M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE solitary point involved in this civil revision petition centres around the question as to whether the Trial Court was justified in granting leave under Section 92, C. P. C. to the respondents who are the plaintiffs before the Trial Court. They had briefly contended that the present petitioner-Trust is being mismanaged by the trustees and furthermore, that the Court should consequently issue a declaration that the properties of the trust vest in the plaintiffs and that they should be permitted to run the trust. This application was opposed by the present petitioners who contended that the 5th respondent was a tenant of the trust against whom certain legal proceedings were instituted and that in order to hit back, he has formed an association and is trying to usurp the trust and its properties. The petitioners had specifically contended that the ingredients of section 92, C. P. C. have not been satisfied and that consequently, the original plaintiffs should not be granted leave to institute the suit. The learned trial Judge heard the parties and came to the conclusion that in so far as the plaintiffs are alleging mismanagement of the affairs of the trust and in so far as the claim that they are interested in improving that state of affairs, that they are entitled to sanction from the Court to institute the suit. It is against this order that the present civil revision petition has been instituted. ( 2 ) THE petitioners' learned Advocate has submitted that the order of the Trial Court proceeds on a total misreading to the essential requirements of Section 92. He has drawn my attention to three judgments wherein the Court had occasion to consider this section. The first of them is a judgment in the case of pragdasji Guru Bhagwandasji v Ishwarlalbhai Narsibhai and others. The second is also a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and Another v ramji Tripathi and Another and the third one is a judgment of the Court in the case of Smt. Chawali v Biharilal. The second is also a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati and Another v ramji Tripathi and Another and the third one is a judgment of the Court in the case of Smt. Chawali v Biharilal. The Courts had occasion in the course of these decisions to examine the basic ingredients of Section 92, C. P. C. and the Courts have held that it must be demonstrated in the first instance that there is a public trust in existence and secondly, that in a situation where mismanagement has been alleged, that what is sought for from the Court is appropriate corrective action and that such an application must emanate from a person having interest in the trust. The petitioner's learned Advocate has submitted that applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it will be seen that the plaintiffs are neither members nor persons who have any interest whatsoever in the trust. The learned Advocate also demonstrates that this is not a public trust and thirdly, he submits that the suit is for a declaration that the plaintiffs are entitled to the vesting of the trust property in them and for consequential reliefs. He submits that on the facts of the present case, none of the essential ingredients of Section 92, C. P. C. are present and that the learned trial Judge was definitely in error in having accorded sanction to sue the trust and its trustees. The defence that was pleaded on behalf of the plaintiffs is that they are essentially interested in not only the management, but the trust properties in so far as they have averred that the temple in question is visited by a large number of devotees and to that extent, they claim that they are not only entitled to pray for corrective action, but that they were in fact managing the affairs of the trust and should be permitted to do so. It was also contended on their behalf that the plaintiffs will establish their locus standi and the maintainability of the suit and, that if at all they fail in this regard, that the Trial Court could always dismiss the suit, but that no interference is called for as far as the present order is concerned. ( 3 ) THIS is a case involving a pure point of law. ( 3 ) THIS is a case involving a pure point of law. The scheme of Section 92, C. P. C. envisages that it is permissible in certain instances to seek judicial intervention when the affairs of a public trust are being grossly mismanaged. The scope of such a proceeding has also been outlined in Section 92, C. P. C. and a perusal of the various clauses of that Section will indicate that such corrective action can only emanate from a person who has interest in the trust. Obviously, it is necessary to demonstrate that the person is a member of the trust and to that extent, has a locus standi to insist that if there is gross mismanagement, the trustees be removed, that they be replaced by suitable persons and that the property and interests of the trust be safeguarded. The legislature has deliberately used the words "person having interest in the trust" in order to exclude frivolous and mischievous applications by busybodies, members of the public and persons who do not have a specific interest in the trust. The term "person interested" is not to be loosely construed and to this extent, I see considerable justification in the submission canvassed by the petitioner's learned Advocate that the plaintiffs who are totally outsiders to the trust would have no locus standi to present a suit of the present type. ( 4 ) THE real intention of the plaintiffs is apparent if one were to peruse the prayer clauses in the plaint. Whereas Section 92 circumscribes the proceeding to one where corrective action is to be taken vis-a-vis the management of the trust in so far as errant trustees be removed and replaced by more deserving persons and the property and interests of the trust be safeguarded under orders of the Court; in the present instance, we find that the suit is one for a declaration simpliciter, that the trust properties are vested in the plaintiffs and that they are entitled to administer it. ( 5 ) IT is in this background that I am constrained to observe that the learned trial Judge has completely overlooked the real spirit and scope of Section 92, C. P. C. and that he has further erred in granting sanction to institute the proceedings. ( 5 ) IT is in this background that I am constrained to observe that the learned trial Judge has completely overlooked the real spirit and scope of Section 92, C. P. C. and that he has further erred in granting sanction to institute the proceedings. The challenge to the order is well-founded and on a considered view of the material placed before me, I am of the opinion that the impugned order requires to be interfered with. ( 6 ) THE impugned order is accordingly set aside. The civil revision petition is allowed. As a necessary consequence, the suit instituted before the Trial Court will stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .