Judgment :- Arunachalam, J. The prayer in this petition is for issue of a habeas directing the respondent herein, who is the Inspector of Police, ‘Q’ Branch Police, Tanjore District, to produce Velmurugan alias Selvam before this Court, so that he could so set at liberty from illegal detention. 2. In the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner, who in the brother of the detenu, he has stated that the detenu has been falsely implicated in a prosecution relating to offences punishable under Sec.3 of Prevention of Damages to Public Properties Act and Sec.5 of Explosive Substances Act. Detenu was arrested on 19. 1995 and remanded to judicial custody without any incriminating material. Thereafter, remand of the detenu was extended from time to time mechanically without application of mind, when he was produced before Judicial Magistrate No. II, Kumbakonam. On 211. 1995, the said Magistrate while extending the remand, observed that the detenu would be produced before the Court of Session, Tanjore, on the next date of hearing. However, the detenu was not produced before any court after 211. 1995 and hence detention beyond 112. 1995 is illegal and violative of Art.21 of the Constitution of India. Petitioner has further stated in his affidavit that no Magistrate can competently authorise detention beyond 15 days at a time under Sec. 167 or under Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and hence the detention will have to be struck down as illegal. 3. Notice was ordered in this habeas corpus petition on 3. 1996. A counter-affidavit has been sworn to by R. Subramanian, Inspector of Police, ‘Q’ Branch C.I.D. Tanjore. After denying the allegations contained in the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner, respondent has stated that this habeas corpus petition cannot be maintained either on the basis of allegations contained in the affidavit or on the contention raised. He has further stated that Velmurugan has an alias name Selvam, although the petitioner had chosen to describe him as two different persons. According to the respondent Velmurugan alias Selvam was arrested on 19. 1995 in connection with Crime No.222 of 1992 registered for offences punishable under Secs.447, 427 and 120, I.P.C., Sec.3 of Prevention of Damages to Public Properties Act. Sec.5 of Explosive Substances Act and Sec. 10 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1962. Detenu was produced before Judicial Magistrate No.II, Kumbakonam, who remanded him to judicial custody on 19. 1995 in connection with Crime No.222 of 1992 registered for offences punishable under Secs.447, 427 and 120, I.P.C., Sec.3 of Prevention of Damages to Public Properties Act. Sec.5 of Explosive Substances Act and Sec. 10 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1962. Detenu was produced before Judicial Magistrate No.II, Kumbakonam, who remanded him to judicial custody on 19. 1995 itself. After completion of investigation, final report was laid on 29. 1995. Judicial Magistrate No.II, Kumbakonam, committed the case against the detenu on 211. 1995 to facilitate trial by the Court of Session, Tanjore. Under Sec.209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Magistrate had passed orders committing the case, while remanding the detenu to jail custody. The case records were received by the Sessions court, Tanjore, on 212. 1995. After taking on file, the learned Sessions Judge, Tanjore, made over the case to Assistant Sessions Judge, Kumbakonam on 212. 1995 itself. Records were received by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Kumbakonam, on 212. 1995 and the case is passed for further proceedings before the said court on 23. 1996. Jail authorities had been directed to produce the detenu the said court on 23. 1996. The deponent has further stated that the detenu is now in custody pursuant to a valid order and as such this habeas corpus petition deserves to be dismissed in limine. 4. We have heard in very great detail Mr.R. Sankara Subbu, petitioner’s learned counsel, and Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor. A few decided cases were cited before us by Mr.R. Sankara Subbu which we will mention in passing, for most of them do not relate to the issue involved in this habeas corpus petition. In his turn, Mr.B. Sriramulu, learned Public Prosecutor, has referred to certain decided cases, which we will consider at the appropriate time. 5. Facts stated above indicate that the detenu was arrested on 19. 1995 and he was duly remanded on the same day. After final report was laid, committal proceedings stood commenced, and on 211. 1995 detenu was committed to take his trial before the Court of Sessions, Tanjore. 5. Facts stated above indicate that the detenu was arrested on 19. 1995 and he was duly remanded on the same day. After final report was laid, committal proceedings stood commenced, and on 211. 1995 detenu was committed to take his trial before the Court of Sessions, Tanjore. A copy of the committal order was placed before us by the learned Public Prosecutor, which shows that the learned Magistrate, while committing the detenu as well as four others to take their trial before the Court of Session, has observed that such of those accused, who were already on bail, shall continue to be on bail, while those in remand will continue to be in jail in terms of Sec.209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the detenu is now in prison, in terms of an order passed under Sec.209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it will be necessary to extract the said section. "209. Commitment of case to Court of Session when offence is triable exclusively by it: When in a case instituted on a police report or otherwise, the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall- (a)..... (b) Subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during, and until the conclusion of, the trial." Under Sec.209(a) when it appeared to the Magistrate that the offence was triable exclusively by a Court of Session, he shall have to commit the case, after complying with the provisions of Sec.207 or Sec.208 of the Code as the case may be. Of course, subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, the Magistrate shall have to remand the accused to custody until such commitment stood made. Under Sec.209(b) of the Code, the learned committal Magistrate, subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, remanding the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial. Sec.209(b) of the Code is a special provision and naturally, it will over-ride the other general provision contained in the Code. Further., under Sec.209(b) of the Code, remand is subject to provisions of the Code relating to bail and this sub section does not refer to any other provision of the Code, to which such remand shall be subjected to. Sec.209(b) of the Code is a special provision and naturally, it will over-ride the other general provision contained in the Code. Further., under Sec.209(b) of the Code, remand is subject to provisions of the Code relating to bail and this sub section does not refer to any other provision of the Code, to which such remand shall be subjected to. It is not as though this question has not been considered earlier by courts. 6. In Sunder Lal v. State, 1983 Crl.L.J. 736, a Full Bench of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, while scrutinising the provisions of the Code under Secs. 167, 209, 309, 380 and 437, stated as hereunder, after extracting the provisions under Secs. 167 and 309 of the Code: "The learned counsel contended that both these provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code provided for detention of an accused for a definite period and if no period has been specified in the detention warrant then the custody of the applicant in jail would be rendered illegal. The argument of the learned counsel apparently appears to be extremely facinating, but is devoid of substance. It has already been mentioned above that the applicant had been committed to the Court of Session to stand trial." Thereafter, provisions of Sec.209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were extracted. Thence forth the following observations follow: "Sec.209, Crl.P.C. has been introduced by the new Code of Criminal Procedure and it provides for commitment of a case which is exclusively triable by a Court of Session. The wordings of this section are very relevant, the words "subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail" refer to Secs.436, 437, 438 and 439 of the Code which contain provisions relating to bail. The power of the committing Magistrate to cancel the bail of an accused who has been bailed out by him and to remand him to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, is subject to the provisions contained in Sec.437(5) of the Code, hence the committing Magistrate who has admitted the accused to bail under Sec.437(1) or (2) may cancel his bail and commit him to custody if he considers it necessary to do so. The Magistrate, however should exercise his discretion in taking the accused into custody at the time of committing the case on sound judicial principles and should not act arbitrarily. The Magistrate, however should exercise his discretion in taking the accused into custody at the time of committing the case on sound judicial principles and should not act arbitrarily. This Sec.209 of the Code empowers the committing Magistrate to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions relating to bail. The period therefore, of the judicial custody of the accused is not indefinite nor can it be said arbitrary as the custody is for the period starting with the commencement of the sessions trial and lasts till its conclusion. This period has been made subject to the condition that the applicant may be admitted to bail provided the applicant satisfies the court that he is entitled to be bailed out. Sec. 167 relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant also envisages that in case a charge sheet has not been submitted within a period of 90 days or 60 days the applicant is entitled to bail provided he furnished bail. The law does not envisage that on expiry of the period his detention in jail would become illegal. The Legislature in its wisdom has only provided an opportunity to the detenu to avail for being enlarged on bail. Sec.309, Crl.P.C, deals with the postponement of the commencement or adjournment of any inquiry or trial and also for remand of the case where such postponement or adjournment is made. The powers of the Magistrate are thus regulated for postponement and adjournment by this section......A reading of Sec.209, Criminal Procedure Code shows that it is a self-contained Code...... The statutory requirement of a separate order in writing with reasons therefor, is only in respect of commitment and not in respect of remanding the accused to jail custody for which mere issue of warrant of remand is sufficient......This section vests the Magistrate with a power to authorise the detention of accused in jail custody during and until the conclusion of the trial while committing his to stand his trial before the Sessions Court. In such a case even though all further proceedings are to take place before the Court of Session and no proceedings are to take place before the Magistrate the detention of the accused in jail custody can be authorised by the Magistrate who commits the accused to sessions. In such a case even though all further proceedings are to take place before the Court of Session and no proceedings are to take place before the Magistrate the detention of the accused in jail custody can be authorised by the Magistrate who commits the accused to sessions. In the instant case that Magistrate while passing the order dated 3. 1982, has clearly directed, as mentioned above, that the applicant should be keep in judicial custody in District Jail during and until the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, the order authorising the applicant’s detention is perfectly in accordance with the provisions contained in Sec.209, Crl.P.C, and if authorises the Superintendent, District Jail, to keep the applicant in his custody during and until the conclusion of the sessions trial......the period as a matter of fact has been mentioned in the warrant itself and that period commences from the date of commencement of the trial until its conclusion...... In fact, clause (b) renders the detention of the applicant during and until the conclusion of the trial subject to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to bail. This removes the indefiniteness as argued by the learned counsel for the applicant." 7. An identical view was taken was by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Zabbar v. Superintendent of District Jail, Meerut and others, (1984)1 Crimes 512 . The sum and substance of the verdict rendered is that a remand order under Sec.209 (b) of the Criminal Procedure Code, becomes effective as soon as it is made. That is to say, a trial before the sessions court becomes pending as soon as the case in committed to it. Secondly, if an order remanding the accused to jail custody is passed by a Magistrate under Sec.209(b), Criminal Procedure Code, then the Superintendent requires no order under Sec.309, Criminal Procedure Code from the Sessions Court to authorise the detention of the accused. After extracting the provisions of Sec.209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that Division Bench has stated as hereunder: "This section clearly enables the Magistrate to, while committing the case of a person accused of offences triable exclusively by a Court of Session to that court, authorise his detention for the duration of the session trial. After extracting the provisions of Sec.209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that Division Bench has stated as hereunder: "This section clearly enables the Magistrate to, while committing the case of a person accused of offences triable exclusively by a Court of Session to that court, authorise his detention for the duration of the session trial. Once under Sec.209(b) of the Code an accused has been remanded to jail custody for the duration of the session trial the Jailer/ Superintendent, District Jail becomes entitled to keep him in custody during that period and no further authorisation for the purpose is required from the Court of Session. Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a general provision governing various inquiries and trial. Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.309 runs thus: "(2) If the court, after taking cognisance of an offence, or commencement of trial, finds necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn, any enquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody; Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time; Provided further...... Explanation (I)...... Explanation (II)...... This provision enables the court before which an inquiry or trial is pending to while adjourning the bearing of the same remand the accused who is already in custody for such terms as it thinks fit. Sec.209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure however is a specific provision pertaining to cases which in the opinion of the Magistrate are exclusively triable by a Court of Session, and it enables the Magistrate to pass an order remanding an accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the session trial It is well set led that a special provision in a statute governing a specific situation excludes the applicability of any general provision contained therein, to that situation. Accordingly, nothing contained in Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limits the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody for a period of fifteen days only will apply to a case where a Magistrate makes an order remanding the accused to custody while committing his case to Court of Session. Accordingly, nothing contained in Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which limits the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to remand an accused to custody for a period of fifteen days only will apply to a case where a Magistrate makes an order remanding the accused to custody while committing his case to Court of Session. As already stated, Sec.209 in very clear words authorises the Magistrate to pass an order directing the jail authorities to keep an accused in custody during and until the conclusion of the sessions trial and this is what has precisely been done in the instant case." We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed by the Full Bench and Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court. As a matter of fact, the provisions of Sec.209(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure are so clear, without any ambiguity surrounding it. The committing Magistrate will certainly be entitled under this provision to remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of sessions trial subject, of course, to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. 8. Let us now have a quick survey of the cases cited by Mr.R. Sankara Subbu, petitioner’s learned counsel in State of U.P. v. Lakshmi Brahman, A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 439: 1983 Crl.L.J. 839: (1983)2 S.C.C. 372 : 1983 S.C.C. (Crl.) 439, Supreme Court while considering Secs.2(g) 167, 170, 207, 209, 309 and 439, Crl.P.C. stated that. "From the time the accused appeared or was produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Sec. 170 and the Magistrate proceeded to enquire whether Sec.207 had been complied with and then proceeded to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Sec.2(g) of the Code. "From the time the accused appeared or was produced before the Magistrate with the police report under Sec. 170 and the Magistrate proceeded to enquire whether Sec.207 had been complied with and then proceeded to commit the accused to the Court of Session, the proceeding before the Magistrate would be an inquiry as contemplated by Sec.2(g) of the Code. Obviously Sec.309 would enable the Magistrate to remand the accused to the custody till the inquiry to be made was complete......It was incorrect to say that after the accused was brought before the court alone with the police report the Magistrate must forthwith commit the accused to the Court of Session because the Magistrate has no jurisdiction in the absence of any provision to remand the accused to custody till the order committing the case to the Court of Session was made." It is very clear, that the Supreme Court was considering, the power to release on bail or remand to custody of an accused, after submission of chargesheet and before passing of the order of committal. We are now concerned with a case where, on committal the learned Magistrate has passed an order under Sec.209(b) of the Code. The decision of the Supreme Court in the aforestated case does not enure in favour of the detenu. 9. In C.Sathyanarayana v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 2130: (1986)1 A.P.L.J. (S.C.) 66: (1986)3 S.C.C. 141 : 1986 S.C.C. (Crl.) 321: (1986)3 S.C.J. 121, Supreme Court while referring to Secs. 167(2) and 309 of the Code, relating to powers of remand of a Magistrate, under two different provisions, observed that they call for a harmonious reading insofar as the period of remand was concerned. We are not concerned with those sections, for the specific issue involved is about the scope of power exercisable by the Magistrate under Sec.209(b) of the Code, on committal of a case to a Court of Session for trial. 10. The question considered in C.B.I. v. Anupam J. Kulkarni, 1992 S.C.C. (Crl) 554 also centers round Sec.167 and Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the ultimate Principle enunciated was that the Judicial Magistrate can, in the first instance, authorise detention of an accused in either police or Judicial custody from time to time, but the total period of detention cannot exceed 15 days in the whole. Within this period of 15 days, there can be more than one order changing the nature of such custody either from police to judicial or vice versa. Likewise, the remand under Sec.309, Crl.P.C. can only be to judicial custody in terms mentioned therein. Sec.309 comes into operation, after taking cognizance and not during the period of investigation and the remand under this provision can only be judicial custody and there cannot be any controversy about the same.... After the expiry of the first period of 15 days the further remand during the period of investigation can only be in judicial custody. Police custody if found necessary, can be ordered only during the first period of 15 days. If a further interrogation is necessary, after the expiry of the period of first 15 days, there will be no bar to interrogating the accused, who is in judicial custody during the periods of 90 days or 60 days. It is not known as to how the petitioner on derive any benefit on the basis of the principles enunciated in this case. 11. The decision of the Supreme Court in Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra, 1992 S.C.C (Crl.) 870, was referred, to underline, that if two views are possible in the field of criminal justice involving the liberty of an individual, the concerned provision must be construed strictly in favour of individual liberty, since even the law expects early completion of investigation. That was a case where the Supreme Court was considering if bail could be granted under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, for failure to complete investigation within the period prescribed therein and if on mere presentation of the challan, bail can be cancelled at any time thereafter. Sec.209(b) of the Code is not ambiguous and the possibility of taking two different views, on interpretation of this section does not at all arise. 12. In Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 514:1978 M.L.J. (Crl.) 320: (1978)2 S.C.C. 39 : 1978 Crl.L.J. 642: 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 172: (1978)1 S.C.J. 449: (1978)2 S.C.R. 861 , the concept of a quick committal was underlined, we have crossed that stage and hence this decision has absolutely no bearing. 13. 12. In Sanjay Gandhi v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 514:1978 M.L.J. (Crl.) 320: (1978)2 S.C.C. 39 : 1978 Crl.L.J. 642: 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 172: (1978)1 S.C.J. 449: (1978)2 S.C.R. 861 , the concept of a quick committal was underlined, we have crossed that stage and hence this decision has absolutely no bearing. 13. In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 1675: 1978 Crl.L.J. 1741, Supreme Court stated, that for a prisoner all fundamental rights are an enforceable reality, though restricted by the fact of imprisonment. In the instant case, there cannot be any dispute that whatever rights the prisoner has, has been taken note of by us. 14. The principle laid down in Nimeon Sangma v. Home Secretary, Government of Meghalaya, 1980 L. W. (Crl.) 9, is that the Code of Criminal Procedure, in Secs. 167, 209 and 309, has emphasized the importance of speedy disposal of cases, including investigations and trials. That fact that court will certainly keep guard of. 15. Yet another Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Pushpendra Singh v. Superintendent District Jail, Nainital, 1984 Crl.L.J. 838, held as hereunder: “Sec.209(b) commands that the remand of the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial shall be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail. So any order passed under Sec.209(b) of the Code remanding the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of the trial, will be subject to the provisions of the Code relating to bail, irrespective of the fact that the order passed by the Magistrate does not clarify this fact. So it is not necessary for the Magistrate to clarify this position and the order will remain subject to the provisions of the Code even if this fact is not mentioned in the order. The order of remand passed by the Magistrate under Sec.209(b) is not illegal because the Magistrate has mentioned that the order is subject to any order which may be passed by the Sessions Court. The order of remand passed by Magistrate is not at all open to two interpretations in this case. It is a perfectly legal order passed under Sec.209(b) of the Code.” This decision supports our interpretation of Sec.209(b) of the Code. 16. The order of remand passed by Magistrate is not at all open to two interpretations in this case. It is a perfectly legal order passed under Sec.209(b) of the Code.” This decision supports our interpretation of Sec.209(b) of the Code. 16. Though it was sought to be contended that Sec.309 would be the only provision for remanding the accused by the Magistrate, we are unable to uphold the said submission. Sec.309 will come into operation, after cognizance is taken and till the order of committal is made and thereafter Sec.209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure will hold the field in cases committed for trial before the Court of Session. In other trials conducted before a Magistrate, Sec.309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, will certainly operate. We are unable to hold in favour of the petitioner either in law or on facts. 17. This habeas corpus petition, which has no merit, shall stand dismissed.