Usha Mehra, J. ( 1 ) THIS petitioner was charged with three offences punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter called the act of 1988 ). The first charge against him is that he accepted gratification for providing safe passage to one Shri Partap Singh for smuggling of gold. Secondly he agreed to provide safe passage to one Shri Charan Singh for smuggling of weapons from Pakistan, who had a design to purchase Naka to smuggle weapons from Pakistan. Thirdly the petitioner voluntarily omitted to inform about the said design to his superior officer. Proceedings before General Security Force Court were held under the Border Security Force Act,1968. After affording full opportunity to the petitioner, the proceeding of conviction was submitted. Authority sentenced the petitioner to suffer rigorous imprisonment for four years and also dismissed from service. This sentence was confirmed by the appropriate authority. It is against this conviction and sentence that petitioner has felt aggrieved. He has approached this Court for setting aside the same. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the challenge by the petitioner to the impugned order, we must have a quick glance to the relevant facts of this case. The petitioner, Sukhwant Singh, was working in the Border Security Force in 0ctober,1966. In December,1991 while serving as Junior Staff Officer (Water Wing) he was posted to perform the duties as the Personal Officer of the Inspector General, Frontier Head Quarters, B. S. F. at Jammu. At the relevant time the petitioner was placed under Closed Arrest under the orders of the Inspector General, Frontier Head Quarters, B. S. F. , Jammu. On 3rd December,1991 he was taken from Jammu to New Delhi under an armed escort and from there on 4th December,1991 to Bangalore. There he was handed over to the Commandant, S. T. C. , B. S. F. , Bangalore on 6th December,1991 where also he was placed under Closed Arrest on 4th and 5thjanuary,1992. Shri L. S. Bisht, Commandant, 33 Battalion, B. S. F. held the proceedings of Recording of Evidence (ROE) under the provisions of Rule 48 of the B. S. F. Rules,1969, at Bangalore. Statements of the witnesses on oath were recorded. Questions were asked from the witnesses for the purpose of clarification. Shri L. S. Bisht, Commandant, 33 Battalion, B. S. F. held the proceedings of Recording of Evidence (ROE) under the provisions of Rule 48 of the B. S. F. Rules,1969, at Bangalore. Statements of the witnesses on oath were recorded. Questions were asked from the witnesses for the purpose of clarification. On the basis of the proceedings of the Record of Evidence, the Said Shri L. S. Bisht on 29th January,1992, submitted the proceedings implicating the petitioner. On the basis of ROE charge sheet was prepared. Mr. L. S. Bisht applied to the Inspector General (Head Quarters) B. S. F,, under Rule 52 of the B. S. F. Rules in the prescribed form for issuing a convening order for the assembly of a General Security Force Court for the trial of the petitioner. The convincing order was issued on 3rd February,1992 for the assembly of General Security Force Court at New Delhi. This was issued on 12th February,1992 for the purpose of trying the petitioner. As per the convincing order dated 3rd February,1992 Shri L. S. Bisht, Commandant who had earlier presided over and conducted the proceedings of the recording of evidence at Bangalore was appointed as a prosecutor to prosecute the petitioner during the trial of the case before the General Security Force Court. ( 3 ) MR. DINESH Mathur, Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner besides assailing the order of conviction and sentence has also challenged the procedure adopted by the respondent in prosecuting the petitioner. From this arguments following points emerge for consideration, namely: 1. Whether the offence which was allegedly committed in March,1986, can it be covered under the provision of Section 7 of the Prevention and Corruption Act,1988. 2. Whether the said Shri L. S. Bisht, who held the proceeding and recorded ROE could preside as Prosecutor, Will it amount to taking undue advantage of the material facts which were in his personal knowledge while recording the ROE? 3. Whether on the basis of uncorroborated testimony petitioner could be punished? ( 4 ) WHETHER as per Rule 99 of the B. S. F. Rules, the respondent was required to give the finding "guilty or not guilty" on each and every charge? Having not given the sentence separtely on each charge, the sentence is liable to be set aside? 3. Whether on the basis of uncorroborated testimony petitioner could be punished? ( 4 ) WHETHER as per Rule 99 of the B. S. F. Rules, the respondent was required to give the finding "guilty or not guilty" on each and every charge? Having not given the sentence separtely on each charge, the sentence is liable to be set aside? ( 5 ) ADMITTEDLY, Section 7 of the Act was not in existence when the alleged offence was committed in March,1986. The firt charge reads as under : FIRST Charge: COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, BEING A PUBLIC SERVANT, ACCEPTING FROM ANY PERSON, FOR HIMSELF, ANY GRATIFICATION, OTHER THAN LEGAL REMUNERATION, AS A REWARD FOR SHOWING, IN THE EXERCISE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, FAVOUR TO ANY PERSON, PUNISHABLE U/s 7 OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT,1988. in that he, at Amritsar, during March,1986, while as Officiating Coy Commander at BOP Pulnkanjri, accepted a sum of Rs. 48,000. 00 (Rupees Forty Eight Thousand only) from Shri Partap Singh, S/o Late Lakha Singh, Resident of Village Burj Atalgarh, P. S. Ghrinda, Distt. Amritsar for providing safe passage to said Shri Partap Singh for smuggling of Gold. ( 6 ) MR. DINESH Mathur Senior Advocate contended that the provisions of the Act of 1988 could not apply retrospectively. These provisions came into existence w. e. f. 9th September,1988. Whereas the alleged offence took place in March,1986. At the relevant time, the provision of Corruption Act of 1947 (in short act of 1947 ) were to apply or provision of Section 161 Indian Penal Code. could be attracted. However, in 1988 the Act of 1947 stood repealed and the Act of 1988 was re- enacted. Therefore, on the date the alleged offence was commited the Act of 1947 could be made applicable and not the provisions of the Act of 1988. The provisions of Sectin 161 Indian Penal Code. were applicable under the Act of 1947. Under the repealed Act read with Section 161 Indian Penal Code. punishment for such an offence prescribed could extend to three years or with fine or with both. Whereas under Section 7 of this Act of 1988 punishment for the offence prescribed is maximum six months extendable upto five years and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, referring to these provisions Mr. punishment for such an offence prescribed could extend to three years or with fine or with both. Whereas under Section 7 of this Act of 1988 punishment for the offence prescribed is maximum six months extendable upto five years and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, referring to these provisions Mr. Mathur contended that Section 7 has been placed at higher pedestal than that of Section 7 while enhancing the period of punishment to five years has also stipulated that the offender shall be compulsarily imprisoned for a period not less than six months which was not there either under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 or under Section 161 Indian Penal Code. Now by punishing the petitioner under Section 7 of the Act of 1988, his fundamental right granted under Article 20 of the Constitution of India has been violated. His cause has been prejudiced. This also shows non- application of mind by the authorities concerned. ( 7 ) REFUTING these arguments of Mr. Mathur, Mr. Dalip Singh, counsel for Union of India contended that Section 7 of the Act of 1988 correspond to Section 5 of the Act of 1947. The provisions of the repealed Act have been saved by the provision of Section 30 of the Act of 1988. It says that the offences committed and covered under the Act of 1947 shall be covered by the provision of the re-enacted Act of 1988. Hence the provision of Section 7 of the Act of 1988 was rightly invoked in this case. To support his contentions he drew the attention of this Court to the provision of Section 8 of the General Clauses Act, which provides that where an Act is repealed and re-inacted then the provisions of the re- enacted Act would apply. In this case, since the provisions of the Act of 1947 stood repealed and the Legislature re-enacted the same provision vide Act of 1988, hence the provision of re- enacted Act have to apply even as per the General Clauses Act. ( 8 ) TO bring home his point that after the re-inacting of the Act of 1988 would apply also REFERRED TO to Section 13 of the Act of 1988. This according to Mr. Dalip Singh corresponds to Section 5 of the Act of 1947 with modification. ( 8 ) TO bring home his point that after the re-inacting of the Act of 1988 would apply also REFERRED TO to Section 13 of the Act of 1988. This according to Mr. Dalip Singh corresponds to Section 5 of the Act of 1947 with modification. Therefore, he contended that the petitioner could be charged under the re-enacted Act of 1988. Mr. Dalip Singh contended that besides the provisions of the Act of 1988, General Clauses Act and the provsions of Indian Penal Code. , there is another angle to the case, which strengthen his arguments that the punishement under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 could be awarded. In this case besides invoking the aid of Section 7 of the Act of 1988 the petitioner had also been charged under Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act which is para-meteria the same as Section 69 of the Army Act. Under the provisions of Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act the punishment is seven years. Whereas in the present case, the petitioner has been convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment besides dismissal from service. Therefore, this sentence is within the four walls of Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act besides falling under Section 13 of the Act of 1988 Act. To support his argument, he placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of G. P. Nayyar Vs. State (Delhi Admin.), (1979) 2 SCC page 593 where the Supreme Court was ceased of the same proposition and the Court held : "that by virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the operation of all the provisions of the Prevention and Corruption Act would continue in so far as the offences that were committed when Section 5 (3) was in force. In view of Setion 6 (c) of the Act, whether Act 16 of 1967 had been brought into force on 5th May,1967 or not, the rule of evidence as incorporated in Section 5 (3) would be available regarding offences committed prior to its repeal. The effect of the amendment is that sub- section (3) of Section 5 as it stood before the commencement of 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed tohave always applied in relation to trial of such offences. The effect of the amendment is that sub- section (3) of Section 5 as it stood before the commencement of 1964 Act shall apply and shall be deemed tohave always applied in relation to trial of such offences. There can be no objection in law to the revival of the procedure which was in force at the time when the offence was committed. ( 9 ) TO appreciate his contention Sectoin 46 of the B. S. F. Act is reproduced as under 46. Civil Offences Subject to the provisions of Section 47, any person subject to this Act who at any place in, or beyond India, commits any civil offence, shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against this Act and, if charged therewith under this Section shall be liable to be tried by a Security Force Court and, on conviction, be punishable as follows, that is to say:- (a) if the offence is one which would be punishable under any law in force in India with death, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, assigned for the offence, by the aforesaid law and such less punishment as is in this act mentioned; and (b) in any other case, he shall be liable to suffer any punishment, assigned for the offence by the law in force in India, or imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or such less punishment as is in this Act mentioned. " ( 10 ) READING of this Section shows that reliance by the respondent on Section 46 is misplaced. Section 46 deals with the commission of civil offence. The punishment which is to be awarded is the one prescribed under the concerned Act under which the alleged civil offence is described and not any punishment. under Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act. This Section envisages and enables the B. S. F. Court to deal with the punishment as may be mentioned under the Act under which the Civil offence was committed. Hence, the State cannot take advantage of the provisions of Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act. ( 11 ) MR. DALIP Singh contended that Section 7 of the Act of 1988 corresponds to Section 5 (1) (d) of the Act of 1947. In fact Section 161 Indian Penal Code. Hence, the State cannot take advantage of the provisions of Section 46 of the B. S. F. Act. ( 11 ) MR. DALIP Singh contended that Section 7 of the Act of 1988 corresponds to Section 5 (1) (d) of the Act of 1947. In fact Section 161 Indian Penal Code. would be the corresponding Section to Section 7 of the Act of 1988 which on account of Section 6 and 8 of the General Clauses Act would apply even if the Act of 1947 repealed and re-inacted vide Act of 1988, re-enacted provision of the Statute will apply. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision of the Madras High Court in the case of Moosa Kazimi Vs. K. M. Sheriff and anr. , AIR 1959 Madras page 542 where the Court observed that: "if the provisions of a Statute are incorporated by reference to a second Statute and the earlier Statute is repealed the second Statute would continue to be in force with the incorporated provision of the repealed Stature being treated in force as a part of it. ( 12 ) I am afraid the contention of Mr. Dalip Singh has no substance. Section 31 of the Act of 1988 clearly provides that provisions of Section 161 to 165 (a) (both inclusive) stood omitted and would not apply. It, therefore, makes it clear that the respondent cannot take help of Section 161 to prove its point. Sub Section (2) of Section 30, which is reproduced as under, stipulates that saving provisions would be attracted, if those are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act of 1988. But apparently it is not disputed that the provisons of Section 7 and that of Section 161 and Section 5 (3) of the Act of 1947 are inconsistent. The minimum punishment has not been prescribed under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 whereas under Section 7 of the present Act it has been so prescribed. Therefore, no advantage can be taken by Mr. Dalip Singh through the saving provisions of Section 30 of the Act of 1988. The minimum punishment has not been prescribed under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 whereas under Section 7 of the present Act it has been so prescribed. Therefore, no advantage can be taken by Mr. Dalip Singh through the saving provisions of Section 30 of the Act of 1988. SUB Section (2) of Section 30: (2) Notwithstanding such repeal, but without prejudice to the application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act,1897 (10 of 1897), anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the Act so repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in pursuance of the corresponding provision of this Act. ( 13 ) MR. DALIP Singh tried to urge that provision of Section 13 of the Act of 1988 is the corresponding provision to Section 5 of the Act of 1947 with however modifications. I am afraid this argument is also without merits for the reason that first charge nowhere indicate that petitioner was to be punished under Section 13 of the Act of 1988, rather it states that petitioner would be punished under Section 7 of the Act of 1988. Hence, neither Union of India nor this Court is empowered to substitute the provisions under which the petitioner has to be punished. Therefore, no help can be taken by the respondent in invoking the provisions of Section 13 of the Act of 1988 at this stage. ( 14 ) THERE is no quarrel with the proposition that under Section 464 Indian Penal Code. the proceedings once initiated cannot be questioned merely on the basis of deficiency charge or mentioning of-the wrong provisions. In this regard reliance can be placed on the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of R-S. Kalakapur Vs. State of Kamataka, 1994 CRL. L. J. page 2696 to say that framing of charge under wrong section cannot be taken for the first time in appeal. The allegation against the petitioner being serious, the entire procedings cannot be quashed. ( 15 ) THE judgment cited by Mr. Dalip Singh are of no help to him. In G. P. Nayyar s case ($upra) the question before the Supreme Court was not about the applicability of the provisions of the repealed Act. The allegation against the petitioner being serious, the entire procedings cannot be quashed. ( 15 ) THE judgment cited by Mr. Dalip Singh are of no help to him. In G. P. Nayyar s case ($upra) the question before the Supreme Court was not about the applicability of the provisions of the repealed Act. The Supreme Court was dealing with the procedural part of the repealed Act and, therefore, concluded that the offence in that case which was committed was when Section 5 (3) was in force and by the amended Act the procedure was revived. It has not as if the procedure brought into force for the first time. It was in this background that the Court opined that the appellant could not object if the procedure was different from what obtained at the time of the commission of the offence. We are not dealing in this case with the procedural part. We are concerned with the substantive provision where the right of an individual is going to be effected. Under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 the sentencing authority could not give less punishment than six months, of course he could give more. But that was not so under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 or under Section 161 Indian Penal Code. which provisions were applicable so far as the alleged offence under Charge No. 1 is concerned. ( 16 ) THE observations of the Madras High Court in the case of Moosa Kazimi case (supra) in the facts of this case are not applicable. There the provisins of a Statute were incorporated by reference to second Statute and the earlier Statute stood repealed. The Court observed that the second Statute would continue to be in force with the incorporated provision of the repealed Statute. But that is not the case in hand. Therefore, observations of the Madras High Court are not applicable to the facts of this case. ( 17 ) FROM the above discussion, it is clear that so far as the first charge is concerned, the authority did not apply its mind. The petitioner could not have been convicted or sentenced for this Charge under Section 7 of the Prevention and Corruption Act,1988 because the offence alleged to have been committed during March,1986 i. e. prior to coming in force of the Act of 1988. The petitioner could not have been convicted or sentenced for this Charge under Section 7 of the Prevention and Corruption Act,1988 because the offence alleged to have been committed during March,1986 i. e. prior to coming in force of the Act of 1988. ( 18 ) EVEN the Karnataka High Court in the case of R. S. Kalakpur (supra) observed that the Legislature has placed Section 7 on a higher pedestal than that of Section 161 IPC. Section 7 of the Act of 1988 while enhancing the period of punishment to five years, stipulates that the offender shall be compulsorily imprisoned for a period of not less than six months which was not there either under Section 5 of the Act of 1947 or under Section 161 Indian Penal Code. Moreover, the offence for which a person is sought to be convicted must have been in force at the time when the act with which he is charged was alleged to have been committed. In this case also Section 7 of the Act of 1988 was not in force at the time the petitioner is alleged to have demanded and accepted the illegal gratification. The provision of Section 161 Indian Penal Code. have been omitted by the Act of 1988 as is clear from the reading of Section 31 of the Act. In view of this legal position, to my mind, the petitioner could not have been convicted under the provisions of Section 7 of the Act of 1988 because the provision was not in force at the relevant time. Therefore, the conviction and sentence against Charge No. 1 under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 cannot be sustained being opposed to Article 20 (1) of the Constitution. ( 19 ) SO far as Charge No. 2 and 3 are concerned, they are inter-linked hence taken up together. As per these charges which are reproduced as under, the offence was committed in November/ December,1991. Prosecution led substantial evidence to justify the same. Now the question for consideration is, can this Court re- appraise that evidence and give a finding different than what has been given by the competent authority? As per these charges which are reproduced as under, the offence was committed in November/ December,1991. Prosecution led substantial evidence to justify the same. Now the question for consideration is, can this Court re- appraise that evidence and give a finding different than what has been given by the competent authority? SECOND Charge: COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, BEING A PUBLIC SERVANT, AGREEING TO ACCEPT FROM ANY PERSON, FOR HIMSELF, ANY GRATIFICATION, OTHER THAN LEGAL REMUNERATION, AS A MOTIVE FOR SHOWING, IN TH EEXERCISE OF HIS OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS, FAVOUR TO ANY PERSON, PUN- ISHABLE UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT,1988. ( 20 ) IN that he, at Fatehgarh Churian, during November/december, 1991, agreed to accept a sum of Rs. 100,000. 00 (Rupees one lakh only) per trip from Shri Sohan Masih, S/o Sadhu Puran Masih, Resident of Village Berian Wala, Fatehgarh Churian, the representative of Shri Charan Singh of Village Hamwal, the self styled Leiutenant General of Terrorists, for providing safe passage to said Shri Charan Singh for smuggling of weapons from Pakistan. THIRD Charge: COMMITTING A CIVIL OFFENCE, THAT IS TO SAY, BEING PUBLIC SERVANT, KNOWING ITTO BELIKELY THAT HE WILL THEREBY FACILITATE THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENCE, WHICH IT WAS HIS DUTY AS SUCH PUBLIC SERVANT TO PREVENT, VOLUNTARILY CONCEALED, BY AN ILLEGAL OMISSIONTHE EXISTENCE OF DESIGN TO COMMIT SUCH OFFENCE, PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 119 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE. ( 21 ) IN that he, at Fatehgarh Churian, during November/december,1991, having come to know from Shri Sohan Masih, S/o Shri Sadhu Puran Masih, R/ovillage Berian Wala, Fatehgarh Churian, that the self styled Lt. General of Terrorists Shri Charan Singh had a design to purchase Naka to smuggle weapons from Pakistan, voluntarily omitted to inform about the said design to his superior officers. ( 22 ) PROSECUTION examined as many as nine witnesses. The petitioner cross examined all of them. He was also given opportunity to enter the witness box and adduce his witnesses. He produced one witness in his defence i. e. DW-1 Dalip Singh. Even prior to recording of this evidence according to the respondent full opportunity was given to the petitioner thereby staling the case of the prosecution and recording his evidence in question-answer form. He was also given opportunity to enter the witness box and adduce his witnesses. He produced one witness in his defence i. e. DW-1 Dalip Singh. Even prior to recording of this evidence according to the respondent full opportunity was given to the petitioner thereby staling the case of the prosecution and recording his evidence in question-answer form. He in fact was asked to produce any other witness, but he declined and closed his case after only adducing the evidence of Dalip Singh. It was only after full opportunity having been given to the petitioner that the proceedings were closed. After recording of the finding by the competent authority, the petitioner was given opportunity to address arguments on sentence. It was thereafter hearing him that the sentence was awarded. In this view of the matter, counsel for the respondent contended that the second and third charges stood proved. To establish that sufficient material and evidence is on record and to substantiate these charges he REFERRED TO to the testimony of PW-4 and the corroborating testimony of SI Gurnek Singh PW-5. He testified that Rs. 40,000. 00 was recovered from the Scooter which was being driven by Dhara Singh and Narender. These two persons were going to deliver that amount to the petitioner as per agreement. Their testimony corroborates the commis-sion of offence and the charge is based on the same. Basing on the unrebutted and uncontroverted evidence, the General Security Force Court rendered the findings holding the petitioner guilty. Mr. Dalip Singh while refuting the arguments of Mr. Mathur that finding is not supported by evidence and that no reasons have been given to arrive at that finding urged that under Rule 98 member of the General Security Force Court were not required to assign detailed reasons. They could render the finding by word of mouth. Similarly, under Rule 99 the finding can be recorded simply as a finding of "guilty or not guilty". Under Rule 102 which is a deeming provision the punishment awarded in the sentence will relate to the appropriate provisions in the BSF Act and the Rules. The General Security Force Court was not required to give any reasons for the conviction and sentence in view of these rules and the BSF Act. Therefore, refuting the contention of Mr. D. C. Mathur Mr. Dalip Singh contended that reasons were not required to be given. The General Security Force Court was not required to give any reasons for the conviction and sentence in view of these rules and the BSF Act. Therefore, refuting the contention of Mr. D. C. Mathur Mr. Dalip Singh contended that reasons were not required to be given. Nor this Court can reappraise the evidence to arrive at a different conclusion. In this regard, he placed reliance on the decision in the case of Som Dutt V. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 414 . In that case the punishment awarded to the accused was six years RI and was dismissed from service. While challenging the said order he took the plea that orders of the Chief of the Army Staff confirming the proceeding of the Court Martial under Section 164 of the Army Act and the Central Government order under Section 165 dismising him from service being non-speaking were bad in law and must be quashed. Supreme Court while repealing these arguments held that Sections 164- 165 do not impose any obligation on the confirming authority or upon the Central Government to give reasons in support of their decision to confirm the proceedings of the court martial. In that case it was observed as under:- "apart from any requirement imposed by statute or statutory rules expressely or by necessary implications, we are unable to accept the contention that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that a statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision. " ( 23 ) THIS decision was re-affirmed subsequently in the case of S. N. Mukherjee V. Union of India (1990) 4scc593, where the Court observed as under:- "a perusal of the provisions of the Army Act and Rules show that at the stage of recording of findings and sentence, the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons. The members of the Court have to express their opinion as to the finding by word of mouth on each charge separately and the findings on each charge is tobe recorded simply as finding of "guilty or of not guilty". ( 24 ) MR. DALIP Singh, therefore, contended that the provisions of the Army Act and the Rules are para-materia the same as that of the B. S. F. Act and rules made thereunder. ( 24 ) MR. DALIP Singh, therefore, contended that the provisions of the Army Act and the Rules are para-materia the same as that of the B. S. F. Act and rules made thereunder. Similarly, in the case of Raipur Development Authority V. Chokha Mal 1989 (2) SCC 721 , which though was a case under the Arbitration Act, but drawing the analogy the Apex Court observed that where reasons are not recorded it is not open to the Court to interfere in the conviction and sentence recorded by the Court Martial. It was further held that there was no rule of natural justice requiring the recording of reasons and as such a decision of the court martial is not justiciable in the Court. In the latest judgement of the Supreme Court in the case Union of India and ors. Vs. J. S. Brar reported in (1993) I SCC 176 it has been observed as under:- "act and Rules do not require reasons to be given for the findings and sentences rendered by the Court Martial and in the absence of reasons, it is not possible to say whether the General Court Martial has placed any reliance at all on the testimony of the so called accomplice or the retracted confession of Pradhan in coming to a finding against the accused. ( 25 ) PERUSAL of these decisions clearly indicates that under the B. S. F. Act and Rules no reason is required to be given nor envisaged. The decision on conviction and sentence is as per the provisions of the B. S. F. Act and the Rules applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, it is not open to this Court to probe the mental process of the members of the General Security Force Court to find out as to what evidence wheighed in the mind to arrive at the conclusion that petitioner was guilty. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in such cases where reasons have not been assigned in the order of conviction and sentence, this Court cannot assume the power of an appellate authority. In view of this settled principle of law, it is not for this Court to try to probe into the mental process of the General Security Force Court and reappraise the evidence as Mr. Dinesh Mathur wants this Court to do. In view of this settled principle of law, it is not for this Court to try to probe into the mental process of the General Security Force Court and reappraise the evidence as Mr. Dinesh Mathur wants this Court to do. That is not the intention of drafters of the rules nor can be inferred from judicial pronouncements. Even the principle of Natural justice cannot be taken up or invoked to arrive at a different finding than what has been rendered by the General Security Force Court. ( 26 ) MR. D. C. MATHUR, Sr. Advocate has tried to take me through the evidence of Sohan Masiha and other witnesses recorded before the Court, in order to show that on the basis of their evidence this finding could not have been arrived at. I am afraid in view of the well settled principle of law as discussed above, this Court cannot rewrite the sentence nor in writ jurisdictin evidence can be reappraised. Even otherwise discripencies pointed out in the evidence of these witnesses are minor. It does not prove that on the basis of their testimony this sentence could not have been awarded. ( 27 ) BEFORE concluding I would like to discuss the objection taken by Mr. Dinesh Mathur, Senior Advocate with regard to Mr. L. S. Bisht acting as prosecutor. It must be made clear that there is not an iota of evidence placed on record to show that by the appointment of Mr. L. S. Bisht as prosecutor any prejudice had been caused to the petitioner. Mr. Dalip Singh rightly contended that Mr. L. S. Bisht only prepared the record of evidence. He recorded the ROE not as a Judge nor expressed his opinion at any time, hence the objection that since Mr. L. S. Bisht recorded ROE, therefore, could not act as prosecutor has no force. Even otherwise this objection could have been taken at the relevant time. It appears to be an after- thought. The contention of Mr. Mathur that this objection could not have been raised because rule did not permit has no force. Such an objection could have been taken, no law prevents it provided petitioner could prove that by doing so respondent caused any prejudice to him. Hence this objection deserves no merit. Lastly Mr. The contention of Mr. Mathur that this objection could not have been raised because rule did not permit has no force. Such an objection could have been taken, no law prevents it provided petitioner could prove that by doing so respondent caused any prejudice to him. Hence this objection deserves no merit. Lastly Mr. Mathur contended that since under Rule 102 of B. S. F. Rules only single sentence for all the charges can be awarded, therefore, once this Court hold that conviction and sentence under Charge No. 1 is bad, then the sentence as a whole must go. I find no merits in this submission. Admittedly, single sentence has been awarded, but charge No. 1 is independent and its decision does not depend on the decision of other charges nor interlinked in any way with other charges. But since the Authorities found all charges proved thereby awarded single sentence. Now if the Court finds on technical ground that sentence could not have been awarded under the existing Act that does not mean that the award of sentence qua the other charges would stand vitiated. I see no reason why the single sentence awarded against other charges cannot be sustained. I find no merits in this argument. ( 28 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I sustain the order of conviction and sentence with regard to Charges No. 2 and 3 but so far as sentence under Section 7 of the Act of 1988 against Charge No. 1 is concerned, the same cannot be sustained. Accordingly the writ petition is allowed partly i. e. only with regard to sentence against Charge No. 1 with no order as to costs.