M. B. VISHWANATH, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal under Section 100 of the C. P. C. has been filed by plaintiff Subbayya Setty (since deceased by his L. Rs.) against the respondent-defendant Savithramma. ( 2 ) THIS appeal arises out of Regular Appeal No. 33 of 1983 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore District, bangalore, dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsiff, Anekal, in Original suit No. 381 of 1979, dated 23-10-1982. ( 3 ) THIS suit was filed by the plaintiff (since deceased by hisl. Rs.) against the defendant for recovery of the balance of principal amount of Rs. 4,000/- with interest at 18% amounting to Rs. 2,160/- in all Rs. 6,160/ -. This amount, according to the plaintiff, is the amount due by the defendant to the plaintiff towards the balance of sale consideration in respect of sale deed dated 1-11-1972 (Ex. D-2) which was compulsorily registered on 13-9-1976. The sum and substance of the plaintiffs case is that the sale consideration under Ex. D-2 was Rs. 8,000/ -. The defendant paid Rs. 4,000/- on 1-11-1972 and she has not paid the balance. Hence the suit. ( 4 ) THE sum and substance of the defence is that the defendant paid Rs. 4,000/- under the sale deed Ex. D-2 out of the total sale consideration of Rs. 8,000/ -. Regarding the balance of Rs. 4,000/-, the plaintiff subsequently prevailed upon the defendant to pay that amount to one Siddalingaiah in whose favour the plaintiff had mortgaged the property. It is the case of the defendant that she discharged the mortgage debt due by the plaintiff to siddalingaiah by paying the amount to Siddalingaiah's son d. W. 2-Basavaraj. So, she is not due any amount to the plaintiff. ( 5 ) THE learned Munsiff framed the relevant issues. By his judgment dated 23-10-1982, he dismissed the plaintiffs suit. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment of dismissal passed by the learned Munsiff, the plaintiff filed appeal in Regular Appeal No. 33 of 1983 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore. The learned Additional Civil Judge, by his judgment dated 17-12-1988 dismissed the appeal. By his judgment dated 23-10-1982, he dismissed the plaintiffs suit. ( 6 ) AGGRIEVED by the judgment of dismissal passed by the learned Munsiff, the plaintiff filed appeal in Regular Appeal No. 33 of 1983 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge, Bangalore. The learned Additional Civil Judge, by his judgment dated 17-12-1988 dismissed the appeal. ( 7 ) IT should be mentioned here that the learned Civil Judge has passed a common judgment in Regular Appeal No. 33 of 1983 arising out of Original Suit No. 381 of 1979 which has given rise to present Regular Second Appeal No. 434 of 1989 and regular Appeal No. 103 of 1980 arising out of Original Suit No. 99 of 1980 which has given rise to Regular Second Appeal No. 417 of 1989. ( 8 ) ORIGINAL Suit No. 99 of 1980 was filed by one of the sons of the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 381 of 1979 against the present respondent-defendant Savithramma, who was also the defendant in Original Suit No. 381 of 1979. ( 9 ) ORIGINAL Suit No. 381 of 1979 (which has given rise to Regular Appeal No. 33 of 1983 and present Regular Second appeal No. 434 of 1989) was filed for recovery of the balance of sale consideration under the sale deed referred to above. ( 10 ) ORIGINAL Suit No. 99 of 1980 (which has given rise to Regular Appeal No. 103 of 1980 and Regular Second Appeal No. 417 of 1989) was filed by one of the sons of the plaintiff in original Suit No. 381 of 1979 for declaration that he was the absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of partition deed dated 23-10-1974 between him, his father and others and for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with his peaceful possession of the suit schedule property alleged to have been sold by his father Subbaiah Setty in favour of the present respondent-defendant Savithramma. ( 11 ) AS I have already stated, the learned Additional Civil Judge passed a common judgment. ( 11 ) AS I have already stated, the learned Additional Civil Judge passed a common judgment. Since the two suits related to different reliefs and the parties were not completely identical in the sense, one suit was filed by the father for recovery of balance of sale price against Savithramma and the other was filed by his son against Savithramma for declaration and injunction, it would have been better for the learned Additional Civil Judge had he written separate judgments. ( 12 ) THOUGH there is some obstruction to clarity in the common judgment of the learned Civil Judge, after going through his common judgment, I must say that he has discussed all the points involved in each appeal. ( 13 ) TO repeat, the plaintiffs case is that out of consideration of Rs. 8,000/- under the sale deed Ex. D-2 (Ex. P-2 is the certified copy of Ex. D-2), the defendant paid Rs. 4,000/ -. He has filed the present suit claiming the balance of Rs. 4,000/- with interest. ( 14 ) THE sum and substance of the defence is that the plaintiff had mortgaged the suit property in favour of one Siddalingaiah and subsequently the plaintiff prevailed upon the defendant to discharge that mortgage debt due by him to Siddalingaiah. Accordingly, the defendant discharged the mortgage debt due by the plaintiff to Siddalingaiah (since deceased) by paying the amount to his son D. W. 2-Basavaraju. ( 15 ) THE Courts below have believed the evidence of the respondent-defendant Savithramma (D. W. 1) and Basavaraju, son of deceased Siddalingaiah (D. W. 2 ). D. W. 1-Savithramma has stated in her evidence that as per the directions of the plaintiff, she discharged the debt due by the plaintiff to siddalingaiah by paying the amount to Siddalingaiah's son D. W. 2-Basavaraju. D. W. 2 has corroborated D. W. 1. ( 16 ) P. W. 3-Rajanna, who is none other than the plaintiffs witness, has also stated in his evidence before the District registrar as per Ex. D-3 that Savithramma gave the amount to discharge the mortgage debt. P. W. 2 is the son of the deceased plaintiff. He has also stated in his evidence that Savithramma through one Chikka Heggade Thimmaiah paid the balance of consideration as per Ex. D-2 to the plaintiff to clear the mortgage debt due to Siddalingaiah. Ex. D-l is the mortgage deed. Ex. P. W. 2 is the son of the deceased plaintiff. He has also stated in his evidence that Savithramma through one Chikka Heggade Thimmaiah paid the balance of consideration as per Ex. D-2 to the plaintiff to clear the mortgage debt due to Siddalingaiah. Ex. D-l is the mortgage deed. Ex. D-l (a) is the endorsement executed by D. W. 2-Basavaraju, son of mortgagee Siddalingaiah, showing that the mortgage amount due under Ex. D-l was discharged. ( 17 ) ONE salient point which clinches the matter in favour of the respondent-defendant Savithramma is that she got possession of the mortgage deed executed by the plaintiff in favour of Siddalingaiah, This proves clearly that the respondent-defendant discharged the mortgage debt due under ex. D-l by the plaintiff in favour of Siddalingaiah, by paying the amount to Siddalingaiah's son D. W. 2-Basavaraju. Both the courts below believed the evidence of defendant Savithramma and D. W. 2-Basavaraju, son of Siddalingaiah and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. ( 18 ) THE conclusions reached by the Courts below are findings on facts. ( 19 ) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v S. Hanymayya and Others, that a Judge of a High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact based upon appreciation of relevant evidence. The supreme Court has been pleased to frown upon the practice of some Judges of the High Courts disposing of second appeals as if they were first appeals. The Supreme Court has been further pleased to lay down that there is no jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. ( 20 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff pointed out some minor discrepancies in the evidence adduced by the parties and submitted that there was a total non-consideration of material evidence. I am not prepared to go that far. Both the courts below have adverted to the facts which appear in bold relief. ( 21 ) SO the authority in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Another v Ramalingam Chettiar and Another, relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not apply to the facts of this case. I am not prepared to go that far. Both the courts below have adverted to the facts which appear in bold relief. ( 21 ) SO the authority in the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Another v Ramalingam Chettiar and Another, relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant does not apply to the facts of this case. ( 22 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Appellate Court has committed a serious error of law in passing a common judgment, though the reliefs prayed for were different. It cannot be said that the lower Appellate Court has committed any error in law. At worst, it is a procedural mistake which does not affect the merits of the case. In the very authority relied on by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the supreme Court V. Ramachandra Ayyar's case, supra, has been pleased to lay down that the High Court will not be justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower Appellate Court. ( 23 ) IT is argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that the burden of proof was wrongly cast by the Trial Court on the plaintiff and that it should have been on the defendant. It is too late in the day to advance this argument. No application for amendment of issues was filed in the Court of first instance nor in the Appellate Court. It is laid down by the supreme Court in C. Abdul Shukoor Saheb v Arji Papa Rao (deceased) by L. Rs. and Others, that where the parties have led evidence and the entire evidence is before Court, the question of burden of proof is merely academic. ( 24 ) SECTION 100 (5) of the C. P. C. clearly says that it is open to the respondent, at the time of hearing of the appeal, to argue that the case does not involve any substantial question of law. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent-defendant, in the instant case, no substantial question of law arises for decision by this Court. As rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent-defendant, in the instant case, no substantial question of law arises for decision by this Court. ( 25 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of opinion, there is no substance in this appeal. The second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, each party to bear his or her own costs in this Court. --- *** --- .