction and payment of rent and for restraining the appellants from raising any structure over Plot No. 159, Mohalla Khas Bazar No. 3, Qaiserbagh, Lucknow. 2. Suit No. 206 of 1982 was filed by Satyawati Devi and Dharm Raj Singh against the appellants Sube Din, Bhikhan and Anwar whereas Suit No. 280 of 1983 was filed by Dharma Raj Singh against the three appellants. Suit No. 280 of 1983 was filed for claiming the relief of possession from the defendants over the land in suit and recovery of rent and damages. Suit No. 206 of 1982 was filed for injunction so as to prevent the appellants from raising any structure thereon. Since both the suits were between common parties and in respect of same land the trial Court heard and decided both the suits together. Parties led only one set of evidence in both the suits. 3. Case of plaintiff-respondents was that the land in suit was heir adda Land (land used for sale of animals ). It was let out to appellants for carrying out the business of sale and purchase of milk animals (cows and buffaloes) for a period of eleven months or. a monthly rent of Rs. 800/ -. With the land various provisions such as temporary covered space for tethering 80 animals, well and pumpset attached with it, temporary covered Kothari for keeping fodder for the animals, handpump etc. were provided therewith to enable appellants to carry out the business of sale and purchase of the animals. The arrangement between appellants and respondents was reduced in writing on a stamp paper of Rs. five. The allegation by respondent was that though the agreement was for eleven months but it was cunningly made five years and amount of rent too was reduced to the advantage of appellants. 4. The arrangement between appellants and respondents was reduced in writing on a stamp paper of Rs. five. The allegation by respondent was that though the agreement was for eleven months but it was cunningly made five years and amount of rent too was reduced to the advantage of appellants. 4. The case of respondent was that the land was not adda Land, on the con trary it was a building which was let out to them for a period of five years. For this reason according to the appellants the Suit was not maintainable in the Civil Court. They sought protection of the provisions of U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972) ; they also denied that it was let out for carrying on the business of sale and purchase of the milk animals and that they did not commit default in the payment of rent. Appellants also raised the plea of want of jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the suit. 5. Both the suits, as observed above, were decreed by the trial court and on appeal the lower appellate court upheld the decree of the trial court. It was inter alia held by the Courts below that what was let out by respondents to the appellants was adda Land for allowing them to carry on the business of sale and purchase of milk animals only on a monthly rent of Rs. 800 and not building. Therefore, protection of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not available to the tenancy of the appellants. It was also held that the adda Land was let out for carrying out the business of sale and purchase of milk animals whereas the respondents violated the condition of lease by converting the said land for the purpose of running the business of dairy (selling milk) and for their residence by constructing residential houses thereon. It was also held that appellants stopped payment of rent settled and therefore they were liable to pay the arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 10,586 and damages after termination of tenancy to the extent of Rs. 2640. 00. Respondent Satyawati Devi was held to be owner of the land of which appellants were tenant. It was also held that appellants stopped payment of rent settled and therefore they were liable to pay the arrears of rent to the tune of Rs. 10,586 and damages after termination of tenancy to the extent of Rs. 2640. 00. Respondent Satyawati Devi was held to be owner of the land of which appellants were tenant. The trial Court further held that apart from tin shed for tethering animals and Kothari for keeping Bhoosa (cow fodder) no other construction was present at the time of the inception of the tenancy but the appellants illegally made construction of four rooms thereon unauthorisedly without obtaining permission from the owner of the adda Land. On these findings the suit was decreed for eviction of appellants, recovery of rent and damages, demoli tion of unauthorisedly constructed structures from the land with the direction against appellants against raising any structure on the adda Land. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the decree passed by the trial court, appellants filed appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure which too was dismissed by the lower appellate court which confirmed the findings recorded by the trial court and upheld the decree passed by it. 7. This second appeal has not yet been admitted for hearing under Rule 11 of Order XLI. However, by an earlier order of this Court dated 26-2-96 it was directed to be finally decided, this is how it has been listed before me for final hearing. Appellants during the pendency of the appeal in this Court have obtained stay order for the stay of the decree which order respondents want to be discharged. It was for this reason that the appeal was fixed (by another Honble Judge) for final hearing. 8. When a second appeal is filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is required to be listed before the Court for dismissal under Order XLI, Rule 11 of the Code. Only after its preliminary hearing under Order XLI, Rule 11 if the Court finds that substantial questions of law are involved in the appeal it can be admitted for final hearing. 9. In the present case hearing under Order XLI, Rule 11 did not take place and without admission of the appeal on substantial question of law it was, in my opinion, wrongly fixed for final hearing. 9. In the present case hearing under Order XLI, Rule 11 did not take place and without admission of the appeal on substantial question of law it was, in my opinion, wrongly fixed for final hearing. After this position was made known to the learned counsel for the appellants I requested him to confine his arguments for the admission of the appeals and not for final hearing, the counsel however insisted that the appeals having once been fixed for final hearing they must be heard finally and not only for admission on the question as to whether it involves substantial question of law. 10. Section 100 postulates hearing of an appeal filed under Section 100 at two stages. First hearing is held at the threshold for admission when the Court is required to formulate substantial questions of law which may be involved in the appeal. Second hearing thereafter is held when respondent is called upon to argue that the questions framed as substantial questions or law are not involved in the case or that the questions framed by the Court are not substantial questions of law. The Court has also been given the powers to hear the appeal on any other substantial question of law after recording reasons therefor in case the Court is satisfied that any other substantial question of law is involved in the appeal. The requirement in this respect in Section 100, C. P. C. in my opinion is of mandatory nature and this Court too cannot short circuit those mandatory provisions so as to finally hear a second appeal without first framing the substantial questions of law which may be found involved in the appeal. 11. I am, therefore, of the view that this appeal, notwithstanding the earlier order of the court for its final hearing, has to be heard for its admission under Order XLI, Rule 11, C. P. C. 12. 11. I am, therefore, of the view that this appeal, notwithstanding the earlier order of the court for its final hearing, has to be heard for its admission under Order XLI, Rule 11, C. P. C. 12. While addressing the Court on behalf of the appellants Sri M. A. Khan, their learned counsel formulated following questions for the consideration of the court which according to him are involved in these two appeals : (a) Suit No. 206 of 1982 and suit No. 280 of 1983 having not been consolidated together by specific order of the trial court evidence led in Suit No. 206 of 1982 could not legally be read for decreeing Suit No. 280 of 1983 in which no specific evidence was led by plaintiff-respondents. (b) Issue relating to the jurisdiction of the court to try the suit in view of the appellants plea that it was hot cognizable by Civil Court but by Small Causes Court as provided in U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 having not been decided the decree is vitiated. (c) In absence of proof of the notice under Section 196 of the Transfer of Property Act the suit for eviction could not be decreed. (d) Since no finding was given on issue No. 8 by the trial court, therefore in the absence of finding on issue No. 8 the decree against appellant is illegal. (e) The lease-deed having not been sufficiently stamped and fine imposed by the lower appellate court under Section 35 of the Stamp Act having not been paid, the same was not admissible in evidence, therefore lease-deed was not admissible in evidence. The decree passed on inadmissible evidence vitiates the decrees. (f) The agreement of tenancy in the case admittedly in the case being for a period of eleven months the deed of contract of tenancy is not admissible in evidence because the same was not registered as required by para 2 of Section 17 of Registration Act set up by the plaintiff was inadmissible in evidence and therefore on that ground also the decree passed by the courts below is liable to be set aside. 13. No other point except the above was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants. 14. 13. No other point except the above was argued by the learned counsel for the appellants. 14. So far point (a) is concerned, in my opinion that offers no scope for inter ference by this Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Absence of an order for consolidation of the two suits which should have been passed by the trial court in my opinion will not at all vitiate the decree inasmuch as the two suits related to the same property and between the same persons for identical cause of action. Leading of evidence in one of suit was more for the convenience of the court than for the convenience of the plaintiffs. It caused no prejudice either to the plaintiffs or to the defendants, therefore, absence of order regarding consolidation of the two suit for their disposal together will cause no inherent illegality in the decree passed in those suits. This argument of the learned counsel raises no substantial question of law which is accordingly turned down. 15. Coming to the point (b) argued by the learned counsel it is to be seen that necessary facts in this regard were raised by the appellants in their written statement which they filed in Suit No. 280 of 1983 on which issue No. 3 to the following effect was framed by the trial Court; "kya VADGAT SAMPATTI KE BHAVAN HONE KE KARAN IS NYAYALAYA KO IS MUKADAME KEE SUNWAI KA KSHETRADHIKAR PRAPT NAHI HAI? JAISA KI PRATIVAD PATRA KE PARA 19 MEN KAHA GAYAHAI?" on this question finding was recorded by the trial Court along with issue No. 1 It was held by the trial court that what was let out to the appellant was not a building but open land alone with tin shed and Kothari respectively for tethering animals and for storing fodder For them ; therefore in the opinion of the court below provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not attracted. In this regard reliance was placed by the trial court on a judgment of this Court in Gopal v. Additional District Judge, Gorakhpur, AR. C, 1987 (1) 150. It is, therefore, incorrect on the part of the learned counsel for the appellants to contend that no issue regarding maintainability of the suit in Civil Court was framed by the trial Court. 16. C, 1987 (1) 150. It is, therefore, incorrect on the part of the learned counsel for the appellants to contend that no issue regarding maintainability of the suit in Civil Court was framed by the trial Court. 16. Appellate Court too considered contentions advanced on appellants behalf on this issue and found no illegality in the finding that the subject-matter of tenancy between the appellants and respondents was the adda Land and not building, there-fore, U. P. Act No 1. 3 of 1972 was not applicable. 17. Before me Sri Mohammad Arif appearing for the appellants reiterated that this Court in many cases has maintained that even a kotharf was covered within the ambit of building so as to get the protection of the Rent Control Act; he had cited a number of judgments on this point. 18. I have no doubt that even a khokha or a kothari1 if let out may be called building for the purpose of the Rent Act but the question here is not as to whether the tin shed and the Kothari which existed over the adda Land would be building or not. On the contrary the question involved in the suit was whether protection of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which was pleaded by the appellants would also be applicable to the adda Land because on that land existed tin shed and Kothari respectively for tethering cows and buffaloes and for keeping fodder for them. 19. In this context the Court below, in my opinion, rightly held that since what was let out to appellants was land termed as adda Land for carrying on the business of sale and purchase of milk animals by them, therefore, provisions of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 would not be attracted simply because on that land there existed tin shed and Kothari respectively for tethering those animals and for keeping Bhoosa (fodder) for those animals inasmuch as the subject of tenancy between the appellants and respondents was land and not the tin shed and the Kothari existence whereof on the land let out to appellants was for the effective use of the adda Land for the purpose for which it was let out to appellants. For this proposition of law support can be found from Apex Courts judgment in Prabha Manufacturing Industrial Co-operative Society v. Banwan Lal, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1101. For this proposition of law support can be found from Apex Courts judgment in Prabha Manufacturing Industrial Co-operative Society v. Banwan Lal, AIR 1989 Supreme Court 1101. The Supreme Court held in this case that if open land with a small shed on it was let out it will be letting of land and not the building (see para 16 ). Judgment in this case was let referred by the lower appellate court in its judgment. Similar view has been expressed again by the Apex Court in Koti Saroj Anamma &anr. v. Jonnalagada Malleswara Rao, AIR 1995 SC 1401 . In this case too the Supreme Court held that it is the pre-dominant pur pose of the lease which will determine as to what was out. In this case Saw Mill Machinery was let out which was covered by zinc sheet shed. The Court held that since the dominant purpose of the lease was leasing out the "saw Mill Machinery" therefore it cannot be held that zinc sheet shed with which saw machinery was covered was let out. 20. In para 7 of the report the Apex Court observed as follows : "looking to this evidence, it is clear that the shed, which has a zinc sheet roof, was erected only to protect the Saw mill machinery. What was leased out to the respondent was substantially the Saw mill machinery for the purpose to carrying on timber/saw mill business. The shed was merely erected to shelter the machinery. The dominant purpose of the lease was to lease out the Saw mill machinery. In order that the lease should be covered by the Andhra Pradesh Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, the lease should be of a building as defined in Section 2 (ii ). It should, therefore, be a lease of any house or a hut or a part of house or a hut let for residential or non-residential purposes. It would include gardens, grounds, garages and outhouses appurtenant to such a house or a hut. In the present case, however, the lease is not of any house or a hut or part of house or a hut. The lease is of Saw mill machinery which is covered by a zinc sheet shed. The dominant purpose of the lease is to lease out the machinery. The shed is only an adjunct. In the present case, however, the lease is not of any house or a hut or part of house or a hut. The lease is of Saw mill machinery which is covered by a zinc sheet shed. The dominant purpose of the lease is to lease out the machinery. The shed is only an adjunct. It is also pointed out that a covering over the machinery in the shape of a structure consisting of zinc sheets supported on poles can hardly be called a house or even a hut. In any case, looking to the dominant purpose of the lease, the two Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the lease is not covered by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960". Similar is the position in the present case. Appellants were let out adda Land with covered space (with tin shed) for tethering animals along with a Kothari for keeping Bhoosa (fodder) for the animals for the purpose of running the business of sale and purchase of milk animals. Thus the predominant purpose of the lease in this case too was letting of adda Land and not of the tin shed and the Kothari standing thereon which was erected only for the protection of the animals and their fodder from the vagaries of nature. 21. I find noanerit in the contention of the appellants counsel that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court in my opinion, too, U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable inasmuch as what was let out to them by the respondents was land not building, therefore, the suit was rightly entertained by the Civil Court. 22. So far point c is concerned, that too has no merit. Finding recorded by the trial court in issue No. 4 in Suit No. 280/83 would show that the appellant himself accepted in para 13 of the written statement about the receipt of the notice, though he pleaded mat the notice was illegal without specifying as to what was the illegality involved in it. The Courts below on consideration of the contents of the notice and appellants admission of its receipt held that the notice was lawful and was duly served on the appellants. Therefore, the argument by appellants learned counsel that the notice was not proved has no substance which is accordingly turned down. The Courts below on consideration of the contents of the notice and appellants admission of its receipt held that the notice was lawful and was duly served on the appellants. Therefore, the argument by appellants learned counsel that the notice was not proved has no substance which is accordingly turned down. 23. Now I take up point (D) raised by the learned counsel. 24. Issue No. 8 framed in Suit No. 280/83 reads as follows; "kya VAD KANOONIROOP SE CHALANE YOGYA HAIATHVA NAHI"? 25. Argument in this respect was also raised in the lower appellate court on behalf of the appellant which has been dealt with by the lower appellate court in para 12. A reading of para 12 of the judgment of the lower appellate court would disclose that though issues Nos. 1 to 7 were framed on 6-8-86, issue No. 8 was framed on 3-11-87 by another Presiding Officer of the trial court. Question which was raised in Issue No. 8 had already been raised in Suit No. 206 of 1982 in the form of Issue No. 6 which if translated in English will read as follows: "whether the suit was barred by the provisions of Specific Relief Act as stated in paras 15 and 18 of the written statement? 26. It has further been found by the lower appellate court that it could not be explained as to how issues 6 and 8 were different from each other. In the 9pinion of the lower appellate court issue No. 8 was framed by way of surplus age without any purpose out of carelessness. Therefore, according to the lower appellate court absence of finding on issue No. 8 made no difference to the decree passed by the trial court. 27. Before me also learned counsel has not been able to point out any difference between Issue Nos. 6 and 8. The point was raised only for the technicality which has no merit and is accordingly turned down. 28. Now I take up points (e) and (f) on which much emphasis was given by the learned counsel for the appellants during the course of his argument. 29. It was contended that the lease-deed or in other words agreement of letting of the adda Land by the plaintiff- respondents though was witnessed by a document lease deed but the same was reduce a to writing on a stamp paper of Rs. 29. It was contended that the lease-deed or in other words agreement of letting of the adda Land by the plaintiff- respondents though was witnessed by a document lease deed but the same was reduce a to writing on a stamp paper of Rs. Five only. Therefore, the document being insufficiently stamped was not admissible in evidence as provided in Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act. It was further argued that since the lease deed was also not registered as per the requirement of para 2 of Section 17 of the Registration Act the agreement was not admissible in evidence and therefore no decree could be passed on the basis of the said lease-deed. 30. I would like first to deal with the arguments of the learned counsel on the point that the lease deed is required to be registered and its inadmissibility in evidence on account of its non-registration. 31. Section 17 (1) (d) of the Indian Registration Act provides that no lease of any immovable property from year to year or for a period exceeding one year reserv ing yearly rent can be created except by a registered document. Section 107 of Trans fer of Property Act provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. Para 2 of Section 107 further provides that all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agree ment accompanied by delivery of possession. 32. A reading of the aforementioned provisions would show that where lease of immovable property is from year to year or for a term exceeding one year etc. It has to be witnessed by a registered document; in case such a lease is not registered same will not be admissible in evidence and has to be totally ignored by the Courts. However, if the lease is for any other period then it can be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement. However, if it is not made by a registered instrument but has been made by an unregistered instrument same shall also be inadmissible in evidence before any court. However, if the lease is for any other period then it can be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement. However, if it is not made by a registered instrument but has been made by an unregistered instrument same shall also be inadmissible in evidence before any court. Though such lease can be created by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession (which is not the case of the par ties in the present case ). Proviso to Section 107 empowers the State Government to issue Notification in the official Gazette providing for execution of lease of immov able property in respect of lease other than the lease from year to year or for any term exceeding one year by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement accom panied with delivery of possession. 33. In exercise of power conferred on the State Government in the proviso to Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act the State Government made amendment of Section 107 by U. P. Act No. 37 of 1976 on 1-1-1977. By this amendment the second paragraph of Section 107 of the Act was substituted to read as follows : "all other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by an agreement oral or written, accompanied by delivery of possession". 34. The effect of the amendment-made by the State Legislature of the second para of Section 107 of the Act was that a lease of immovable property other than those mentioned in first part could be made even by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement followed with delivery of possession. 35. Contention in this respect was also raised on behalf of the appellant before the lower appellate court which considered this argument in detail in para 15 of its judgment. It was found by the lower appellate court that since the delivery of posses sion of the leased property had already been made to the appellant prior to the execution of the leased-deed therefore, mere non-delivery of possession at the time of the execution of the lease did not make out any case for the inapplicability of the said amendment to the facts of the present case. 36. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a Division Bench judgement of this Court in Zarif Ahmad & Anr. v. Satish Kumar & Anr. 36. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on a Division Bench judgement of this Court in Zarif Ahmad & Anr. v. Satish Kumar & Anr. reported in AIR 1983 All 164 wherein it was held that if a lease-deed for letting out immovable property for a period of less than one year was not registered same could not be read in evidence and Section 107 of Transfer of Property Act was attracted to the same. A perusal of the judgment in Zarif Ahmad would show that U. P. Amendment was not considered by the Court while laying down the law on the point. The view to this effect was expressed by the Division Bench on a reference of the question to it so as to resolve the conflict between earlier decisions rendered by single Judges. In my opinion, in view of the U. P. Amendment of 1977 substituting para 2 of Section 107. It is not open for the learned counsel for the appellant to argue that lease agreement which was executed between the parties was not admissible in evidence only because that it was not registered under Section 17 of the Registration Act. 37. Coming to the last contention of the learned counsel on the point of inadmissibility of the lease-deed on account of its being insufficiently stamped also I do not find much force in this contention too. 38. The lease-deed initially was prepared on a stamp paper of Rs. 5/- Subsequently on objection raised by the appellant before the trial court direction was issued by the trial court requiring the plaintiff- respondent for making good the deficiency in the stamp duty and for payment of fine. Though deficiency in the stamp duty was supplied by the respondents but fine was not paid which was subsequently paid by plaintiff-respondents at the appellate stage on the directions of the appellate court. Lower appellate court has observed that though direction for payment Of difference in the stamp duty and the fine was made by the trial court but due to inadvertence the document was admitted in evidence by the trial court despite non payment of fine imposed by it. Lower appellate court has observed that though direction for payment Of difference in the stamp duty and the fine was made by the trial court but due to inadvertence the document was admitted in evidence by the trial court despite non payment of fine imposed by it. Lower appellate court in the circumstances held that since admission of the lease-deed in evidence by the trial court was on account of its oversight (failure to notice non-payment of fine) no objection regarding its inadmissibility on account of non-payment of fine imposed by the trial Court could be taken by appellants especially so when appellants had themselves placed reliance on the terms and condition of the lease-deed in support of their own case. On a joint reading of the provisions of Sections 35, 36 and 61 of Indian Stamp Act, in my opinion, there is no sanction for the learned counsel for the appellants to contend that simply because the fine imposed by the trial court was not paid by respondents before the lease-deed was admitted as evidence by the trial court the decree passed by the trial court should be vitiated on account of the fact that lease-deed was inadmissible in evidence. 39. No doubt Section 35 creates disability against a party filing a document in evidence which is not sufficiently stamped and declares that such a document will be inadmissible in evidence. It however empowers the Court to remove the defects by requiring the party concerned to make good the deficiency of the stamp duty and to pay the fine which is imposed thereon. Trial Court in this case exercised its power requiring the respondent to make good deficiency in the stamp duty and to pay fine thereon ; respondents partly complied trial courts order and supplied the short fall in the Court-fees but failed to pay the fine but being unmindful of respondents failure to pay the fine the trial court admitted the lease-deed in the evidence. As a matter of fact defect from which the lease-deed suffered stood substantially removed with the passing of order under Section 35 by the trial court. 40. It is further to be noted that Section 36 provides that once the document is admitted by the trial court in evidence no objection regarding its inadmissibility can be taken except in the manner provided in Section 61 thereof. 40. It is further to be noted that Section 36 provides that once the document is admitted by the trial court in evidence no objection regarding its inadmissibility can be taken except in the manner provided in Section 61 thereof. In the present case, despite non-payment of fine imposed by the trial court on the appellant the lease deed was admitted in evidence. Appellants too relied on the terms of that lease- deed in these circumstances. In my opinion, no substantial illegality crept in the decree passed by the trial court only because the trial court admitted the lease-deed in evidence despite non-payment of fine imposed by it on the appellants on account of insufficiency m the stamp duty paid thereon. 41. This contention of the learned counsel, in my opinion, will not be substan tial question of law within the meaning of Section 100, C. P. C. inasmuch as the appellants themselves placed reliance on the terms of the lease-deed and referred to the same during the course of trial of the suit and also during the hearing of the appeal in the lower appellate court. Before me also learned counsel for the appel lants made reference of various paras of the lease-deed so as to contend that what was let out to the appellants through the lease-deed was the building and not open land. No prejudice therefore, was caused to the appellants on account of the admis sion of the lease-deed in evidence by the trial court. It is settled law that a party cannot be allowed to approbate and reprobate in the same breath. 42. No other point was argued. 43. None of the points urged by the learned counsel for the appellants before me involve substantial question of law which may merit admission of the appeal for hearing. It will not be out of place to mention that the appellant with the passing of the stay order by this Court for staying the operation of the decrees passed against the appellants, the respondents appeared and participated in the hearing of the appeals before me". Learned Counsel for the appellants as also learned Counsel for respondents cited a number of decisions in support of their respective contentions. If reference to all those judgments which were cited before me is given in this judgment, the judgment will become cumbersome. Learned Counsel for the appellants as also learned Counsel for respondents cited a number of decisions in support of their respective contentions. If reference to all those judgments which were cited before me is given in this judgment, the judgment will become cumbersome. Therefore, only those judgments have been noticed which in my opinion were of hearing to the points with reference to the questions of law argued for admission of the appeals. 44. In the result, the appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed in limine. Stay order dated 9-7-92 is vacated. Appeals dismissed. .