S. K. PHAUJDAR, J. This second appeal is at the instance of the defendant, who are aggrieved by the judgment of the 1st Additional District Judge, Jaunpur, in Civil Appeal No. 58 of 1974, dated 11-9-79. The first appellate court had modified the decree of the trial Court passed in original Suit No. 202 of 1968 by the Munsif, Shahganj, on 11-4-74, whereby the suit of the plaintiff Ramdev was dismissed. 2. The plaintiff Ramdeo, predecessor of the present respondents, filed the suit for plot No. 293 situated in village Kheta Sarai measuring -09 acres claiming the land to be his tenancy plot. It was stated that in the western portion of this land, as shown by letters ABC and D in the map annexed to the plaint, he had his own construction. Appurtenant to this construction there lay a portion of the- land marked by the letters B C D E and F which was being used by him as a Sahan- and Pichwara, to the further east of this Pichawara there was a well and a Paudar belonging to the plain tiff. Next to the well and Paudar a further portion of 0. 02 acres of this very plot was there. The defendants purchased this 0-02 acres of land from the plaintiff by means of a sale-deed and were in possession thereof. But. they had no concern with the western portion of the land beyond the above said 0-02 acres land. It was alleged that in June, 1986 when the plaintiff wanted to make a construction on the portion marked by letters B, C, D, E and F, the defendant threatened to interfere. According ly, the plaintiff filed the suit for prohibitory injunction to restrain the defendant from such act. 3. The defendant contested the suit and stated that plot No. 293 with an area 0-09 acres was a Bhumidhari of the plaintiff and his house lay on the western portion thereof. It was alleged that on 18- 11-64 the plaintiff had a talk with the defendant for the sale of the entire 0-09 acres land of plot No. 293 to the defendant and in fact a sale deed was executed for Rs. 96/ -. The plaintiff also delivered possession to the defendant over a portion except the house. The well and paudar lay in the land purchased by the defendant by means of the sale-deed. 96/ -. The plaintiff also delivered possession to the defendant over a portion except the house. The well and paudar lay in the land purchased by the defendant by means of the sale-deed. When the defendant tried to make some construction on the land so purchased, one Ram Adhar, a witness to the sale deed, demanded a portion of the land from the defendant and on refusal he influenced the plaintiff to file the suit. It was stated that no portitipn of the disputed land was the Sahan or Pichawara of the plaintiffs house. The legality of the suit was challenged on the ground of limitation and estoppel and also under the provisions of Sections 31, 38 and 41 of the Specific Relief Act. The trial Court framed issues touching the title and possession of the plaintiff on the suit properties as also of the defendant on the portion of the suit property purchased by him. The question of maintainability of the suit on the legal pleas were also raised before the court below and the court had further framed an issue on the question of jurisdiction. The trial Court found that the plaintiff was not the owner in possession of the disputed plot while the "defendant was transferred the possession for the same to the extent of the land lying east of the plaintiffs house. The maintainability of the suit. on legal points was not challanged at all. The suit was held maintainable but on a decision on facts it-was dismissed with costs. The first appellate court found on facts that the disputed portion of the land did not fall fully in plot No. 293. According to him only some portion of it towards East shown by letters Pa, Pha, Ka and Kha in the 2 maps and also some portion towards South West situated between the Paudar and the house of Din Mohd. lay in plot No. 293 while a major portion of the suit property lying towards the East and West of the Paudar in plot No. 292 and the plaintiff (as also the defendant) laid no claim on plot No. 292. The learned first appellate court came to a finding that the suit of the plaintiff had to fail in respect of plot No. 292 forming part of the suit property. The learned first appellate court came to a finding that the suit of the plaintiff had to fail in respect of plot No. 292 forming part of the suit property. The first appellate court also considered the case for the portion of the land in suit that lay between the eastern wall of Din Mohammad and the western line of the Paudar as shown in the maps. He found the plaintiff to be the owner thereof and the same was never transferred to the defendant. The first appel late court also found on fact that the plaintiff never intended to sell his 0-09 acres of land in plot No. 293 and he had put his thumb impression under the belief that he was only signing an "yaddast" for writting a document subsequently. The suit was partly decreed by the first appellate court for that portion of the disputed land which was found to be belonging to the plaintiff. This portion was described by letters Pa, Pha, Ka, Kha and was also described to be lying towards East of Din Mohammad and West of the Paudar. The defendants were restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs possession on that portion of the suit property. 4. The appeal was admitted on 2 substantial question of law (1) Whether the plaintiff could be granted a decree for injunction without cancellation or rectifica tion of the sale deed under which the defendants claimed to purchase the land from the plaintiff, and (2) Whether the lower appellate court was justified in granting a decree for injunction without recording a clear finding that the plaintiff was in actual possession of land in respect of which the injunction was granted. 5. It was argued that the first appellate court while reversing the judgment of the court below failed to give reasons for his conclusion and when it was only an appreciation of the oral testimony, the trial Court finding should be given more weight than that of the first appellate court as the trial Court had a chance to look to the demeanure of the witness examined before it. The appellant further contended that no injunction could have been granted without cancellation of the deed for which the plaintiff had not made any prayer and when there was no finding of possession, no injunction should have been granted. The appellant further contended that no injunction could have been granted without cancellation of the deed for which the plaintiff had not made any prayer and when there was no finding of possession, no injunction should have been granted. It was further contended that the learned first appellate court had overlooked certain admissions made by the plaintiff. On behalf of the respondents it was contended that the plaintiffs have sold only 2 decimals and not all the 9 decimals in plot No. 293 and the paper was wrongly prepared. No possession was delivered to the defendants. According to the learned counsel, no prayer for cancellation was necessary as the plaintiffs knew that it was only a Yaddast that was being written. 6. The learned counsel also took me through certain decisions in support of their contentions. As indicated above, the appellants raised a point that when the suit was decided on appreciation of the oral evidence the finding of the trial Court should be given more weight than that of the first appellate court. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Madhumdhan Dass v. Smt. Narain Bala, AIR 1983 SC 114 . In this decision the Supreme Court held that in an appeal against a trial court decree, when the appellate court considered and issue turning on oral evidence, it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they had given their testimony. When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses the general rule was that the appellate court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial court to prevail, unless it clearly appeared that some special features about the evidence of a particular witness had escaped the notice of the trial Court or there was a sufficient balance of improbability to displace, its opinion as to where the credibility lay. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants further pressed that an admission of the plaintiffs on the question of possession in mutation proceedings as per exhibits. A-2 was absolutely overlooked and this admission itself should have tilted the find ing in favour of the defendants. 7. The learned counsel for the appellants further pressed that an admission of the plaintiffs on the question of possession in mutation proceedings as per exhibits. A-2 was absolutely overlooked and this admission itself should have tilted the find ing in favour of the defendants. It was stated that this admission could not have been discarded on the ground that it was made in a mutation proceeding. He relied on another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kale and others, AIR 1976 SC 807 . A family arrangement was in question in the matter before the Supreme Court and it was indicated under what circumstances registration of family arrangement was necessary. In this connection, it was observed that even assuming the document was compulsorily registrable, the family arrangement being binding on the parties to it, would operate as an estoppel by preventing a party after having taken the ad vantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the admission of the plaintiffs concerning possession would always bind him and shall always be used against him irrespective of the nature of the proceeding wherein the same was made. It is neces sary to state here the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent on this point. He stated that even if any admission was made by a party in a mutation proceeding, the same admission may not be used against him in a civil suit. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Bhoore v. Peerbux 1973 A. L. J. Volume-2 page 312. It was observed herein that any consent or admission made in a mutation proceeding had no relevance in regular title proceed ing and the Deputy Director, Consolidation was in error in spelling out an exclusive title in Bhoore on the basis of this admission. A reading of these two case laws make it clear that the admission in a mutation proceeding may not prove title, but an admission of possession, in my view, still binds the maker thereof. A mutation proceeding is nothing, but a fiscal arrangement between the State landlord and the tenant and it was basically dependent on the factum of possession. A reading of these two case laws make it clear that the admission in a mutation proceeding may not prove title, but an admission of possession, in my view, still binds the maker thereof. A mutation proceeding is nothing, but a fiscal arrangement between the State landlord and the tenant and it was basically dependent on the factum of possession. If possession of one party is admitted by the other, even in a mutation proceeding, that does not confer any title to the said other party. But I find no reason why the admission on the point of possession may not be used against the party making it. On the question of interference on finding of fact in Second Appeal. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of the Supreme Court, reported in 1980 Revenue Decisions 300. It was held herein that where there was a clear finding of fact by a District Judge in appeal, it was not open to the High Court to interfere into that finding in second appeal, even if the finding was wrong. 8. To appreciate these case-laws on the questions of scope of a second appeal, duties of a first appellate court as also on acceptance of an admission, it is necessary to go through the judgments and the relevant papers. 9. The trial Court believed the factum of mutation and had also arrived on a finding of fact that the plaintiffs were never in possession of the said property after sale. The first appellate court found that the total area of plot No. 293 was. 09 acre on a part of which, on the western portion, the house of the plaintiffs stood. The Commissioner had prepared a map of the said property. About l/4th area towards west in plot No. 293 was covered by the construction of the plaintiffs accepted the sale of some portion of this plot to the defendants and on that portion the title of the defendant was also accepted. The plaintiffs claim that a Paudar and a well, spoken out in the plaint, lay in plot No. 293, but it was the defence case that the well and Paudar constituted a separate plot. The map that was relied upon by the courts below established that the well and the Paudar lay for the most part of it in plot No. 293. The map that was relied upon by the courts below established that the well and the Paudar lay for the most part of it in plot No. 293. The first appellate court had found that the real dispute between the parties was for a piece of land situated in between the plaintiffs house and the well and the Paudar. This portion of the land lay towards east of the plaintiffs house in which he was admittedly having a shop and this land lays to the west of the well and the Paudar. The first appellate court actually engaged itself to find who was the owner and who was in possession of this portion of land. It found further on a perusal of the map that the whole of this area in between the house and the well and Paudar did not lie in plot No. 293. Only some portion towards east as shown by the letter Pa, Pha, Ka and Kha in the map and a further portion towards south-west situated be tween the Paudar and house of Din Mohammad lay in plot No. 293 while a big portion of this plot towards the east of the link, Ka, Kha and west of the Paudar actually lay in plot No. 292. It was found by the first appellate court that none of the parties laid any claim of plot No. 292 and accordingly he proposed to examine the case for that portion of plot No. 293 only which formed a part of the suit property. The learned appellate court also went to discuss the acceptability of the sale-deed had discarded the sale for the entire area on the ground that admittedly the house portion and well and the Paudar were not sold to the defendants. He accepted the plaintiffs theory that he has put his thumb- mark on a piece of paper knowing it to be a "yaddast" and, in fact, safe was to be made for two decimal of the land and that portion lay to the east of the well and the Paudar. 10. The alleged admission of possession in the mutation proceeding was made through the application proved and marked Exhibit A-2. This purports to be an application of Ram Dev to the mutation authorities accepting transfer of 0. 9 acre (nine decimal) of land in favour of the defendants and transfer of possession thereof. 10. The alleged admission of possession in the mutation proceeding was made through the application proved and marked Exhibit A-2. This purports to be an application of Ram Dev to the mutation authorities accepting transfer of 0. 9 acre (nine decimal) of land in favour of the defendants and transfer of possession thereof. Ram Dev the plaintiff was examined in court and his cross-examination indicates that he was asked about the mutation proceeding and he denied knowledge about it. He denied to have accepted possession of the defendants on the basis of the sale-deed. The original application was never produced and Ram Dev was never con fronted with his signature thereon. The application for mutation filed before the mutation authorities is not a public document and it could not, therefore, have been proved by mere production of a certified copy. The evidence on the point of admis sion by Ram Dev in the mutation proceeding is, therefore, not at all a legal one. 11. The learned counsel for the appellants, as indicates above, submitted that there could not be any injunction without cancellation of the sale-deed. In the cir cumstances, of the present case cancellation of the deed was not necessary and it was within the competence of the civil court to look to the contention of the parties to determine what was the actual area sold. In view of the admission of the defendants that the house was not purchased, nor the well and the Paudar and further, in view of the fact, that the plaintiff was in possession of the house, make the averments in the deed unreliable to the extent of the area (nine decimals) of plot No. 293 that was sold out to the defendant. The court below rightly went to the question as to what portion of the land was actually sold to the defendants. When a finding of fact has been given on that point it is not open for this court to reverse it when there is no wrong in the approach of court below to determine this fact. 12. On the question of finding of possession also the first appellate court found, on comparison of the two maps, that most of the area shown to be in dispute lay in plot No. 292 and only a small portion thereof was in plot No. 293, and was in possession of the plaintiff. 12. On the question of finding of possession also the first appellate court found, on comparison of the two maps, that most of the area shown to be in dispute lay in plot No. 292 and only a small portion thereof was in plot No. 293, and was in possession of the plaintiff. The suit of the plaintiff was decreed only to that extent with a further finding that the portion sold out to the defendants lay to the east of the well and Paudar. It is true that between the two courts below only the court of first instance had a chance to see the demeanour of the witnesses. However, the court of first instance did not record any particular demeanour, nor is there any reflection in the discussion rtf the evidence of the court of first instance in that respect. The first appellate court was, therefore, competent to reapprise the evidence and to re-assess it to determine the real controversy between the parties and to give a finding of fact different from that of the court of first instance for reversing the Judgment of the Munsif. The first appellate court was required to give good reason for his decision and a discussion of the first appellate courts judgment as made above indicates that reason were advanced for arriving at the decision. The said finding may not, therefore, be disturbed in this Second Appeal. The first appellate court found that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the land denoted on the map Pa, Pha, Ka, Kha and it is not a judgment granting any injunction without a finding of possession. 13. For all the above discussion, I find no merit in this Second Appeal and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties are to bear their own costs. Appeal dismissed. .