M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is one more of the several proceedings that have ultimately come to this court wherein a furious legal debate has ensued all of which hinges around the question as to whether an auction sale that has taken place several years back should be interfered with by the court. It is difficult to draw a parallel between any two of these cases on facts and even though the principles in relation to the various provisions of law are reasonably well defined, it still becomes necessary to individually decide each of these cases on merits wherein occasions do arise for the courts to either modify slightly or even in the interest of Justice innovate on those guidelines. The real issue before me is as to whether an auction sale that took place as long back as on 18-12-1978 i. e. 18 years back should be interfered with. The undisputed facts are that a decree passed in a suit against the judgment-debtor came up for execution in case No. 493 of 1977. The decree in question was for recovery of an amount of approximately Rs. 3,500/- and the decree-holder applied for attachment of the judgment-debtor's property. A statement has been made on behalf of the respondent 2, who is the original judgment-debtor that she was a school teacher who had incurred certain debts with the decree-holder who was a moneylender. However these aspects of the matter are irrelevant because the learned advocates have canvassed certain pure points of law which alone are material particularly since this is a revision petition and the jurisdiction of this court is limited to decide or interfere purely on the basis of law points. The attachment came to be levied by the executing court against a house property belonging to the judgment-debtor. Ultimately that house was put up for auction sale and the petitioner who is the auction purchaser was the successful bidder and he had offered a sum of Rs. 67,000/ -. I need to mention here that there was some dispute with regard to the fair value of that property at the relevant time, the judgment-debtor having valued it at about Rs. 75,000/- and the court having considered various aspects of the matter, had before it a valuation of Rs. 85,000/ -. 67,000/ -. I need to mention here that there was some dispute with regard to the fair value of that property at the relevant time, the judgment-debtor having valued it at about Rs. 75,000/- and the court having considered various aspects of the matter, had before it a valuation of Rs. 85,000/ -. The limited reason for my referring to this aspect of the matter is because learned Advocate on both sides have advanced very weighty arguments in relation to this particular facet of the case. Petitioner's learned Advocate submitted that the appeal court among other things has also upheld the view that the auction sale did not realise the best possible price which was in consonance with the market value. Petitioner's learned Advocate has demonstrated to me that the learned judge has totally overlooked the fact that the property was subjected to two other encumbrances which relate to two other loans which would aggregate to almost Rs. 17,000/- and that therefore the auction purchaser had taken on this liability along with the property and that if this amount were to be added on to the purchase price, it would fully match with what the market value of the property stood at. Learned Advocate who represents respondent 2 has vehemently disputed this but in any event, on a consideration of the material before me I do not think that this was any ground on which the auction sale could have been interfered with. The court needs to take cognizance of the fact that if it comes to the notice of the court at any stage that the price realised was hopelessly inadequate and that it is very clear that a valuable property has been disposed of virtually for a throw-away price, it is a valid ground on which interference with the sale would be necessary or for that matter the sale itself ought not to be confirmed. The courts have to take note of the fact that the so-called market price that is referred to is invariably an approximate figure and the judgment-debtor is bound to pitch his case higher than necessary. The courts have to take note of the fact that the so-called market price that is referred to is invariably an approximate figure and the judgment-debtor is bound to pitch his case higher than necessary. Also, auction sales are not the best avenues for realising a good value for a property because these sales are not too well attended and if persons who are really keen on the property are not present there, then the bidding would not go very high and the property may not fetch the best price. As long as it bears some reasonable relationship with what the court considers fair in consonance with the existing market rate, it would be sufficient for a court to hold that no interference with the auction sale is competent on this ground. ( 2 ) THE petitioner who is the auction purchaser, as indicated by me, was the successful bidder and in keeping with the rules he deposited the amount of Rs. 67,000/- within the prescribed time. The petitioner's learned Advocate submits that the sale came to be confirmed and the sale certificate was also issued to the petitioner but unfortunately he was unable to take possession of the property only because on 19-1-1979 an application was filed for setting aside the auction sale. Various contentions were raised in the application which mainly centre around the fact that according to the applicant there were some irregularities in the conduct of the sale. They can briefly be summarised in so far as firstly it was contended that the auction sale had not been duly published. Secondly, it was contended that the proclamation was not properly published. Also, the contention was that there were several other irregularities in the conduct of the sale all of which according to the judgment-debtor were sufficient to vitiate the entire sale. The learned trial judge who was presiding over the executing court heard the parties and through a speaking order overruled everyone of the objections. Basically, the judge held that the sale conducted under the directions of the couart was a valid, legal and binding sale and that no interference was called for. Under the circumstances the application filed under Order 21, rule 90 for setting aside the sale was dismissed. Basically, the judge held that the sale conducted under the directions of the couart was a valid, legal and binding sale and that no interference was called for. Under the circumstances the application filed under Order 21, rule 90 for setting aside the sale was dismissed. The matter was however carried in appeal and the appeal court upheld almost all the objections that were canvassed and set aside the sale on the ground that each of the irregularities that had been alleged had been established and furthermore that some of them were material and were sufficient to void the transaction. The original auction purchaser who had, as indicated by me, deposited the purchase price but who could not obtain possession because of the pendency of the proceedings has filed the present revision petition which assails the correctness of the appellate Order dated 16-8-1990. The amount deposited by him has been lying in the court since the year 1978 and the appeal court had finally disposed of the matter only in august 1980, the decision going against the auction purchaser. It is against this Order that he has preferred the present civil revision petition. This being a hotly contested litigation, the Order sheet indicates that the matter did come up from time to time before the court for hearing but for one reason or the other it did not get disposed of which is why it has finally been taken up by me for final disposal only in june 1996. Among the various arguments canvassed was the one advanced by the petitioners' learned Advocate who stated that as the auction purchaser, he is a compete stranger to the dispute and that he was a bidder at an auction sale conducted under the directions of a court, that he was the highest bidder and that he had offered a price which was fair and reasonable in relation to the existing market price. He contends that having done this and having deposited the money, that he has been subjected to 18 years of litigation and a strong grievance was made about the fact that this is not a case in which this court should show any sympathy to the judgment-debtor who is principally responsible for this State of affairs. He contends that having done this and having deposited the money, that he has been subjected to 18 years of litigation and a strong grievance was made about the fact that this is not a case in which this court should show any sympathy to the judgment-debtor who is principally responsible for this State of affairs. Learned Advocate drew my attention to the fact that the appeal court even though it decided in favour of the appellant who was the judgment-debtor and who is the second respondent before me, took a serious view of the fact that it is the judgment-debtor who is litigating over the years and therefore while allowing her appeal directed the payment of compensatory costs of Rs. 15,000/ -. Learned Advocate submitted that this amount has not been paid and that the second respondent is therefore disqualified from even making any submissions before this court. The crux of the matter is that there are three contesting parties before me, the first one being the petitioner who is the auction purchaser, the second one being respondent 1, the decree-holder represented by his legal heirs and the third one being respondent 2 who is the original judgment-debtor. Conflicting claims and submissions have been made on behalf of these three parties and it will therefore be necessary to carefully evaluate the various contentions raised for purposes of finally deciding as to whether the appeal court was justified in setting aside the auction sale in question. ( 3 ) PETITIONER's learned Advocate has confined his submissions to a pure challenge of points of law. He adverts to two aspects of the law in this regard, the first of them being that the principles embodied under Order 21, rule 90 and the allied provisions very clearly stipulate that an auction sale would only be interfered with by court if it is demonstrated that is suffers from material irregularities. What the learned Advocate has submitted is that several procedures are required to be complied with in the course of the conduct of these sales and that merely because there may be some minor procedural non-compliance either of a trivial or of a non-consequential nature, that it can never be argued that the auction sale should be interfered with. What the learned Advocate has submitted is that several procedures are required to be complied with in the course of the conduct of these sales and that merely because there may be some minor procedural non-compliance either of a trivial or of a non-consequential nature, that it can never be argued that the auction sale should be interfered with. What he basically submits is that an auction sale is invariably preceded by an attachment and that certain amount of time elapses before the court ultimately takes the final step of ordering the property to be auctioned. Various procedures are involved in this procedure and it is a step of the last resort because there are no other means of satisfying the decree. The auction purchaser is invariably a third party and a stranger to the entire dispute. He is required to deposit substantial amounts of money immediately on his bid being accepted and, the learned Advocate submits that rights accrue in favour of the auction purchaser subject however to the sale being confirmed by the court. He submits that once that process is over, merely because the judgment-debtor or some other party starts raising procedural objections, that no court is obliged to take cognizance of them unless the irregularities that are pleaded are so substantial and so grave as to materially affect the legality of the sale. One of these could always be a situation where, as indicated by me earlier, there exists a serious doubt as to whether the price realised even if it has been confirmed by the court is at all fair or whether the property has virtually gone for a throw-away price. Also, instances do come up where serious malpractices take place in the course of the auction sale and if these are demonstrated, they would go to the very root of the matter and affect its validity. Learned Advocate has emphasised at some length that the irregularity must be demonstrated to be a material one and everyone of the grounds on which the appeal court has interfered in this case are, in his submission, not of any consequence and, certainly not material. Learned Advocate has emphasised at some length that the irregularity must be demonstrated to be a material one and everyone of the grounds on which the appeal court has interfered in this case are, in his submission, not of any consequence and, certainly not material. In support of his arguments, learned Advocate has drawn my attention to two decisions of the Supreme Court, the first in the case of Radhy Shyam v Shy am Behari Singh, wherein the Supreme Court upheld the setting aside of a sale on the ground that the inadequacy of the price was so very material that it virtually resulted in a fraud. The second decision in the case of M/s. Kay Jay industries (p) ltd. V M/s. Asnew Drums (p) ltd. And others, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to hold that in a given circumstance a relatively low price alone would not be sufficient to interfere with the sale if it was demonstrated that the conduct of the judgment-debtor was such that it had deterred several likely purchasers from touching the property. ( 4 ) AS far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, the petitioner's learned Advocate had occasion to refer in passing to a few other decisions wherein the courts had occasion to examine certain other aspects of the law. In Dhirendra Nath Gorai and others v Sudhir Chandra Ghosh and others, the Supreme Court had occasion to observe that Order 21, rule 66 is a provision conceived in the interest of the judgment-debtor and that therefore non-compliance would not render the sale a nullity. In two other cases in Rajammal v A. T. Krishnaswami Mudaliar (dead) by l. rs. And others and Balwant Rai kumar v Smt. Amrit Kaur, the courts had occasion to hold that non-service of notice under Order 21, rule 66 is not an irregularity relating to the publication or conduct of the sale nor was it a ground for setting aside the sale. In an earlier decision of this High Court in the case of S. V. Kanakaraj v Vijaya Bank, the court had occasion to refer to an earlier decision of this very High Court in the case of Manjamma v S. N. Suryanarayana Rao and others, wherein the controversy had been raised with regard to the question of whether the proclamation etc. Should be in english or kannada or both the languages and the court held that the ruling in question would not apply. In the earlier case, however, on the facts before the court a view was taken that the language did matter and that if it was in a language that was not ordinarily understood or was known in the area that it cannot be said that the sale was validly conducted. ( 5 ) LEARNED Advocate who represents the decree-holder raised one basic contention namely that all sorts of pleas were raised by the judgment-debtor when the matter came up before the appeal court and that if the pleadings are scrutinied, that it will be seen that none of these manifold objections were originally pleaded. In this regard, he drew my attention to a decision in the case of Rudrawwa v Balawwa and another, in which the court upheld the view that non-pleading is basically fatal in so far as grounds that have not been canvassed in the application cannot thereafter be made the subject-matter even of evidence and that a court would not allow new evidence along these lines to be adduced at a later stage of the contest. A similar view was taken by the court in the decision in the case of Smt. Sarjoobai v Deepchand and others, wherein the court held that a sale cannot be set aside on the grounds that have not originally been pleaded and furthermore, that oral evidence which is contrary to the pleadings cannot be relied upon by the court in an application for setting aside the auction sale. As far as these aspects of the matter are concerned, I do need to observe that a perusal of the original application does indicate that it is almost devoid of all the grounds that were subsequently canvassed and that too effectively at the appellate stage. Also, a spirited defence was taken up when the court subsequently went into an examination of the matter and to my mind this was a considerable improvement on the original plea that was put forward. None of the various grounds that have been set-out by me are to be found in the application and the court would have to take serious note of the fact that these are obvious improvements. None of the various grounds that have been set-out by me are to be found in the application and the court would have to take serious note of the fact that these are obvious improvements. ( 6 ) REFERRING to an another aspect of the matter, the learned Advocate relied on a decision in Munivenkatappa v Vysya Bank Ltd. , wherein the court pointed out that the sale is completed only when the bid is accepted and that as far as the present case is concerned, the judgment-debtor had appeared through an Advocate when the court considered the various aspects of the matter and confirmed the sale. Sri shetty, thereafter pointed out to the court that there is an entirely different philosophy embodied in these provisions relating to the setting aside of an auction sale and for purposes of assessing whether interference would be competent or not, that it is essential for the judgment-debtor to demonstrate that substantial injury has occurred as a result of the irregularities that are alleged in the conduct of the auction sale. He has referred to the decision in the case of Govind Janardhan Mahale v Ramdas Keshav Kamath , as also another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Valivety Ramakrishnaiah v Totakura Rangarao, wherein the courts have laid down the principles that where a proper amount is realised pursuant to the sale that merely because some technical irregularities are pleaded, there can be no question of setting it aside. In this regard, the learned Advocate also drew my attention to an earlier decision of this court in H. N. Vvinayaka and others v Firm of H. Venkatasastry and sons, wherein the court had occasion to lay down the principle that it is insufficient to merely aver that injury or substantial injury has occurred and that the onus of establishing this fact is that of the judgment-debtor. Referring to one of the other irregularities which have been upheld by the appeal court namely that the judgment-debtor had paid some small amount of money which does not appear to have been taken note of, Sri shetty pointed out that this court in the decision in the case of Seetharama Krishnaiah Setty v Satyanarayana Setty , has laid down that this would not affect the validity of the sale in so far as it is merely a question of financially adjusting the amount. Sri shetty thereafter drew my attention to another aspect of the matter in so far as he pointed out that the appeal court itself has taken serious note of the fact that this was a case in which the judgment-debtor did not pay up the amount right through the long period of time when she could have done so prior to the confirmation of the sale and that in view of the manner in which the litigation had been dragged on at her instance, that it was very necessary to compensate the auction purchaser for the amount of loss and prejudice to which he had been put as a result of the manner in which the judgment-debtor had been litigating. The court therefore directed that a sum of Rs. 15,000/- must be paid by the judgment-debtor. Sri shetty pointed out that this amount has not been paid by the judgment-debtor and the submission at the bar was that the judgment-debtor was therefore estopped from presenting any challenge at the hearing of this proceeding. He submitted that if the Order has not been complied with, that the judgment-debtor ought not to be heard at all. In this regard, he drew my attention to an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Nanak Chand v Goswami Preetam Lal , wherein the court was dealing with the effect of non-compliance with a conditional Order and the court held that in such a situation the only result would be one of automatic dismissal. His submission was that since the' appeal court allowed the appeal and laid down certain condition which the second respondent has not complied with, that the Order must be treated as having been automatically vacated. A more or less similar position has been laid down by the Supreme Court in two subsequent decisions in the case of Smt. Ram Pyari and others v Jagdish Lal and AIR 1993 SC 352 . Normally, when a court passes a conditional Order, the consequences of non-compliance are inevitable. In the present case however, the court did not pass a conditional Order but what the court held was that since the sale had been set aside, that the second respondent before me was liable to pay compensation to the auction purchaser quantified at Rs. 15,000/ -. In the present case however, the court did not pass a conditional Order but what the court held was that since the sale had been set aside, that the second respondent before me was liable to pay compensation to the auction purchaser quantified at Rs. 15,000/ -. Had the Order been conditional, non-compliance would have been fatal to the second respondent but in this instance one needs to take note of the fact that the Order was not a conditional one. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the second respondent has submitted that since the matter was pending before this court that his client had not paid the amount but that he is willing to comply with that order. That aspect of the matter will be looked into by me but having regard to the fact that the payment of compensation was not conditional to my mind the principles laid down in the aforesaid decisions will not apply. ( 7 ) SRI shetty presented a spirited a challenge to the appellate Order and he submitted that it had not been demonstrated that any material irregularity has taken place, that even the findings of the learned judge are not borne out on a scrutiny of the record and that adequate consideration has resulted and that there is no ground on which the appellate Order can be sustained. He referred to a few decisions which I shall briefly summarise. Firstly, he submitted that the allegation of inadequate consideration does not constitute a substantial injury as held in govind janardhan mahale's case, supra. Conversely, he referred to the supreme court decision in the case of valivety ramakrishnaiah, supra, in support of his contention that if a proper sale price has been fetched and there is no irregularity in conducting the sale, that there is no ground on which the sale can be set aside. He next submitted that if the court had applied its mind in accepting the highest bid, that this is not a ground on which a sale must ordinarily be set aside as held in M/s. Kayjay industries (p) limited's case, supra. ( 8 ) WITH regard to the scope for interference with an Order of the lower court, the petitioners' learned Advocate relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Co-Operative Federation Ltd. V Sunder Bros. ( 8 ) WITH regard to the scope for interference with an Order of the lower court, the petitioners' learned Advocate relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Uttar Pradesh Co-Operative Federation Ltd. V Sunder Bros. , Delhi, wherein the supreme court observed that if the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify such interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. The courts have also enunciated the principle that an appellate court would not normally interefere with the trial court's judgment in exercise of its appellate powers unless and until the judgment is demonstrated to be unreasonable, capricious or that it has ignored several relevante facts. In this regard, reliance was placed on in the cases of Sangashetty v Ismail bee; 1970 kar. L. j. sh. N. 202 and 1971 kar, l. j. sh. N. 208. Conversely, Sri shetty pointed out that the Supreme Court in the decision in the case of Vinod Kumar v Smt. Surjit Kaur had occasion to observe that where a court has not considered the case in proper perspective and has committed an error or serious irregularity. The court can interefere with it in exercise of its powers under Section 151, c. P. c. by setting aside such a judgment. ( 9 ) THERE is one other aspect of the matter which the learned Advocate did have occasion to refer to in considerable detail. I shall deal with the submission canvassed by the learned Advocate who represented the original judgment-debtor who is the second respondent before me wherein a grievance was raised that for the amount of hardly Rs. 3,500/- which was due from the judgment-debtor, that there was no need to have put her residential house on auction and thereby render her homeless. I shall deal with the legal aspects of the matter presently while referring to the arguments canvassed on behalf of respondent 2 but the point that was canvassed before the two lower courts and which they have also considered was the question as to whether a part of the property could have been sold for realisation of that amount instead of putting the whole property to sale. Dealing with this argument, both Sri upadhya and Sri shetty have advanced a common submission in so far as they have contended that if one were to carefully scrutinise the plan of that property, that undoubtedly there was some land appertinent to it on all sides but they have submitted that the land in question was very little, that it was physically impossible for one to have cut off a separate plot on any side of that property because such a plot had to be big enough for the party who bought it to utilise the plot, that under the development rules in force at the relevant time and having regard to the set backs that had to be left, that it was impossible to think of any such sub-division of the property. Learned advocates who represented respondent 2 did seek to raise the submission that it was possible to get a plot of sufficiently economic dimensions without touching the main property and to even utilise the same and that it was the duty of the trial court to have explored this possibility before the auction sale of the property for realising a small amount of Rs. 3,500/ -. I have spent considerable time looking at the plan and it is correct as pointed out by both Sri shetty and Sri upadhya that this was a corner plot and furthermore that having regard to the development, rules in force that the feasibility of cutting off any amount of land and selling it separately does not arise. The contention in this regard therefore has rightly been rejected by the trial court because to my mind such a course of action was not practicable. One needs to bear in mind that if a piece of land is required to be separated from the main property that this cannot be done without leaving sufficient set backs within the main property itself and the balance piece of land will also have to be of sufficient size as to permit either a residential or commercial building to come up and if one were to take the effect of this cumulatively, it would be impossible to hold that such a course of action was feasible in the present case. ( 10 ) THE original judgment-debtor is the second respondent before me and it was contended that the irregularities as far as the present case are concerned are both material and substantial and that they seriously affect the validity of the auction sale. Reliance was placed on a decision in the case of manjamma, supra, wherein, the learned single judge of this court had occasion to hold that if the proclamation was not in the kannada language, that it was a good ground on which the sale was liable to be interfered with. On the facts of that case, the court did have occasion to interfere because the court was satisfied that if the documents were not in the language that was normally known in the area and that was intelligible, that the number of persons who had notice of the sale would have been limited. Learned Advocate submitted that where the objective is to ensure that the sale is properly conducted, the first ingredient requires that as many persons as possible should come to know about it and therefore the use of the local or regional language is compulsory. In given situations this may be the position but I need to record that this is only one of the many circumstances and that it is not a necessary and inflexible rule. Learned Advocate further submitted that the decision in the case of Madappa v Lingappa, took the view that the notice of the sale and the proclamation by virtue of the provisions of rule 138 of the Karnataka civil rules of practice, made it obligatory that publication must be done also at the court premises and at the office of the municipal corporation and that in the absence of this being done, that the sale itself would be rendered null and void. In that particular instance, the court took that view because full and proper publication is a must and the court found that the publication was so limited and so wanting that the sale itself was rendered inherently bad. I am unable to subscribe to the view that even a mere procedural irregularity would be synonymous with a situation where a particular transaction is rendered null and void. I am unable to subscribe to the view that even a mere procedural irregularity would be synonymous with a situation where a particular transaction is rendered null and void. There is a material difference in law between an irregularity which may be procedural, which may be substantial and which may be material and an inherent legal infirmity which will void the entire transaction. Non-compliance with procedural requirements where it results in substantial injustice or failure of Justice may be a ground for interference but to my mind it could not void the transaction. A similar objection was sought to be raised with regard to certain other aspects of the proclamation wherein the judgment-debtor was described as a lessee in possession and where relying on a decision in the case of s. v. kanakaraj, supra, it was contended that the correct language ought to have been used and the learned Advocate vehemently submitted that it is not a question merely of each of these individual infirmities but that the court will have to take into account the overall effect and the collective damage that resulted for purposes of assessing whether serious injury has occurred and whether this is a case in which interference is called for. In this regard, he submitted that this court in the case of s. v. kanakaraj, supra, set aside a sale on the ground that the brother of the decree-holder was the purchaser and it was demonstrated that the entire operation was a virtually domestic affair and that the sale had not been freely conducted. The learned Advocate submitted that as a result of the series of irregularities, that the number of bidders who would have come forward was necessarily restricted and that the conduct of the sale itself becomes so unfair and irregular that the appeal court has justifiably listed all of them and come to the conclusion that the sale cannot be upheld. He submitted that ultimately, a court is required to do substantial Justice and that the Order of the appeal court has done precisely that and therefore, that this court ought not to interfere with that Order while dealing with the aspect of irregularities. He submitted that ultimately, a court is required to do substantial Justice and that the Order of the appeal court has done precisely that and therefore, that this court ought not to interfere with that Order while dealing with the aspect of irregularities. The learned Advocate emphasised that if the court were to look at the facts, that the position is almost atrocious in so far as a 'poor school teacher who had incurred certain debts was sought to be deprived of her house in which she was residing merely because she was unable to repay the amount when the same was demanded of her. On the other hand, learned Advocate submitted that it is his case that the decree-holder was none other than a professional moneylender and that while assessing the concept of substantial justice, all that the court would have to see is as to whether the decree-holder was in a position to get his decree satisfied and if this could be done without the property having to be sold, that the court ought to have adopted such a course of action. ( 11 ) IN support of this last submission, the learned Advocate placed heavy reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ambati Narasayya v M. Subba Rao and another, wherein the Supreme Court while dealing with a case relating to the sale of agricultural land set aside an auction sale on the ground that it was unnecessary for the whole of a large valuable piece of agricultural land to have been sold when it was perfectly permissible for realising the debt of Rs. 11,000/- to have sold a small piece of that land instead of the whole of that. The Supreme Court had occasion to deal with the provisions of Order 21, rule 64, wherein, the principle is enunciated that the court must apply its mind while directing the sale of property to ensure that only that much of the judgment-debtor's property is put up for sale or disposal as is necessary to satisfy the decree. In this regard, the learned Advocate did submit that a part of the plot could have been sold and not the whole of it to satisfy the decree which was for Rs. 3,500/ -. In this regard, the learned Advocate did submit that a part of the plot could have been sold and not the whole of it to satisfy the decree which was for Rs. 3,500/ -. I have already held that having regard to the size of the property and its location it is impossible to uphold this argument. ( 12 ) I have substantially set-out the arguments canvassed by the various learned advocates as also the various principles culled out by the courts in the course of the many decisions, that have been referred to by me. On a total appraisal of the record of this case, I do find that the various so-called infirmities that have been canvassed on behalf of the judgment-debtor alleging material irregularities are not substantial enough or serious enough to justify the setting aside of the auction sale. Normally therefore, I would have straightaway set aside the Order of the appeal court. There is however one overriding circumstance which is present in this case which to my mind courts executing decrees will have to carefully bear in mind and which both the courts-below seem to have completely and wholly overlooked. I have had occasion to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of ambati narasayya, supra, wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to reiterate the principle earlier laid down in the case of Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi v Pujari Padmavathamma and others. The Supreme Court was dealing with Order 21, rule 64 and had occasion to interfere because a large piece of agricultural land which was the only property possessed by the judgment-debtor was sold rendering the judgment-debtor landless and this auction sale had taken place for purposes of realising a relatively small amount of Rs. 17,000/ -. The court was conscious of the need to ensure that while doing Justice to the decree-holder, corresponding injustice cannot be done to the judgment-debtor. The court therefore held that only that much of the property of the judgment-debtor as was necessary to satisfy the decree ought to have been sold. The principle that can be culled out in such cases is that the court must proceed on the doctrine of doing the least damage or better, the doctrine of ensuring that the least harm takes place. The principle that can be culled out in such cases is that the court must proceed on the doctrine of doing the least damage or better, the doctrine of ensuring that the least harm takes place. I have I carefully assessed the facts of the present case and it is true that I have rejected the plea that the property in this case could have been sub-divided. I do not however share the view that the trial court was justified in mechanically giving into the decree-holder's plea that the residential house of the judgment-debtor should have been put up for sale when the amount due from her was hardly Rs. 3,500/- more so, when the court was dealing with the case of a school teacher and one who would have been rendered homeless as a result of this procedure. It may be true that decree-holder like a shylock will make the most beneficial or the most ruthless of demands but that is where the principles embodied in rule 64 has got to be applied by the court and where the judge concerned will have to step in and ensure that the least damage takes place while executing the decree in keeping with these principles. To my mind, the executing court does not seem to have been justified in mechanically agreeing to auction the residential house when a simple appraisal of the facts indicates that even if the movables were to be attached and sold, the small amount of Rs. 3,500/- could have been easily realised. Having regard to this overriding consideration, which to my mind goes to the very root of the matter, this court will have to interfere. The grounds on which the court set aside the auction sale do not appear to me to be substantial enough to sustain that decision but the auction sale will still have to be set aside on the overriding consideration that it was in total and flagrant breach of the provisions of Order 21, rule 64. Nothing can justify the trial court having mechanically put up the residential premises for sale when the amount recoverable was rather meagre and where the executing court could easily have recovered that amount through alternate means. Nothing can justify the trial court having mechanically put up the residential premises for sale when the amount recoverable was rather meagre and where the executing court could easily have recovered that amount through alternate means. ( 13 ) THAT leads me to the last aspect of the matter namely the question as to the consequences of this court upholding the setting aside of the auction sale. I need to take note of the fact that under normal circumstances the second respondent would have lost her residential house. Obviously, she was litigating desperately to save it. At the same time the court needs to take note of the fact that the decree-holder is entitled to the satisfaction of his decree and secondly, that a considerable amount of time has now elapsed and that the decree would therefore have to be independently satisfied. If the judgment-debtor is not in a position to satisfy the decree, and if the judgment-debtor does not come forward with any other cogent property which could be sufficient to satisfy that decree, it may be inevitable that the court would have to put up the house for auction sale once again. However, the option is left to the judgment-debtor to satisfy that decree. ( 14 ) I need however to take cognizance of the fact that one party who is the most affected as a result of this State of affairs i. e. the auction purchaser is a stranger to all these litigations and he has paid the money something like 17 years back and is the one who is most affected. The appeal court took cognizance of this fact and directed that the auction purchaser would be entitled to the refund of the money deposited by him with interest, if that money has been invested, and that the judgment-debtor is liable to compensate the auction purchaser to the extent of Rs. 15,000/ -. Normally, I would not have interfered with that Order except for the fact that a considerable amount of time has elapsed and the auction purchaser who is the petitioner before me is legitimately entitled to point out that it is as a result of the litigation that the respondent 2 has been carrying on that he has been put to substantial loss right through this period of time. If the property is to be reauctioned, it is directed that he will be given the first option of purchasing it provided the price is in consonance with the fair market value in which case the amount deposited by him along with interest if any may be adjusted against the purchase price. If however the judgment-debtor comes forward to satisfy the decree, the question of auction sale will not arise. For that reason, it is directed that irrespective of whether the property is put up for auction sale or not, that the present petitioner shall have the option of claiming refund of the entire amount deposited by him along with interest and that the respondent 2 who is the judgment-debtor shall pay compensation to him which is quantified at Rs. 30,000/ -. This amount shall be paid within an outer limit of twelve weeks from today. It is also made clear that this direction is conditional and if the said amount is not paid to the petitioner within that period of time, that the earlier auction sale shall stand confirmed. If the amount is paid, then the sale shall stand set aside. ( 15 ) THE present civil revision petition partially succeeds and stands disposed of to the extent as indicated by me. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no Order as to costs. --- *** --- .