Manmohan Sarin, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff company has filed the present suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act alleging that though being lessee under a registered lease deed, they were illegally and wrongfully dispossessed on 29-8-1994 by defendants 1 and 2. ( 2 ) ONE of the questions that would arise for consideration is that if the defendants are to he restrained from alienating or patting with possession of the suit property during the trial of the suit, whether the plaintiff should be put to any terms so as to secure defendants against loss in ease it ultimately fails in the suit. ( 3 ) ME look at the facts in some what more detail:- (I) The plaintiff company has instituted the suit through it director, Sh. Karan Luthra. The plaintiff case is that it was looking for rental accommodation in South Delhi and one property dealer Sh. Rohtas Yadav informed the plaintiffs director that ground floor of property No. 8-2/13 Safdarjang Enclave was available for being let out if the plaintiff was prepared to deposit Rs. 7 lakhs as security. It was represented to the plaintiff that defendant No. 3 is the owner of the properly. The plaintiff met the defendant No. 3, who confirmed that she was the owner and had the right to let oul the property. Further on enquiries being made from neighbourhood, the plaintiff learnt that the defendant No. 3 had been residing in the properly for a long time. Earlier, her late father, Sh. Gurbux Singh, used to reside with her. Sh. Gurhux Singh had gone to LJ. S. A and died there. The plaintiff, therefore, had no reason to suspect the bonafides of the defendant No. 3. (II) The plaintiff thereupon agreed to take the ground floor at a monthly rent of Rs. 2500. 00 and refundable interest free security of Rs. 5 lacs as agreed was paid vide pay order No. 468539 dated 29-7-1994. A registered lease deed dated 1-8- 1994, was executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff who were put in possession on 1-8-1994. The defendant No. 3 also gave an affidavit to tlie effect that she was the owner of property and had un-questioned right to let out the same. A registered lease deed dated 1-8- 1994, was executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of the plaintiff who were put in possession on 1-8-1994. The defendant No. 3 also gave an affidavit to tlie effect that she was the owner of property and had un-questioned right to let out the same. (III) The plaintiff alleges that on a false complaint by defendant No. I, a FIR was registered and two employees of the plaintiff, present in the suit premises were arrested and the police took away the articles in the premises including a Maruti Van belong to the plaintiffs director. The allegation made by. the defendant No. 1 was that the defendant No. 3, was not the owner of the property and had no right to let out the same. In the event-, when on 30-08-1994, Sh. Karan Luthra director of the plaintiff company went to the premises in suit, he found that the board of the company had been removed, possession had been taken over by defendants 1 and 2 and police personnel posted there. The said Sh. Karan Luthra was also arrested subsequently. A FIR was also lodged by defendant No. 1 against the plaintiffs director alleging trespass as. well as other offences such as theft and criminal conspiracy. (IV) The plaintiff alleges that police acted in collusion with defendant No. 1 and 2 to illegally deprive the plaintiff of property in its possession. It now transpires that defendants I and 2 had only -an agreement to sell in their favour. A power of attorney had earlier been obtained in the name of their father Sh. Gurbux Singh from the original owner. (V) The plaintiffs case is that it has been dispossessed from the property without the due process of law with the help of police un authorizedly and the plaintiff is entitled to repossess the property. The suit has been instituted within six months from the date of dispossession. The Court vide order dated 2-11-1994, had restrained the defendant from parting with possession, alienating, transferring or encumbering the said property in any manner. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS land 2 have filed the written statement wherein it is averred that defendant No. 3 i. e. sister of defendants I and 2 was merely a Care taker for the property and as such a mere licencee. She was never in possession of the property. ( 4 ) DEFENDANTS land 2 have filed the written statement wherein it is averred that defendant No. 3 i. e. sister of defendants I and 2 was merely a Care taker for the property and as such a mere licencee. She was never in possession of the property. Defendant No. 3, Smt. Surinder Kaur, could not confer any possession or right to possession on the plaintiff of the property since it was a right which she herself did not possess. It is further averred that even if it was assumed that the plaintiff was in possession, it was possession of a trespasser and not settled possession. It was a casual act of possession and the defendants were entitled to re-enter. The property. was acquired by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by an agreement to purchase and a Will. The Will was duly registered. A power of attorney had also been issued in favour of their father, Sh. Gurbux Singh. The defendants had constructed a three storied house with twenty rooms and furnished. the same as a guest house. A licence from the District Magistrate for running a guest house was obtained and defendants began running a guest house in the name of Baljeet Guest House. The defendants I and 2 s contention is that their sister had been way ward and promiscuous. While studying in Nursing College, she had eloped with a boy. Later on she started living with another man, without getting married and had five children from him. Though the family was unhappy, but with a view to help her) in March 1991, they appointed defendant No. 3 as a care taker on a salary of Rs. 2000. 00 P. M. to look after the Guest House. She was provided a two bed room set duly furnished. It is stated that the defendant No. 3 was friendly with broker Sh. R. Yadav, who had even stood surety for her in a case under the Immoral Traffic Act. ( 5 ) THE crux of the allegation is that defendant No. 3, R. Yadav and Sh. K. L. Luthra of the plaintiff conspired together to usurp and grab the property. R. Yadav, who had even stood surety for her in a case under the Immoral Traffic Act. ( 5 ) THE crux of the allegation is that defendant No. 3, R. Yadav and Sh. K. L. Luthra of the plaintiff conspired together to usurp and grab the property. The defendant No. 1 on learning that defendant No. 3 was trying to sell the property even got a public notice taken out in the Indian Express and Hindustan Times on 26-08-1994 and 27- 08-1994, to the effect that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 continued to be the lawful owners. It is alleged that on 26-08-1994 name-plate of the defendants were removed. The name plate of plaintiff and their associate concerns M/s. K. N. Agencies Pvt. Ltd and M/s. K. N. Distributors Pvt. Ltd had been put up. It is stated at Bar that separate lease agreements have been entered into with them, which are subject matter of different suits. The defendants I and 2 thereupon lodged a FIR on 29-08-1994, alleging that the defendant No. 3 had broken up the locks and unauthorizedly inducted the plaintiff and other companies, who were trespassers. Defendant No. 3 has not been served. She is said to be not traceable. ( 6 ) I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has urged that plaintiff came into possession pursuant to a registered lease deed being executed by defendant No. 3. The plaintiff had acted bonafide. Defendant No. 3 had given an affidavit to the effect that she was owner on the basis of an agreement to sell executed by her father in her favour. It is submitted that defendant No. 3 had un-interrupted possession over a long period of time and plaintiff had no reasons to suspect or doubt her credentials for entering into lease. Plaintiff enjoyed un-interrupted peaceful possession for 28 days pursuant to a registered lease. The plaintiff had taken possession of property from a person, who admittedly enjoyed dominion and peaceful possession, as a result of the acts of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. Learned counsel argued that infact the defendant No. 3 had duped the plaintiff and received the security deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs which had been paid vide a pay order. Defendant No. 3 was not coming forward as a result of the family pressure of defendant Nos I and 2. 1 and 2. Learned counsel argued that infact the defendant No. 3 had duped the plaintiff and received the security deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs which had been paid vide a pay order. Defendant No. 3 was not coming forward as a result of the family pressure of defendant Nos I and 2. Defendant Nos. 1 to 3 were acting in collusion. Learned counsel relied on Baldev Raj Vs. Delhi Development Authority reported at 1971 RLR 84 , State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Anandom Viswanathan 1989 J. T. VOL. 1 181, Krishna Ram Mahale Vs. Mrs. Shobna Venkat Rao - 1989 J. T. 489 Vol. 3 and Fidelity Growth Fund (P) Ltd. and Anothers Vs. S. Partap Singh and Anothers 1996 DLT 346 in support of his proposition that the plaintiff being in settled possession could not have been dispossessed without the due process of law. It was argued that the plaintiff was. entitled to restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act and the enquiry must be confined to the question of illegal dispossession. Further that the plaintiffs had a good prima facie case and were entitled to the interim injunction. ( 7 ) COUNSEL for the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 argued that the entire transaction of lease was a sham transaction. The plaintiff being a tres passer could not obtain the equitable relief of injunction. The defendant being a mere Care taker had no authority to enter into any agreement to sell or lease. He laid considerable emphasis on the plea that plaintiff s director and defendant No. 3, had entered into a criminal conspiracy to usurp and grab the properly of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The plaintiff was a party to the criminal conspiracy and theft committed of the Guest House goods and articles, which had been recovered from the residence of the plaintiffs director for which there was no explanation. It was argued that had it been a straight forward transaction of a lease as contended, there was no question of the goods and articles being recovered from the residence of plaintiffs director. The entire transaction was vitiated by fraud perpetrated pursuant to the criminal conspiracy. Counsel relied on Emperor Vs. Bandhu Singh reported at 1928 0 Patna 124, S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jaganath - 1993 Vol. 4 A. D. 539, Sham Lal Vs. The entire transaction was vitiated by fraud perpetrated pursuant to the criminal conspiracy. Counsel relied on Emperor Vs. Bandhu Singh reported at 1928 0 Patna 124, S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu Vs. Jaganath - 1993 Vol. 4 A. D. 539, Sham Lal Vs. Rajinder Singh - 1994 A. D. 1036. Reliance was also placed on Premji Rattan Sey Shah Vs. Union of India - 1994 5 S. C. C. 547, Mahadev Savalram Ram Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation - 1995 R. L. R. S. C. 212 and DTTDC Vs. D. R. Mehra and Sons - 1996 (ii) A. D. Delhi 3040 in support of his contention. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel cited the above authorities in support of his contention that the plaintiff whose possession was unlawful having been fraudulently obtained was not entitled to the discretionary and equitable relief of injunction. Emperor Vs. Bandhu Singh - supra supports the view that a trespasser cannot by the very act of trespass dispossess the owner, who may re-enter without using more force than necessary. In the second case, S. P. Chengal Varaya Naidu Vs. Jagannath, it was held that any decree or judgment obtained by fraud would be a nullity, since fraud avoids all judicial acts. There is no dispute with the legal principles laid down in this authority. In the third authority Sham lal Vs. Rajinder. Kumar and Others, it was held that possession of a chowkidar/servant was the possession of the real owner. The chowkidar or servant could not exercise such a possession or right to possession over the property so as to exclude the master or real owner of the properly from his possession or exercising right to possession over the property. In the fourth case cited Mahadev Savalaram Vs. Pune Municipal Corporation, it was held that a licencee or tenant in unlawful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the true owner. The apex Court also held that while exercising the power of discretion for grant of injunction, Courl could call upon the plaintiff to give security for compensation to the defendant for the loss caused to the defendant by grant of injunction, in case plaintiff ultimately fails in suit. In M/s. Premji Ratansey Shah Vs. Union of India and others the Apex Court reiterated that no injunction could be issued in favour of a trespasser. In M/s. Premji Ratansey Shah Vs. Union of India and others the Apex Court reiterated that no injunction could be issued in favour of a trespasser. who gained unlawful possession as against true owner, it was found that the appellants had no interest or right in the property. ( 9 ) LASTLY in DTTDC Vs. M/s. D. R. Mehra and Sons, a Division Bench of this Court declined injunction against eviction to the Appellant DTTDC, who were mere licencces, whose licence had expired and had pleaded for a short period to vacate premises. The Division Bench after noting the judicial pronouncements on the subject and relying on Mahadev Savlaram vs. Pane Municipal Corporation supra and Shiv Kumar Chadha Vs. MCD - 1993 (3) S. C. C. 161, held that no injunction could be granted against the owner at the instance of a person in unlawful possession, and a trespasser cannot seek injunction against the true owner. The Division Bench further held that injunction being an equitable relief, the person who seeks equity must do equity. The Division Bench also observed that assuming a trespasser could seek restoration of possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, the grant of injunctions, however, does not depend entirely on Section 6 of Specific Relief Act but mainly on certain general principles applicable to the Law of injunctions. ( 10 ) IT would be pertinent to notice that in all the above cases, it was cither a licencee, whose period had expired, or a trespasser or person in unlawful possession, who sought the injunction against dispossession, which was sought to declined on the considerations and principles enumerated in the above cases. The present case is on a different fooling. The plaintiff here has already been dispossessed. The plaintiff claims to have been wrongfully dispossessed, without due process of law. The plaintiff pending the decision on the suit for restoration of possession seeks restraint on the defendant from parting with possession alienating or creating third parly interest. This is to preserve status quo during the trial of the suit. ( 11 ) FROM a reading of the pleadings, appreciation of documents on record, the position which emerges is that plaintiff had admittedly been put in physical possession, pursuant to a registered lease deed executed by defendant No. 3, sister of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. This is to preserve status quo during the trial of the suit. ( 11 ) FROM a reading of the pleadings, appreciation of documents on record, the position which emerges is that plaintiff had admittedly been put in physical possession, pursuant to a registered lease deed executed by defendant No. 3, sister of defendant Nos. 1 and 2. The defendant No. 3 had been residing in the property, having possession of the same. Plaintiff case is that defendant No. 3 claimed to be the owner and gave an affidavit to this effect. The deposition in the affidavit is that Sh. Gurbux Singh, father of defendants, who had an irrevocable power of attorney in his favour from original owner entered into an agreement to sell dated 4-9-1991 with her upon receipt of consideration, transferred the property to her. A certificate from plaintiffs Bankers has also been produced on record confirming encashment of the pay order for security deposit of Rs. 5 lakhs given under the registered lease deed. The plaintiff has a prima facie case which require consideration. ( 12 ) THE plaintiffs explanation for a low rental is that interest free security deposit of Rs. 5 lakh, itself raises rent in real terms to Rs. 10,000. 00. The allegation of the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 is that defendant No,3 does not appear to have receivedthe secuirty deposit. The defendant No. 1 has no doubt filed on record documents evidencing the purchase of properly by defendant No,1. Further letters appointing defendant No. 3 as Care laker of the Guest House have been produced. The plaintiff has also produced a letter purported to have been written by defendant No. 1 to defendant No. 3 on a bereavement, which suggests relations between them were not inimical. ( 13 ) THE question is whether the lease deed was a sham transaction and a result of the criminal conspiracy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 , or not requires investigation and trial. The defendant s version cannot at this stage be accepted so as to non-suit the plaintiff. ( 13 ) THE question is whether the lease deed was a sham transaction and a result of the criminal conspiracy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 , or not requires investigation and trial. The defendant s version cannot at this stage be accepted so as to non-suit the plaintiff. ( 14 ) BASED on the allegations of the defendant itself that there was a conspiracy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 to usurp the property, it would follow that the plaintiff was put in physical possession by defendant No. 3 who admittedly had physical possession and dominion over the property either in her own rights as claimed by plaintiff or was having custody on behalf of other defendants as a Care taker. Be it may, it cannot be said at this stage that the plaintiffs were trespassers or were not in physical possession. In any case, they were in actual physical un-interrupted possession. Whether the said possession was obtained fraudulently and pursuant to criminal conspiracy between plaintiff and defendant No. 3 or not requires investigation ( 15 ) THE purpose and object of a Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is to provide a speedy remedy to a person who is dispossessed without due process of Law. While it is true that the Court would not come to aid of a plaintiff or a trespasser and grant discretionary relief of injunctions, the situation here is different. The plaintiffs were in possession pursuant to a registered lease deed executed by a sister, who was in possession and claimed to be the owner. In my view the appropriate order to be passed in this case, keeping in mind the observations of the Apex Court in Mahadev Savalaram Shelke Vs. Pune Municipal. Corporation (Para 12 and 13) would be to restrain the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 from parting with possession or alienating the suit property pending trial and disposal of the suit. However, since the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are being injuncted from alienating/letting out or parting with possession they deserve to be protected against any loss or damage to them if is ultimately found that the lease transaction was a sham one, vitiated by fraud and result of criminal conspiracy to grab the property with defendant No. 3, and the plaintiff fails in suit. 1 and 2 are being injuncted from alienating/letting out or parting with possession they deserve to be protected against any loss or damage to them if is ultimately found that the lease transaction was a sham one, vitiated by fraud and result of criminal conspiracy to grab the property with defendant No. 3, and the plaintiff fails in suit. It would therefore, be necessary to put the plaintiff to terms for the grant of injunction. CONSIDERING the totality of circumstances, including the fact that defendant may themselves use the property during the trial, the plaintiff is directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 3. 5 lakhs as security which amount be kept in F. D. R. within six weeks. The defendant Nos. 1 and 2 shall not alienate/transfer or part with possession of suit property pending trial of suit subject to plaintiff depositing Rs. 3. 5 lakhs in Court within six weeks. I. A. stands disposed of in above terms.