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1996 DIGILAW 375 (MP)

Sanjeev Arora v. National Insurance Co.

1996-04-04

FAKHRUDDIN, SHACHEENDRA DWIVEDI

body1996
ORDER Shacheendra Dwivedi, J. -- 1. The appellant has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge on a revision preferred by the appellant. The appellant was the claimant before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Shivpuri. The learned Tribunal had allowed him compensation to the tune of Rs. 31,033/- and the claimant had filed execution for recovery of the amount. Against the award, the Insurance Company had preferred an appeal after depositing 50% of the awarded amount which was withdrawn by the claimant/appellant. 2. The learned Single Judge in the Misc. Appeal of the Insurance Company held that the liability of the Insurance Company was limited to pay only Rs. 6,000/-. After the decision of the Misc. Appeal of the Insurance Company, an application was filed by the Company in the execution proceedings that its liability to pay having been determined by the High Court only upto the extent of Rs. 6,000/-, it was entitled to the refund of balance amount withdrawn by the claimant. The learned executing Court directed the claimant to deposit the excess amount, which was required to be refunded to the Insurance Company. On the non-compliance of the direction, the executing Court directed the attachment of the appellant's property. The learned executing Court also rejected the prayer of the appellant for the impleadment of two more persons as non-applicants. 3. The claimant/appellant had thereafter preferred a revision petition, which was heard and dismissed summarily by the learned Single Bench as it was found that the initial order directing the appellant to deposit the amount, passed on 8.8.95 was not challenged and was allowed to become final. Therefore, the contention in that regard was held to be without merit. As the claimant had also not deposited the ordered amount, the impugned order of attachment was passed, which is only consequential to the original order, which was allowed to become final and could, therefore, not be attacked now. 4. So far as the question relating to the rejection of the impleadment of two more persons viz. Jagdish and Ajmer respondents 2 and 3herein was concerned, the appellant was allowed liberty to move the executing Court, if there was a decree/award passed against them. 5. 4. So far as the question relating to the rejection of the impleadment of two more persons viz. Jagdish and Ajmer respondents 2 and 3herein was concerned, the appellant was allowed liberty to move the executing Court, if there was a decree/award passed against them. 5. The vital question that still survives for our consideration is whether the order passed by the learned Single Bench in a revision; can be challenged before the Division Bench by way of Letters Patent Appeal and whether this appeal is maintainable. 6. Shri N.D. Singhal, appearing for the appellant, has very vigorously contended that as the order passed by the learned Single Bench amounted to 'judgment' since it purported to decide the controversy finally, therefore, the Letters Patent Appeal was maintainable. In support of his contention, Shri Singhal has placed implicit reliance on the Full Bench authority of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Saraswati Bai ( 1995 JLJ 11 ). 7. The argument advanced by the appellant is wholly misconceived. It may be observed that the Code of Civil Procedure does not make any provision of an appeal against the 'Judgement' passed by the learned Single Bench of the High Court to the High Court. However, it is only under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal (Nagpur) that the appeal from the Judgment of a Single Judge to the High Court is provided and such appeal is known as Letters Patent Appeal. In this regard, reference may be had to section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short the 'Code'), which provides that the Code would not effect any special jurisdiction or power if conferred or if any special form of procedure is prescribed, by or under any other law for the time being in force. 8. Since the special jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court by the provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent (Nagpur), the provisions of the Code regarding the appeals do not operate as bar for preferring of an appeal from the judgment of Single Judge of the High Court to toe High Court. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has succeeded the High Court of Nagpur, which had an occasion to examine the question in Madhukar Trimbak v. Shri Sati Godawari Upasani Maharaj (AIR 1940 Nagpur 39 FB). The High Court of Madhya Pradesh has succeeded the High Court of Nagpur, which had an occasion to examine the question in Madhukar Trimbak v. Shri Sati Godawari Upasani Maharaj (AIR 1940 Nagpur 39 FB). The view was reiterated in Ram Prasad Ramdin v. Dagdulal Nandlal (AIR 1956 Nagpur 211). 9. The High Court at Nagpur was established under the Letters Patent issued by King George, The Fifth on 2.1.1936 under section 108 of Government of India Act 1915 and by the legal fiction the jurisdiction extended under Article 225 of the Constitution of India. After the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 was applied, the present Madhya Pradesh was formed by including the old States of Madhya Pradesh, Madhya Bharat, Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh. The Courts of Judicial Commissioner for the States of Bhopal and Vindhya Pradesh and the High Court of Madhya Bharat was abolished and the then existing High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Nagpur by virtue of Article 225 of the Constitution of India, thus, became the High Court of the new State of Madhya Pradesh. 10. The High Court at Nagpur was established by Letters Patent, issued under section 108 of the Government of India Act, 1915, wherein the provision was as under :- "Each High Court may by its own rules provide as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more judges, or by division Courts constituted by two or more judges of the High Court of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court." 11. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent contained the provision of appeal to the High Court from judges of the Courts. Since the controversy centers round the above clause, it would not be out of place to reproduce the same, which is as under :- "10. Clause 15 of the Letters Patent contained the provision of appeal to the High Court from judges of the Courts. Since the controversy centers round the above clause, it would not be out of place to reproduce the same, which is as under :- "10. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Courts.-- And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Nagpur from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction) in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the powers of superintendence under the provisions of section one hundred and seven of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a Judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section one hundred and eight of the Government of India Act, made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgment of Judge of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, Our Heirs and Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.," 12. It is apparent from Clause 10 itself that no Letters Patent Appeal would lie against the 'Order' passed by the Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The reliance of the appellant on the Full Bench authority of Oriental Insurance Co. (supra) is wholly misplaced and misconceived. It is apparent from Clause 10 itself that no Letters Patent Appeal would lie against the 'Order' passed by the Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The reliance of the appellant on the Full Bench authority of Oriental Insurance Co. (supra) is wholly misplaced and misconceived. An appeal shall not lie against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in a revision, as Clause 10 of Letters Patent Appeal itself creates an embargo. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwik and Brothers. Ltd. ( AIR 1953 SC 357 ), while considering the provisions of Trade Marks Act and Clause 15 of Letters Patent (Bombay), observed that as there was nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act to the letters Patent, which Provided for an appeal, such appeal would lie to High Court, from the judgment of Single Judge, but in the instant case, as there is a clear prohibition, that appeal would not lie when an order is passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, this appeal is not maintainable. 13. In the celebrated case of Umaji Keshao Meshram and others v. Radhika Bai & another ( AIR 1986 SC 1272 ), after a long discussion on the power of Superintendence conferred upon every High Court by Article 227, vesting supervisory jurisdiction, with reference to Clause 15 of Letters Patent (Bombay), which was similar to Clause 10 of Letters Patent (Nagpur), their Lordships of Supreme Court held that' 'Under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of that High Court an intra-Court appeal against the decision of the learned Single Judge was expressly barred.", and, therefore, it was further held that the appeal filed by the appellants from the decision of the Single Judge to the Division Bench against the order passed in a writ petition filed only under Article 227, was not maintainable. The view was reiterated in Susheela Bai's case (AIR 1992 SC 187). 14. On the foregoing discussion, we hold that Letters Patent Appeal does not lie against the order passed by Single Judge in revision and this appeal is, therefore, not maintainable and is dismissed.