Devinder Gupta ( 1 ) RULE. D. B. ( 2 ) LEARNED counsel for the parties agree that the petition may be heard and disposed of. ( 3 ) PETITIONER on 15. 7. 1974 joined as a teacher with respondent No. 2, a school duly recognised under the Delhi School Education Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the act ). As a result of certain domestic circumstances, the petitioner on 21. 10. 1994, through communication, annexure R-7/a, addressed to the Principal of the School, informed that she was unable to continue serving the School. She prayed that the communication be considered as three months notice. It was accordingly treated as a resignation by her. ( 4 ) IT is petitioner s case that the resignation tendered by her would have become effective only on the expiry of the period of three months on 21. 1. 1995. Or in case it was to be treated as resignation the same would also become effective from the date of its acceptance by the Managing Committee of the School with the approval of the Director of Education, as per the requirements of Rule 114-A of the Delhi School Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the rules ). Before this was accepted by the Managing Committee or approval could be granted by the Director of Education, she through her representation dated 11. 11. 1994 expressed her desire to withdraw the letter of resignation dated 21. 10. 1994. It was on 8. 12. 1994 that the petitioner was informed that her request for withdrawal had not been accepted by the School authorities but no reason was assigned for the same She repeatedly had been pressing upon the School Authorities to permit her to discharge her duties thereafter but she was not permitted to join her duties instead she was given a wrong impression that she would not be entitled to reinstatement in any circumstance, after tendering her resignation and the subsequent withdrawal dated 11. 11. 1994 was of no consequence. Under this wrong impression she placed a demand for payment of gratuity and other dues but no amount till date of filing of the petition was paid to her. Only a cheque for Rs. 4,879. 00 was received by her along with letter dated 7. 4. 1995, which she had not got encashed. This fact was also intimated to respondent No -. Only a cheque for Rs. 4,879. 00 was received by her along with letter dated 7. 4. 1995, which she had not got encashed. This fact was also intimated to respondent No -. 2 through representation dated 10. 5. 1995. Her case is that after having tendered resignation, before it could be accepted by the Competent Authority and approval accorded thereupon by the Director of Education, she had withdrawn the same and any order passed thereafter will be void ab-initio and the act of respondent No -. 2 in not permitting her to continue performing her job in the School, as a teacher till the age of normal superannuation is bad in law. Contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules she was being deprived other legitimate rights. Consequently she has prayed for treating the letter of resignation as redundant and ineffective in view of her letter of withdrawal dated 11. 11. 1994 and has sought for quashing of communication dated 8. 12. 1994 and 31. 5. 1995 to be illegal and invalid and in violation of provisions of Rule 114 A of the Rules. ( 5 ) THE stand of respondent No. 2 in its reply is that she voluntarily tendered her resignation on 21. 10. 1994, which was accepted on 22. 10. 1994 by the Manager of the School, the appointing authority in the case of the petitioner. Due intimation was sent to the petitioner on 27,10. 1994. The matter of acceptance of resignation was thereafter sent to Director of Education for his approval through letter dated 7. 11. 1994. Respondent No. 1 thereafter asked respondent No. 2 to submit a resolution of the Managing Committee in relation to the resignation. Normally no resolution regarding acceptance of resignation is required, but a resolution thereafter was passed by the Staff Matters Sub Committee of respondent No. 2. In the meanwhile petitioner had approached Management of respondent No. 2, expressing her desireto withdraw her resignation on 11. 11. 1994. Petitioner was apprised through reply dated 8. 12. 1994 that request for withdrawal of resignation had not been accepted. In view of the fact that respondent No. 1 accorded his approval on the acceptance of the resignation through letter dated 21 12. 1994, the same cannot be permitted to be challenged. 11. 1994. Petitioner was apprised through reply dated 8. 12. 1994 that request for withdrawal of resignation had not been accepted. In view of the fact that respondent No. 1 accorded his approval on the acceptance of the resignation through letter dated 21 12. 1994, the same cannot be permitted to be challenged. Petitionerwas aware of the progress in the matter and after period of three months from the date of tendering resignation she on 21. 1. 1995 was relieved from School. Relieving letter, annexure VII was signed by her. Petitioner felt satisfied with The acceptance and later accordingly she moved an application regarding payment of gratuity and other dues. Pursuant to her request, respondent No. 2 sent a cheque, which was received by the petitioner in full and final settlement of her dues. A fare-well party was also arranged by the Staff Welfare Committee on 21. 1. 1995. No grievance was made by the petitioner against the School and in these circumstances, the petitioner will be deemed to have acquiesced in the action of respondent No. 2 in accepting the resignation and is estopped from questioning the legality and validity of the acceptance of her resignation due to her acts and conduct. ( 6 ) PETITIONER in her rejoinder has controverted the stand of respondent No. 2 and has reiterated her stand that there is no estoppel in the case. The cheque was not got encashed by her and due to non- compliance of provisions of Rule 114-A of the Rules, there is no valid acceptance. Not only the act of acceptance of resignation by the Manager of School is void but the resignation itself became ineffective from the date when she withdrew it on 11. 11. 1994. ( 7 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record, which was made available to us on behalf of respondent No. 2 in Court. ( 8 ) IT is not in dispute that in the matter of acceptance of resignation compliance of Rule 114 A of the Delhi School Education Rules is necessary. Rule 114 A reads: "114-A Resignation The resignation submitted by an employee of a recognised private school shall be accepted within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the managing committee with the approval of the Director. Rule 114 A reads: "114-A Resignation The resignation submitted by an employee of a recognised private school shall be accepted within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the managing committee with the approval of the Director. Provided that if no approval is received within 30 days, then such approval would be deemed to have been received after the expiry of the said period. " ( 9 ) A bare reading of the Rule would show that there are two conditions precedent in order to make the resignation effective, namely, it must be accepted within a period of thirty days from the date of the receipt of the resignation by the Managing Committee and such acceptance should be with the approval of the Director of Education. The approval, if not received within thirty days, the Director will be deemed to have accorded the approval after the expiry of thirty days. ( 10 ) WE are not inclined to accept the respondents version that the acceptance of the resignation by the Manager on22. 10. 1994isa valid acceptance or that it is acceptance by the appointing authority. Respondents stand that the Manager of the School, in the case of. the petitioner,, is the appointing authority is wholly fallacious. The contract of service, copy of which we directed respondent No. 2 to be placed on record, on the face of it reflects that the same was entered into, as per the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Delhi School Education Act and the Rules between the petitioner and the Managing Committee of the School. The same on behalf of the Managing Committee of the School has been signed by the Manager. The mere fact that the Manager has signed the contract of service "for and on behalf of the Managing Committee" will not make the Manager of the School as the Appointing Authority. Appointing Authority will remain the Managing Committee and it is Managing Committee, who alone is competent to accept the resignation, which is also one of the essential requirements of Rule1 14-A of the Rules. There has been no acceptance of the resignation, as is frankly admitted on behalf of respondent No. 2, by the Managing Committee, prior to receipt of letter of withdrawal dated 11. 11. 1994. Neither before the Staff Matters Sub Committee, which passed the resolution on 28. 11. There has been no acceptance of the resignation, as is frankly admitted on behalf of respondent No. 2, by the Managing Committee, prior to receipt of letter of withdrawal dated 11. 11. 1994. Neither before the Staff Matters Sub Committee, which passed the resolution on 28. 11. 1994, nor to the Director of Education, the petitioner s request for withdrawal dated 11. 11 1994 was forwarded. In case resignation had not been accepted by the Managing Committee prior to 11. 11. 1994, acceptance by the Manager on 22. 10. 1994 will be ineffective and all actions taken on the basis of this acceptance would be redundant, in view of withdrawal of the resignation by the petitioner on 11. 11. 1994. The resignation would become effective only on its acceptance by the Competent Authority and not beforethat and it is a well settled proposition in law that resignation, before it becomes effective, can be withdrawn and in the instant case the same admittedly had been duly withdrawn by the petitioner on 11. 11. 1994. The act of respondent No. 2, as such, in relieving the petitioner or in treating the petitioner relieved from service on 21. 1. 1995 is also bad in law since the petitioner could not have been relieved on the basis of void orders. ( 11 ) THE question now would be that whether due to any of her acts or conduct the petitioner would be estopped from pursuing her claim. The acts and conduct as attributable to the petitioner, as stated on behalf of respondent No. 2, are the acceptance of farewell party, receiving letter relieving her; and accepting a cheque for Rs. 4,879. 00 towards full and final settlement of dues through annexure R-9 It is petitioner s case that cheque till date has not been got encashed by her and it is also not disputed that on 10. 3. 1995 the petitioner through notice annexure P-3 challenged the alleged actions of the respondents and apprised the respondents of the fact that she has not accepted the amount and got encashed the cheque, In these circumstances we are of the view that principle of estoppel will not be applicable. Doctrine of estoppel cannot be made applicable in this case, assuming that by her alleged acts or conduct she accepted the acceptance of resignation to be valid. Doctrine of estoppel cannot be made applicable in this case, assuming that by her alleged acts or conduct she accepted the acceptance of resignation to be valid. Any admission on a point of law or in ignorance of legal rights does not create an estoppel. No question of estoppel can arise when the parties are labouring under a misapprehension or mistake of law. Respondent No. 2 was aware of true state of affairs. The petitioner was not the Managing Committee of the School had not accepted her resignation. Respondent No. 2 acted on the acceptance of petitioner s her resignation by trie Manager, who was not competent to do so. In case there was no acceptance of the resignation prior to 11. 11. 1994, even the Staff Matters Sub Committee or the Director of Education could not have proceeded to accept the same or granting approval to the acceptance, when the letter of resignation stood withdrawn on 11. 11. 1994. Petitioner has not taken any undue advantage or benefit and respondent No. 2 cannot be said to have changed their position to their detriment due to acts and conduct of the petitioner. It was due to the wrongful acts of the respondents in making the petitioner to believe that acceptance of her resignation was by an authority competent to do so. In these circumstances, petitioner is not debarred from agitating her rights. ( 12 ) CONSEQUENTLY, holding the act of acceptance of resignation to be void, we allow the writ petition, quash the decision of respondent No. 2 communicated through letters dated 8. 12. 1994 and 31. 5. 1995 and direct respondent No. 2 to take the petitioner back in service forthwith with full back salary and allowances for the intervening period. The intervening period for all intents and purposes will betaken as the period spent on duty. Petitioner will also be entitled to costs of the petition quantified at Rs. 2,000. 00