M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THE only point that falls for decision in this civil revision petition is with regard to the contention raised by the petitioner in relation to the interpretation of rule 443 of the Indian telegraph rules. The present petitioner was a partner of M/s. Poonam textiles and this firm was the subscriber in relation to telephone No. 3545. The bills in respect of this telephone had aggregated to Rs. 8,819/- and it is undisputed that these amounts had not been paid. The petitioner had a personal telephone at his residence which was No. 3987 and the telephone department issued a notice of disconnecting this telephone on the ground that the bill in respect of the other partnership telephone had not been paid. The petitioner at that stage filed a suit against the department wherein he contended that such action was impermissible in so far as the outstanding dues were not amounts recoverable from him as a subscriber or for that matter in respect of a telephone that had been rented by him. The trial court after hearing the parties accepted the contention raised by the petitioner and granted the injunction against the department. The matter was taken in appeal and the appeal court set aside this order. The appeal court accepted the department a contention that the petitioner was as much liable for the payment of the dues in respect of the partnership telephone as he was in respect of his personal telephone and that under the provisions of rule 443, it was permissible to disconnect his personal telephone on the ground of non-payment of dues in respect of the other line. It is against this Order that the present civil revision petition has been preferred. ( 2 ) PETITIONER's learned Advocate relies on the wording of rule 443 which is as follows:in particular what he emphasised is the clause "any telephone or telephones rented by him may be disconnected without notice. . . . It is against this Order that the present civil revision petition has been preferred. ( 2 ) PETITIONER's learned Advocate relies on the wording of rule 443 which is as follows:in particular what he emphasised is the clause "any telephone or telephones rented by him may be disconnected without notice. . . . " learned Advocate submits that two conditions are necessary, the first of them being that both the telephones must be telephones rented by the subscriber and secondly that there should be an outstanding due in respect of one of them and only in that case the coercive action as permitted by this rule be permitted against the second of the two telephones, or for that matter any other telephone line as long as it is rented out by the same subscriber. He submits that it is undisputed on facts, in the present case that the petitioner was not a subscriber in respect of the line rented out to M/s. Poonam textiles of which line or telephone the firm was the entity which rented it out. Learned Advocate submits that the trial court had very correctly drawn a distinction between the firm and individual which cannot be lost sight of and that therefore the appeal court was clearly in error. He seeks to draw considerable support from a decision of the gauhati High Court in Santhok Singh v Divisional Engineer Telephones Shillong. The gauhati High Court interpreted the ruling very strictly in view of the fact that it was virtually a penal provision and held that the expression him should be confined to a situation relating to. That telephone line alone. The court was of the view that if the dues in respect of a particular telephone have not been paid by the subscriber that the power of disconnection under Section 443 has to be limited to action in respect of that line alone and that it is not permissible to extend it to others. The reasoning proceeded on the footing that the dispute related to that particular telephone and that it could therefore not to be extended to others. It is on the basis of this ruling that the learned Advocate submits that the appellate Order is liable to be set aside. The reasoning proceeded on the footing that the dispute related to that particular telephone and that it could therefore not to be extended to others. It is on the basis of this ruling that the learned Advocate submits that the appellate Order is liable to be set aside. ( 3 ) RULE 443 empowers the department in cases of non-payment of bills to disconnect any telephone or telephones as and by way of coercive action. The real issue that arises is as to whether in respect of non-payment of dues by a subscriber that have accrued in relation to one telephone line of which the party is not a subscriber, action can be taken not to disconnect any other telephone lines of which the same party is a subscriber. It is true that the gauhati High Court has observed that if the dues are not paid, it is open to the telephone department to file a suit. That to my mind is an extreme view and an impractical one and a view that does violence to the provisions of rule 443. That any party who needs to recover dues including the telephone department can file a suit is not something that requires to be restated. In respect of services rendered by the state, the statutes do provide for some inbuilt coercive action as it was not considered practicable or necessary to drive the departments to the law courts for recovery of each of their dues. The law also took cognizance of the fact that situations of the present type would arise wherein the firm is supposed to have become a defaulter and therefore, short of taking the telephone instrument back there was no other action which the department could resort to nor would the firm come forward to pay the bill because it has ceased to do business and therefore no longer interested in paying the telephone services. The question arises as to whether any parallel coercive action is permissible within the frame work of law. It is for this reason that rule 443 has made provision for the disconnection of any other telephone or telephones rented by the subscriber. The wording of the rule does not circumscribe the action to the line in respect of which alone default has taken place. It is for this reason that rule 443 has made provision for the disconnection of any other telephone or telephones rented by the subscriber. The wording of the rule does not circumscribe the action to the line in respect of which alone default has taken place. By implication it is very clear that the department is given the power to take coercive action in respect of other lines which have been rented out by the same subscriber. ( 4 ) THE real issue that falls for determination in this case is a rather tricky position that has been pleaded namely that the subscriber in respect of the line in which the default has taken place was poornima textiles namely the firm and as far as the personal telephone of the petitioner was concerned, that he was the subscriber in his individual capacity. What the learned Advocate for the petitions submitted was that even on a liberal interpretation of rule 443, it might have been permissible to disconnect any other telephones of which the firm was the subscriber but that the rule cannot be expanded or include the personal telephone of the partner. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the position in law will have to be viewed very clearly. It is true that the subscriber in respect of the defaulting telephone was the firm but we will have to go a little deeper and ascertain as to from whom were the bills recoverable or against whom the department can proceed for purposes of recovering those outstanding dues. One cannot go by the technical nomenclatures while deciding these issues because the liability under the partnership ACT clearly foists a hundred per cent liability on everyone of the partners in respect of dues that are recoverable from the partners. Under these circumstances, the amount outstanding in respect of the partnership telephone was recoverable from the petitioner by the department within the framework of law and therefore, he is relegated to the position where the dues in respect of that line were amounts recoverable by him. The mere fact therefore that the telephone line technically stood in the name of the firm would pale into insignificance because the petitioner would be relegated virtually to the position of the subscriber having regard to this position in law. The mere fact therefore that the telephone line technically stood in the name of the firm would pale into insignificance because the petitioner would be relegated virtually to the position of the subscriber having regard to this position in law. If therefore, as indicated by me earlier, the department was within its rights to disconnect any other telephone for non-payment of dues in respect of this one, it will have to be held that the department did possess the power to do so in this case. One must realise that while interpreting rule 443 that it is not possible to read something into that rule which does not exist and which does not emerge from the plain reading of that rule. With utmost respect to the gauhati High Court therefore, I am unable to subscribe to the view as enunciated in the decision referred to by me supra. ( 5 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid position, it is clear that the appellate Order where under the interim relief has been vacated proceeds on a correct footing in law and does not deserve any interference with. The civil, revision petition accordingly fails and stands disposed of. Interim Order to stand vacated. --- *** --- .