KUMAR RAJARATNAM, J. ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiffs revision petition. The plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of a certain amount with costs and interest. An on demand promissory note and consideration receipt dated 8-1-1987 agreeing to repay the sum with interest was also executed by the defendants. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff fairly conceded that the on demand promissory note was not in Survey No. 15/1 of Cholanayakanahalli Village, Kasaba Hobli, bangalore North Taluk. In the plaint, the plaintiff has prayed for specific performance of the agreement of sale in question. In the plaint, it is alleged that there was an earlier agreement between the plaintiff and late Ramakka, whose legal representatives are the defendants on 10-3-1982 and that the plaintiff was put in possession of the suit schedule property by her. That agreement could not be enforced as Ramakka died and after her death, the defendants entered into an agreement to sell the property to the plaintiff on 30-9-1988 by receiving further advance of Rs. 50,000/ -. The possession of the suit schedule property continued with the plaintiff which he obtained in pursuance to the agreement dated 10-3-1982 executed by Ramakka. ( 2 ) THE defendants filed a detailed written statement. While they admitted the execution of the agreement in question, they disputed the correctness of the statement of the plaintiff with regard to delivery of possession of the property in question in his favour and the other allegations levelled against the petitioners were denied. ( 3 ) THEREAFTER, the plaintiff filed an application under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the plaint seeking for alternate relief of giving benefits arising out of the acquisition of the property in question in the event the acquisition proceedings in respect of the suit schedule property is completed. In the application for amendment, it was sought to be brought out that the suit schedule property was proposed for acquisition and the final declaration was issued in the year 1989 for acquiring the land in favour of the Bangalore Development authority. It is further alleged that the acquisition proceedings are not completed and the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the suit schedule property. It is further alleged that the acquisition proceedings are not completed and the plaintiff continued to be in possession of the suit schedule property. It is alleged in the amendment application that a prayer has to be added to the effect that, in the event the land acquisition proceedings are completed by the government, the plaintiff would be entitled for all the benefits arising out of the said acquisition. Accordingly, he prayed for amendment of the prayer by adding the prayer to the effect that in the event of the acquisition proceedings of the said property is completed and the scheme is implemented, the plaintiff is entitled for all the benefits arising out of the acquisition of the suit schedule property. This was sought to be added in the plaint as prayer (aa ). ( 4 ) THE defendants filed a detailed objections to the amendment application. But by an order dated 27-10-1995, the lower Court allowed the application for amendment. It is this order that is challenged in this revision petition. ( 5 ) IT is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the preliminary notification is dated 2-6-1978 and that the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 2-2-1989. It is submitted by the learned Counsel for the revision petitioner that the title to the suit schedule property vests in the defendants and that even assuming that there is an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff, he is not entitled to the benefits arising out of the land acquisition proceedings. In other words, it is contended that the plaintiff has no subsisting title to the property and that he is not entitled to the benefits arising out of the land acquisition proceedings and accordingly, the amendment should not have been allowed. In support of his contention, learned Counsel for the revision petitioner- defendants relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Sunil kumar Jain v Kishan and Others. In that case, a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 17-11-1980, acquiring the lands in question and the collector made an award of a sum of Rs. 38,500/ -. In that case, a notification under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 17-11-1980, acquiring the lands in question and the collector made an award of a sum of Rs. 38,500/ -. The appellant putforth an agreement of sale dated 5-12-1991 contending that the respondents had received a consideration and kept the petitioner in possession of the land and that therefore, by operation of section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the petitioner is entitled to the compensation. That contention was not accepted and the Supreme Court observed as follows:"we are unable to agree with the learned Counsel. In a reference, the dispute is to the title to receive the compensation. It is settled law that the agreement of sale does not confer title and, therefore, the agreement holder, even assuming that the agreement is valid, does not acquire any title to the property. It is seen that the agreement is subsequent to the notification ur. der Section 4 (1 ). The Government is not bound by such an agreement. The inter se dispute is only with respect to the title as on the date of notification under Section 4 (1 ). The respondent is the undoubted owner of the property as per Section 4 notification and that, therefore, the compensation was directed to be paid to the respondent since he is one of the members. We cannot find any illegality in the order passed by the Courts. However, if the petitioner has got any claim under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, it is open to him to take such action as open to him under law". From the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is clear that holder of the agreement of sale does not obtain any title to the property and that he is not entitled to claim the compensation due under the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the land. It is no doubt true that the Supreme Court has left open the question the right of the petitioner therein for any claim under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, but the former part of the judgment is clear to the effect that the agreement holder is not entitled to claim any compensation in respect of the land, as admittedly, he was not the title holder on the date of Section 4 (1) notification. In this case also, the agreement was subsequent to section 4 (1) notification which was admitted to be on 2-6-1978 and as such, the plaintiff may not be entitled to claim the compensation amount on the basis of the agreement of sale, if at all, in his favour. ( 6 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in K. Raheja Constructions Ltd. v Alliance Ministries and Others , has no application to the facts of the case as the suit itself is originally for specific performance of the contract. ( 7 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff contended that, when the land is acquired during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract and if the contract could not be enforced due to the acquisition of the land under the Land acquisition Act, he is still entitled to receive the compensation. It is his case that the agreement of sale became unenforceable not because of any fault on his part, but because of the intervention of the land acquisition proceedings and so he is entitled to the compensation amount in case he is entitled to specific performance of the contract. In support of his contention, he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Jagdish Singh v natthu Singh, but on a close reading of that decision, I am clearly of the opinion that the learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff is under misapprehension in regard to the scope and purport of the dictum laid down in that decision. In that case, a suit was filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 3-7-1993 for reconveying the property for an amount of Rs. 15,000/- within two years. Based on that agreement, the suit for specific performance was filed. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court and by the District Judge, but in the second appeal, the High Court reversed the finding of the two Courts below and allowed the appeal and held that the respondent-plaintiff was ready and willing to perform the contract and that the respondent-plaintiff was entitled to a decree for specific performance. ( 8 ) DURING the pendency of the second appeal before the High Court, the State had initiated proceedings for compulsory acquisition of the suit properties. ( 8 ) DURING the pendency of the second appeal before the High Court, the State had initiated proceedings for compulsory acquisition of the suit properties. On this basis, it was contended before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the contract became incapable of specific performance in view of the fact that the subject-matter of the suit itself ceased to be available. As the land was acquired during the pendency of the second appeal before the High Court, it was contended that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. The High Court held that, by the acquisition of the land plaintiffs right do not get extinguished in totality and that Appellate Court can suitably mould the relief which the circumstances of the case may require or permit. Consequently, the High Court gave a direction that, if the decree for specific performance of contract in question is found incapable of being executed due to acquisition of subject land, the decree shall stand suitably substituted by a decree for realisation of compensation payable in lieu thereof as may be or have been determined under the relevant Act. It was further provided that the plaintiff shall have a right to recover such compensation together with solatium and interest due thereon. It was further provided that, if the defendant had already realised the land acquisition amount, the plaintiff shall have a right to recover from the defendant. 10. Though the Supreme Court confirmed the finding of the high Court that the plaintiff was entitled for specific should be separately examined on the footing that the receipt is an instrument separately chargeable to stamp duty". It appears to me that the acknowledgment of debt would create a cause of action by itself and it is the duty of the Court to mould the relief sought for without reference to the pronote. There is undoubtedly in this case an acknowledgment of debt. It is not the case of the defendants that they did not borrow the money as the defendants have chosen to remain ex parte. The trial Court misdirected itself in dismissing the suit in the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the civil revision petition is allowed and the suit is decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff. The Trial Court is directed to draw up the decree accordingly. The trial Court misdirected itself in dismissing the suit in the facts and circumstances of the case. Consequently, the civil revision petition is allowed and the suit is decreed as prayed for by the plaintiff. The Trial Court is directed to draw up the decree accordingly. The able assistance of Sri Srivatsa, learned Counsel for the petitioner is placed on record. No costs. --- *** --- .