Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. The petitioner is a Subordinate Judge serving in the State Judicial Service. While he was functioning as III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, a suit filed by one Suhura Beevi Educational Trust, pending on the file of the VI Assistant Judge as O.S. No. 9188 of 1992 was transferred to the file of the petitioner by an order passed in O.P. No. 215 of 1993. There were three defendants in the suit, viz., (1) the Government of Tamil Nadu, (2) the Director of Legal Studies, Madras and (3) The Registrar, Manonmaniam Sundaranar University, Thirunelveli. The prayers in the suit were for declaration that the plaintiff was a Muslim religious minority trust and for consequential injunction restraining the defendants from implementing certain Sections of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and some Rules framed thereunder, besides Statute 21 of Chapter XXVI of the Laws of the University. There was an application for interim injunction. The University had filed a counter affidavit in the said application and also a written statement in the suit. The suit stood posted to 30-9-1993. 2. The plaintiff in the suit filed I.A. No. 15580 of 1993 for advancing the hearing of the suit and notice was ordered to the respondents on 20-9-1993. Though notice was served on defendants 1 and 2, it was not served on the third defendant. When the matter was called on 23-9-1993, the counsel for defendants 1 and 2 made an endorsement, “Since the written statement is ready, I am not filing any counter in this application”. The counsel for the plaintiff made an endorsement, “As against the third respondent there is no relief in the suit and therefore I am not pressing the 3rd respondent/defendant”. At the same time, an endorsement was made by the said counsel on the plaint as follows:— “The suit as against the 3rd defendant is withdrawn as not pressed”. The petitioner herein made an endorsement on the plaint, “Recorded”. 3. The petitioner also passed an order, “In view of the endorsement made by the counsel for plaintiff suit against D3 is dismissed. On petition hearing is advanced. WS of D2 filed. D1 adopts the same. Draft issues filed. Issues framed. Documents and list of witnesses in two weeks. Trial by 6.10.93”. 3. The petitioner also passed an order, “In view of the endorsement made by the counsel for plaintiff suit against D3 is dismissed. On petition hearing is advanced. WS of D2 filed. D1 adopts the same. Draft issues filed. Issues framed. Documents and list of witnesses in two weeks. Trial by 6.10.93”. Three issues were framed, the first of which was, whether the plaintiff belonged to a minority, the second was whether the plaintiff was entitled to get a decree as prayed for in the plaint and the third was, to what relief the plaintiff was entitled. Consequent on the dismissal of the suit as against the third defendant, an endorsement was made on the plaint in red ink by the petitioner, after rounding off the name of the third defendant in red ink, as follows:— “The suit and the relief claimed against D3 is dismissed as per the end of the plaintiffs counsel and order dt., 23.9.93”. 4. On 6-10-1993, the first witness for the plaintiff was examined and the case was adjourned to 12-10-1993. In the meanwhile, on 5-10-1993, the third defendant filed C.R.P. No. 2939 of 1993 in this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order of the petitioner dismissing the suit against the third defendant. The revision petition was admitted on 7-10-1993 and an interim order of stay of further proceedings was granted in C.M.P. No. 13891 of l993. The said order reached the trial Court on 12-10-1993 only. What happened thereafter in the trial court is not relevant in this case. 5. The same plaintiff had filed another suit, O.S. No. 6549 of 1993 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, against the Government of Tamil Nadu for a declaration that the plaintiff trust was a Muslim Religious minority and for an injunction just as in the other suit. Neither the University nor the Director of Legal Studies was made a party to that suit. That suit was posted before the Second Assistant Judge. As the defendant therein remained ex parte, the suit was decreed on 6-10-1993 by the said Judge. That decree was challenged by the University, which was not a party to the suit, in a revision petition viz., C.R.P. No. 3292 of 1993 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. That suit was posted before the Second Assistant Judge. As the defendant therein remained ex parte, the suit was decreed on 6-10-1993 by the said Judge. That decree was challenged by the University, which was not a party to the suit, in a revision petition viz., C.R.P. No. 3292 of 1993 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. That revision petition was admitted on 10-11-1993 and the Court directed the same to be posted along with C.R.P. No. 2939 of 1993 referred to earlier. Interim stay of operation of the decree passed in that suit was also granted by this Court. 6. The two revision petitions were heard together and allowed by a common order dated 20.1.1994. The decree passed in O.S. No. 6549 of 1993 was set aside and the suit was dismissed. The order dated 29-3-1993 made by the petitioner in O.S. No. 9188 of 1992 dismissing the suit as against the third defendant as withdrawn was set aside. The third defendant was restored as parry to the suit and the applications. Certain directions were given to the City Civil Court regarding the manner in which the further proceedings in the suit should be conducted. We are not in any way concerned with the said directions and hence, it is not necessary for us to set out the same in detail herein. 7. In the course of the judgement, the Court made the following observations against the conduct of the petitioner herein: “In this case, I find from what has happened the incidents which, have been set out in detail in the earlier portion of this order, that the court below has voluntarily contributed itself by willingly allowing it to be abused in order to help the plaintiff reap an underserved benefit, which would ultimately have a serious consequence of undermining the respect for a fair judicial process and faith of the people in the efficacy of law”. Paragraph 15 of the judgment contained certain observations against the II Assistant Judge, who disposed of O.S. No. 6549 of 1993, with which we are not concerned in this case. 8. Paragraph 15 of the judgment contained certain observations against the II Assistant Judge, who disposed of O.S. No. 6549 of 1993, with which we are not concerned in this case. 8. The learned Judge, who disposed of the Civil Revision Petitions, appended a note to his judgment to the Registry as follows:— “A copy of this order shall be marked to the Registrar, for him to study the position relating to the taking of action against the concerned Judicial Officers, after following the due procedure”. The Registrar would appear to have placed the matter before the Honble the Chief Justice, on whose directions a copy of the order was placed in the personal files of the petitioner. Thereafter, the Registrar issued an Official Memorandum in R.O.C. No. 32/94. Con. B2 dated 24-2-1994 to the petitioner. The observations quoted above were incorporated in the said memorandum in paragraph 2 thereof. It is stated in paragraph 4 of the memorandum that a copy of the order in the Civil Revision Petitions is placed in the personal file. Aggrieved by the said memorandum, the petitioner has filed this writ petition to quash the same. The State Government is the first respondent and the Registrar of this Court is the second respondent. 9. In paragraph 9 of the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the writ petition it is stated that the petitioner had no knowledge about the filing of the second suit O.S. No. 6549 of 1993 until he received a copy of the common order of this Court passed in the Civil Revision Petitions. The correctness of the said statement is not challenged either in the counter affidavit or at the hearing before us. We must also notice that the learned Judge, who disposed of the Civil Revision Petitions, has not found that the petitioner had any knowledge of the filing of the subsequent suit O.S. No. 6549 of 1993. 10. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit, the petitioner has stated that he had not voluntarily and willingly allowed the Court to be abused and that he had not voluntarily done any act to help any party. It is added that he had no personal interest. The correctness of that statement is not also contested in the counter affidavit. 11. 10. In paragraph 15 of the affidavit, the petitioner has stated that he had not voluntarily and willingly allowed the Court to be abused and that he had not voluntarily done any act to help any party. It is added that he had no personal interest. The correctness of that statement is not also contested in the counter affidavit. 11. The ground on which the writ petition has been filed is that the placing of the order of the High Court in his personal file is the result of a punishment meted out to him without giving an opportunity to him and denying natural justice. According to the affidavit, the remarks made against him in the Civil Revision Petitions without hearing him are a nullity and that there was no material for attributing motive to him. Paragraph 18 of the affidavit reads as follows: “18. The remarks passed by the High Court cannot in any event affect my services or my judicial conduct for the reason that the remarks have been passed in my absence and without any notice to me. Such a remark should be deemed non-est in law”. 12. In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, paragraphs 4 and 5 are as follows:— “4. It is submitted that the personal files contain the remarks relating to the quality of judgments and orders delivered by the officers concerned and quantity of work turned out, the remarks relating to their character, reputation and other factors. As a Bench of this Honourable Court made certain observations in the Judicial Order in respect of the manner in which Thiru. S. Thamilvanan has disposed of the abovesaid suit and as the quality of the Order passed by the petitioner was commented upon, it h as to be placed in the personal file and such placing was also informed to the Officers concerned. If the petitioner is aggrieved against the Judicial Orders, he has to take up the matter in a proper Judicial Forum to have the remarks expunged or modified or as deemed necessary. 5. As regards para 16 of the affidavit wherein the petitioner has stated that he was not given an opportunity before placing a copy of the Order in his Personal file, it is submitted that the Officer was informed by the High Courts Official Memorandum in ROC. No. 32/94 Con. B.2, dated 22.2.94. 5. As regards para 16 of the affidavit wherein the petitioner has stated that he was not given an opportunity before placing a copy of the Order in his Personal file, it is submitted that the Officer was informed by the High Courts Official Memorandum in ROC. No. 32/94 Con. B.2, dated 22.2.94. No advance notice is necessary for placing the Judicial orders of the High Court in which observations regarding the quality of the Judgment rendered by the Judicial Officer were made. The petitioner is also entitled to submit representations so that the same can be dealt with Administratively. But the petitioner has not submitted any representation to deal with Administratively. In as much as the Honourable Judge has directed the Office to take action Administratively, a copy of the order was placed in the personal file of the petitioner, as it contains remarks as to the quality of the Judgment rendered by the petitioner. No other action can be taken against the petitioner Administratively”. 13. We have sent for the entire records in the Suit O.S. No. 9188 of 1992 and the applications filed therein from the City Civil Court and perused the same. We do not find anything in the records from which an inference can be drawn that the petitioner had knowledge of the tactics adopted by the plaintiff in that suit to play a fraud on the Court by filing a second suit, when the first suit was already pending. Nor is there any material warranting any inference that the petitioner had willingly or voluntarily played into the hands of the plaintiff or allowed the Court to be abused in order to help the plaintiff in the suit to reap an undeserved benefit. There was no chance for the petitioner suspecting that the order of dismissal of the suit against the third defendant as withdrawn would have the serious consequence of undermining the respect for a fair judicial process and faith of the people in the efficacy of law. In fact, no such ground has been raised by the third defendant in C.R.P. No. 2939 of 1993. The only complaint of the third defendant in that revision petition was that the University had jurisdiction to find out the truth of the claim of minority status made by the plaintiff in that proceeding. 14. In fact, no such ground has been raised by the third defendant in C.R.P. No. 2939 of 1993. The only complaint of the third defendant in that revision petition was that the University had jurisdiction to find out the truth of the claim of minority status made by the plaintiff in that proceeding. 14. The reasons given by this Court in the order made in the Civil Revision Petitions for arriving at such a conclusion as against the petitioner herein are set out in paragraph 14 of the order, which reads as follows: “14. The prayer and relief sought for in the suit O.S. No. 9188 of 1992, which as already adverted to, would go to show that the declaration of minority status was specifically sought for with reference to the Trust as also M.G.R. Law College, Kanyakumari with particular reference to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976 and the Rules made thereunder as also Statute 21 of Chapter XXVI of the Law of University, which is stated to be the same as the one applicable to the Madurai Kamaraj University. In the context of such a prayer involving also the 3rd defendant - University, perhaps the suit could not have been maintained without making the University as a party defendent to the proceedings in the Court below. Though it is the right of the plaintiff to choose the party respondent or defendants to a cause to be instituted or to give up or abandon a party at any stage of the suit or proceedings, such things cannot be allowed to be done without consequential amendment of pleadings. It is preposterous to claim a relief against a party or a relief, in terms, which will directly affect the rights of a party, but yet claim a right also either not to implead such a person or authority who may be directly affected as a party or give up or abandon such a person once earlier made a party to the proceedings. In such cases, in the absence of sought for as well as the allegations pertaining to such a party, who is not impleaded or given up subsequently the proceedings will suffer the vice of not having before the Court the necessary parties and on such ground alone the proceedings will have to fail without there being any enquiry or adjudication on the merits of the claim. The Court in such cases cannot also pretend to be either ignorant or oblivious to such patent manoeuvres and manipulations or itself allow it to be made in gross abuse of the judicial process. De hors the presence of the 3rd defendant as a party to the suit O.S. No. 9188 of 1992, the petitioner could not be permitted to have the declaration of the nature claimed in the suit or in the injunction application without violation of the procedure of law as well as the course of justice. Even that apart, as has been indicated earlier, the petitioner herein who was a party and who has filed its written statement and also its counter affidavit to the injunction application, cannot be given up behind its back, depriving its right to insist upon either the costs or even to raise a plea that in consequence of such giving up or withdrawal of abandoning, the suit itself would be rendered futile and pursued. The trial court (III Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Madras) also, in my view, ought to have seen that the parties do not take undue advantage of the courts and court procedures and should not also willingly allow itself to be abused by either one or the other of the parties to the proceedings before it, at the expense of the other or in denigration and abuse of process of court. In this case, I find from what has happened, the incidents which have been set out in detail in the earlier portion of this order, that the court below has voluntarily contributed itself by willingly allowing it to be abused in order to help the plaintiff reap an undeserved benefit, which would ultimately have a serious consequence of undermining the respect for a fair judicial process and faith of the people in the efficacy of law”. 15. It is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the said reasons are based on a wrong understanding of the law. 15. It is rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the petitioner that the said reasons are based on a wrong understanding of the law. Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that at any time after the institution of a suit, the plaintiff may, as against all or any of the defendants, abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. The Rule has been considered by the Supreme Court in Hulas Rai Baij Nath v. Firm K.B. Bass and Co. ( AIR 1968 S.C. 111 ). It is held therein that the language of the Rule gives an unqualified right to a plaintiff to withdraw from a suit and, if no permission to file a fresh suit is sought under sub-rule (2), of that Rule, the plaintiff becomes liable for such costs as the court may award and becomes precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter. The Court has pointed out that there is no provision in the Code which requires the court to refuse permission to withdraw the suit in such circumstances and to compel the plaintiff to proceed with it. It is very clear from the rule as interpreted by the Supreme Court that the only right of the third defendant was to seek an order for costs and nothing else. Even if a party against whom the suit is abandoned or withdrawn is a necessary party, in whose absence the suit cannot go on, the Court cannot compel the plaintiff to continue the suit against the said party. Even with regard to costs, sub-rule(4) of Order 23, C.P.C. use s the expression ‘may’ and gives a discretion to the Court to make the plaintiff liable for such costs as it may award. Thus, the third defendant did not have any right to prevent the plaintiff from withdrawing the suit as against him. We are unable to appreciate how the question of amendment of plaint can arise at the stage of unconditional and unqualified withdrawal of the suit by the plaintiff as against the third defendant. One important aspect of the matter which has been overlooked by the Court at the time of disposal of the revision petitions is the endorsement made by the petitioner on the plaint that “the suit and the relief against D3 was dismissed”. One important aspect of the matter which has been overlooked by the Court at the time of disposal of the revision petitions is the endorsement made by the petitioner on the plaint that “the suit and the relief against D3 was dismissed”. Thus, the prayer in the suit was automatically confined only as against defendants 1 and 2. Whether the plaintiff would be entitled to get any relief as against defendants 1 and 2 in the absence of the third defendant was a matter to be decided by the trial court at the time of trial. The petitioner could not have been expected to decide that question even when the plaintiff withdrew the suit as against the third defendant unconditionally. It was certainly open to defendants 1 and 2 who had filed written statement on that day to point out the futility or the non-maintainability of the suit without the third defendant being a party to the suit 16. We are quite aware that we are not called upon to decide the correctness or otherwise of the judgment in C.R.P. No. 2939 of 1993 as between the parties thereto. We have referred to the above aspects of the matter for the limited purpose of showing that there was no material whatever before the learned judge on the basis of which he could have made such drastic comments against the conduct of the petitioner. No doubt, the petitioner has committed a mistake in not considering the question of awarding costs to the third defendant when the suit was withdrawn as against the third defendant. But that would not lead to an inference that the petitioner had willingly and voluntarily played into the hands of the plaintiff or allowed the court to be abused in order to help the plaintiff in the suit to reap an undeserved benefit. The strong language used by the learned judge would certainly cast a cloud upon the integrity of the petitioner and make anyone who peruses the judgment to suspect the character of the petitioner. The said observations were totally unnecessary for the disposal of the revision petition. The conduct of the petitioner was not the subject matter of the lis before the learned judge when he heard the Civil Revision Petition. 17. The said observations were totally unnecessary for the disposal of the revision petition. The conduct of the petitioner was not the subject matter of the lis before the learned judge when he heard the Civil Revision Petition. 17. It is necessary at this stage to refer to a subsequent event which has been brought to our notice by the learned Additional Government Pleader who has produced the relevant files of this Court before us. When the writ petition was taken up for hearing, we pointed out to learned counsel for the petitioner that it would be advisable for the petitioner to file a petition for review before the same learned judge, who could reconsider his opinion and see whether the observations made by him could be altered or removed. Learned counsel took an adjournment and it is seen that the petitioner sent a representation to the Registrar of this Court through the Principal District Judge, Chengalpattu, instead of filing a petition for review in this Court. In that representation dated 18-1-1996, the petitioner had stated that the remarks made in the judgment in the Civil Revision Petitions affected his career adversely and his name was not included in the panel for promotion on account of them. He had prayed for suitable orders in the matter by the judge who pronounced the judgment in the Civil Revision Petitions in order to enable his name to be included in the Panel for District Judges-Grade II. The said representation was directed to be placed before the learned judge who disposed of the Civil Revision Petitions by the Honble the Chief Justice on the judicial side. The learned Judge entered a minute that the request of the petitioner was on the administrative side and it may not be possible to consider the same on the judicial side. Then the Honble the Chief Justice directed the matter to be placed before the learned judge on the administrative side. Thereafter, the learned judge entered his minutes, according to which, the observations made by him were fully justified and absolutely necessary and warranted on the facts of the case. Then the Honble the Chief Justice directed the matter to be placed before the learned judge on the administrative side. Thereafter, the learned judge entered his minutes, according to which, the observations made by him were fully justified and absolutely necessary and warranted on the facts of the case. The learned judge, however, added that the criticism was only directed against the irresponsible manner of disposal adopted in allowing a case to be advanced from the posted date of hearing without notice to a party who had filed a counter and also a written statement and not with the object of doubting his integrity or his motives in doing such a thing. On perusal of the minutes, the Honble the Chief Justice entered his minutes that the representation was rejected. The remark in the said minute against the petitioners irresponsible manner of disposal is not a matter for our consideration. It is for the concerned Administrative Committee to consider the same. We are concerned only with the remarks made in the judgment in the Civil Revision Petitions. 18. Though the learned judge has said in his minutes on the representation made by the petitioner administratively that the observations contained in his judgment were not with the object of doubting the petitioners integrity or his motives, the learned judge has at the same time reiterated that the observations made by him were fully justified and absolutely necessary and warranted on the facts of the case. In view of the said opinion of the learned judge, it is necessary for us to consider the validity of the observations contained in the judgment, as the apprehension of the petitioner is that the said observations will always prove to be a stumbling block in his career. With regard to the passing of strictures and making observations against the Presiding Officers of the lower Court or persons who are not parties to the proceedings, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that such observations should not be made unless they were necessary for the purpose of disposal of the case as between the parties. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that there should be a judicial restraint in the matter of the language to be used. It has also been pointed out repeatedly that there should be a judicial restraint in the matter of the language to be used. In Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohamad Isa ( AIR 1963 SC 1728 ), the Court stated:— “It would thus be seen that in reversing the decision of the trial court, the High Court has suggested that the trial court was persuaded by extraneous considerations and that some pull and weight had been used in favour of the appellant from behind. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was not justified in passing these strictures against the trial Judge in dealing with the present case. Judicial experience shows that in adjudicating upon the rival claims brought before the courts it is no t always easy to decide where truth lies. Evidence is adduced by the respective parties in support of their conflicting contentions and circumstances are similarly pressed into service. In such a case, it is, no doubt, the duty of the Judge to consider the evidence objectively and dispassionately, examine it in the light of probabilities and decide which way the truth lies. The impression formed by the Judge about the character of the evidence will ultimately determine the conclusion which he reaches. But it would be unsafe to overlook the fact that all judicial minds may not react in the same way to the said evidence and it is not unusual that evidence which appears to be respectable and trustworthy to one Judge may not appear to be respectable and trust-worthy to another Judge. That explains why in some cases courts of appeal reverse conclusions of facts recorded by the trial Court on its appreciation of oral evidence. The knowledge that another view is possible on the evidence adduced in a case, acts as a sobering factor and leads to the use of temperate language in recording judicial conclusions. Judicial approach in such cases should always be based on the consciousness that one may make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in expressing conclusions or the adoption of unduly strong intemperate, or extravagant criticism, against the contrary view, which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always be avoided. Judicial approach in such cases should always be based on the consciousness that one may make a mistake; that is why the use of unduly strong words in expressing conclusions or the adoption of unduly strong intemperate, or extravagant criticism, against the contrary view, which are often founded on a sense of infallibility should always be avoided. In the present case, the High Court has used inteperate language and has even gone to the length of suggesting a corrupt motive against the Judge who decided the suit in favour of the appellant. In our opinion, the use of such intemperate language may, in some cases, tend to show either a lack of experience in judicial matters or an absence of judicial poise and balance.” 19. In Dr. Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ), the question arose with regard to some comments made against a witness in the case. The said person filed a revision before the High Court under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure for expunging the remarks made by the trial judge. The High Court dismissed the revision petition and an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. While holding that the High Court had power to expunge remarks made by the Subordinate Court, the Supreme Court said that the inviolability of a judgment is necessarily confined to its integral parts, that is the verdict and reasons therefor, and that it cannot extend to matters which, though ostensibly apart of the judgment, are not in reality its integral parts. The court also said that every Judicial Officer must be free to express his mind in the matter of appreciation of evidence before him. But, a duty is cast upon the judicial officer not to deflect himself from the even course of justice by making disparaging and undeserving remarks on persons that appear before him as witnesses or otherwise. The Court observed that moderation in expression lends dignity to his office and imparts greater respect for judiciary. 20. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. The Court observed that moderation in expression lends dignity to his office and imparts greater respect for judiciary. 20. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohd. Naim ( AIR 1964 S.C. 703 ), the Court said that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into consideration before Courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending himself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as an integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. The Court also pointed out that it has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. If the three tests prescribed by the Supreme Court in the above case are applied in the present case, it can be seen that the observations contained in the judgment passed in the Civil Revision Petitions do not form an integral part of the judgment and were not necessary for the purpose of disposing of the revision petitions as between the parties thereto. 21. In State of M.P. v. Nandlal (AIR. 1987 S.C. 251), the Court said that the Judges should not use strong and carping language while criticising the conduct of parties or their witnesses and that they must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. It was observed that they must have the humility to recognise that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and, if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice. 22. In A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta ( AIR 1990 S.C. 1737 ), the High Court had commented upon the professional conduct of the Advocate-General without giving any opportunity to him to defend himself. The observations made and aspersions cast on his professional conduct were held to be without jurisdiction and wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted. They were expunged by the Supreme Court. While doing so, the Supreme Court stated:— “13. The observations made and aspersions cast on his professional conduct were held to be without jurisdiction and wholly and utterly unjustified and unwarranted. They were expunged by the Supreme Court. While doing so, the Supreme Court stated:— “13. Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect, that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other coordinate branches of the State, the Executive and Legislature. There must be mutual respect When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process.” 23. In K.P. Tiwari v. State of M.P. ( AIR 1994 SC 1031 ), the comments made by the High Court against an Additional Sessions Judge, while reversing the orders of bail granted by him, were expunged by the Supreme Court. The Court said:— “We are, however, impelled to remind the learned Judge of the High Court that however anguished he might have been over the unmerited bail granted to the accused, he should not have allowed himself the latitude of ignoring judicial precaution and propriety even momentarily. The higher courts every day come across orders of the lower courts which are not justified either in law or in fact and modify them or set them aside. That is one of the functions of the superior courts. Our legal system acknowledges the fallibility of the judges and hence provides for appeals and revisions. A judge tries to discharge his duties to the best of his capacity. While doing so, sometimes, he is likely to err. It is well said that a judge who has not committed an error is yet to be born. And that applies to judges at all levels from the lowest to the highest. Sometimes, the difference in view of the higher and the lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. It is well said that a judge who has not committed an error is yet to be born. And that applies to judges at all levels from the lowest to the highest. Sometimes, the difference in view of the higher and the lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. On such occasions, the lower courts are not necessarily wrong and the higher courts always right. It has also to be remembered that the lower judicial officers mostly work under a charged atmosphere and are constantly under a psychological pressure with all the contestants and their lawyers almost breathing down their necks more correctly, up to their nostrils. They do not have the benefit of a detached atmosphere of the higher courts to think coolly and decide patently. Every error, however gross it may look, should not, therefore, be attributed to improper motive. It is possible that a particular judicial officer may be consistently passing orders creating a suspicision of judicial conduct which is not wholly or even partly attributable to innocent functioning. Even in such cases, the proper course for the higher court to adopt is to make note of his conduct in the confidential record of his work and to use it on proper occasions. The judges in the higher courts have also a duty to ensure judicial discipline and respect for the judiciary from all concerned. The respect for the judiciary is not enhanced when judges at the lower level are criticised intemperately and castigated publicly, no greater damage can be done to the administration of justice and to the confidence of the people in the judiciary when the judges of the higher courts publicly express lack of faith in the subordinate judges for one reason or the other. It must be remembered that the officers against whom such strictures are publicly passed, stand condemned for ever in the eyes of their subordinates and of the members of the public. No better device can be found to destroy the judiciary from within. The Judges must therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them. That is the surest way to take the judiciary downhill.” 24. No better device can be found to destroy the judiciary from within. The Judges must therefore, exercise self-restraint. There are ways and ways of expressing disapproval of the orders of the subordinate courts but attributing motives to them is certainly not one of them. That is the surest way to take the judiciary downhill.” 24. In V. Sujatha v. Sate of Kerala (1994 Supp (3) Supreme Court Cases 436), the Court observed that one of the main principles is that a judge should take special care in making disparaging remarks against a judge of a subordinate court or against a person or authority whose conduct comes in for consideration before him in cases to be decided by him and that making uncalled for remarks against the said persons or authorities would be violation of judicial discipline. On that basis, the Court expunged all the disparaging and uncalled for remarks in that case made by the High Court. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before us Xerox copies of unreported judgments of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of this Court. The former is in Rajagopal G. Sejekah v. State of Karnataka in Civil Appeal No. 5073 of 1989. The Supreme Court held therein that the remarks and observations in the judgment and order of the High Court were uncalled for and expunged the same. In the latter case viz., VII Judge, Court of Small Causes, Appellate Authority v. Amichand and others in Review Application No. 56 of 1994 and Writ Appeal No. 2 of 1994 - by order dated 7-7-1994, the First Bench followed the judgment of the Supreme Court in the former case and held that the relevant observations were not necessary for the purpose of granting relief to the parties and to maintain the integrity of the judgment and, therefore, directed deletion of the same from the judgment under review. Thus, the test adopted by the Division Bench is to find out whether the observations in question were necessary for the purpose of granting relief to the parties to the lis and to maintain the integrity of the judgment. In this case also, we find that the relevant observations made against the petitioner herein were neither necessary for granting relief to the parties to the lis nor for maintaining the integrity of the judgment. 26. In this case also, we find that the relevant observations made against the petitioner herein were neither necessary for granting relief to the parties to the lis nor for maintaining the integrity of the judgment. 26. But, there is yet another important question to be considered by us. The contention of the Additional Government Pleader is that the order in the Civil Revision Petitions is a Judicial Order and it cannot be interfered with by this Bench in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. According to the Additional Government Pleader, the observations in question form part of the judicial order made in the Civil Revision Petitions and, therefore, a writ will not lie against the order of the learned judge. In support of his contention, our attention is drawn to a passage in Durga Das Basus ‘Shorter Constitution of India’, 11th Edition at page 612, which reads as follows:— “But when the High Court or any of its Judges acts in an administrative capacity, a writ under Art. 226 shall lie against such decisions or order, e.g ., (a) When the High Court takes disciplinary proceedings against a member of its staff. (b) Where the High Court refixes the seniority of subordinate judicial officers. (c) Where a High Court Judge acts as Industrial Tribunal. (d) Where the High Court settles its holidays and days of sitting. (e) Where the Chief Justice refuses to allow a sitting Judge to function.” It is contended by the learned Additional Government Pleader that the present case does not fall under any of the illustrations set out in the said passage and, therefore, in the present case, the order in question is a judicial one and it cannot be treated as an administrative order. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader that the illustrations set out in the text book are exhaustive. The learned author refers only to certain cases which have already been de cided and points out that in all those cases the orders were made in administrative capacity and a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution were held to lie against such decisions. That does not mean that if there is any case outside the illustrations, it will not fall within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That does not mean that if there is any case outside the illustrations, it will not fall within the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We have to decide in this case as to what exactly is meant by ‘judicial order’. In the ‘Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Reprint Edition 1987, at page 645, the expression ‘Judicial decision’ has been defined as follows:— “Opinions, or determinations, are the sentiments of the Judges delivered in a cause in Court before them, and which form the decree or judgment of the Court.” The expression ‘judicial act’ has also been defined and the following passage is found in the same page:— “A judicial act must be an act performed by a court, touching the rights of parties, or property, brought before it by voluntary appearance, or by the prior action of ministerial officers. An adjudication of the rights of parties who in general appear or are brought before the tribunal by notice or process, and on whose claims some decision is rendered; the power to decide rights of person of property in specific cases.” Under the heading “Judicial opinion” at page 646, it is stated:— “An opinion given in Court, if not necessary to the judgment given to record is no judicial opinion. It is no more than a gratis dictum . But an opinion, though erroneous, which is necessary to the judgment is a judicial opinion , because delivered under the sanction of the Judges oath upon deliberation, which assures that it is, or was when delivered, the opinion of the deliverer” 27. In Bharat Bank v. Employers of Bharat Bank ( AIR 1950 S.C. 188 ), the Court quoted with approval a passage in the judgment of Griffith, C.J. in Huddart Parker & Co. v. Moorehead , (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330 at page 357, wherein the phrase “judicial power” has been defined. Referring to the same as the best definition of it, the following passage was extracted:— “The words ‘judicial power’ as used in S. 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. Referring to the same as the best definition of it, the following passage was extracted:— “The words ‘judicial power’ as used in S. 71 of the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take action.” 28. In Shankarlal v. Shankarlal ( AIR 1965 S.C. 507 ), the question was whether an order according sanction to sell under the Companies Act was administrative or judicial. The Court held that the order was one deciding ‘lis’ between the parties and passed after hearing on merits and, therefore, it was judicial. The Court pointed out the distinction between ‘administrative’ and ‘judicial’ orders in the following words:— “13. It is perhaps not possible to formulate a definition which would satisfactorily distinguish, in this context, between an administrative and a judicial order, That the power is entrusted to or weilded by a person who functions as a Court is not decisive of the question whether the act or decision is administrative or judicial. But we conceive that an administrative order would be one which is directed to the regulation or supervision of matters as distinguished from an order which decides the rights of parties or confers or refuses to confer rights to property which are the subject of adjudication before the Court. One of the tests would be whether a matter which involves the exercise of discretion is left for the decision of the authority, particularly if that authority were a Court, and if the discretion has to be exercised on objective, consideration, it would be a judicial decision. It has some times been said that the essence of a judicial proceeding or of a judicial order is that there should be two parties and a lis between them which is the subject of adjudication, as a result of that order or a decision on an issue between a proposal and an opposition. It has some times been said that the essence of a judicial proceeding or of a judicial order is that there should be two parties and a lis between them which is the subject of adjudication, as a result of that order or a decision on an issue between a proposal and an opposition. (Sic) No doubt, it would not be possible to describe an order passed deciding a lis before the authority, that it is not a judicial order but it does not follow that the absence of a lis necessarily negatives the order being judicial.” 29. Keeping the above principles in mind, if we look at the facts of the present case, it is seen that the Civil Revision Petitions were filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Under that Article, the High Court is empowered to exercise powers not only judicially but also administratively. The power of superintendence of the High Court recognised under that Article over all subordinate courts and Tribunals is held to be both judicial and administrative. In that background, if the order passed in the Civil Revision Petitions is perused, it can be seen that the decision as between the parties to the said litigation was an exercise of judicial power and the observations made by the learned Judge as against the petitioner herein could only be in exercise of his administrative power. It could not have been in exercise of judicial power as the petitioner was not a party to that litigation. In Baradakanta v. Registrar, Orissa H.C. ( AIR 1974 SC 710 ), the necessity for the High Court to exercise control over the subordinate courts as part of its functions in the administration of justice has been set out in the following words:— “43. We have not been referred to any comprehensive definition of the expression “administration of justice”. But historically and in the minds of the people, administration of justice is exclusively associated with the Courts of justice constitutionally established. Such courts have been established throughout the land by several statutes. The Presiding Judge of a court embodies in himself the court, and when engaged in the task of administering justice is assisted by a complement of clerks and ministe rial officers whose duty it is to protect and maintain the records, prepare the writs, serve the processes etc. Such courts have been established throughout the land by several statutes. The Presiding Judge of a court embodies in himself the court, and when engaged in the task of administering justice is assisted by a complement of clerks and ministe rial officers whose duty it is to protect and maintain the records, prepare the writs, serve the processes etc. The acts in which they are engaged are acts in aid of administration of justice by the Presiding Judge. The power of appointment of clerks and ministerial officers involves administrative control by the Presiding Judge over them and though such control is described as administrative to distinguish it from the duties of a judge sitting in the seat of justice, such control is exercised by the Judge as a Judge in the course of judicial administration. Judicial administration is an integrated function of the Judge and cannot suffer any dissection so far as maintenance of high standards of rectitude in judicial administration is concerned. The whole set up of a court is for the purpose of administration of justice, and the control which the judge exercises over his assistants has also the object of maintaining the purity of administration of justice. These observations apply to all courts of justice in the land whether they are regarded as superior or inferior courts of justice. 44. Courts of justice have, in accordance with their constitutions, to perform multifarious functions for due administration of justice. Any lapse from the strict standards of rectitude in perforating these functions is bound to affect administration of justice which is a term of wider import than mere adjudication of causes from the seat of justice. 45. In a country which has a hierarchy of courts one above the other, it is usual to find that the one which is above is entrusted with disciplinary control over the one below it. Such control is devised with a view to ensure that the lower court functions properly in its judicial administration. A judge can foul judicial administration by misdemeanours while engaged in the exercise of the functions of a Judge. It is therefore as important for the superior court to be vigilant about the conduct and behaviour of the Subordinate Judge as a Judge, as it is to administer the law, because both functions are essential for administration of justice. A judge can foul judicial administration by misdemeanours while engaged in the exercise of the functions of a Judge. It is therefore as important for the superior court to be vigilant about the conduct and behaviour of the Subordinate Judge as a Judge, as it is to administer the law, because both functions are essential for administration of justice. The Judge of the superior court in whom this disciplinary control is vested functions as much as a judge in such matters as when he hears and disposes of cases before him. The procedures may be different The place where he sits may be different. But the powers are exercised in both instances in due course of judicial administration. If superior courts, they will fail in an essential function of judicial administration and bring the whole administration of justice into contempt and disrepute. The mere function of adjudication between parties is not the whole of administration of justice for any court. It is important to remember that disciplinary control is vested in the court and not in a Judge as a private individual. Control, therefore, is a function as conducive to proper administration of justice as laying down the law or doing justice between the parties. When we come to our Constitution we find that whereas Articles 225 and 227 preserve and to some extent extend these powers in relation to administration of justice, Article 235 vests in the High Court the control over District Courts and Courts subordinate thereto. In the State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (1966) 1 SCR 771 = ( AIR 1966 SC 447 ) this court has pointed out that control under Article 235 is control over the conduct and discipline of the Judges. That is a function which, as we have already seen, is undontedly connected with administration of justice. The disciplinary control over the misdemeanours of the subordinate judiciary in their judicial administration is a function which the High Court must exercise in the interest of administration of justice. It is a function which is essential for the administration of justice in the wide connotation it has received and, therefore, when the High Court functions in a disciplinary capacity, it only does so in furtherance of administration of justice.” 30. It is a function which is essential for the administration of justice in the wide connotation it has received and, therefore, when the High Court functions in a disciplinary capacity, it only does so in furtherance of administration of justice.” 30. Thus, we have no doubt that the observations made in the judgment of the Civil Revision Petitions as against the petitioner herein were only administrative in character and not judicial. It cannot be said to form an integral part of the judgment in the Civil Revision Petitions. Even if those observations are removed from the judgment, it will remain in tact and the integrity of the judgment will not be affected in any manner. As between the parties, the judgment will continue to be binding and the remaining part of the judgment is sufficient to determine the rights of parties in that litigation. 31. However, it has been held by this Court that observations made in a judgment by a Bench of this Court cannot be expunged by another Bench. In Inre G. Vasantha Pai (AIR 1960 Madras 73 = (1959)72 L.W. 585 ) a Division Bench held that the Court has no inherent power to expunge from the judgment of a judge of the High Court any remarks or observations. The Bench said:— “A judgment of a single Judge of this Court whether it be in the Original Side or on Appellate Side, in civil or criminal proceedings, is a judgment of the High Court. We do not think that a Division Bench or a fuller Bench of this Court has the power to delete passages from the judgment of this Court delivered by a single Judge. The High Court is a Court of Record and that is another reason why we have no power to direct any expunging from the judgment of a learned Judge which is a part of the record of this Court” 32. However, learned counsel for the petitioner contends that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, an administrative order can be quashed if there is a violation of the principles of natural justice. According to him, the observations contained in the order passed in the Civil Revision Petitions which we have now held to be administrative in character, having been made without any notice to the petitioner herein, deserve to be quashed in this writ petition. According to him, the observations contained in the order passed in the Civil Revision Petitions which we have now held to be administrative in character, having been made without any notice to the petitioner herein, deserve to be quashed in this writ petition. It is also contended by him that the said observation could be held to be void ab initio in as much as the principles of natural justice have been violated. Reliance is placed in Nawabkhan v. State of Gujarat ( AIR 1974 SC 1471 ). It is held in that case that an order which is void, may be directly and collaterally challenged in legal proceedings and beyond doubt, an order which infringes a fundamental freedom passed in violation of the audi alteram partem rule is a nullity. Reference is also made to the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in N. Manoharan v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1981 Madras 147 = 94 L.W. 51). A Division Bench held that certain findings given by a Commission appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry (Tamil Nadu) Rules (1972) framed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act were not valid as no notice was given to the concerned person against whom findings were rendered. 33. Recently, this Bench had occasion to consider whether the remarks made by judge of this Court on the administrative side entered in the confidential records against the petitioner therein who was a District Judge on Super-time Scale are justiciable and whether they can be challenged in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in V.S. Arulraj v. The Registrar, High Court, Madras (W.P. No. 14786 of 1994 - judgment dated 12-2-1996) (reported in 1996 Writ L.R. 277). By our judgment we held that the entires made by a Judge of this court in the confidential record were not justiciable. For coming to that conclusion, our reasoning was that the entries by themselves would not affect the rights of the concerned official. We had pointed out that in confidential record, remarks would be made by several Judges and some of them may be favourable to the concerned official. The relevant par t of the judgment reads as follows:— “24. In so far as the second question framed by us is concerned, in our opinion the adverse entries in the confidential record are not per se justiciable in matters of judicial service. The relevant par t of the judgment reads as follows:— “24. In so far as the second question framed by us is concerned, in our opinion the adverse entries in the confidential record are not per se justiciable in matters of judicial service. It is not as if when one officer makes a remark against a Subordinate Officer the remark would stand in the way of the further prospects of the officer concerned. In the case of Subordinate Judicial Service, when the Judges of this court are making remarks, each Judge is to make his own remarks according to his own decision. Several of the remarks may be in favour of the particular Judicial Officer. Even if one or two remarks are against the Judicial Officer, they are communicated to the officer concerned and his representations are obtained. As and when a question arises as to whether the officer should be promoted or he should be given some other benefits and the of confidential records is necessary for that purpose, it is the Full Court which decides the issue. It is not as if in every case the Full Court would accept the adverse remark alone and refuse to grant him the benefits to which he may be entitled. In that case, the Full Court considers all the remarks made by the various Honble Judges and comes to a conclusion on the basis of the entire records. Hence, it Cannot be said from the mere fact that there is an adverse remark that it would act against the interest of the concerned person. It can be said that the petitioner has come to Court much before he is hurt. If and when the adverse entry made against him is used against him and any particular benefit is denied to him there will be time enough for him to challenge the same by an appropriate proceeding. In one sense, the present writ petition is premature. In another sense, in our opinion, the mere adverse entry in the confidential record is not per se justiciable. It will become justiciable only if it is used against the petitioner to deny the benefits which he might be entitled to in his service.” 34. In one sense, the present writ petition is premature. In another sense, in our opinion, the mere adverse entry in the confidential record is not per se justiciable. It will become justiciable only if it is used against the petitioner to deny the benefits which he might be entitled to in his service.” 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the said ruling will not apply in this case in as much as the petitioner in that case was already a District Judge on Super-time scale and the petitioner in this case has been overlooked while preparing the panel for promotion to District Judges-Grade II. In W.M.P. No. 27262 of 1995 the petitioner has prayed for a direction to the respondents to consider the inclusion of the petitioners name in the panel for District Judges-Grade II without in any manner being influenced by the observations made against the petitioner in C.R.P. Nos. 3292 and 2939 of 1993. In the affidavit filed in support of the said petition, the petitioner has stated that a list of names has been published on 1-7-1995 mentioning the judicial officers who have been promoted as District Judges-Grade II. The date mentioned in the affidavit appears to be wrong. The records show that the petitioners name was not included in the panel only because the consideration of his promotion has been postponed. It is not as if he has been superseded. In view of the pendency of the writ petition, the consideration of the petitioners name has been postponed. After the disposal of this writ petition, the petitioners name will certainly be considered for the purpose of promotion. 35. However, the apprehension of the petitioner that the order passed in the Civil Revision Petitions will be considered by the concerned Administrative Committee to be a judicial order binding on them and the consideration of the petitioners name for the purpose of promotion will be only on that footing is well founded. Hence, it is our duty to make it clear that the order in so far as it contains the adverse observations against the petitioner, is not judicial character and it is only administrative. It will tantamount, if at all, to a remark made by one of the Judges of this Court on the administrative side. The said remark cannot bind the Administrative Committee when it considers the case of the petitioner for promotion. It will tantamount, if at all, to a remark made by one of the Judges of this Court on the administrative side. The said remark cannot bind the Administrative Committee when it considers the case of the petitioner for promotion. It is too well known that for the purposes of promotion, several matters are taken into consideration before an Officer is given promotion. The question of promotion does not depend merely on the remark of one of the Judges of this Court. It depends on the quality of the judgments rendered by the official and other matters mentioned in his confidential records. 36. The Additional Government Pleader contends that the rights of the petitioner are in no way affected and just because he claims to have suffered mental agony, he will not be entitled to maintain this writ petition. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Naresh v. State of Maharashtra ( AIR 1967 SC 1 ). In that case, the High Court passed an order that the evidence given by the parties in the case and the witness examined by them shall not be reported in the newspapers from day-to-day. The validity of the said order was challenged by certain journalists by filing a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the order violated their fundamental rights. That contention was negatived by the Supreme Court and it was held that the Court had power to pass an order which was necessary in the interests of justice as between the parties to the dispute. We do not find any relevance whatever of that ruling to the present case. 37. The Additional Government Pleader referred to Sri D.G. Vidyalaya Association v. State of U.P. (AIR 1962 Allahabad 187). On the facts of that case, the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court found that no legal right of the applicant was infringed and a writ could not be issued, particularly as the question of the validity of a piece of legislation was raised. The Court said that law cannot take note of the mental or even sentimental injury caused to any person for the purpose of granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ruling has no bearing in the present case. 38. The Court said that law cannot take note of the mental or even sentimental injury caused to any person for the purpose of granting relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The ruling has no bearing in the present case. 38. Though we have held that the observations of the learned Judge made in the judgment are only administrative in character, in our opinion, it may not be judicial propriety to quash the same in as much as it is incorporated in a judicial order. Instead, it will be sufficient if we declare that the said observations made against the petitioner herein having been made without notice to him will not be binding on the concerned Administrative Committee or the Full Court and they cannot be used against the petitioner for any purpose in his career. 39. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.