JUDGMENT S.N. Mallick, J. The Judgment in this Second Appeal was passed by J.N. Hore, J. on 17.12.90 allowing the appeal on setting aside the Judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and of the First Appeal Court whereby the Title Suit being No. 5 of 1976 of the 3rd Court of the Munsif, Basirhat was dismissed. The Supreme Court on special leave appeal has set aside the aforesaid Judgment and has remanded it as per Judgment dated 17.8.92 to this High Court for disposal according to law keeping in mind the provisions of s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The instant appeal has been preferred by the defendant appellant against the Judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 698 of 1978 dated 23.6.79 affirming the Judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif, 3rd Court, Basirhat in Title Suit No. 5 of 1976 dated 27.6.78. In the suit brought by the plaintiff-respondent declaration was sought for that the Registered Sale Deed dated 1.12.69 executed by him in favour of the defendant-appellant in respect of the disputed property was in fact a loan transaction and not an out and out sale. It was the case of the plaintiff-respondent that his father-in law Golam Navi being a resident of the said village transferred 2½ bighas of land by way of sale to one Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife. As the latter wanted to sell the property again the plaintiff-respondent agreed to purchase the property on a consideration of Rs. 6,000/-. The defendant-appellant is his own brother who is an employee of the Calcutta Tramways while the plaintiff-respondent is an employee of Jessop Company. At the relevant time the plaintiff had only Rs. 2,000/- as his personal saving in home and could manage to take a personal loan of Rs. 2,000/- from one of his colleague in the company, there being a shortfall of Rs. 2,000/- more to purchase the property of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife. Being approached, the defendant-appellant agreed to give him a loan of Rs. 2,000/- on the plaintiffs executing a kobala as a security in respect of the disputed property which consists of his homestead, a tank, danga and agricultural land comprising an area of 78 decimals. 2,000/- more to purchase the property of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife. Being approached, the defendant-appellant agreed to give him a loan of Rs. 2,000/- on the plaintiffs executing a kobala as a security in respect of the disputed property which consists of his homestead, a tank, danga and agricultural land comprising an area of 78 decimals. It was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the defendant would get possession of the tank and other lands but the plaintiff would remain in possession of his homestead; the interest on the said loan of Rs. 2,000/- would be adjusted against the usufructs of the property. The plaintiff-respondent also agreed to pay the loan amount from the bonus which he would get at the time of Puja. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he paid the loan amount by instalments and asked the defendant for accounting which was refused; hence the suit after a village 'salish' failed. It is the further case of the plaintiff-respondent that at the relevant time the suit property was valued more than Rs. 6,000/-. It. is also in the plaint that he purchased property of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife by two Registered kobalas dated 1.12.69. On the same day the plaintiff also executed the kobala by Registered deed in respect of the disputed property in favour of the defendant-appellant. 3. The defendant-appellant's contention is purely of denial. It is his case that the kobala was an out and out sale deed which voluntarily executed by the plaintiff in his favour as he wanted to purchase more valuable property by disposing the disputed property. It is also his case that the actual consideration money on the plaintiffs kobala from Dhiren Ghosh and his wife was Rs. 2,000/- and Rs. 6,000/- which was shown as the consideration money only to avoid pre-emption. Explaining the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the homestead it is the defendant's case that he out of love and sympathy allowed the plaintiff to stay in the 'Bhita' till construction of his new Bastu upon the land purchased from Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife. 4. Explaining the possession of the plaintiff in respect of the homestead it is the defendant's case that he out of love and sympathy allowed the plaintiff to stay in the 'Bhita' till construction of his new Bastu upon the land purchased from Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife. 4. Both the parties adduced evidence before the Trial Court and both the Courts below on appreciation of evidence and on hearing the arguments of the learned Advocates appearing for both the parties have come to a concurrent finding that the disputed transaction between the parties as per kobala dated 1.12.69 (vide Ext. 1(e) = Ext. A) is not an out and out sale but a loan in substance. In coming to this finding both the Courts below have held that the plaintiff-respondent purchased the property of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife for a sum of Rs. 6,000/- and that consideration was a real one and not an inflated one as alleged by the defendant for the purpose of avoiding pre-emption. Both the Courts below have found that the consideration of the disputed transaction as per Ext. 1 (e) is very much inadequate and both the Courts have also taken into consideration the admitted fact that the plaintiff since the date of the Ext. 1(e) is in possession of his homestead having an area of 42 decimals. Both the Courts below have also accepted the plaintiffs story proved by evidence that in fact the plaintiff took a loan of Rs. 2,000/- from his brother defendant for the purpose of purchasing the property of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh and his wife and at the request of the defendant he executed the sale deed only for the purpose of security for the loan. The Courts below have also accepted the plaintiffs story for the purpose of coming to the conclusion that the disputed transaction was loan in substance that there was an agreement between the parties that the defendant would be in possession of the danga, tank and cultivable lands and would enjoy the usufructs thereof for the purpose of adjusting interest against the said loan and the plaintiff would remain in possession of his 'Bhita' in the disputed properties. So, on being satisfied of the above facts being proved the Trial Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and the First Appeal Court confirmed it. So, on being satisfied of the above facts being proved the Trial Court passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff-respondent and the First Appeal Court confirmed it. By the Judgment of remand dated 17.8.92 the Supreme Court has directed to dispose of the appeal with reference to the provisions of s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Supreme Court has also observed that the High Court in its earlier Judgment passed in this appeal has re-appreciated the evidence which cannot be done under s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Under s. 100 of the Civil Procedure Code in a Second Appeal the High Court is to be satisfied that the case involve a substantial question of law. Section 101 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down that no Second Appeal shall lie except on the ground mentioned in s. 100. Section 103 of the Civil Procedure Code provides as follows :- "In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal,- (a) which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the lower Appellate Court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100". The law is quite well settled that while dealing with a second appeal under s. 100 the High Court may determine any issue of fact necessary for the disposal of the appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient which has not been determined by the lower Appellate Court or by both the Courts of first instance and the lower Appellate Court or which has been wrongly determined by such Court or Courts by reason of a decision of such question of law as is referred to in s. 100. It is also well settled that the concurrent finding of fact based on a discussion of evidence relating to such an issue in favour of the plaintiff cannot be disturbed in second appeal, (Janakiram vs. Amirchand Ram, AIR 1984 Pat page 191). It is also well settled that the concurrent finding of fact based on a discussion of evidence relating to such an issue in favour of the plaintiff cannot be disturbed in second appeal, (Janakiram vs. Amirchand Ram, AIR 1984 Pat page 191). In a similar case it has been held by Allahabad High Court (Kartey Singh vs. Iftikhar Ahmed, AIR 1981 All 384 ) that finding of a Court that the money was advanced as loan is a finding on question of fact and that the High Court will not interfere with it in the second appeal when it is not vitiated by any error of law and that the High Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and find out what is the weigh t of evidence on a particular point. So, under clause (b) of s. 103 a wrong determination can only be challenged in the second appeal provided it is a decision on such substantial question of law as is referred to in s. 100. 5. It has been argued by Shri Raychowdhury the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant that the First Appeal Court has wrongly laid the onus to prove that the disputed transaction is not a loan transaction upon the defendant-appellant. But I do not find any support to such contention of Shri Raychowdhury from the lower court Judgments. The learned Trial Court while discussing the issue No. 2 has held:-"it is the duty of the plaintiff to prove the transaction was not an out right sale. The plaintiff has to prove from the surrounding circumstances that the transaction was a loan in substance". The Appeal Court in its Judgment has no where stated that the defendant has to prove that the disputed transaction is not a loan transaction. On the other hand, when both the parties had adduced evidence on a certain point the question of onus loses significance, although it is the primary responsibility of the plaintiff to prove his own case. What the Appeal Court has done in the impugned Judgment is that it has considered the matter factually on much more details with reference to the evidence on record so as to concur with the findings of the Trial Court. This cannot be said that by doing so the Appeal Court has placed the onus wrongly upon the defendant-appellant. What the Appeal Court has done in the impugned Judgment is that it has considered the matter factually on much more details with reference to the evidence on record so as to concur with the findings of the Trial Court. This cannot be said that by doing so the Appeal Court has placed the onus wrongly upon the defendant-appellant. In this position I am unable to accept the first contention of Shri Raychowdhury. The second contention of Shri Raychowdhury is that while dealing with the question of fact i.e. whether the disputed transaction is a loan transaction or not the Appeal Court has failed to consider the legal tests before coming to the conclusion that the disputed transaction is a loan transaction. But the Appeal Court's Judgment does not support such contention of Shri Raychowdhury. The Appeal Court has considered and accepted the evidence on the part of the plaintiff that he was running for a loan of Rs. 2,000/- for the purpose of purchasing Dhirendra Nath Ghosh's property for which he took Rs. 2,000/- from the defendant-appellant his own brother by way of loan and to have the same he had to execute the kobala as per Ext. 1(e). Both the Courts have considered the evidence of the defendant-appellant (D.W. 3) that he was present at the time of execution of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh's kobala as per Ext. 1 and 1(a) and that he paid Rs. 2,000/- to Dhiren Babu. It may be recalled that the admitted position is that all the three kobalas including the disputed kobala were executed on the same date. The area of land transferred under Dhirendra Nath Ghosh's kobala was about 83 decimals. Both the Trial Courts accepted and came to a finding that the consideration money for Dhirendra Nath Ghosh's kobalas was Rs. 6,000/- dismissing the case of the defendant or the evidence of Dhirendra Nath Ghosh that Rs. 6,000/- was shown as consideration only to avoid pre-emption. Both the Courts came to a finding that such evidence was not acceptable in view of the evidence of Dhiren Babu that the annual income from his properties transferred to the plaintiff was Rs. 5,000/- to 6,000/- per year. The learned Appeal Court observes as follows:-"it is difficult to believe that a property from which Rs. 5,000/- to 6,000/- was around per year would be sold at Rs. 2,000/- only. 5,000/- to 6,000/- per year. The learned Appeal Court observes as follows:-"it is difficult to believe that a property from which Rs. 5,000/- to 6,000/- was around per year would be sold at Rs. 2,000/- only. I do not, therefore, see any reason to disbelieve the plaintiff that he purchased the property for Rs. 6,000/- when his evidence is corroborated by kobala Ext. land Ext. 1(a)". Both the Courts below have taken into consideration the admitted fact of possession of the homestead by the plaintiff after the alleged sale as per Ext. 1(e)=Ext. A. The story of license or permissive possession as alleged by the defendant has been disbelieved by both the Courts. The Appeal Court has observed "it is curious that even after the dispute arises between the parties the defendant did not revoke the license and take any step for eviction of the plaintiff from the homestead. So, it is difficult to believe the defendant's evidence that the plaintiff has been in possession of the homestead as his licensee". Both the Courts have rejected the evidentiary value of the rent dakhilas produced by the defendant in respect of the disputed property which are all post suit documents. Admittedly the Jama was common in the name of both the brothers. Both the Courts have also come to a finding that the consideration for the Ext. 1(e)=Ext. A in respect of the disputed transaction is too inadequate. In this connection the Appeal Court has considered all the documents produced by the parties in support of their respective contention. It has been argued by Shri Raychowdhury that the documents produced by his client were not considered. But from the Appeal Courts Judgment it appears that he has specified all the documents produced by the parties regarding the point of adequacy of consideration and on such consideration has come to a finding that the consideration is too inadequate. It would be going into a question of fact whether the First Appeal Court has considered rightly the documents produced by the defendant which is not permissible under' s. 100 read with s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. It. has been submitted by Shri Raychowdhury that the learned Munsif has not considered the material evidence on record but from the Appeal Court's Judgment it does not appear any where that it has overlooked any material piece of evidence given by the parties. It. has been submitted by Shri Raychowdhury that the learned Munsif has not considered the material evidence on record but from the Appeal Court's Judgment it does not appear any where that it has overlooked any material piece of evidence given by the parties. The Appeal Court has duly considered the evidence of P.W.3 Umed Bux and has accepted his evidence being an eyewitness to the transaction between the parties and has held that this witness could not be shaken in the cross-examination. Shri Raychowdhury has argued much on the point that both the Courts have rejected the evidence of P.W.5 Ram Upadhayay to establish the case of the plaintiff that he took a loan of Rs. 2,000/- from him and that the plaintiff having not produced the account book it was hard to believe that this witness gave a loan of Rs. 2,000/- to the plaintiff. But it must be remembered that the evidence of this witness i.e. P.W.5 was not rejected by the Trial Court. Furthermore, the Appeal Court also did not reject that evidence but only observed that the case that plaintiff took a loan of Rs. 2,000/- from P.W. 5 is not very convincing. But enquiry into such a matter is neither necessary nor important because the question is whether the disputed transaction is a loan transaction. Both the Courts below have come to a finding of fact that the disputed transaction is a loan transaction. There being a concurrent finding of fact I do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment. There is nothing to show that the impugned Judgment is perverse or illegal or suffers from non-application of judicial mind to material piece of evidence. Shri Raychowdhury has referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1963 SC page 302 (V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Another, Appellants vs. Ramalingam Chettiar and Another, Respondent) he has also referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1987 SC page 1484 (Budhwanti and Another, Appellant vs. Gulab Chand Prasad, Respondent) and to a decision of this High Court in (1980)2 CLJ page 70. But the principles laid down there are not applicable to the present case because there is nothing to show as I have already noted that the impugned Judgment is vitiated by application of wrong tests or based an conjectures or assumptions or the impugned findings are based on no evidence so as to be interfered with under s. 100 read with s. 103 of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no substance in the instant appeal as such it must fail and it fails. The second appeal is dismissed on contest. No order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. The impugned confirmatory Judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court do stand affirmed. The LCR be sent down to the Trial Court immediately. Appeal dismissed.