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1996 DIGILAW 379 (PAT)

Sheo Pujan Singh v. State Of Bihar

1996-06-14

M.Y.EQBAL, SACHCHIDANAND JHA

body1996
Judgment S. N. Jha, J. 1. In this writ-petition the petitioners, 48 in number, seek a mandamus for payment of salary during the period of retrenchment. They also seek questioning of the order of the respondent-Sone Command Area development Agency (called the Agency in short) as contained in its letter dated 10.5.1991 holding their appointment, made in 1984, as fresh appointment and directing that their pay shall be fixed at the minimum of the time scale of pay as applicable in 1984. The facts of the case briefly stated are as follows. 2. The petitioners and others were appointed to Class III/iv posts in the Agency on different dates during 1975-80. The services of as many as 73 such persons were terminated on different dates between 1.4.81 and 1.7.81. The matter was raised on the floor of the Legislative Assembly and referred to the House Committee called question and Call Attention committee on 22.7.81 Committee in its report dated 26.7.82 recommended their reinstatement. In due course, on 1.3.84 the State Government directed the agency to take back 68 such persons in service, apart from 5 others who had already been reinstated earlier. An office order accordingly was issued by the agency reinstating 68 persons including the petitioners on 28.3.84. Certain correspondences were made between the agency and the State Government regarding payment of salary for the interregnum during which the petitioners and others were out of job. On 12.11.84, vine letter a contained in Annexure-6 to the writ-petition, the Slate Government directed the Agency to pay them salary for the period. (From Annexure B/2 to the Counter Affidavit of the respondents, however, it appears that implementation of the said letter was stayed soon thereafter on 24.11.84 ). According to the petitioners the matter remained pending until the Agency came out with the impugned letter dated 10.5.1991 treating the 1984 appointments as fresh appointments and, thus, rejecting that. 3. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have not denied that the petitioners and others were appointed during 1975-80 and in course of time in 1981 their services were terminated. According to the respondents, however, the services were terminated as they refused to participate in the selection process which was initiated to regularise the services of the temporary employees. 3. The respondents in their counter-affidavit have not denied that the petitioners and others were appointed during 1975-80 and in course of time in 1981 their services were terminated. According to the respondents, however, the services were terminated as they refused to participate in the selection process which was initiated to regularise the services of the temporary employees. The respondents do not also dispute that pursuant to the government directive in the light of the recommendations of the House Committee the petitioners (and others) were taken back in the service. According to them, however, it was a case of fresh appointment and not reinstatement. As regards the claim for salary for the period in question, according to the respondents, the State Government not only stayed the implementation of its decision as contained in letter dated 12.11.84 by letter dated 24.11.84 as contained in annexure B/2 (supra) but also finally rejected the same on 5.8.85 vide letter of the Agriculture (Special Programme)Department, marked Annexure C/2 to the counter-affidavit. The aforesaid decision not to pay the salary for the period in question was also later communicated to the Secretariat of the legislative Assembly on 25.9.86 vide annexure D/2. According to the respondents, thus, the claim of the petitioners stood rejected in 1985 itself and the same cannot be allowed to be reagitated after six years. As regards letter dated 10.5.91 it has been stated that the same was issued in the light of the government directive, as contained in agriculture (Special Programme)Departments letter dated 13.6.90 (Annexure E/2) to the effect that employees working either on regular or provisional basis on 1.4.81 would be entitled to the revised pay scale recommended by the fourth Pay Revision Committee prior to the termination/retrenchment. Persons working on daily wages basis were not to be given benefit of the revised pay scales as their appointment was not made in the scale. 4. Mr. Basudev Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the Agency being an industry within the meaning of Industrial disputes Act, as held by this Court in the case of Vijav Kumar Mahto V. State of bihar (1983pljr 667), the petitioners were/are entitled 10 protection of section 25-F of the said Act. The retrenchment being contrary to the mandate of section 25-F they must also be held entitled to arrears ofsalary. The retrenchment being contrary to the mandate of section 25-F they must also be held entitled to arrears ofsalary. In support of his plea he placed reliance on L. Robert dsouza V/s. Executive Engines Southern railway [air 1984 S. C.1253] and gamon India Limited V/s. Niranjan Dass [air 1984 S. C.500]. Mr. Basudev prasad also contended that the claim of the petitioners has been rejected not on the ground that during the period in question they were gainfully employed elsewhere but on the ground that they did not work, According to the Counsel, petitioners having been denied the opportunity to work during the period in question, rejection of the claim must be held to be on extraneous and untenable consideration. In this connection, it was pointed out that the assertion of the petitioners that they were not gainfully employed during the period in question has not been controverted by the respondents. 5. The petitioners have filed reply to the respondents counter-affidavit wherein they have not denied the case of the respondents to the effect that their services were terminated on account of the fact that they refused to participate in the selection process. The statements made in the counter-affidavit in this regard have been termed by them as "misconceived and erroneous". I fail to understand as to how the stand of the respondents can be said to be misconceived and erroneous. There does not appear to be any dispute that the petitioners were appointed on temporary basis. If, therefore, the agency wanted to undertake selection process and consider the cases of the employees working on temporary basis for the purpose of regularisation, the action cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary at all. It is relevant to mention here that a group of persons being aggrieved by the proposed selection process had come to this Court in cwjc No.470 of 1991. The grievance of the petitioners was not accepted by this Court. It is relevant to mention here that a group of persons being aggrieved by the proposed selection process had come to this Court in cwjc No.470 of 1991. The grievance of the petitioners was not accepted by this Court. The order dated 6.3.81, copy whereof has been marked as Annexure a/2 to the counter-affidavit may usefully be quoted as follows : "it appears that the petitioners have been appointed on a temporary basis and we are informed by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Sone Commend area Development Agency that the steps are being taken for permanent appointment to the different posts and the petitioners have been requested to appear at the test for the same. The petitioners cannot make any grievance in such a situation. " It is worth mentioning here that petitioner No.1 of that writ-petition i. e. CWJC No.470 of 1991, happens to be petitioner No.18 of the present writ-petition and there does not appear to be any dispute at the Bar that the interests of the rest of the petitioners herein and those of the other petitioners in that case were the same. 6 The termination of services was no doubt held to be illegal by the house Committee and the State government, followed by the Agency, gracefully accepted its recommendation. The decision having been implemented this is not the proper occasion to go behind the correctness or propriety of the recommendation at this stage. As regards the claim for salary, however, the fact remains that the same was rejected by the State Government way back on 5.8.85 which was duly communicated to the Committee through the Assembly Secretariat on 29.5.86. The Committee/assembly accepted the reinstatement without salary for the interregnum as sufficient compliance of its recommendations. On their part, the petitioners too accepted their reinstatement unconditionally. Although the claim was rejected, as stated, on 5.8.85, they did not challenge the same in a court of law for about six years (the present writ-petition was filed on 16.7.91 ). I do not think it is open to them to challenge the correctness of the decision of the State Government as contained in letter dated 13.6.90 (which is the basis of the impugned letter dated 10.5.91 ). which is mere reiteration of the previous decision, at a belated stage. 7. I do not think it is open to them to challenge the correctness of the decision of the State Government as contained in letter dated 13.6.90 (which is the basis of the impugned letter dated 10.5.91 ). which is mere reiteration of the previous decision, at a belated stage. 7. Upholding the petitioners case that they be given the salary for the period in question would amount to treating them in continuous employment which would necessarily involve the question of inter- se seniority vis-avis others. As a matter of fact at the stage of their reinstatement/re-appointment a writ-petition being CWJC No.1589 of 1984 was filed by the other group of employees of the Agency, whose services had been made permanent after the selection process, making a grievance that their (petitioners and similarly situate others)reinstatement may affect their seniority etc. This Court found substance in the grievance which would be evident from the order dated 24.4.84 by which the writ- petition was disposed of as follows: -"learned Counsel for the State relying upon the affidavit filed on behalf of the state and the Sone Commission development Agency gives us to understand that the petitioners seniority and pay scale shall not be affected by absorption of the 73 employees who had previously been retrenched and have since been reinstated. In that view of the matter, learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks permission to withdraw this application. We expect that the assurance given by the learned State Counsel shall not subsequently be given a go by the authorities concerned, (emphasis added)The order of this Court is to be read not only as recording the undertaking of the Agency to the effect that the reinstatement of the petitioners and others similarly situate would not adversely affect the seniority and pay scales of other group of employees, but also as the Court expressing its own view in the matter. In other words the undertaking was found to the just and proper and in accordance with law and therefore, made part of the order of the Court. 8. In service Jurisprudence it is permissible to give the benefit of notional seniority and, in appropriate cases, also the consequential benefit thereof. But this is not to be done where it is likely to affect the rights of the third parties. 8. In service Jurisprudence it is permissible to give the benefit of notional seniority and, in appropriate cases, also the consequential benefit thereof. But this is not to be done where it is likely to affect the rights of the third parties. I do not, therefore, think it would be proper exercise of discretion and jurisdiction on our part to issue any direction for giving notional seniority to the petitioners treating them as having remained in employment throughout and pay them the salary of the period. This may adversely affect the rights and interests of the other sets of employees, who are not before this Court in the present proceeding and in whose favour this Court made observations in the previous writ-petition. They are persons who had participated in the selection process and had taken the chance of selection or removal. They are continuing in employment through proper channel and their claim is surely better than of these petitioners or others similarly situate. 9. I am aware of the cases in which the Courts have upheld the claim of the employees for giving them consequential monetary benefits. Where in-service employees are denied promotion and thus prevented from working and discharging the duties of a higher post which ultimately is found due to them they are entitled to consequential monetary benefits and it is the duty of the Court to give the same to them See state of Mysore V/s. C. R. Sheshadri ( AIR 1974 SC 460 ), Allapat Narana Menon V/s. State of Kerala, 1977 (2) S. L. R. (SC)] the cases of the employees who were out of job on account of orders of termination, dismissal etc. however, would stand on a different footing. Even if the orders of termination/dismissal are found to be illegal and the same are set aside, that would not per se entitle them to consequential monetary benefits so far as the writ courts exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution are concerned. It may be permissible to the Labour Courts/industrial tribunals to pass such orders. It is because they have the advantage of taking evidence on the point as to whether the workman concerned was idle or gainfully employed elsewhere during the relevant period. It may be permissible to the Labour Courts/industrial tribunals to pass such orders. It is because they have the advantage of taking evidence on the point as to whether the workman concerned was idle or gainfully employed elsewhere during the relevant period. In the absence of any positive evidence on the point it is not possible for this Court to record any finding in favour of the petitioners and hold them entitled to salary. 10. Even according to the petitioners, as noticed at the outset, the agency is an industry and they are entitled to protection available to the workmen under the Industrial Disputes act. If that be the contention, in my opinion, for seeking the relief regarding payment of salary, they should have better taken recourse to proceeding under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial disputes Act rather than filed the present writ-petition This observation should not be stood to mean that the writ-petition is being rejected on the ground of alternative remand. It is well settled that the question of availability of alternative remedy becomes in consequential after admission of the writ-petition at the stage of final hearing. This observation has been made only to high-light the fact that the petitioners had alternative remedy available to them which would have been more complete and efficacious because in that event they would have had got opportunity to lead evidence on the point. 11. So far as the Court is concerned, having regard to the circumstances in which the services of the petitioners were terminated namely, their refusal to participate in the selection process for the purpose of regularisation in service, which action of the respondents, as observed above, cannot be said to be illegal or arbitrary, i do not think petitioners can maintain their claim of seniority of continuous employment and payment of salary for the period in question. That would amount to giving them premium for their own defaults. It would be unreasonable and unfair to treat them at par with their counter-parts who had participated in the selection process at an earlier point of time and became permanent employees. 12. The decisions of the Supreme court in the cases of Robert D Souza (supra) and Gamon India Limited (supra) are of on help to the petitioners. Those cases had arisen out of proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. The decisions of the Supreme court in the cases of Robert D Souza (supra) and Gamon India Limited (supra) are of on help to the petitioners. Those cases had arisen out of proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court held that where order of retrenchment is not in consonance with the provision of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act the termination of services is void. No doubt, any order which is void in law is to be treated as non-est in the eye of law. But holding the order void and on that basis directing the reinstatement of retrenched employee is one thing and giving benefit of arrears of back wages and other monetary benefits is another thing while reinstatement follows automatically from the finding that the retrenchment was invalid, the question of paying back wages and other monetary benefits depends on other circumstances as well such as whether the employee/workman concerned was gainfully employed. Such a finding can be recorded on the basis of evidence by the labour Courts/industrial Tribunals. It is not proper for the writ courts to record any finding one way or the other on the basis of the affidavits containing bald assertions and denials. I, therefore, do not think it is possible to grant the relief of back wages on the basis of the aforesaid authorities which have been given in the context of proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the above premises, I would dismiss this writ-petition but make no order as to cost. Petition Dismissed.