MANMOHAN SARDU ( 1 ) BY this order, I would be disposing of IA 7710 of 1993, which is an application under Order IX rule 4 Civil Procedure Code and IA 1026 of 1994, being an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing the application under Order DC rule 4 Civil Procedure Code. ( 2 ) THE present suit is one for declaration and setting aside a decree, alleged to have been obtained by fraud. It was dismissed in default on 12th march, 1993. The application for restoration was moved on 1st September, 1993 i. e. nearly a period of six months after the dismissal of the suit. ( 3 ) IT would be pertinent at the outset to notice the subject matter of the suit. The present suit had been filed to have the decree obtained in Suit No. 74 of 1993, set aside and declared a nullity. ( 4 ) THE plaintiffs case in brief is that the plaintiff namely Jamia Millia Islamia, filed a suit bearing No. 74 of 1993, against the defendant seeking an injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the ownership and possession of the land belonging to the plaintiff. It was the plaintiff s contention that the defendant, who was the owner of adjoining land, wanted to grab the land of the University and had been making proposals for exchange of land, which were declined. It is alleged in the suit that me defendant No. 1 acting in collusion with defendant No. 2, the then counsel of the plaintiff late Mr. C. B. Thanai, made the plaintiff suffer the said decree, in the suit filed by the plaintiff itself. It is contended that Late Mr. C. B. Thanai gave his "no objection" to the defendant amending the written statement, who added by way of counter-claim a plea of adverse possession. It is contended that the plaintiffs counsel not only got the suit dismissed as withdrawn, but stated that plaintiff did not want to file a written statement to the counter-claim of the defendant, resulting in the defendants counter claim being decreed. Mr; C. B. Thanai defence to the present suit was that suit was withdrawn pursuant to instructions, since land of the plaintiff was under acquisition and award was stated to have been made. Mr; C. B. Thanai defence to the present suit was that suit was withdrawn pursuant to instructions, since land of the plaintiff was under acquisition and award was stated to have been made. The plaintiff, of course denies any instructions being given and alleges fraud and collusion. This resulted in the suit filed by the plaintiff being dismissed as withdrawn, while defendants counter claim was decreed. It is this decree with regard to the counter claim, which was suffered by the plaintiff in the Suit No. 740/93, which is sought to be set aside as having been fraudulently obtained in the present suit. Unfortunately Mr. C. B. Thanai, who had been impleaded as defendant No. 2, in the meantime expired. The suit is now continued only against defendant No. 1. ( 5 ) I have given above facts some what in detail. to bring out the questions involved in the suit and the nature of the subject matter, which deserve to be disposed of on merits in public interest and to subserve the ends of justice. ( 6 ) COMING to the present application, it is contended in the application under Order DC rule 4 Civil Procedure Code that the plaintiff had engaged Mr. Vinod Tyagi and Mr. A. K. Batta Advocates on behalf of the University. However, Mr. Vinod Tyagi ceased to be on the panel of lawyers of the plaintiff University in the year 1989 and Mr. A. K. Batta alone continued to act for the plaintiff University. Mr. Batta is reported to have suffered from Bilateral avascular Neurosis of both Femoral Heads and had to be hospitalized from 28-1-1993 to 8-2-1993 at the All India Medical Institute, New Delhi. He was subsequently taken to Jaslok Hospital and Research Centre, Bombay and underwent surgery and remained hospitalized there upto 16-3-1993. Thereafter he proceeded to Medical College, Panji Goa for Physiotherapy till April, 1993. It was in these circumstances, that he could not attend the case and the suit was dismissed in default on 12th March, 1993. The Registrar of the plaintiff University, it is stated on coming to know of the illness of Mr. A. K, Batta got the records inspected on 19th August, 1993, and came to know of the dismissal of the suit and filed the present application. The Registrar of the plaintiff University, it is stated on coming to know of the illness of Mr. A. K, Batta got the records inspected on 19th August, 1993, and came to know of the dismissal of the suit and filed the present application. The application is supported with the affidavit of the counsel as well as the medical reports in support thereof. The application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeks condonation of delay in filing the above application on similar grounds. It is supported with the affidavit of the Registrar of the University. ( 7 ) THE application has been opposed by learned counsel for the defendant, who urged that the plaintiff had been negligent all through in conducting the case, in not summoning the witnesses for trial as well as in not filing the list of witnesses and not appearing before the Joint Registrar. Further that the plaintiff itself had a duty to be vigilant, even if allowance was to be made on account of illness of the counsel. Mr. Rohtagi further contended that the plaintiff has filed this false suit and in this process assailed the credibility of their previous counsel, who had impeaccable credentials. ( 8 ) I am afraid that the previous conduct of the plaintiff in either not summoning the witnesses on the dates of trial or not being present before the Joint Registrar, would not be determinative of whether the plaintiff had sufficient cause for non-appearance on the date, when the suit was dismissed i. e. on 12th March, 1993. Incidentally on the said date, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant was present. ( 9 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of this case, I am of the view that the plaintiff has sufficient cause for non-appearance on 12th march, 1993. The plaintiff is a University, which was being represented by the counsel. Indisputably the counsel was hospitalized and the medical certificate in support thereof has been produced on record. The plaintiff, of course cannot be altogether absolved of not being vigilant in pursuing the case through its other staff. However, when the State or Government departments or institutions are involved, certain factors as were enumerated by the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India Vs. M/s. R. P. Builders have to be given due consideration. The plaintiff, of course cannot be altogether absolved of not being vigilant in pursuing the case through its other staff. However, when the State or Government departments or institutions are involved, certain factors as were enumerated by the Division Bench of this Court in Union of India Vs. M/s. R. P. Builders have to be given due consideration. It would be worthwhile to recapitulate the observations of the Division Bench of this Court in para 11 of the said decision. ( 10 ) THE above decision of the Supreme Court clearly lay down that while the State cannot be treated differently from any other litigant, the Court is "bound" to take into consideration the following factors- (i) redtapism in government, (ii) delays in correspondence, (iii) habitual indifference of Government officials or Government pleaders as distinct from the usual diligence of ordinary litigants or lawyers for private parties; (iv) collusion or negligence by Government officials or Government pleaders or fraud, (v) damage to public interest or to public funds or interests of the State, (vi) institutional or bureaucratic procedures as well as delays arising thereon, and (vii) need to render substantial justice on merits. It is not as if, fraud on the part of the Government officials or pleaders has necessarily to be proved by the Government in every case. Reference may also usefully be made to the decision of the Apex Court in Collector, land Acquisition, Anant Nag Vs. Katji-AIR 1987 S. C. 153. The Apex Court in the above case observed that the words " Sufficient cause in Section 5 are adequately elastic enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserve the ends of Justice, that being the. life performance for the existence of the institutions of Courts. The Apex Court advocated a liberal approach. Reference may also usefully be made to State/public Sector. G. Ramegowda Vs. Special land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore- 1988 S. C S97. The Apex Court while enumerating the factors to be considered and the liberal approach to be extended in condoning delay in Public Sector interalia noted:- ( 11 ) THE Law of limitation is, no doubt, the same for a private citizen as for Governmental authorities. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. Government, like any other litigant must take responsibility for the acts or omissions of its officers. But a somewhat different complexion is imparted to the matter where Government makes out a case where public interest was shown to have suffered owing to acts of fraud or bad faith on the part of its officers or agents and where the officers were clearly at cross-purposes within. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, in assessing what, in a particular case, constitutes sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5 it might, perhaps, be somewhat unrealistic to exclude from the consideration that go into the judicial verdict, these factors which are peculiar to and characteristic, of the functioning of the Government. ( 13 ) APPLYING the ratio of the above decisions which to my mind would apply also to statutory bodies like the plaintiff, I am of the view that having regard to the peculiar, facts and circumstances of this case and the subject matter of the suit as discussed earlier, consideration of substantial justice and public interest require that the suit be disposed of on merits. As discussed in preceeding paras 6,7,8 and 9 hold that there was sufficient cause for the plaintiffs non-appearance when the suit was dismissed in default and the plaintiff has made out sufficient grounds for condoning the delay in preferring the applications for restoration of the suit. The defendant can, however, be compensated by costs. In these circumstances, I allow the application under order DC rule 4 Civil Procedure Code and the application under Section: 5 of the Limitation Act and recall the order dated 12th March, 1993 dismissing the suit subject to costs of Rs. 3,000. 00 The suit is restored to its original number. I. A Nos. 7710/93 and 1026/94 stand disposed of.