Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. Heard Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr. B.B. Sinha, learned Counsel for the respondents and with their consent, this writ application has been heard at the admission stage itself and is being disposed of by this order. 2. The order dated 8.12.1995 (Annexure l)has been impugned by the petitioner, by and under which the respondents have cancelled the allotment of plot No. 13-B Phase. A prayer has also been made to unseal the factory premises and to restrain the respondents to interfere with the business of the petitioner. 3. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, certain facts are necessary to be stated. According to the petitioner, for establishing the Tin Box Manufacturing Industry at Adityapur, he applied for allotment of the plot at the Aditypur Industrial Area Development Authority in 1970 and an area of 23400 sqr feet was allotted to the petitioner by an under dated 1.7.1972 and 7.10.1974. On 3.12.1975 a lease deed was expected for 99 years in between the authority and the petitioner and the possession of the land was handed over on 22.1.1973. The said allotment was in respect of a vacant land without any structure thereon and the petitioner constructed boundary wall, factory shed, plants and machineries etc. for carrying out its business and started its production in the year 1978. Further case is that as his business was totally dependent upon the performance of M/s. Indian Cable Industry. Jamshedpur and as business performance of the said Cable Industry deteriorated, business of the petitioners unit was also affected, as a result of which there was substantial loss in production. It is admitted by the petitioner that due to sudden sickness of its industry, it was unable to make timely payment of its dues to the respondents. However, the petitioner regained its position and started its production upto 13.4.1996. Grievance of the petitioner is that without giving any reasonable opportunity, the authority cancelled the allotment of the plot resulting in huge loss to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that before issuing the impugned order dated 81.2.1995, the respondents did not issue any show cause notice nor had taken any step to get the notice served upon the petitioner even at the factory premises to enable the petitioner to submit its explanation. It is the case of the petitioner that before issuing the impugned order dated 81.2.1995, the respondents did not issue any show cause notice nor had taken any step to get the notice served upon the petitioner even at the factory premises to enable the petitioner to submit its explanation. On receipt of the impugned order a detailed representation was submitted before the respondent No. 2 making those grievance but no reply has been given till date. However, the petitioner has agreed to clear of all the dues immediately. 4. In the counter affidavit respondents have categorically denied the assertions made by the petitioner by stating that the petitioner was given number of opportunities before the impugned order was passed but for the reasons best known to the petitioner, it failed to file its show cause explaining its position. Annexing several letters, the respondents have asserted that since March, 1975 the petitioner was repeatedly requested to clear of the dues but the petitioner deliberately ignored the same and as such, the authority had no option but to cancel the lease as per the provisions of the lease deed. 5. Mr. Mahto has contended that even for violation of breach of any condition of the agreement, forcible possession is not permissible and it can only be taken through process of court. He further contends that before Cancellation the petitioner was entitled for a notice and that having not given, the whole action of the respondents is arbitrary and without authority in law and as such, the same must be quashed. In support of this contention, he has relied on a decision in the case of the Gait Public Library & Institute V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1995 (1) PLJR 585. 6. Mr. Sinha, countering the argument of Mr. Mahto, has contended that allotment of the land was made on 7.10.1994 and the petitioner was required to deposit the price of land in ten yearly instalments. According to Government Resolution and order, after payment of first instalment, the possession of the land was given to the petitioner after execution of a bond undertaking to pay the balance amount. The petitioner, it is contended, after getting possession over the land did not pay further instalment and as such, by letter dated 10th March, 1975 it was directed to deposit the same. The petitioner, it is contended, after getting possession over the land did not pay further instalment and as such, by letter dated 10th March, 1975 it was directed to deposit the same. It was also pointed out that in view of one of the terms of allotment order the petitioner was required to start production within six months after the allotment but it has not made any progress in this regard so far. According to him, the impugned order has been passed in accordance with the provisions of the Bihar Industrial Areas Development Authority Act, 1974 (Bihar Act 16, 1974). He has further drawn my attention to the provisions of amendment Sec. 6 of Bihar Act 16, 1974 and has contended that this writ application is not maintainable simply on the ground that against the impugned order the petitioner has alternative remedy by way of an appeal before the State Government. Lastly it is contended that the decision relied by Mr. Mahto is under general law but in the instant case the impugned order has been passed under as specials stature namely, the Bihar Industrial Areas Development Authority Act, 1974 and as such, the said decision has no application. 7. It is now well settled that the question whether the purported for-features or cancellation of the lease are valid or not could not be allowed to be agitated in the proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. In the case of State of U.P. V/s. Dharmander Prasad Singh, reported in -- , under almost similar circumstances their Lordships observed as follows:- We do not propose to go into the merits of these grounds and their sufficiency in law to support the purported forfeiture as, in our view, this exercise, having regard to the disputed questions of fact that are required to be gone into in that behalf, are extraneous to proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. Similarly in the case of Radtfkrishna Agrawal V/s. State of Bihar, reported in -- , their Lordships have held that after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid, contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. Similarly in the case of Radtfkrishna Agrawal V/s. State of Bihar, reported in -- , their Lordships have held that after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the constitutional provisions but by the legally valid, contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Article 14 or of any other constitutional provisions when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power of obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract. 10. In the back drop of the authoritative pronouncement, if the facts and circumstances of the present case is scrutinized, it would be clear that the relationship between the authority and the petitioner is that of a lessor and a lessee which arises out of contract. 11. In order to provide for planned development of Industrial areas and for promotion of industries and matter appertaining thereto, the Bihar Industrial Areas Development Authority Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was enacted. The authority under the Act, exercising its power within the frame work of the Statute, entered into a contract with the petitioner and the allotment of the land was made subject to certain conditions. Admittedly the petitioner violated some of the terms of the agreement and accordingly it was served with a notice to show cause. Though the petitioner has alleged that no notice was served but from the various annexures, it appears that notice was sent to Sri Manohar Prasad Singh, the proprietor of Hindustan Tin Box Industry, which was duly received by Mr. Singh. 12. Annexure E, the notice of forfeiture and determination of the lease, is dated 7.10.1986 which was received by Sri Singh on 30.12.1986. In such view of the matter, it is futile for the petitioner to argue that before the impugned order was passed, he was not served with any notice. Moreover, when the petitioner itself has admitted that it failed to deposit the dues in time, it is obvious that there was breach of agreement. In such view of the matter, it is futile for the petitioner to argue that before the impugned order was passed, he was not served with any notice. Moreover, when the petitioner itself has admitted that it failed to deposit the dues in time, it is obvious that there was breach of agreement. Under these circumstances, in my view, the petitioner is not entitled to get any relief from the writ court. 13. In the case of Gati Public Library & Institute (supra), the Division Bench, while considering the extent of power of the Collector under Rules 21 and 22 of the Bihar Government Estates (Khas Mahal) Manual, 1953, came to the conclusion that power of resumption can be exercised on fulfilment of two conditions; firstly there should be a provision in the lease authorising the lessor to resume possession of the whole or part of the land and secondly if the land is required for a public purpose. According to their Lordships, the question of resumption arisen when the lease is existing. If the period of lease, their Lordships continued, has expired then the question of resumption does not arise and the lessor, after expiry of the period may take possession of the land according to law or extend the period as the case may be. In that case, the High Court interfered under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the peripd of lease had expired and as such, there was no question of resumption of the land in exercise of power under Rule 27 of the Khas Mahal Manual. In my considered opinion, the aforesaid decision relied on by Mr. Mahto is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. Another important aspect of the matter is that in view of amendment provision of Sec. 6 of the Act, the person aggrieved by such order can file an appeal under Sec. 6 (2a) of the Act. It would be useful to look into the provisions of Sec. 6 (2a), which reads thus: 6. (2a)-In case necessary effective steps are not taken within the fixed period to established the industry, the authority shall in such condition, cancel the allotment of allotted plot/shed and also forfeit the amount deposited in this connection. The authority shall, before cancelling the allotment allow the month time to the allottee to put up his case. (2a)-In case necessary effective steps are not taken within the fixed period to established the industry, the authority shall in such condition, cancel the allotment of allotted plot/shed and also forfeit the amount deposited in this connection. The authority shall, before cancelling the allotment allow the month time to the allottee to put up his case. The allottee on being dissatisfied with the order of the authority may file an appeal to the State Government within one month and the State Government within one month and the State Government shall, after due consideration dispose it of within two months from the date of receipt of the appeal. 15. The last but not the least fact is to be borne in mind that after the possession was recovered from the petitioner on 13.4.1996, the possession of the land was given to the firm named.Steel City Casting but this firm has not been made a party in the present application and so no relief can be given to the petitioner in absence of the said firm. 16. Taking into consideration all aspects of the matter, in my considered opinion, the petitioner has failed to make out any case for interference by this Court in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. In the result, I find no merit in this writ application and the same is dismissed.