S. K. Mahajan,j. ( 1 ) THIS order will dispose of the application of the plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code for the grant of an injunction as well as the application of the defendant under Order 39 Rule 4 Civil Procedure Code for vacating the ex parte order of injunction and also the application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code filed by the defendant for permission to carry on the construction. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff has filed this suit on the allegations that defendant No. 1 was allotted the plot in question by the DLF; that defendant No. l sold the said plot to one Smt. Vidya, defendant No. 6 by a registered sale deed and by a registered general power of attorney, she appointed defendant No. 5 as her general attorney. It is alleged that the plaintiff along with his wife purchased plots of 100 sq. yds. each from defendant No. 5, general attorney of defendant No. 6 and the remaining 300 sq. yds. plot was purchased by defendant No. 3, defendant No. 2 and defendant No. 4 in equal shares; 530 that the sale deeds were duly registered in the name of the plaintiff. The further allegations in the plaint are that in 1991-92 aforesaid purchasers jointly applied to the Income-Tax department for permission undersection 269 UC of the Income-Tax Act for sale of the property in favour of Nath Meichantile Private Limited at a price of Rs. 75,00,000. 00 ; that the Income-Tax department, however, by order dated 17th January, 1991 acquired the property under Chapter XX C of the Act; that defendant No. l filed a writ petition being CWP. No-568/91 in this Court. against Income-Tax Department as well as against the plaintiff and his wife and defendant No. 2 to 6 contending that-the plot was never sold by her to defendant No. 6 from whom the plaintiff and other defendants have alleged to have purchased the same. The writ petition was admitted for hearing and the parties were directed to maintain status quo with regard to possession. During the course of hearing of the petition, it was observed that there was a dispute with regard to title of the property which could be decided only by a Civil Court and defendant No. l was given liberty to file a suit for adjudicating the dispute regarding the title. During the course of hearing of the petition, it was observed that there was a dispute with regard to title of the property which could be decided only by a Civil Court and defendant No. l was given liberty to file a suit for adjudicating the dispute regarding the title. Defendant No. l accordingly, on August 28, 1994 filed a suit for declaration and cancellation of the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff, in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, which suit is still pending and is being contested by the plaintiff and his wife. Other defendants, however, did not appear in the said suit and are not contesting the same. It is further alleged that though the suit in the Court of Civil Judge was adjourned to 11th July, 1995, cn. 3rd July, 1995, certain persons alleging themselves to be the representatives of defendant No. 6 approached the plaintiff and asked him to settle the matter with respect to his share in the plot and he was informed that defendant No. l had sold the property to defendant No. 7 under a collaboration agreement; that when the plaintiff went to see the plot in question, he was shocked to see that some labourers, were involved in digging the land on the plot. The plaintiff, therefore, claiming himself to be the owner of 200 sq. yds. of land filed this suit for an injunction for restraining the defendants from raising any construction or creating any third party rights or interest in the plot in question. It is also alleged in the plaint that raising of the construction by defendant No. 7 and transfer of plot in his favour by defendant No. l was in Clear violation of the order of status quo passed by this Court in CWP. No-563/91 and the defendants could not be allowed to continue to construct or create third party rights in the property. ( 3 ). By an exparte order passed on August 2,1995, the parties were directed to maintain status. quo with regard to the plot in question and the defendants were restrained from creating third party interest therein. ( 4 ) EVER after the passing of the order of status quo, it appears the defendants continued to raise construction on the plot of land and the plaintiff, therefore, filed an application being IA. quo with regard to the plot in question and the defendants were restrained from creating third party interest therein. ( 4 ) EVER after the passing of the order of status quo, it appears the defendants continued to raise construction on the plot of land and the plaintiff, therefore, filed an application being IA. No-11951/95 for initiating contempt of Court proceedings against defendant Nos. l and 7. In reply to the contempt application, defendants I and 7 have stated that as per advice of their counsel, they were under a bonafide impression that the order of status quo passed by this Court was limited only to the alienation of the suit property and did not enjoin or call upon the said defendants not to carry on the construction,on the plot of land. The said defendants, however, tendered uncondition apology for their having continued to carry on the construction and submitted that construction had been stopped by them immediately after it was brought to their notice that the order of status quo also amounted to the stay of further construction. ( 5 ) DEFENDANTS 1 and 7 have Filed a joint written statement and it has been stated that defendant No. 1 is the exclusive owner, of the property in question in which neither the plaintiff nor any other defendants has any interest; that suit is based upon misrepresentation in as much as the plaintiff is not in possession of the suit property which is allegedly evident from the fact that in CWP. No. 568/91 no such plea had been taken by him;. in spite of the alleged dispossession, the plaintiff has not lodged any report anywhere, no details of the day or time have been given when he had allegedly been dispossessed. It is further stated that as defendant No. l was the owner and in exclusive possession of the property in suit, he had every right to raise the construction thereon. Defendants I and 7, therefore, wanted the suit as well as the application to bedismissed. None of the other defendants has been served and the report on the summons is that they do not live at the addresses given in the plaint. ( 6 ) THOLIGH, it has been alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff had purchased a part of, the property comprising of 100-sq. yds. in his own name and another 100 sq. yds. ( 6 ) THOLIGH, it has been alleged in the plaint that the plaintiff had purchased a part of, the property comprising of 100-sq. yds. in his own name and another 100 sq. yds. in the name of his wife from defendant No. 6, however, the case of defendant No. 1 is that she had not sold any part of the land to defendant No. 6. In the present suit, the plaintiff has alleged that it was at the end of July, 1995 that he had been dispossessed from the property, however, no date or the manner in which he has been dispossessed is given in the plaint. It is also not been stated in the plaint as to whether the property had been partitioned into Five different plots of 100 sq. yds. each and whether the possession of each of such parcel of land was with the person to whom the said portion was alleged to have been sold by defendant No. 6. The report on the summons sent to defendant No. 6 is that no such person is living at the address given in the plaint. Till date no other address has been furnished by the plaintiff on whom the said defendant could be served. In the written statement which had been filed by the plaintiff in reply to the suit Filed by defendant No. l in the Court of the Civil Judge fora declaration that she had not sold the property to defendant No. 6 or to the present plaintiff, the stand taken by the present plaintiff is that the present defendant No. l had taken forcible possession from the present plaintiff and his wife. The said written statement has been verified on 8th September, 1994 and was filed in the Court on the same day. The relevant portion of the written statement of the present plaintiff and his wife in suit No-1734/94 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge was in the following terms : - "para 3 is wrong and the same is denied. It is denied that answering defendants with the connivance of the allied associates hatched a criminal conspiracy to cheat and defraud the plaintiff are taking forcible possession of the plot. It is submitted that plaintiff has taken possession forcibly from the answering defendants. Since plaintiff is influencial person and police has not received complaint from answering defendants. It is denied that answering defendants with the connivance of the allied associates hatched a criminal conspiracy to cheat and defraud the plaintiff are taking forcible possession of the plot. It is submitted that plaintiff has taken possession forcibly from the answering defendants. Since plaintiff is influencial person and police has not received complaint from answering defendants. " ( 7 ) IN case, the stand taken by the present plaintiff in the written statement in suit No. 1734/94 pending in the Court of the Civil Judge is correct that he had already been forcibly dispossessed, the plea now taken in the present, written statement that he along with his wife was in possession of the plot in question till the last week of July, 1995, when they were allegedly dispossessed by defendants I and 7, appears to be false on the face of it. It does not appeal to reasoning that a person who according to his own showing was not in possession in September, 1994 would have obtained possession thereafter. It is not even the case of the plaintiff that he had been able to obtain possession after he had filed the written statement in the Court of the Civil Judge. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiff has not approached the Court with clean hands and has suppressed the material fact of his having been not in possession even in 1994. That itself, in my opinion, is sufficient to disentitle the plaintiff to the grant of an ad interim order of injunction. ( 8 ) ADMITTEDLY, defendant No. 1 was in possession of the property in question as on the date when the construction had commenced and I, therefore, sec no reason as to why at the instance of the plaintiff there should be any restriction upon the defendant in the construction of the property. As held in Salwan Educational Trust Vs. L. G. , 1986 RLR (NSC) 2, when the defendant was in possession of the disputed land on the date of the filing of the suit, there was no justification to restrain him from putting up construction thereon, however, conditions of removal of the construction can. still be imposed by the Court. As held in Salwan Educational Trust Vs. L. G. , 1986 RLR (NSC) 2, when the defendant was in possession of the disputed land on the date of the filing of the suit, there was no justification to restrain him from putting up construction thereon, however, conditions of removal of the construction can. still be imposed by the Court. ( 9 ) WHILE, therefore, I am of the opinion that the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction and defendant No. 1 may be entitled to raise construction on the plot of land on her giving an undertaking to remove the construction within six months of the suit being decided against her, the question still remains is whether defendants 1 and 7 can be permitted to continue with the construction. It is admitted case of the parties that the Income-Tax department had by anorder passed under Chapter XX-C of the lncome Tax Act, acquired the property and the proceedings for quashing the said order arc pending in the writ petition filed by defendant No. l in this Court. It is also admitted case of the parties that in the said writ petition, the Court had passed an order vectiong. the parties to maintain status quo. Though, the contention of the defendants counsel is that this order of status quo will not come in the way of the said defendant to raise the construction on the plot of land as the said order of status quo is only with regard to possession, however, I fee] that till such time the matter is clarified by the Division Bench, the defendant cannot be allowed to continue with the construction nor can they be permitted to change the character of the property, which is sought to be acquired by the Income-Tax Department. ( 10 ) WITH these observations, the application of the plaintiff is disposed of.