JUDGMENT S.K. Chattopadhyaya, J. - The petitioner, a registered Company, is carrying on business of manufacturing auto parts made of iron and steel such as universal joint cross, differential spider etc. After starting its production since 27.4.93 a certificate of registration to that effect was granted by the Director, Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority (the Development Authority in short). In view of Industrial Incentive Policy, 1993 issued by the Government of Bihar, a notification dated 4.4.94 was issued and pursuant thereto the petitioner applied for grant of exemption from payment of sales tax on sales of finished products on the basis of the said Policy as well as the notification. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes directed the petitioner to submit some documents pertaining to production of goods, raw materials and required machineries installed etc. and in compliance thereof the petitioner filed the same on 27.4.94. In spite of filing of those documents as directed by the Development Authority from time to time, the petitioner was informed by letter dated 5.1.95 that his prayer for grant of certificate of exemption has been rejected and the petitioner was directed to deposit the amount of tax by 10.1.95. The said letter is annexure 6 to this writ application. From the certified copy of annexure 6 the petitioner came to know that by order dated 10.11.94/21.12.94, respondent no.3 passed an order rejecting the application of the petitioner observing, inter alia, that the reasons for such rejection will follow later on. The entire order-sheet has been annexed as annexure 7. This order dated 10.11.94/21.12.94 has been impugned by the petitioner. Subsequently by filing an amendment petition he has also impugned the order dated 31.1.95 as contained in annexure 8. The notification dated 21.8.94 is contained in annexure 8. The notification dated 21.8.94 extending the period for filing application for exemption and the certificate showing clearance of goods manufactured and payment of excise duty by the petitioner, have been annexed by him subsequently. Similarly a certificate dated 7.4.95 issued by the Development Authority has been brought on record as annexure 13. 2. On the other hand, stand of the respondents is that as because the petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of the notification for availing the benefits and as they were not the manufacturer, the petitioner is not entitled to exemption as prayed for. 2. On the other hand, stand of the respondents is that as because the petitioner did not fulfil the conditions of the notification for availing the benefits and as they were not the manufacturer, the petitioner is not entitled to exemption as prayed for. Further case of the respondents is that the Industrial Policy of the Government is not accepted in toto by the Commercial Taxes Department and more over as the petitioner filed the application on 3.6.94 i.e. much beyond the period prescribed in the said notification, this was also one of the grounds for rejecting the claim of the petitioner. The main contention of the respondents is that the petitioner does not do any manufacturing work, rather, it is engaged mainly in job works inasmuch as they receive finished products of M/s Telco and does only grinding and cleaning work. As the petitioner is not producing any new product, it is not engaged in selling activities in most of the cases, rather, they partly purchase semi finished products and after further processing they sell it to M/s Telco. The respondents have admitted that there was a bit of procedural lapse but as the financial year was closing, respondent no.3 was busy in collection works and he passed the said order. However, it is said that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice as the reasons were recorded in the order dated 31.1.95. 3. Mr. Pawan Kumar appearing on behalf of the petitioner has contended that the grounds for rejection of the claim of the petitioner are illegal because the petitioner filed documents and certificates showing that the Company is engaged in manufacturing parts and are not merely assembling the auto parts. According to him, the certificate granted by the Development Authority dated 7.4.95 is a complete proof of the fact that the petitioner is engaged in manufacturing and processing of auto parts and thus the petitioners's claim could not have been rejected on that account. It is further urged that the second ground for rejection that the petitioner did not file his application within the prescribed time is also erroneous inasmuch as the petitioner sent his application on 12.4.94 through post and, as such, the finding of respondent no.3 that the said application was filed on 3.6.94, is baseless and contrary to records. Mr. It is further urged that the second ground for rejection that the petitioner did not file his application within the prescribed time is also erroneous inasmuch as the petitioner sent his application on 12.4.94 through post and, as such, the finding of respondent no.3 that the said application was filed on 3.6.94, is baseless and contrary to records. Mr. Pawan Kumar alternatively puts forward an argument that even assuming that the application was not made within 30 days as contemplated under the notification, but the said period cannot be treated as mandatory and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it must be held that the said period is directory in nature. Elaborating his argument Mr. Pawan Kumar submits that the order contained in Annexure 7 is bad in law inasmuch as no reason has been assigned in the order which shows non-application of mind. Similarly, attacking the reasonings given in annexure 8, he contends that the same are erroneous as because, (a) petitioner is a manufacturer within the meaning of S.2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act and when the competent authority under the Notification has certified that the petitioner is a manufacturer, the finding of the authority that the petitioner is not a manufacturer is bad is law. His further contention is that central excise duty is imposed only on a manufacturing unit and not on other units and that duty having been imposed on the petitioner's unit, it is absolutely wrong to hold that petitioner's unit is not a manufacturing unit. It is urged that the petitioner has filed all relevant documents in support of its claim but the authority concerned has not dealt with any of them rather relied on a report for rejecting the claim without even giving any opportunity of controverting the contents of the report. This has violated the principles of natural justice, contends the learned counsel. On the point of time barred claim petition filed by the petitioner as stated in the impugned order (annexure 8), Mr. This has violated the principles of natural justice, contends the learned counsel. On the point of time barred claim petition filed by the petitioner as stated in the impugned order (annexure 8), Mr. Pawan Kumar contended that in view of notification dated 31.8.1994 by which time limit has peen amended the petitioner's petition filed even on 3.6.94 must be held to be in time as the production of the unit commenced on 27.4.93, that is to say, in between 1.4.93 and 4.4.94 and the application was filed within one month from the date of publication of notification dated 31.8.94 (annexure 15). 4. Mr. M.Y. Eqbal, learned Govt. Advocate, countering the argument of Mr. Pawan Kumar has contended that in order to get relief from this court the petitioner should have stated the factual basis of the case and that having not been done, he cannot claim any relief from this court. His contention is that, the notification as contained in annexure 3 lays down certain conditions for grant of exemption and in order to get such exemption the petitioner must state the facts in compliance thereof to show that he fulfils all the criteria for exemption. Referring to clause (2) of the notification he submits that the petitioner's unit will not be granted this benefit if he had already opted for deferment tax. Similarly clause (3) of the said notification, he continues, contemplates that such unit must be registered permanently and in view of sub-clause (Gh) of clause (3) the petitioner must satisfy the authority that the machines and tools etc. which are used in its unit, have not been used in any other workshop or factory at any time before in the whole of India or have been acquired to be used. Mr. Eqbal further contends that in view of clause 6(ka) application for exemption must be filed within 30 days from the date of production and in this case the petitioner having filed such application beyond the period prescribed under the notification, is not entitled to get any relief. 5. I shall now consider the weight of the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties. 5. I shall now consider the weight of the contentions advanced by the counsel for the parties. In this petition the prayer of the petitioner is to direct the authority to grant exemption certificate by quashing annexures 7 and 8 and for refund of amount collected by way of tax from the petitioner, whereas the stand of the petitioner is that it is a manufacturing unit and to prove its case it has filed a number of documents before the authority, the respondents have asserted that the petitioner is not a manufacturing unit, rather, it is a processor. Section 2(n) of the Bihar Finance Act defines the term 'manufacture' as follows:- " 'Manufacture' with all its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means producing, making, extracting, altering, ornamenting, finishing or otherwise processing, treating or adopting any goods but does not include such manufacturer or manufacturing process as may be prescribed." From the above definition it is clear that an unit which does even 'finishing or otherwise processing' is a manufacturer. However, one exception is there that this definition does not include such manufacture or manufacturing process as may be prescribed. It is not in controversy that the type of job done by the petitioner has not been prescribed by the State Government as not manufacture or manufacturing process. It is well settled that a manufacturer also consumes commodities which are ordinarily called raw materials when produces semi finished goods which have to undergo further process of production before they can be transformed into consumer's goods. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 47 S.T.C. 369. 6. At this juncture, let us have close scrutiny of provisions of the Industrial Incentive Policy, 1993 (in short I.I.P.). The relevant provisions in paragraph 10.2 read thus: "10.2. The facility of exemption from payment of sales tax on finished products in lieu of deferment shall be admissible only to the industrial units mentioned in Annexure VI of this policy. This facility would be available to those units only which have capital investment of not more than RS.15 crores in plant & machinery. The sales tax exemption benefit for the districts under category 'A' (para 10.1) would be for 10 years and for the districts under category 'B' (para 10.1) would be for 8 years. This facility would be available to those units only which have capital investment of not more than RS.15 crores in plant & machinery. The sales tax exemption benefit for the districts under category 'A' (para 10.1) would be for 10 years and for the districts under category 'B' (para 10.1) would be for 8 years. All other industrial units which enter into production between 1.4.93 to 31.3.98 will get only this facility of deferment of sales tax payable on finished goods. It means that the units going into production between 1.4.93 to 31.3.98 except those mentioned in annexure VI, shall have the facility of deferment of sales tax only as per the rules." A reading of the said provision in the context of the I.I.P. shows that the facility of exemption from payment of sales tax is given on finished products in lieu of deferment. It is not in dispute that the petitioner's unit falls under Annexure VI of the policy. In this context the order dated 31.1.95 (Annexure B) is clear which states that the petitioner's unit does processing works after purchasing materials made of steel. In such view of the matter, the conclusion arrived at by the authority that the unit is not a manufacturer, in my view, is not a correct interpretation of the term 'manufacturer'. The respondents have admitted that the unit purchases semi finished products and after further processing, sells it to M/s Telco. In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa and another vs. Jagannath Cotton Company and another reported in (1995) 5 SCC 527 , the ordinary connotation of the term 'manufacturer' has been explained thus:- "Manufacture, in its ordinary connotation, signifies emergence of new and different goods as understood in relevant commercial circles. Furthermore, the use of the expression 'purchase of raw material' itself shows that what is ultimately produced is different goods than the raw material used. Furthermore, the use of the expression 'purchase of raw material' itself shows that what is ultimately produced is different goods than the raw material used. Similarly, the repeated use of the expression 'finished products' and the grant of exemption in the case of small scale industries both in respect of raw materials as well as finished products indicates that these concessions at substantial cost to public exchequer were being provided with a view to encourage units engaged in the manufacture or production of goods and not to help those units which merely engaged themselves in some sort of processing whereunder the goods remain essentially the same goods even after the said process. Even if a process is adopted, the test is the same, viz., whether different goods emerge as a result of application of such process." Similarly in the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax (Assistant), Kerala vs. P. Keshvan and Co. reported in 1995 Supp(4) S.C.C. 709 their lordships, inter alia, held that where technical matters are involved, and particularly when processes of manufacture have become increasingly complicated, it is appropriate that the authorities best competent to deal with such matters, should be allowed to do so. Where sufficient evidence is placed before the writ court for an unambiguous conclusion upon technical matters to be reached, the judgments taking the view that it was not necessary to relegate the assessee to the statutory authorities, might be apposite, but where intricate technical processes are involved, it is proper that the writ court should direct the writ petitioner to agitate their grievances before statutory authorities who are more competent to assess the merits thereof. 6A. With a view to encourage the industrialisation of the State, this Policy was published in the year, 1986 and the same was modified from time to time experiencing non-fulfilment of desired progress in this aspect as a result of which the I.I.P. 1993 was published. It provided several incentives to those establishing new industries in the State and, inter alia, provided for certain concessions in the matters of sales tax. 7. The impugned orders do not disclose the fact as to how the respondent no.3 has come to a conclusion that the unit is not a manufacturer when admittedly the certificates (annexures 13 and 14) issued by the competent authority suggest that the unit is manufacturing and processing auto parts. 7. The impugned orders do not disclose the fact as to how the respondent no.3 has come to a conclusion that the unit is not a manufacturer when admittedly the certificates (annexures 13 and 14) issued by the competent authority suggest that the unit is manufacturing and processing auto parts. Moreover, in my opinion, the respondent No.3 could not have relied on a report against which no chance was given to the petitioner to controvert the same. This fact further gets support from the admission of the respondent to the effect that "admittedly there was a bit procedural laspe" and "as financial year was closing he was awfully busy with collection works hence he passed the said order". This admission of the respondent coupled with the facts that documents filed by the petitioner were not considered by the respondent is sufficient to conclude that the respondent no.3 has mechanically come to a finding that the unit is not a manufacturer and, as such, not entitled for exemption. In my considered opinion the first ground for rejection of the claim must be held to be illegal as it is against the principles of natural justice. 8. Similarly, second ground for rejection holding the petition of the petitioner as time barred is also not sustainable in law. According to the petitioner he sent the application for exemption on 12.4.94, whereas according to the authority no such application dated 12.4.94 was received in his office, rather a petition dated 3.6.94 was filed by the petitioner. Clause 6(ka) of notification no. S.O. 96 dated 4.4.94 originally prescribed time limit for filing application as 30 days from the date of production. However, notification dated 31.8.94 issued by the Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department, by partial amending existing clause 6(ka), contemplated that unit which have started production in between 1.4.93 to 4.4.94 can apply within 30 days from the date of publication of this notification. According to the petitioner, it started production from 27.4.93, and, as such, even if application was filed on 3.6.94, the same was well within time. Thus, in my opinion, when the petitioner filed its application on 3.6.94, that is, much before issuance of notification dated 31.8.94, it cannot be said that the said application was time barred. The matter can be viewed from another angle. Thus, in my opinion, when the petitioner filed its application on 3.6.94, that is, much before issuance of notification dated 31.8.94, it cannot be said that the said application was time barred. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The production commenced from 27.4.93, that is, in between 1.4.93 to 31.3.98 as envisaged in Clause (a) of I.I.P., 1993. The first notification came into existence on 4.4.94 and, as such, the petitioner could not have tiled his application before 4.4.94. Immediately after coming into operation of notification dated 4.4.94, it filed the application on 3.6.94. If the authority treated this petition as time barred in view of notification dated 4.4.94, then obviously the same ought to have been considered as within time in view of notification dated 31.8.94. The petitioner, in my opinion, could not have been debarred from claiming exemption on both account and more so, when uncontrovertedly he started its production on 27.4.93, that is, within the period as prescribed in provision (a) to the I.I.P. The respondent no.3 in its order dated 17.11.94/27.12.94 (annexure 7) has not assigned any reason for rejection of the claim but in a hurry to collect revenue, passed the order mechanically. It appears that realising the lacuna in this order, he has given some unsustainable reasons in his order dated 31.1.95 (annexure 8). Not only this, the order dated 31.1.95 shows utter non-application of mind inasmuch as whereas, order as contained in annexure 7 refers to a report, this order(annexure 8) does not indicate as to how the respondent no.3 got an impression that the petitioner's unit is not a manufacturing unit and does only processing job. 9. In the aforesaid premises I have no option but to come to an irresistible conclusion that the respondent no.3 has miserably failed in his duty to consider the application of the petitioner in accordance with law and the second ground assigned by respondent no.3 must be held to be illegal. In such circumstances, orders contained in annexures 7 and 8 are set aside. 10. In such circumstances, orders contained in annexures 7 and 8 are set aside. 10. However, in my view, the prayer of the petitioner for a direction to the respondent to grant exemption certificate cannot be allowed by this court in exercising its writ jurisdiction for the following reasons: In the notification dated 2.4.94 (annexure 3) for being eligible to get such exemption, certain conditions have been imposed out of which one condition is that the unit must not have invested more than Rs.15 crores on the plant and machineries. This notification is S.O. 94 dated 2.4.94. Another notification no. S.O. 96 dated 4.4.94 lays down further conditions that the unit which has opted for deferment tax, will not be entitled to get such facility of exemption. Other similar conditions are there for which the unit must satisfy the authority that it has fulfilled the conditions laid down in the aforesaid notifications. In the instant case there is a woeful lack of material. The petitioner has been fully unable to make out any factual basis for his claim for exemption. 10. In the case of Arvind Industries and others vs. State of Gujarat and others reported in 1996(1) PLJR, 1 (SC), their lordships while dealing with the case of promissory estoppel, have dismissed the appeal mainly on the ground that the appellant had been entirely unable to make out any factual basis for a case of promissory estoppel. Their lordships found that the appellant being a partnership firm had not stated at what point of time the partners decided to set up the plant and when and how the fund required for setting up the plant was raised. 11. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, I am of the opinion, that the petitioner could not make out any case for issuing a writ of mandamus directing the authority to grant exemption certificate. Therefore, this prayer of the petitioner cannot be allowed by this court. 12. In the result, this application is allowed in part by quashing the impugned orders dated 10.11.94/21.12.94 and 31.1.95 as contained in annexures 7 and 8 respectively and the matter is remitted to respondent no.3 to consider the case of the petitioner after giving him sufficient opportunity to substantiate his claim for exemption. 12. In the result, this application is allowed in part by quashing the impugned orders dated 10.11.94/21.12.94 and 31.1.95 as contained in annexures 7 and 8 respectively and the matter is remitted to respondent no.3 to consider the case of the petitioner after giving him sufficient opportunity to substantiate his claim for exemption. It is needless to say that respondent no.3 is also required to consider as to whether the petitioner has fulfilled the other conditions laid down in the aforesaid notifications for grant of exemption. Respondent no.3 is directed to reconsider the matter in the light of the observations made above and also on the basis of the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Gurusharan Sharma, J. - I agree.